What are Linguistic Representations?*

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Abstract

Linguistic representations are taken by some to be representations of something, specifically of Standard Linguistic Entities, such as phonemes, clauses, noun phrases etc. This perspective takes them to be intentional. Rey (2021) further argues that the SLEs themselves are inexist-ent. Here I argue that linguistic representations are simply structures, abstractions of brain states, and hence not intentional, and show how they nevertheless connect to the systems that use them.

Keywords: terminology, ontology, representations, syntax, phonology

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1 Introduction

We generative linguists can be cavalier with terminology and we usually cut short our explanations of phenomena before clearly linking them to the external world. This is a side effect of talking amongst ourselves too much. It causes no end of headaches for philosophers, with a spate of books over the years attempting to work out what on earth we are doing, and whether it is what we should be doing. The latest of these is Georges Rey’s (2020) *Representation of Language*, which is a broad defence of some of the philosophical implications of Chomsky’s approach to language, as developed over the last half century or more. Rey does, however, take a different direction philosophically from Chomsky in a number of areas. There is much of the book that I agree with wholeheartedly, including the nuanced approach to issues of innateness, the defence of linguistic judgments as data, the arguments against externalist views of linguistic entities, the broadly psychological conception of the part of linguistics that generative grammar encompasses and much more.

A major proposal in Rey’s book, though, is that linguistic representations are intentional (that is, they are representations “of” something and hence “about” that something). A good summary of the view is given on page 211. By this point in the book, Rey has identified Standard Linguistic Entities (SLEs—Noun Phrases, phonemes, Tense nodes, etc.), and he says of them (emphasis in the original):

[Generative linguists] are concerned with an *internal computational explanation* defined over mental *representations* of them [SLEs]—just as vision theorists are concerned not
with real colors, but with computations in the visual system
over representations of colors, whether or not there really
are colors answering to them

Rey’s core point is that the computations that generative linguists
appeal to are over representations and that these representations are
“of” SLEs. Rey further argues that SLEs are ‘intentional inexistents’;
they do not exist, though, nevertheless, they can be what representa-
tions are about. Unicorns, Zeus, and noun phrases are inexistents,
and contrast with chairs, Chomsky and quarks, which exist. Mental
representations, including linguistic ones, are equally representations
of both kinds of thing, and are hence intentional.

In response, I will argue that, in fact, when generative linguists1
use the term ‘linguistic representation’ they usually use it in a non-
relational sense, meaning ‘linguistic structure’ (where ‘linguistic’ may
be replaced by phonological, syntactic etc.). Linguistic representa-
tions, from this perspective, are therefore not “of” or “about” anything.
They are ontologically grounded not by intentionality but by being ab-
straction from hypothesized physiological properties of the brain. My
claim is narrow. I’m not arguing that our mental representation of
Zeus or Chomsky are non-intentional. I’m arguing that the posits of

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1I will use the term ‘generative linguistics’ here in a narrow sociological sense to pick
out the research programme that stems from Chomsky’s work, though other research pro-
grames are also generative in some of that word’s senses (Categorial Grammar, Lexical
Functional Grammar, etc.). Many generative linguists in either sense are of course not
concerned with the philosophical issues discussed here, or would disagree with my char-
acterization, but the picture I sketch out here is, I think, one that many working in the
generative tradition would subscribe to.
generative linguistics are not representations, and hence no question of intentionality arises. Further, my argument is not that it is incoherent to posit intentionality for linguistic objects like trees, or noun phrases, but rather that it is not necessary to do so. Generative linguistics has a perfectly workable ontology without intentionality.

I don’t think I’m saying anything startlingly original here; the views I’ll sketch out are not commonly articulated by generative linguists, though they are views that can be discerned through Chomsky’s writings. Chomsky (2000) (159-161), for example, explicitly says, when talking of Marr’s computational theory of vision that “"representation" is not to be understood relationally, as "representation of,\"” extending this approach to the representations involved in language, which “enter into interpretation, thought, and action, but [for which] there is no reason to seek any other relation to the world.” Chomsky mentions the world here, but we can be fairly sure that Chomsky’s notion of representation as also excludes representations of inexistents in Rey’s sense.

What I have to say here is similar also to Collins’ (2014) proposal that “the theorist employs dyadic representational talk in order to frame generalisations about monadic, non-relational states.” That is, if I understand it correctly, exactly right. The SLEs that generative linguists talk about with locutions such as “TP”, or “c-command”, are just structures and mechanisms of the mind (abstracted from unknown physiological structures and mechanisms). Collins, following Goodman (1949), proposes a “method of hyphenation” to achieve the connection between theoretical talk and the actual entities, but I don’t think such a method is necessary to understand what generative linguists are do-
ing. I’ll argue that it’s simply a fact that generative linguists use the term “representation” as a technical monadic term, and sketch out why we do this\(^2\).

Turning from terminology to the ontology of linguistic representations, Rey takes it to be a “scandal that linguists have not sufficiently pondered what they \([\text{SLEs}]\) are. \([p288]\).” But there is no surprise here. Generative grammarians think of the posits of their theories in much the same way as physicists think of quarks, particles in wave form, etc.: they are the best explanations of the phenomena, though we do not know exactly what they correspond to in the world we can currently observe (an approach Rey explicitly approves of (e.g. p92ff)). Again, this is old hat. As Chomsky notes in his (2003) response to Rey (2003), “corresponding in some manner to such psychological entities \([\text{SLEs—DA}]\) there are physiological configurations, also said to be internally represented.” (see also Chomsky 1980, passim). The phrase “in some manner” simply keeps open exactly how the structures of the mind are to be related to the structures of the brain (whether by properties of neurons (e.g. Pallier, Devauchelle, and Dehaene 2011), the internal structure of cells (e.g. Gallistel and King 2011), electrical oscillations (e.g. Ding, Melloni, Zhang, Tian, and Poeppel 2016), etc.).

\(^2\)Rey mentions in a footnote to page 50 of his book that in early works Chomsky employs the term “representation” and does so “without any assumption of the (meta-) representations being of the phrases of a natural language”. My contention, defended in section 2, will be that this has remained the standard use in generative grammar ever since (agreeing with Collins 2004). Rey provides a great many passages from Chomsky’s work to argue the opposite (p267-271 of Rey 2020); though I don’t have the space here for exegesis, I think they can all be interpreted along the lines I argue for here).
Rey is of course aware of these ways of thinking about the issues, and argues that even if one thinks of generative grammar in this way, the grammar and its outputs must have some connection to the perceptual and motor systems in human brains that interact with the external world, and intentionality must play a role in that connection: the speaker’s grammar builds representations of the relevant properties. Rey provides some criticism of remarks in Adger (2019b), where it is suggested that the connection is rather made through transduction. Rey grants a role for transduction but argues that “intentionality is needed where mere transduction gives out. It provides a “common coin” needed at the interface between grammar and, inter alia, the perceptual system.” [p9]. Intentionality is needed because “children must hear ambient noises, exactly as they seem to do, as SLEs of the ambient language” [p284, emphasis in the original]. In section 4, I’ll try to be more explicit about how I think a generative grammar can both explain certain core linguistic phenomena, and be incorporated into a model of the speaker, without appeal to intentionality.

2 Terminology

Generative linguists have a bad habit of using non-technical terms technically. Terminology proliferates in our field, making it a full time job to keep abreast of significant changes. Worse, we sometimes systematize our sloppiness, such as the common use of the term ‘grammar’, for both the linguist’s theory and the natural (mental) object that it is a theory of (Chomsky 1965, p25).

The term ‘representation’ is one of these words whose use strays
from common practice. The first extensive use of the term in generative grammar was in Chomsky’s (1955) *Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory* (LSLT), published in mimeographed form in 1955 but not released as a book until twenty years later. LSLT introduced the notion of “Level of Linguistic Representation”, where each such level is a system of symbols and a means for combining them. These systems of symbols were intended to provide an analysis, at a particular level, of utterances.

At the time Chomsky wrote LSLT the ontology of linguistics was resolutely externalist, following Bloomfield (1933). Speech was the real thing, and linguists represented properties of speech in their work. Linguistic theory was built from the bottom up, starting with observable properties of utterances. Through processes of segmentation and classification, more abstract levels of structure could be constructed (Harris 1951). The more abstract levels are built from less abstract ones, creating a system of levels where each level represents properties of larger parts of the utterance (phonemes, morphemes, words, phrases, sentences, texts). Representations at the different levels were typically ordered sequences (strings) of symbols. A phonemic representation, for example, was a series of symbols that referred to the properties of the utterance that were part of the phonemic structure of the language. A morphemic representation was constructed from the phonemic one, and so on. The word “representation” here is used in

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3This word, utterance, was used at the time pre-theoretically to refer to something a speaker of a language may say. The term has a slightly different use today, where it is commonly used to mean ‘token of a sentence’. Chomsky uses the pre-theoretical notion throughout LSLT and later.
its usual relational sense: the representations were about properties of the utterance, so Harris (1951) could write, for example (p34), “[T]he representation of speech as a sequence or arrangement of unit elements is intimately connected with the setting up of phonemic distinctions between each pair of non-equivalent utterances”.

At the beginning of LSLT, the discussion of lower levels of linguistic structure (phonetic, phonemic, morphophonemic, word, category) clearly connects to this perspective, and Chomsky in fact uses the locution “representation of the utterance.” However, the perspective in LSLT is top-down rather than bottom up. Each level is an independently specified concatenation algebra consisting of a set of primes (symbols) and relations at that level, and the algebra specifies certain strings of symbols as well-formed, so the “representations” are not derived from the utterance. Rather, each string of symbols at one level can be converted into a lower level of structure through a specified set of mappings (e.g. at the phonemic level we have a single symbol /p/ for the bilabial stop in pill and spill, but there is a mapping to the phonetic level where there are distinct symbols, representing an aspiration difference between the stops ([pʰ] vs [p])). In LSLT, Chomsky reconceptualized the notion of level: rather than higher levels being built from lower ones, they were independently specified and mapping relations were constructed to relate them.

The argument for the independent specification of levels as opposed to their derivation from properties of utterances was most clearly made for the higher levels like syntax: the properties of sentence structure are obviously quite distinct from anything that can be extracted from physical properties of the utterance, and Chomsky highlighted this
fact, arguing that phrase structure representations involved sets of strings, as opposed to a single string. The abstract character of syntax is, Chomsky argued, quite distinct from the (essentially finite state) character of lower levels. This provided general motivation for the idea that the “levels of representation” must be independently generated systems of formal symbols, related to each other by mappings. This proposal was bolstered by a number of case studies showing that better analyses of linguistic phenomena could be developed in such a system.

In the approach Chomsky developed, purely formal properties of the levels, especially the phrase structure and transformational levels, had real explanatory value, even though they could not be mapped to the physical utterance by procedures of classification, segmentation, etc.

Though the linguistic levels were still called “levels of representation” in LSLT, their symbols don’t represent physical properties of utterances or anything that can be directly derived from such properties: they are fundamentally monadic and sui generis. From this perspective, a “representation of an utterance” at level L should not be understood as the symbols being ‘about’ the utterance any more than the combination of two hydrogen atoms with one oxygen atom is ‘about’ water; they are rather an independently generated collection of structures related to each other by mapping functions.

LSLT severed the link between physical utterances and grammatical explanation that had been central to the approach of Bloomfield and his followers. It argued that you cannot directly extract a grammar from the signal; rather the grammar is independently specified and its links to the signal are indirect. This severance underlies the later competence-performance distinction: there is an independent compu-
tational system (the grammar) which is accessed by all the other components of cognition that use it (for particular events of speaking, signing, thinking, planning, etc.). The grammar, and the structures it generates, are not representations “of” anything.

Chomsky in LSLT kept the word “representation” but changed the theory behind it. This reconceptualization of the notion of linguistic level, not as a representation of properties of the utterance, but rather as an abstractly specified structure, is, I think, the root of the idea that became the standard monadic view of linguistic representations: each level is given as an autonomous system that is related by mapping functions to other systems. Together, the levels and the mappings specify the grammar of the language. Rather than representing linguistic properties of utterances, the grammar generates structures whose properties correspond to them (see below for discussion of how). As the theory developed, this notion of representation as generated structure remained, and it is the main use of that word in Chomsky’s work since. We might think of it as the following (shamelessly borrowing from Soare’s (1996) Recursion Convention):

(1) The Representation Convention

Use “representation” to mean independently generated linguistic structure as defined by the computational mechanisms of the relevant variant of generative grammar.

As well as using the term “representation” to talk about particular mental structures associated with utterances in some fashion (see below), Chomsky uses the term in a related (non-relational) way to
talk about the grammar as a whole. Rey quotes Chomsky in the introduction to the 1975 edition of LSLT writing “The child constructs a mental representation of the grammar of the language” and notes the use of the same term in Chomsky’s 1965 account of language acquisition. However, all of these uses of the term should be read in the light of the discussion above. “A mental representation of the grammar of the language” is just the mental structure (brain state) which is, at the relevant level of abstraction from physiological mechanisms, the grammar of the language. No notion of representation in the relational sense is intended or needed.

Of course the word ‘representation’ can also be used relationally. The physical configuration of lines and letters on the page below in (2) is a representation of a syntactic structure.

(2) TP
   /   \
  /     \  
Lilly   T[past]
  /  \   |
  T   vP
     /  |
   /    v
  /     |
 ⟨Lilly⟩  v
   /    |
   /     v
  /      |
 jump    v

The syntactic structure which (2) is a representation of, however, is something which is not on this page. That structure is what Adger
(2019a) calls “a gesture of the mind”. A gesture with my hand is made possible by my anatomy and made actual by my intentions. When I utter or comprehend *Lilly jumped*, I make a gesture of my mind: the physiology of my brain takes on a particular configuration, dependent on what I, the speaker, intend to express (or by what I perceive). (2) represents this gesture of the mind.

Generative linguists, as Rey points out, usually collapse the use/mention distinction, so we talk of T c-commanding v in structures like (2), though what we mean is that T c-commands v in cognitive structures like those represented by (2). Rey is perplexed by the idea that the brain really contains T, and not a representation of T, but that is exactly what generative linguists intend. “T” in (2) represents T, a putative object of the world that occurs in certain mental events. We say that T c-commands v in a finite clause much as we might say that hydrogen bonds to oxygen in water.

Rey’s idea of “representational pretence” is almost the opposite of this. He suggests that generative linguists are committed to computations over representations of SLEs, but not to SLEs themselves. In actuality, we are committed to SLEs, and to the idea that SLEs are built by processes that are computational, but we are only committed to our theories of these being representational (in the standard sense that the theories are about the SLEs etc.).

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4Of course, (2) is a representation of a type of mental event, as opposed to a particular token of it (see Rey’s useful discussion of tokens and types in linguistics in his chapter 3).
3 Ontology

I said above that when a generative linguist says “T c-commands v,” we are talking about putative entities in the world, (types of) gestures of the mind that are ultimately to be understood as configurations of the brain. We are not talking about representations. Rey’s counter-argument to this view is as follows:

Given that phonemes are not in the acoustic stream, does anyone really want to insist that they have a “theoretical” reality comparable to, say, electrons? If they do not exist in the acoustic stream, where are they? Do they have causal powers? How? ... Of course, if (as any right minded scientist likely thinks?) the mind just is the brain, then, it follows SLEs are in the brain, no? So SLEs would have the causal powers of brain states. Silly philosophical problem dissolved. But not quite so fast. The inference is obviously invalid. Ghosts, angels, the fountain of youth, colors, rotating cubes, ideal geometric shapes: lots of “things we think about” are said to be “psychologically real” and “in the mind,” in that thoughts about them play a real role in people’s lives. But it would be lunacy to say that the things thought about, themselves, are in the brain! Rey (2021) p324.

Rey criticises the inference that if the mind is the brain, and SLE’s are in the mind, then they are in the brain. But a claim about “T c-commanding v” is not a proposal that T or v are “in the mind," as objects of thought (like ghosts or colours), but rather that they
constitute the stuff of mind, the components out of which mind is built. If the mind is the brain, then claiming that (some aspect of it) is built out of $T$, $v$, etc., does of course allow the inference that $T$, $v$ etc. are (abstract, hypothesized) components out of which the brain is built. Again a chemical analogy is apt: the symbols and terms “$T$”, “$v$”, “$c$-command” etc. are used to refer to objects and relations at a mental level of description which correlate with physiological objects and mechanisms of the brain, just as “$H$”, “$O_2$”, “bonding” etc. are used to refer to objects and relations at a chemical level of description which correlate with quantum objects and mechanisms (Chomsky 1980).

4 Connection

If syntactic representations are monadic, how do they connect with the world? They must, as Chomsky notes “be accommodated to the sensory and motor apparatus.” (Chomsky 1995, p221). For Rey, this is where intentionality is indispensible. He argues that brains are sensitive only to local physical properties of their environments, and that what he calls “abstruse properties,” such as being a $TP$ and other SLEs are not local or physical. It is, he suggests, intentionality that bridges the gap.

Adger (2019b) argues, in contrast, that transduction is involved in the connection between the grammar and the sensory and motor apparatus, but of course an abstruse property is not transducible. If SLEs are abstruse phenomena, transduction is, indeed, insufficient.

However, here I think Rey is assuming what he wants to argue, since, as I have suggested above, SLEs are not abstruse phenomena.
They are just abstractions over physical properties of brain states. I think the best kind of counter-argument is a counter-proposal, so in the remainder of this paper, I will sketch out how the grammar connects with the physical world in two important areas: (i) how the grammar explains linguistic phenomena; (ii) how the grammar can be “accommodated to the sensory apparatus” in parsing. Space precludes discussion of production and of relations to meaning, but I take it that Rey’s argument, that intentionality provides a common coin for the grammar and the parser, is the crucial one to address here (see also Collins and Rey 2021).

Let’s first look at how grammars figure in an account of speakers’ linguistic judgments. Linguistic judgments are part of the data (and hence explananda) of generative linguistic theory, and Rey uses their properties to provide strong arguments for doing linguistics in a generative way.

Take an example like the following, a core case of the kind of thing syntactic theory is meant to explain (what Rey calls ‘why-nots’):

(3) Which woman did you wonder when left?

Native speakers of English have a fairly uniform reaction to examples of this sort (they find it unacceptable). If you, a philosopher, ask a syntactician why the reaction is what it is, they will unhelpfully say something like (4), and everyone’s eyes will glaze over:

(4) The sentence is ungrammatical because the wh-subject has been extracted from the lower subject position across a filled specifier of CP, which violates a locality condition on its rela-
There’s a lot to be unpacked here which is relevant to the question of how the grammar actually works to explain the phenomenon, and which is usually left unsaid, but I want to initially focus on a difference in presuppositions about the philosopher’s question. The syntactician is answering a question about the grammar, but the philosopher is asking a question about the speaker.

What the syntactician could have said was the following.

(5) A speaker encountering (3) will judge it as unacceptable because they go through the following process: they connect elements of the physical signal they hear (or see) to internal grammatical structures, which we call lexical items, given in a particular order. The speaker’s grammar (their generative procedure) is unable to generate a structure the terminal nodes of which have the lexical items the speaker has identified in the presented order: specifically the structural relationship between the subparts of structure which woman and left are disallowed by the grammar. This is why the speaker’s grammar fails to generate a structure for (3), and it is what explains their reaction.

I’ll return to the crucial term “connect” in the discussion of transduction below, so for the moment will leave it unanalysed.

Let’s first see how this kind of explanation can be given more specificity and rigour. This will involve some technical material, but I’ll simplify and highlight the issues that are relevant to Rey’s concerns.
I think it’s necessary to go through the details so as to be clear about how a non-intentional explanation will work.

The lexical items that the physical signal connects to have a number of formal properties that distinguish them from each other and from other lexical items. Lexical items will have the following kinds of shape (this is broadly the analysis given in Adger 2003, a standard textbook):

(6) a. which[D, wh]
b. 0[C, uwh*, T*]
c. did[T, uInf:past, uAgr:_, uD*]
d. woman[N, sing]
e. you[D, 2, sing, nom]
f. wonder[V, uD, uC*]
g. ... 

The representations in (6) refer to actual hypothesized items in a speaker’s grammar, where the formal differences in the representations (e.g. D vs C; uwh vs wh; T vs T*, D vs uD*, etc.) correspond to hypothesized differences in the cognitive structures referred to (I’ll explain some of the details below). Lexical items consist of some phonological structure (I use orthography here in the representations for ease of exposition, with 0 to signal a phonology that lacks phonetic expression) and some syntactic structure given as a collection of features. “Feature” is a technical term that just means distinguishing property of the internal structure, much as lego-bricks might be distinguished from each other by their shape, or connective structures, see e.g. Adger and Svenonius 2011. Formally, features are atoms of
the system that are combined to make larger structures (as in LSLT, see Adger 2010 for an explicit theory). The use/mention collapse that generative linguists are prone to means that we talk of features being both in the representations in (6), and being properties of the relevant mental configurations. Contra Rey, then, the feature (qua distinguishing property of a mental configuration) that a feature (qua symbol of the theory) like [+nasal] or [uD\*] represents is, in fact, in the mind, ultimately the brain. It is not in the nose, the acoustic signal, nor is it inexistent.

A speaker of English, encountering (3) will connect various parts of the signal with the lexical items in (6): They will hear an acoustic signal whose linguistically relevant properties we can represent in phonetic notation as [wIt] but those linguistically relevant properties are an internal structure, a tokening of a particular configuration of the mind. That phonetic configuration, perhaps having been modified by a phonological computation, will connect to a stored lexical item (in this case the item which[D, wh]); similarly, the English speaker will hear a signal whose phonetic properties can be represented as /wum\n/ and the mental configuration that that connects to, the stored lexical item woman[N, sing], will be related structurally to the configuration previously tokened by [wIt] (the structural relation being homomorphic to the temporal ordering relation in the signal (Kayne (1994))); similarly for /dId/ and did[T,Infl:past, uD\*]; and so on.

In a real time speech event, this process of connecting physical properties of the signal to internal structures is part of parsing the signal, and takes place roughly incrementally, with multiple lexical items being considered and rejected as they enter into the parse, in
ways that will depend on the parsing strategy, the grammar, and the
developing parse. Information from the grammar and from the context
is relevant to this process, so the speaker may include lexical items
with no corresponding phonetics as part of their parse. Lexical items
may also be selected on the basis of frequency, leading to classical
garden path effects such as *The old man the boats*, where the frequent
lexical item for *man*, a noun, is selected while the only parse that the
grammar will license is one where a less frequent lexical item *man*,
a verb, is needed. Syntacticians attempt to abstract away from the
vagaries of parsing so that accounting for the patterns of judgments
is addressed by answering the question: when we have a particular
collection of lexical items in a particular order, what structures built
by the grammar will yield those items in that order?

For the case in hand, during the encounter with the physical signal,
at some point phonetic processing leads to selection of a lexical item
with the phonology (orthography) *wonder*, which syntactically has two
‘sloths’, represented by what are called ‘selectional features’ (*uD, uC*)
in the lexical item in (6): intuitively, these slots are for a subject and a
clausal complement; their formal role is to ensure that a particular kind
of structure is built involving the verb, a DP and a CP in particular
structural relationships. The formal differentiation between C and D
will result in different structural objects being connected to this item,
and the presence of the * on C specifies exactly how the structural
connection is made (it requires a close structural connection). If the
speaker who judges (3) uses this lexical item when encountering (3),
then the grammar will build a structure, dependent on the formal
properties of the lexical items and the rules of the grammar. This
structure is represented in (7):

\[(7) \quad [\text{CP } \langle [\text{DP which woman}] \rangle \text{ C } [\text{TP you wonder }] \text{ C } [\text{TP } \langle [\text{DP which woman}] \rangle \text{ T } [\text{VP left } (\text{when})]]]]\]

For those not versed in syntactic theory, the only crucial thing to note is that \([\text{DP which woman}]\) appears in two places in the structure\(^5\). \([\text{DP which woman}]\) is a single syntactic element but is connected within the structure to two positions (it is local to both the matrix \text{C} and to \text{wonder}). This is also true for the item \text{when}. These cases, where a single syntactic element appears in multiple positions in structure, usually correlate with a meaning that logicians represent as variable binding, so (7) would have a meaning representable as:

\[(8) \quad \text{Who is the x such that you asked when x left}\]

However, there is something awry with the structure which (7) represents. Based on many phenomena, generative syntax makes the claim that, when a single syntactic element is in multiple positions in a structure, those positions must be related to each other in a particular way: specifically that relationship cannot cross a clausal boundary (a CP) unless it is at the structural edge of that clause. This is part of the specification of the grammar (indeed, it is hypothesized to be a property of grammar that is universal to human beings). The structure in (7) is, then, not generable by the grammar because the positions that

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\(^5\)I have notated this, as is common, by angled braces in the representation of the configuration; the actual configuration is usually thought to involve some kind of looped structure (see Adger 2019a for an exposition of the idea aimed at a popular science audience).
[DP which woman] occupies are not related in this way. This means that a speaker who encounters (3) will be unable to assign a structure like (8) to the sequence of lexical items they have used (alternatively, they assign the structure but the violation of the condition on syntactic relationships marks it as ill-formed). This is why (3) is unacceptable, and specifically why it can’t have the meaning in (8). The theory explains a core piece of linguistic data (a ‘why-not’, in Rey’s terms): the acceptability judgment made by native speakers. It does so without appeal to representations of SLEs; the explanation is one that trades in SLEs themselves.

Of course this explanation requires a connection between the physical properties of the signal, and the phonological properties of the lexical items. This is where transduction comes in. As Pylyshyn (1984), p152, notes a “transducer performs a rather special conversion: converting computationally arbitrary physical events into computational events.”

Our speaker on encountering (3) is exposed to a physical signal (a computationally arbitrary physical event). The signal could be aural in the case of spoken language, or visual in the case of sign language. It could be written, or even, as in the cases of the Tadoma method, tactile. Physical properties of the signal have to be mapped into some structure that the grammar can interact with. Rey highlights Pylyshyn’s constrain in transducers: “The only requirement is that the transformation from the input, described physically, to the ensuing token computational event, also described physically, follow from physical principles” (p154).

The human transducer seems to have exactly these properties, and,
at least for phonetic properties, there is good evidence that it is universal and innate.

Mahmoudzadeh et al. (2013), in a study of pre-term babies, investigated cortical responses to acoustic presentations containing productions of [b] and [g] and compared these with cortical responses to male vs female voices. There are large acoustic differences in the latter case, while the acoustic differences between [b] and [g] are extremely subtle, connecting to continuous properties of certain formants. Mahmoudzadeh’s team showed that there was a major response in the language-associated areas of the brain to the [b]/[g] distinction, but not to the male/female distinction. Given these babies are pre-linguistic, it appears their brains are innately attuned to possible phonological differences and not to other acoustically larger effects. Rats showed the opposite effect, suggesting that human brains, but not rat brains, are wired to extract phonologically relevant information from the physical signal.

Continuous acoustic differences between [b] and [g] therefore correlate with well-known featural differences. [b] is [+labial] and [g] is [+velar]. Mahmoudzadeh’s team’s work suggests that these phonological features correlate with differentiated brain states. That is, there is some physiological regularity to brain states caused by tokens of [b] that distinguishes them from those caused by token of [g]. There is a transduction between a computationally arbitrary physical event (signal) and a computationally relevant event (a tokening of a phonological feature/corresponding regularity in brain states). Part of the universal human linguistic endowment, then, is a transducer that connects signal to the phonological features of the lexical items in this
We have now completed the connection. A transducer transforms a physically described acoustic input signal into a token computational event. That event is a particular cortical response, therefore also physically described, and the cortical response correlates with a phonological feature ([+labial] in one case, [+velar] in the other). The transformation itself is governed by (apparently species specific) biology. The transducer as a whole then meets Pylyshyn’s requirements. Nothing is “abstruse”. No appeal to intentionality to make the connection is required.

More needs to be said about syntactic features. Generative grammar has long argued that at least some of these are innate and specific to syntax (the others being constructed from the more basic ones, e.g. Harbour 2016), much as phonological theory takes certain featural distinctions to be innate and specific to phonology. Much less is understood here than in the case of phonetic features but we do know that there are specific cortical responses connected to postulated properties of phrase structure (e.g. Ding, Melloni, Zhang, Tian, and Poeppel 2016). In any event, I have argued above that these features too are to be understood as abstractions over ultimately physical properties of brain states. Intentionality doesn’t do the work, computation does.

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6 A similar transduction must be available for visual signals, where the phonological structure of signs is accessed through a function that maps from aspects of hand-shape, motion, direction, etc. It may be that the transduction in general is underpinned by the human imitative capacity: the child uses its internal structures to imitate the external signal thereby making those structures an active part of language learning.
5 Conclusion

I have, of course, not provided a full account of acquisition, parsing, production and other aspects of language use here, but I hope to have shown how such accounts do not presuppose the notion of intentional- ity. This is just as well, as generative grammar has never understood linguistic structures to be representations of anything.

References


symbolic Logic 2:284–321.