Against semantic features: towards a (minimalist) Theory of Features.¹

ABSTRACT: This paper reviews the bibliography on a (yet to come) Theory of Features, establishes its desiderata, and posits some theoretical and methodological prerequisites for it. It then goes on to make suggestions on how such a Theory should be compiled and also proposes some fundamental tenets on which it should be founded. These tenets are centred around the idea that purely semantic features do not exist and that (possible) formal features are Saussurean signs abstractly encoding a limited number of archaic concepts. Speculations on the correct formalism for features, on how to assemble a reliable repertory of features, and on how they make functional heads are offered.

KEYWORDS: feature, concept, evolution, sign, functional head, interface, acquisition, grammar

1. Features as interface instructions: formal features

During his presentation at the Abralin ‘The Minimalist Program: Achievements and Challenges’ online event on 6 July 2020, Marcel den Dikken admits what everyone working in the field seems to already know, namely that “the Minimalist Program doesn’t have currently a theory of features”.

Similar observations are already in place in Adger and Harbour (2008), in their review of the history of attempts to come up with a theory of formal features. Adger and Harbour dedicate some space to Muysken and van Riemsdijk (1986), who in turn lay down the fundamental desiderata of an explanatory Theory of Features:
(1) “[H]ow many are there?”, “what are they?”, “how do they distribute over syntactic structures?”

Unlike what would be sufficient in grammatical frameworks merely seeking to describe the workings of the syntactic mechanism, a minimalist theory of features would have to be founded upon certain biolinguistic assumptions. A first fundamental assumption would be that features in general be conceived as “instructions to the interfaces” (Chomsky 1995).

Following the ‘virtually conceptually necessary’ hypothesis that there are two interfaces, one with the Articulatory-Perceptual (A-P) systems and one with the Conceptual-Intentional (C-I) ones, a sort of division of labour is established. Hence, as in Zeijlstra (2008), phonological features would be instructions to the interface between the combinatorial system of language and the A-P systems and semantic and (interpretable versions of) formal features would be instructions to the interface between the combinatorial system of language and the C-I systems.

Consequently, beginning to address the ‘how many’ question in (1), we will have to ensure that any features posited will abide by no less than expectations of psychological reality: features posited will have to be instructions to the interfaces. Still, this requirement seems to be hardly obvious in practice, as in generative research features are often conceived as

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1 The “interpretable versions of” caveat is necessary also because this definition de facto excludes Case (at least in their conception in Chomsky 2001; and pace Pesetsky and Torrego 2001; 2004; Manzini and Savoia 2011, chaps. 7 and 8) and grammatical gender features (Kramer 2015; Panagiotidis 2018) from among formal features, as they probably possess no interpretable versions and/or their values are not readable at the relevant interface; e.g. the [feminine] value of the gender feature in the Italian noun casa (‘house’) is not an instruction in any coherent way.
mere diacritics (as ‘flags’) for particular structural relations and/or operations (e.g. a feature [wh] for wh-movement, or index features used in classic accounts of Binding).

The features-as-flags practice is however incompatible with the features-as-instructions requirement. More concretely, the likes of SLASH, Strong, EDGE, Brody’s * Spell-Out feature, or Merchant’s E (for ellipsis) features should all out of the picture, unless they could be independently motivated as instructions to the C-I interface. Interestingly all the above purported features would affect the externalisation of a syntactic structure, hence they would be relevant at the A-P interface. This would make them phonological features, which hardly seems to be the case. If features like SLASH, Strong, EDGE, *, E etc. are to be understood as formal features, they should then be somehow interpreted at the C-I interface, which does not seem to be the case. Therefore,

(2) Non-phonological features must be motivated as instructions to the C-I interface.

Generally speaking, “independently motivated as instructions to the interface” is a condition to be necessarily satisfied before positing a feature. True, the membership and organisation of the actual feature inventories would be open to empirical discoveries, to second thoughts on the appropriate taxonomies, and to similar considerations – a matter to which I will return in Section 5.2.

Hence, on the one hand the theory will have to be built on the psychological reality of features and on their being motivated as interface instructions, as opposed to them solely triggering grammar internal operations such as (external) Merge, or to them flagging dependencies, such as co-indexing. On the other hand, in order for said theory to be
coherent, our approach to features will have to be in unwavering consideration of their role in grammatical relations and operations.

We therefore begin with syntactic or, more aptly, formal features. The rationale for putting formal features first would go like this: we expect formal features both to reflect some sort of concept (in the broadest sense) relevant to the C-I interface and to play a role in grammatical computation (in the narrow sense). So, indispensably:

(3) Formal features must be motivated as involved in grammatical operations and representations in the narrow sense.

The statements in (2) and in (3) taken together amount to an understanding that we cannot motivate a formal feature as a potential trigger of a grammatical relation and/or operation unless it functions as an instruction to the C-I interface. For example: a purported feature [X] can be construed as an instruction to the C-I interface (e.g. animacy) and it plays a role in grammatical computation: [X] is a good candidate for a formal feature. On the contrary, a feature [Y] could be posited to play a role in grammatical computation (e.g. motivate Internal Merge) but cannot be construed as an instruction relevant to the C-I interface: [Y] is not a good candidate for a formal feature. Finally, a feature [Z] could be understood to encode instructions for the C-I systems but at the same time it is inert grammatically: to wit, it is not contrastively marked on functional elements, it is does not trigger grammatical operations, and it is not active in any Agree relations: should such a feature exist, [Z] is not a good candidate for a formal feature. Summarising:
(4) Formal features will have to be motivated both as interface instructions and as playing a role in grammatical relations and operations.²

In this paper I will use (1) as a guide in order to review the role of formal features in a (yet to come) Theory of Features. In doing so I will argue that they are the only unstructured Saussurean signs in natural language. I will then go on to examine what concepts formal features can serve as signs of and argue that purely semantic features, i.e. features not involved in grammatical operations and representations in the narrow sense as per (3) above, do not exist.

2. The primacy of formal features

Once we have established formal features both as instructions to the C-I interface and as being “active”, i.e. as involved in grammatical computation, we then must sharply distinguish them from purely semantic features, should such features exist. As Biberauer and Roberts (2015, 3) put it: “The formal features are [...] interpretable or uninterpretable and, as such, are visible for syntactic operations such as Agree and Merge. The semantic features, on the other hand, are invisible to the core computational system (Narrow Syntax), but presumably visible at the semantic interface.”

Cowper and Hall (2014, 146) make the same point: “We can say that a feature is active if the grammar crucially refers to it in any way. In the case of potential morphosyntactic features,

² The above is the strict scenario but it does make room for the workings of uninterpretable and unvalued features, see also footnote 1.
then, it is not enough to show that the semantic content of a feature is present in the
encyclopedic meaning of some lexical item; rather, to be considered active it must be
involved in inflectional paradigms, or trigger syntactic movement or agreement, or play
some other demonstrably formal role.”

What then matters in formal representations and in grammatical operations is a different
set of features than those possibly involved in “meanings such as whatever distinguishes
camels from reindeer or a joke from an insult” (Adger and Svenonius 2011, 18). More curtly,
we must at least sharply distinguish lexical semantics (feature-based or not) from grammar,
which is driven by formal features.

In the light of the clarifications in the above quotes, we can now elaborate on (4) in a more
precise way. Thus, an example of the formal-semantic distinction would be gender. We
know that Slavic possesses grammatical gender features because these are involved in
concord and other agreement phenomena; indeed, such features are “active” in that they
play a role in grammatical relations and operations: Slavic grammars refer to gender. We
also know that English possesses ‘natural’ gender features because they are involved in the

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3 Cowper and Hall’s criterion for distinguishing between formal and semantic features is (correctly I think)
whether “the grammar crucially refers to it in any way”. This is a more relaxed criterion than that of Zeijlstra
(2008), who claims that “[c]hecking of uninterpretable features [...] forms a diagnostic test to distinguish
interpretable formal features from purely semantic features [...]”. He continues to lay out “three properties
that could be harnessed to test for the presence of a feature [uF]: its semantic uninterpretability, the
triggering of an operation Move and the triggering of an operation Agree. [...] [A]ll three of these properties
reduce to one single property: doubling.”
pronominal paradigms; again the grammar refers to gender, although it does so not via Move or Agree, but by making it manifest on *functional heads* – cf. footnote 3. Interestingly, this makes English ‘natural’ gender a bona fide *formal* feature: if it is marked on functional heads, then it matters for grammar.

At the same time, we can nevertheless safely claim that Turkish makes *no use of formal* gender features because gender distinctions (e.g. man-woman, mister-missus, boy-girl etc.) are indeed made, but have no grammatical effect whatsoever. Such distinctions are purely expressed within the domain of lexical semantics and only marked on contentful elements (‘lexical heads’); gender is completely irrelevant to the grammar of Turkish. Now, whether Turkish distinctions reflecting biological and social gender, certainly not a matter of formal features, are encoded by way of semantic features is a different matter, to which we will return below.4

One point to keep in mind is the one made in the Adger and Svenonius quote cited above: we somehow expect formal features not to simply encode instructions to the C-l interface, as per (2) and (4), but more precisely to point to concepts and functions of a particular sort, as not all concepts are encodable via formal features – something we return to in Section 3.3.

Having clarified that semantic (if existent) features and phonological features are excluded from the empirical domain of a Theory of (formal) Features, let us move on to present the desiderata of such a theory.

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4 Corbett (1991, 146–47) has already stressed the importance of “agreement”, precisely in establishing a gender category.
3. Four issues in a Theory of Features

As already stated in (1), three fundamental desiderata of a Theory of Features would be the following: “how many features are there?”, “what are they?”, “how do they distribute over syntactic structures?”. These desiderata can be formulated as the following four questions that a Theory of Features must address:

I. What are formal features?

II. What is the correct formalism for them?

III. Why are particular concepts encoded, or rather: are encodable, as formal features (e.g. mass / number) and others are not (e.g. colour / brightness)?

IV. How do formal features combine into functional elements (e.g. Indo-European number); are they relevant in the case of ‘modifiers’ (e.g. Mandarin men plurals)?

In the rest of this section these four questions are elaborated upon and placed into context.

3.1. What

Formal features in (4) have already been described as instructions to the interface between the combinatorial system and the conceptual-intentional systems that at the same time “[are] involved in inflectional paradigms, or trigger syntactic movement or agreement, or play some other demonstrably formal role” (Cowper and Hall 2014, 146; cited above).

We therefore already understand formal features

i) as a subset of semantic features or

ii) as a set whose intersection with semantic features is non-empty but whose intersection with phonological features is the empty set (Zeijlstra 2008; Adger
The conviction that formal features cannot be articulatorily motivated, i.e. that their intersection with phonological features must be the empty set, originates from solid empirical observations about the Autonomy of Syntax (cf. Newmeyer 1998, chap. 2):

(5) Whatever is driving grammatical operations is expressible in non-phonological terms; moreover, morphological and syntactic relations are expressible in non-phonological terms.

Building on the above observations in their weakest formulation, we can return to (4) and claim that formal features are about semantic interpretation. As per (4), formal features regulate grammatical relations (e.g. Locality), operations (e.g. movement), and realisations (e.g. morphological contrasts); these in turn are sensitive to Animacy, Individuation, Definiteness, Quantification, Transitivity, Aspect, Tense, Mood, Finiteness, Illocutionary Force and the like – not to phonological properties such as voicing, height, roundness etc. Hence, formal features, which by definition drive and constrain grammatical operations, originate in cognition rather than in articulation (Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002; Hinzen 2006; Emonds 2011; Nóbrega and Miyagawa 2015; Berwick and Chomsky 2017; Golston 2018).

So, what is a formal feature? How exactly are concepts like those listed in the previous paragraph grammaticalised? In order to answer these questions, we must keep in mind that formal, not semantic, features are the true parallel of phonological features, i.e. features motivated by articulatory contrasts and acquired by paying attention to such contrasts.
(Dresher 2014). Hence phonological features are motivated by the A-P systems but at the same time they play a role in the workings of a combinatorial system, phonology.

Similarly, as already hinted in Question III above, formal features are motivated by certain contrasts the C-I systems make available. Only such contrasts play a role in the workings of the combinatorial system, syntax – i.e. the combinatorial system underlying both word and sentence formation (Harley and Noyer 1999).

The parallelism above is no more than a re-affirmation of the old Martinet precept of the ‘double articulation’ of language, popularised in the English-speaking literature by Charles Hockett (Emonds 2011; Golston 2018): language is organised

i) at a non-signifying phonological level (what we now understand to involve its externalisation) and

ii) at a signifying level (what we now understand to be FLN: the Faculty of Language in the Narrow sense).

Thus, phonological features, like semantic features (if they exist), are irrelevant for the workings of syntax. At the same time, formal features express concepts (or whatever we wish to call elements relevant for the C-I systems) that can somehow be quantised: formal features are about concepts that are encodable or, more informally, concepts that are ‘featurable’.

This of course begs the next question: whether there exists a fixed inventory, a closed set possibly defined by UG, of formal features (as has been understood for decades) or features emerge during acquisition through heuristic processes (Cowper and Hall 2014; Dresher 2014; Biberauer et al. 2014; Biberauer and Roberts 2015 among others). This is an
important issue but an empirical one, not to be resolved via theory-building. Whether features are given (say by UG) or they emerge is completely orthogonal to the concerns of a theory of formal features, which should in principle be compatible with both options. Having said that, a theory of features should at the same time constrain what formal features an acquirer may and may not posit, if she is to posit formal features through heuristic processes and based on the input she receives. We return to this matter in Section 3.3.

3.2. Privative, equipollent, or else?

Let us turn to Question II now. The actual form of features is a more or less unresolved matter; by the ‘form of features’, in a rather abstract sense, we must understand their format, i.e. what the internal structure of features would look like (Adger and Harbour 2008; Adger 2010; Adger and Svenonius 2011). There are roughly speaking three options: features are either privative, i.e. completely unstructured, equipollent, i.e. taking a + or – value, or of an [attribute:value] format.

The privative system is conceptually the simplest: a (monovalent) feature is there or isn’t there. The equipollent system is the familiar +/- one, established by the linguists of Prague School (and popularised in the English-speaking literature by Roman Jakobson) for phonological representations (see also Nevins 2008).

Adger and Svenonius (2011) successfully discuss the limitations of privative feature systems in establishing natural classes, natural classes which are necessary e.g. for Locality and

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5 “Privative [...] characterizes systems where atomic features may be present or absent, but have no other properties” (Adger 2010, 187).
defective intervention effects. On top of that, Cowper and Hall (2014) convincingly show that it cannot be the case that privative feature systems are universal. In the meantime, Harbour (2011) focuses on the intricate number system of Kiowa, demonstrating the inadequacy of a privative feature system in describing it. In doing so he also explores and dismisses a notational variant of privativity that he calls the pseudoprivative alternative, i.e. using different versions of the same feature (e.g. F and F’) in order to capture three-way distinctions.

If (formal) features do not belong to a fixed UG repertory but are arrived at by the acquirer precisely as she pays attention to contrasts (and/or distinctions) expressed by grammar, as seems to be the emerging consensus (Emonds 2011; Dresher 2014; Cowper and Hall 2014; Biberauer et al. 2014; Biberauer and Roberts 2015; Biberauer 2019 and elsewhere), the availability of all three systems (privativity, equipollence, and the [attribute:value] format) cannot be excluded a priori, as long as each of these systems would optimally accommodate the grammar-specific data.

Which feature system is at play would ultimately then be an empirical, grammar specific matter, not one to be postulated by a Theory of Features. This of course sounds like a disappointingly permissive stance but Cowper and Hall (2014) have very convincingly shown that the actual form of features is definitely not a matter resolved by Universal Grammar: they argue that there is no UG-constrained formal feature format along the lines of ‘privative’, ‘equipollent’ or ‘[attribute:value]’. A case in point is that of categorial features.  

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6 I am grateful to two Journal of Linguistics reviewers for raising the matter as a way to gain insight into the format of features.

Although he does not come up with a principled reason to posit an [attribute:value] format for categorial features, he nevertheless suggests that this would be the appropriate format for categorial features in the face of cross-linguistic evidence. More specifically, the existence of Classless Words in Farsi (Karimi-Doostan 2008; 2011) leads him to suggest that “[N] should perhaps be recast as [perspective:sortal], [V] as [perspective:temporal], while Classless Words would perhaps be introduced by a categorizer with an unvalued [perspective:] feature” (Panagiotidis 2015, 105).

The above leaves us with a nuanced picture, where the format of formal features is one that optimally accommodates both grammar-specific and cross-linguistic data. As ever, a more restrictive solution would be welcome, say one that would settle for an ‘[attribute:value]’ format for all formal features. In any case, such a potential solution would not form part of a Theory of Features per se, but would result from empirical enquiry (e.g. the availability of an unvalued option for category features in Farsi). I will however offer some relevant discussion in Section 5.3 towards the direction that not all is lost for the (conceptually) more restrictive privative system.
3.3. Which concepts can be encoded as formal features?

Moving on to Question III, from the seemingly unlimited range of concepts available to human cognition only a tiny subset is encoded as formal features. In language after language we encounter the same conceptual categories both organising grammatical categories and being implicated in grammatical operations – despite the most candid attempts at exoticisation in certain grammatical descriptions. These conceptual categories include but are certainly not restricted to Animacy, Individuation, Definiteness, Quantification, Transitivity, Aspect, Tense, Mood, Finiteness, Illocutionary Force and so on.

This matter is eloquently presented in Cinque (2013, 50–52), who for instance notes (ibid., 50): “Verbal projections in clauses grammatically encode (through affixes, particles, auxiliaries, etc.) distinctions relating to the external and internal temporal constituency of events (tense and aspect) and the speaker’s attitude toward the truth of the proposition (mood), but they are never found to grammatically encode such human cognitive universals as ‘‘shame’’, ‘‘mourning’’, ‘‘sexual taboos’’, etc. , nor otherwise cognitively significant concepts like ‘‘worry’’, ‘‘peril’’, ‘‘fear’’, ‘‘hunger’’, ‘‘love’’, ‘‘death’’, ‘‘awe of god’’, etc.”

Even the above remark should be enough to dismiss typical blasé statements that formal features encode ‘cognitively salient’ categories, leaving the issue at that. Even the specimen above, sampled by Cinque, of ‘cognitively salient’ universals that never get encoded as formal features is quite telling.

This issue becomes even more pressing if feature systems are assembled on the basis of linguistic data during the course of acquisition, as discussed in the previous subsection. For instance, how come acquirers never attempt to assemble noun classification systems on the basis of the very salient bright / dark (and, even, red) contrast? Why has the wealth of
quasi-systematic manner-of-motion types expressed among English verbs never yielded a grammatical taxonomy thereof? Why do noun classificatory feature systems may be based on animacy and sex, size and shape, but never on brightness and/or colour? What privileges the concept of surprise (in miratives) over that of worry, of desire or volition (in optatives) over that of fear, of failure (in frustratives) over that of shame (Cinque 2013, 51), those of honorification and deference over a range of diverse attitudes towards other humans?

There are precious few attempts to address the question of what kinds of concepts are encodable as formal features. Adger and Svenonius (2011, 18) make the following crucial point: “The kinds of meanings which distinguish edibles from inedibles and draft animals from mounts are arguably different from those with which formal semantics is concerned, and it is there we find the language of logic, set theory, predicate calculus, and other tools. Notions such as quantification, negation, gradability, boundedness, telicity, plurality, and so on are part of this system. Let us use the term SEMANTICS for such formal representations, excluding vaguer, prototype-based meanings such as whatever distinguishes camels from reindeer or a joke from an insult.”

Roberts and Roussou (2003, chap. 5) go one step beyond and formally define functional categories as precisely those terms that are purely logical, i.e. “invariant under isomorphic structures” (their (45)). If functional categories are composed exclusively of formal features, which would be the zero hypothesis, then formal features would exclusively express “the logical content [which is] independent of the external factors, or in von Fintel’s (1995) words, insensitive to facts about the world”.

One can of course hardly downplay the importance of logical operators expressed as formal features: for instance, we expect conjunction and negation to be universal for rather
obvious reasons, it also looks like they are expressed by way of formal features in all natural languages.\(^7\) Still, claiming that formal features are about categories “such as quantification, negation, gradability, boundedness, telicity, plurality” etc. is problematic in two ways:

First, it is circular. Categories “such as quantification, negation, gradability, boundedness, telicity, plurality” (and not others) are “part of this system” (i.e. Semantics) because we understandably build our (theories of) formal semantics on the basis of natural language: the real question is why these categories, and not others, are part of the system in the first place. An answer to this would be along the lines of the approach of Roberts and Roussou to what makes a category functional: what is “restricted to logical meanings”.

This brings us to the second problem. Indeed it is true that formal features like those underlying quantificational elements as well as those involved in individuation, modals, negation, and even Tense and Aspect are “restricted to logical meanings”. However, already Roberts and Roussou point out that “[t]he status of demonstratives is unclear […] The question of the status of Person features also relates to the demonstratives; essentially the question here is whether 1\(^{st}\)- and 2\(^{nd}\)-person features can be seen as logical elements”. Such reservations hold a fortiori for mirative, frustrative, honorific features – and the like: there are concepts encodable as formal features that can hardly be construed as “purely logical”.

(6) Not all formal features encode ‘logical’ (i.e. narrow semantic) concepts.

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\(^7\) Grammatically speaking there is always the option that, say conjunction, could be expressed with purely lexical means in a language. See Mitrović (2014) for a panorama of how conjunction may be expressed cross-linguistically, one that however does not seem to include purely lexical means.
Before moving on, let’s just concur with Adger and Svenonius that “whatever distinguishes camels from reindeer or a joke from an insult” must be relegated to semantic features, or whatever will have to replace them in a system that takes its Encyclopedia seriously – see Section 4.

Now, Golston (2018; 2019a; 2019b) has shown in some detail that concepts encoded as formal features predate the emergence of the human species. More specifically, he examines the pre-human origins of some $\phi$-features (Golston 2018), of Tense and Aspect (Golston 2019a) and of thematic roles (Golston 2019b) in animals, some of which are quite temporally removed from humans along our ancestral timeline. Interestingly, Emonds (2011) had already made a more sweeping claim, namely that only concepts that predate the emergence of Homo sapiens sapiens (apparently the ‘languaged’ species of the genus Homo) can be encodable as formal features, or be ‘featurable’ if you like. These observations already exclude the featurability of all concepts about artefacts and about exclusively human social organisation; intriguingly they also exclude the option that the successor function be expressed as formal features (ibid., 56-7).

Having said that, Emonds (p. 58) immediately afterwards notices that “many other categories that are almost certainly part of primate cognition are not used in any system of syntactic computation: those of brightness, loudness, perceptions of speed and non-speaker centred motion, awareness of emotion (sadness, fear, anger, anticipation, sexual arousal, illness), and essentially all categories of feeling, taste and smell”.

What Emonds offers is a conjecture regarding which concepts are encodable as formal features: first of all, such concepts must be discrete (ibid., 51). Discreteness, a fundamental analytical category in understanding language at least since Charles Hockett, is a
prerequisite for concepts to be encoded as formal features, filtering out at the same time all the categories listed in the quote above. Based on this, Emonds (2011, 59) goes on to posit *Lexical Labelling* (his 20):

(7) “Lexical items are associated with ("syntactic") labels or categories drawn from the store of the mutant primates' discrete visual concepts (their only conceptually discrete system).”

The above looks like a very promising thesis, as it provides a solid departure point for understanding what restricts the possible repertory of formal features. This departure point will be relevant in both plausible scenarios:

- Whether formal features are listed in fixed UG inventory, pre-selected among discrete visually accessible concepts;
- Or there exists a subset of discrete visually accessible concepts that is readily featurable, as opposed to other ones, while features themselves are emergent, arrived at during acquisition.

Certainly, the discreteness requirement goes a long way. For instance, discreteness is important even when it comes to Tense: time is not treated by tense features as an undifferentiated flow but in discrete terms – something that is actually compatible both with the pronominal and with the quantification of theory of tense.

At the same time, (visually accessible) discreteness again can hardly be the whole story about why surprise (in miratives) but not worry, desire or volition but not fear, failure (in frustratives) but not shame are grammaticalised, possibly encodable as formal features
(Cinque 2013, 51). Our Theory of Features will have to say more on this matter and pending serious empirical research into the matter, I will have to leave it at that.

3.4. From features to functional heads

Concluding the list of Questions with IV, we turn to functional heads as feature bundles or, perhaps, feature structures (Harley and Ritter 2002a). As mentioned above, we would hope that functional heads only encode formal features, whether they be somehow pre-assembled or assembled online from formal features available in the numeration, a la Hegarty (2005).

(8) Functional heads are made exclusively of formal features.

There are two points of some importance to be made here.

First, we need to at least distinguish between necessary formal features and interpretations emerging as the reflex of (long-distance) syntactic relations. This is crucial in the face of the methodologically justifiable but substantially indefensible propagation of purported features in the last 35 years or so. Focus is a case in point: it is a structural relation usually captured as the result of adding a [Focus] formal feature on the focused constituent, hence violating Inclusiveness among other things. Tense is another case in point if something like the quantificational theory thereof is true (Von Stechow 1995; Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria 2000; Stowell 2007): if Tense is about the correlation between time intervals, then formal features such as [past] and the like are superfluous. The above would

8 Such non-feature approaches to Tense also capture sequence-of-tense effects or counterfactual conditionals without the need to posit ‘expletive’ Tense features. I wish to thank a reviewer for raising the matter.
eventually create a true tension between competing feature-based and structure-based explanations of phenomena; Section 5.2 will offer some pointers towards how this tension can be resolved, with the general idea being that invoking structural relations trumps positing dedicated formal features.

Second, we need to (re-)examine how the known features are syntactically represented. In doing so, we must let the grammar itself do the explaining, precisely in how it treats the features (Marcel den Dikken, p.c.). Number is a case in point. We already have in place a very detailed and sophisticated understanding of

- the correct values for Number features (Harley and Ritter 2002a; Harbour 2007; 2011 and elsewhere), e.g. that ‘singular’ and ‘plural’ are not among them;
- how number features work (Ritter 1991; Borer 2005)
- the role of their position within the nominal phrase (e.g. ‘high’ vs. ‘low’) in the way they are interpreted (Acquaviva 2008; 2017; Alexiadou 2011; Dali and Mathieu 2021 and elsewhere)
- the contrast between number on functional heads versus number on modifiers (Borer 2005, chap. 4; Wiltschko 2008; and especially 2014).9

Hoping to illustrate how grammar itself may “do the explaining”, let me dwell a bit more on that last contrast. Whereas we can stand by the conception of functional heads in (8) as consisting exclusively of formal features, modifiers might (also) encode concepts that are not necessarily encodable as (formal) features – this is definitely so if modifiers are syntactically complex and contain lexical material. On the empirical plane, this difference

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between the workings of a Number functional head in, say, Slavic and those of the
Mandarin Chinese ‘plurality’ men modifier translates in the fact that the latter is optional
whereas Number functional heads are not. These Wiltschko-style modifiers look a lot like
pre-Fukui and Speas (1986) specifiers and might turn out to be more than just adverbial
elements – see the claim in den Dikken (2019) that Person features inside nominal phrases
are always located within such modifiers and never as a functional head of the nominal
spine / Extended Projection.

There are two ways to go about this. One is to say that number features do sit on a modifier
like Mandarin Chinese men, but that they are inert: hence, they would be semantic features.
Alternatively, we can think of “plurality” on Chinese men on a par with Turkish gender: as a
matter of ‘lexical meaning’, what Adger and Svenonius call “prototype-based meanings such
as whatever distinguishes camels from reindeer or a joke from an insult”. Given that no
number features participate in any grammatical distinction, relation, or operation in
Mandarin Chinese, based on (4) we need not posit a formal feature [Number] in Mandarin
Chinese, just like we need not pose gender features for Turkish.

4. Semantic features are superfluous

So far I have attempted to set the context in which a theory of features should be framed
via broadly defining what the claims of such theory should be about. Before moving on to
Section 5, where some sketches of possible answers to these questions are offered, it is
necessary to settle a matter that has mostly eluded scrutiny so far.

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10 Borer (2005, chap. 4) discusses the ‘intermediate’ case of Armenian, offering an analysis.
In Section 1 it was pretty uncontroversially established in (4) that formal features must be both readable at the C-I interface and as playing a role in grammatical relations and operations: formal features must be both *instructions* and *active*. The question is whether there exist purely semantic features, i.e. features that abide only by (2), being readable at the C-I interface but grammatically inert. The answer I wish to defend here is in the negative: in a grammatical framework where formal structures are matched with conceptual content late, (purely) *semantic features do not exist.*

In more detail, in separationist-realisational frameworks of grammar (Ralli 1988; Beard 1995; Halle and Marantz 1993; Harley and Noyer 1999 and elsewhere), all semantic interpretation takes place at the interface between the combinatorial system, the grammar, and C-I systems. More specifically, all matching of meaning with form is mediated via syntactic structures built around roots (Borer 2013a; 2013b; Panagiotidis 2020): not even the noun *cat* is an unstructured Saussurean sign (Marantz 1996; 1997). Of course, here we have the kind of rich conceptual meaning in mind that e.g. “distinguishes camels from reindeer or a joke from an insult” (Adger and Svenonius 2011, 18), what can perhaps still be loosely called ‘lexical meaning’.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{11}\) Roots can be understood as contentful but polysemous (Levinson 2007; Marantz 2013) or as radically empty differential indices, i.e. as criteria of lexical identity (Acquaviva 2009; Borer 2014a; 2014b; Harley 2014; Panagiotidis 2014; 2020). What matters for the discussion here is that roots enable the same simplex syntactic structure – say an idealised *nP* consisting of nothing but a root and a categoriser *n* – to be associated with different rich concepts, from *ball* to *hell* and from *run* to *jog* to *sprint*. Hence, by inserting different roots in otherwise identical structures, these structures become distinguishable at the interface with the Conceptual-
Historically speaking, semantic features that are grammatically inert were posited in older frameworks in order to decompose said ‘lexical meaning’ into primitives. So, these features were invoked upon in order to do lexical semantics, originating in Katz and Fodor (1963). Famously, bachelor would be decomposed into [+male] [-married]. This way of doing lexical semantics has long been superseded, but the idea that particular concepts are expressible in terms of grammatically inert features, i.e. semantic features, has persisted until today. Of course, those purely semantic features are nothing but a notational variant of meaning postulates; methodologically they are a remainder of a classic but obsolete way of doing lexical semantics.

Consider again the state of gender in Turkish: clearly there are female and male concepts expressed on lexical nouns, i.e. $nP$ structures built around roots, but there is no evidence of a (grammatically) active gender feature. For instance, all pronouns are gender-neutral, including $o(n)$ (‘she / he’) and $kendi$ (a version of a se-anaphor). Do we need to posit a purely semantic (i.e. non-formal) gender feature in Turkish?

Just like with the so-called ‘plurality’ of men in Mandarin Chinese, the answer is no: all that has to do with masculinity, femininity etc. is retrieved in the Encyclopedia once a suitable structure built around a root reaches the C-I interface. This forces us to think that semantic features, grammatically inert instructions to semantics, are superfluous, therefore inexistent:

Intentional systems and thus can be matched with different concepts (Acquaviva and Panagiotidis 2012; Panagiotidis and Nóbrega to appear).
Purely semantic features do not exist.

A fortiori, the only kind of Saussurean encoding that exists in natural language, that is the only kind of matching of signifiers to signifieds without structure (cf. Borer 2013a), is that of formal features:

Formal features are the only unstructured Saussurean signs in natural language.\(^\text{12}\)

Here, ‘unstructured’ must be understood as “not involving structures built by the combinatorial system of grammar” and it is not a statement about the format of features themselves, discussed in sections 3.2 and 5.3. A consequence of the inexistence of purely semantic features is that the ‘signifieds’ of (non-phonological) features in general are those of formal features: they are both limited (perhaps to discrete pre-human, possibly visually accessible, concepts) and ancient (Nóbrega and Miyagawa 2015; Nóbrega 2018).

More specifically, (formal) features are the only Saussurean signs in language, in that they directly match a signifier and a signified without the mediation of grammatical structure. Now, features have a signifier in the sense of that they must be somehow be expressed, indirectly most of the time. As mentioned above, this abstract signifier is combined with a signified which comes from a limited number of featurable concepts.

If, as Sauerland (2008) argues, semantic markedness of features is a thing, one distinct from morphological markedness, this would be exactly a property of features as signifieds; at the

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\(^{12}\) Adger and Svenonius (2011, 15) are the first (to my knowledge) to conceive features as Saussurean signs: “A given feature might consistently spell out in one way or another [...]. This simply reflects the usual Saussurean arbitrary pairing of phonological content with syntactic and/or semantic content.”
same time, morphological markedness would be a characteristic of features as signifiers. Again, such a signifier should be understood in the most abstract way possible, given that it is hardly ever the case that features are directly expressed via some phonological representation. Concerning features, a signifier must be conceived not as a form but as the potential for form.

If semantic features do not exist and if most denotation is ‘lexically’ mediated, i.e. after structures built around roots are matched with Encyclopedia entries, we only need consider formal features in any Theory of Features. In doing so we can felicitously combat the Boeckxian (Boeckx 2015) anxiety towards coming up with a theory of features that would be called upon to accommodate a messy repertory of too many members, such as the infamous [±married] feature of the Katz and Fodor era, and so on. We can also establish a clearer distinction of what goes to functional heads, i.e. only formal features according to (8), and what must be relegated to (structurally complex) modifiers. Finally, we can form concrete expectations about what kinds of feature systems will never be assembled by acquirers. If the above are in the right direction, then the decision to exclude semantic features from a Theory of Features, initially made for methodological reasons, would end up reflecting an issue of substance, i.e. the actual inexistence of purely semantic features.

5. Sketching the Theory: answering the four questions

Let us now venture into addressing the four questions framed and elaborated upon in Section 3. The discussion below will only serve as a sketch of an emerging Theory of Features. Some issues falling out of it are briefly touched upon, others will surely remain unresolved at this very early stage. Recall that the questions we posed are the following:
I. What are formal features?

II. What is the correct formalism for them?

III. Why are particular concepts encoded, or rather: are enodable, as formal features (e.g. mass / number) and others are not (e.g. colour / brightness)?

IV. How do formal features combine into functional elements (e.g. Indo-European number)?

5.1. Formal features are (the only) Saussurean signs

As already reminded in Section 3.1, language is doubly articulated. The substance of the phonological articulation is phonological features: abstract instructions to the Articulatory-Perceptual systems. Thus, phonological features are the elements that externalisation processes manipulate.

Formal features concern the signifying level of articulation of language. Formal features are the only Saussurean signs in natural language, as in (10): they directly connect particular concepts with some abstract formal realisation. Crucially, unlike what happens elsewhere in FLN, signification in the case of formal features is not mediated by syntactic structure – recall Section 4. Thus, formal features are elements that syntactic processes manipulate.

Beginning with simple cases, a [neg] feature consists of a signified, the logical operator \( \neg \), and of an abstract signifier, the realisation of which is down to the choice of exponents at Morphology. Crucially, a formal feature will have to be realised somehow, the vagaries of morphological Impoverishment, syncretism and/or feature deletion notwithstanding (Halle 1997; Calabrese 2008; Harley 2008 among others).
Moving on to something like a [Q] feature, this one consists of a signified, the illocutionary Force of question, and of a signifier. In languages without Q-morphemes this signifier is the external Merge this feature might force, or the Agree relation it will establish, or similar.

What needs be stressed is that, in its idealised version, the following statement holds

(11) The signifier of formal features is realised i) as (part of) an exponence or ii) via a grammatical relation and/or operation.

Purely semantic features, as already claimed in (9), do not exist. If a feature with a signified has no abstract signifier, it simply is not there. There is nothing making manifest a feature [-married] on words such as bachelor or the horrid spinster; therefore there exists no feature [+married]. The semantic interpretation of contentful (‘lexical’) structures in language is a matter of lexical semantics, and meaning postulates are not features. Finally, let us note once more that contentful structures will be built around a root. Stepping back to assess the bigger picture, semantic features would only be relevant to the proposition, not to the sentence, thus they have no place in grammar.

Recall that the account here, unlike the one sketched in Zeijlstra (2008) is flexible enough to allow us to differentiate between ‘natural’ gender distinctions in English as the reflex of a formal feature and lexical gender distinctions in a language like Turkish. In English, gender distinctions are marked on a functional head that creates pronouns by means of a formal feature, a feature also restricting pronominal reference (Heim 2008), whereas in Turkish no gender distinctions are marked on any functional element and such distinctions are a matter of the lexical semantics of contentful structures meaning ‘man’, ‘woman’, and the like.
Therefore, although both English and Turkish possess a wealth of lexical items making gender distinctions, in Turkish these are definitely a matter of lexical knowledge, with the male-female distinction being a matter of lexical semantics and in this case a distinction identical to “whatever distinguishes camels from reindeer or a joke from an insult” (Adger and Svenonius 2011, 18). Similarly, although Korean honorific features exist, and they are formal features, in English honorification is a matter of lexical choice and lexical semantics, ultimately about choosing between different Encyclopedia items.

The division of labour regarding signification in natural language falls out like this:

(12) A limited number of concepts is featurable, i.e. they can be directly signified as formal features, whereas every other concept will have to be signified by a structure involving (a) root(s).

Hence

(13) The range of concepts that are featurable gives us the range of the possible formal features in natural language.

Statements (12) and (13) link questions I and III. Only formal features exist and they are signs; moreover, the range of their signifieds is restricted by some extra-grammatical principle. Notice again that the statement in (13) is neutral between the idea that there exists a UG inventory of formal features and the emergentist approach reviewed in Section 3.3. I am nevertheless ready to explore the idea that the range of featurable concepts,

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13 The same distinctions on nouns in English (e.g. actor-actress, duke-duchess, poet-poetess) might or might not involve the ‘natural’ gender features made manifest on a functional head like that of she.
hence the repertory of (possible) formal features, is restricted by something like Emonds’ conjecture in (7). It is of course a matter empirical enquiry whether his (somewhat confusingly titled) *Lexical Labelling* is accurate and whether it can be made to accommodate the Roberts and Roussou insight in Section 3.3 that formal features (also) encode logical elements.

What I am convinced about is that concepts serving as signifieds of formal features must definitely *predate the emergence of language in the species* (Emonds 2011; Nóbrega and Miyagawa 2015; Nóbrega 2018; Golston 2018; 2019a; 2019b). Coming to think about it, there is no alternative to this particular constraint on the concepts formal features may encode, unless of course one would be ready to assume that language is still evolving in quite significant ways.

5.2. Positing formal features

Revisiting the remarks in Section 3.4 let us adumbrate an empirical strategy we can follow so as to decide on the scope and validity of something like Emonds’ conjecture in (7). This strategy would involve carrying out in-depth typological work that will pursue at least the following:

(14) *How to compile an inventory of formal features*

a. List all and only the concepts that are encoded as formal features.

b. Decide on feature-based versus structure-based interpretations.

c. Let the grammar do the explaining: follow a careful, theoretically informed algorithm.
First we need of course to list all the concepts expressed as formal features cross-linguistically. This work will have to be carried out under the restrictive definition of formal features encapsulated in (4) and motivated throughout sections 3.4 and 5.1. We must be careful to list only those features in a particular language that are “involved in inflectional paradigms, or trigger syntactic movement or agreement, or play some other demonstrably formal role” (Cowper and Hall 2014, 146). In the light of (9), i.e. the inexistence of purely semantic features, one should for instance count in [animacy] in Spanish but count [number] out in Mandarin Chinese, and so on. Moreover, given that we expect functional heads to be composed exclusively of formal features, as per (8), one could use Cinque (1999; 2006; 2013), Cinque and Rizzi (2010), and similar kinds of work as a starting point, even if one does not necessarily subscribe to strict cartographic approaches.\(^\text{14}\)

Second, now with reference to point b. in (14), one should remain mindful, as hinted in sections 1 and 3.4, of the inevitable analytical tensions between competing feature-based and structure-based explanations of grammatical phenomena. I believe a path worth following is that, all other things being equal, structure-based explanations of phenomena trump feature-based ones. In other words,

(15) Formal features are not to be posited \textit{praeter necessitatem}.  

\(^{14}\) We will however have to be very careful when admitting evidence exclusively from adverbs as making manifest a formal feature in a particular grammar. The cartographic heuristic procession ‘adverb \rightarrow functional specifier \rightarrow dedicated functional head \rightarrow distinctive formal feature’ in Cinque (1999; 2006; 2013), Cinque and Rizzi (2010), and elsewhere \textit{cannot be taken at face value} – not always, at least. See Larson (2021) for a review and criticism.
To give but one example of this tension, we return to the Focus, mentioned earlier: do we really need (at least one) [Focus] feature in all languages? Even when we narrow down our investigation of focus to a sample of languages that unambiguously express it grammatically, like Hungarian, is it always the case that we need to posit [Focus] features in them? Would it not be the case that in at least some languages a focus interpretation is the result of an A’-movement operation that might be otherwise motivated, i.e. not as a result of a purported [Focus] feature? A case in point would be Verb Second (V2), about which Biberauer and Roberts (2015, 16) note that its simplest analysis “requires the acquirer to postulate only a single left-peripheral head which is not specifically associated with formal features like [topic] or [focus]”.

Third, and related to invoking V2 above, “letting the grammar do the explaining” involves not only being consistent with the Theory of Features sketched here (or any other), but also both making theoretical and methodological commitments and keeping them. This is more than just a possibly vapid call for consistency or even for avoiding eclecticism, and it is more about having a solid theoretically informed method. I will briefly present here three such methods which I consider promising.\textsuperscript{15}

The first example is Ramchand and Svenonius' (2014) method of investigating the order of English auxiliaries and the interactions among them. In their drive to take advantage of the syntactic maps drawn out by proponents of the cartographic approach, while keeping an

\textsuperscript{15} My presentation of these three methods is as far as I am going to go in this paper towards probing Question IV, namely “how formal features combine into functional elements”.
eye on the disparate origin of various constraints (a path explicitly followed by Biberauer 2019), they lay out the ingredients of their account:

(16) *The Ramchand and Svenonius (2014) analytical steps:*

a. A Cartographic contribution—the ordering of syntactic nodes in the (conceptually grounded) functional sequence, for example giving us the order of $T_{\text{PERF}}$ over $V_{\text{EVT}}$ (Perf over Prog).

b. A selectional contribution—for example the selection of Asp*$_{en}$ by $T_{\text{PERF}}$, rather than some other featural instantiation of Asp*.

c. A default rule for the spell out of heads in the eventive domain when those heads cannot be filled by raising. This gives us the illusion of *be* ‘selecting’ for the passive phrase and the progressive phrase.

d. A featural stipulation on English modals that they exist only in a morphological form that includes a Fin* feature, like the other tensed morphological forms. This needs to be a stipulation because it is an idiosyncratic fact about English (we give this real semantic content via world anchoring).

One might not agree with the details of the account sketched in (16), or even with the examples supplied. Still, it must definitely be noted that the “featural stipulation” comes last, once other factors at play have been considered. In the case of (16) such factors are order, selection, and externalisation. Such a tactic allows us to exhaust all other explanatory paths before actually positing formal features.

A second example of “letting the grammar do the explaining” before positing features comes from Wiltschko (2014). She begins by arguing against both a cartographically-inspired Universal Base Hypothesis and an ‘anything goes’ No Base approach; she then goes on to
argue for a Universal Spine Hypothesis (USH). According to her USH, four core functions must be satisfied by both clauses and nominal projections, allowing at the same time for considerable variability with respect to *which functional heads* (hence *formal features*) would satisfy these functions.

These four core functions are deployed in clausal and nominal spines as domains of Classification, Point-of-View, Anchoring, and Linking. These functions can be served by different functional heads (and features). Exemplifying with reference to clausal Anchoring, Wiltschko claims that, while this core function in English is taken care of by Tense, it is served by Person in Blackfoot, by Location in Halkomelem, and by Realis in Upper Austrian German (Wiltschko 2014, sec. 4.4). Wiltschko herself acknowledges (2014, chap. 8) that her USH can be employed to make concrete claims about categorial repertories in different languages, thus about formal features, too. This programme is further nuanced by the fundamental distinction between functional heads and modifiers (see Section 3.4).

A third example of methodologically putting structure considerations before positing features is a taxonomic method suggested by Marcel den Dikken (p.c.), perhaps the most speculative method and one that should perhaps be applied only after something like the previous two methods have yielded results. This involves moving from partial formal feature inventories to potential feature families or even geometries, like Harley and Ritter (2002a; 2002b) did on φ-features of simplex pronouns. Once this is accomplished, then family relations among families of features themselves could be traced. This would hopefully identify and establish general feature patterns in different domains, e.g. φ, spatial, quantification, event, categorial, degree / scalar etc.
For instance, it could well be the case that an identical ‘point vs. stretch’ pattern underlies number (singular vs. plural), space (point vs. path), events (points vs. episodes) etc. If this works out, tough questions like “what would be the counterpart of the gender system in other domains?” could then be asked. This way we would be able to move towards a more structured way of seeing how different formal features fall into a potential feature system of sorts – as opposed to them being isolated individual signs, as we have tacitly assumed so far.

If that last method works, it would lead to positing general feature patterns in different domains, a \textit{formal feature system}: it could consequently be the case that feature taxonomies broader than those afforded by the [attribute:value] rendering are in place. Of course it could well be the case that no such system or systems exist and that only individual formal features exist: the matter is ultimately empirical.

This last issue however already invites discussion of the correct formalism of features.

\textbf{5.3. On the correct formalism for formal features}

Moving to Question II at the beginning of Section 5, I wish to reiterate the interim conclusion reached in In Section 3.2, namely that in an emergentist approach to the acquisition of features, formal features can be privative, equipollent or of the [attribute:value] sort and that the matter will have to be ultimately resolved empirically. At this point, the only way I can supplement that conclusion is to offer two somehow speculative points.

Adger and Svenonius (2011, 7) in their criticism of the privative feature formalism correctly point out that “in practice, feature classes are almost always assumed” and classes are
assumed because they make the task of using formal features to cross-classify categories much more straightforward. Having said that, cross-classification is not always necessary within a particular grammar.

Suppose for instance that in some grammar there exist two equipollent person features, [±author] and [±participant], as in Halle (1997). Suppose also that, unlike what happens in Kiowa (Harbour 2007; 2011), there exists a privative [Atomic] feature: its presence is interpreted as ‘singular’, whereas its absence as ‘plural’. Now, the feature being privative, we are not allowed, so to speak, to call it a ‘Number’ feature, because this immediately would impose an [attribute:value] format to it, namely the [number:atomic] one. Still, perhaps this restriction privativity imposes may not matter in the particular grammar, provided that

a) only one functional head – call it φ – can host these features and that

b) it can host exactly three features: [±author], [±participant] and [Atomic].

In this case, no reference to an attribute [number] is necessary here, provided that ‘person’ (i.e. [±author], [±participant]) and ‘number’ (i.e. [Atomic]) features are only present on this very φ head, a pronominal one presumably.

This state of affairs would be reminiscent of ‘natural’ gender in English: whether we claim that English gender is expressed on a ‘semantic gender’ head (Kramer 2009) as [masculine], [feminine] and nothing (‘neuter’, i.e. ‘inanimate’) is ceteris paribus a notational variant of claiming that it is expressed as [animate:masculine], [animate:feminine] and nothing. Perhaps it would make sense to go for the privative set [masculine], [feminine] and nothing,
considering that gender is not marked anywhere else in English: the presence of a privative [masculine] or [feminine] feature would by default also entail animacy.

Going back to the \( \phi \) head of our hypothetical grammar, the privative [Atomic] feature would have to be construed as [number:atomic] if and only if it is probed by an unvalued Probe somewhere in the grammar. In this case, the feature on the Goal, [number:atomic] and not a privative [Atomic] one, is probed for an Agree operation by a Probe bearing its unvalued version, i.e. [number:]. Hence, [number:] would probe the structure looking to be valued via Agree by a [number:atomic] Goal.\(^{16}\) Therefore:

\begin{quote}
(17) Privative features can only be posited by the acquirer iff i) they do not cross-classify and ii) they never function as Goals for unvalued Probes.
\end{quote}

The second point is as follows. The restrictions regarding the syntactic activity of privative features seem unresolvable: once we posit an unvalued feature (or an uninterpretable one – see footnote 16), a more complex formalism becomes necessary to express the feature that participates in the Agree relation, either an equipollent or an [attribute:value] one. Still, there is indeed a way to make privative features create feature classes, and that is no other than Harley and Ritter’s (2002a; 2002b) feature hierarchy. Their feature-geometric analysis

\footnote{\(^{16}\) I am broadly following Adger and Svenonius (2011) here regarding unvalued features. Harbour (2007, 76–78) argues uninterpretability to result from a (bivalent) feature being valued both as + and −. Trivially, + and − can be construed as values of any given attribute, still leaving space for no value, i.e. unvaluedness (Adger 2010). A reviewer points out that privative features can well be uninterpretable if interpretability is a meta-feature – but I would think that positing a meta-feature undermines the privative character of any feature system.}
has undergone a lot of criticism (e.g. Harbour 2007; Nevins 2007), but it carries a potential advantage.

The feature-geometric account goes the opposite direction of what Adger (2010, 194–96) sees as a potential weakness of [attribute:value] systems: the possibility of such rich systems “allowing an entire category to be a possible value of another attribute”, a weakness which Adger goes on to resolve invoking locality. Now, in a feature hierarchy, all (privative) feature relations are local, locked together in dominance relations, which yield strict entailment relations. Consider for instance this fragment of the Harley-Ritter φ hierarchy:

(18) Participant

Speaker Addressee

As Harley and Ritter (2002a, 502) elaborate, the Person feature schema above offers the following options, which are available to different languages:

- Participant vs. nothing (where ‘nothing’ will be interpreted as non-1st, given that Speaker is the default interpretation of the Participant node in this case);
- Participant (2nd) vs. Participant-Speaker (1st) vs. nothing (3rd);
- Participant (1st) vs. Participant-Addressee (2nd) vs. nothing (3rd);
- Participant (contrastive 1st) vs. Participant-Speaker (1st) vs. Participant-Addressee (2nd) vs. Participant-[Speaker Addressee] (1st inclusive) vs. nothing (3rd).

Details aside, we see how the feature geometric-approach could ultimately subsume an [attribute:value] system by essentially translating both attributes (e.g. Participant) and
values (e.g. Addressee) into hierarchically arranged nodes. This could be desirable if such hierarchical relations reflect the order of acquisition (e.g. the positing of features): Harley and Ritter (2002a, 499–501) already discuss this. Moreover, feature-seeking algorithms like the one in Dresher (2014) can actually be mapped in feature-geometric terms, something that has already been acknowledged and implemented in the parameter-positing algorithm of Biberauer, Holmberg, Roberts, and Sheehan (2014), Biberauer and Roberts (2015), Biberauer (2019) and elsewhere.

6. A consequence of the proposed sketch: the status of derivational affixes in a world without semantic features

If we go by the hypothesis in (2) and (10), namely that formal features encode concepts of a particular sort, and if (9) is indeed the case, i.e. that grammatically inert semantic features do not exist, then we are faced with potential problems regarding the explanations available for particular empirical phenomena. One of these problems is the status of derivational affixes, given that derivational affixes are customarily understood as pure feature structures that may attach to root structures or to categorised structures such as nPs (nouns), vPs (verbs), and adjectives (cf. Fabb 1988). Such structures are in practice assumed to comprise both formal features and inert semantic features. This contrasts them with functional heads, which only bear formal features by the hypothesis in (8).

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17 The equalisation of first-order and second-order features, i.e. of attributes and values (Adger 2010), could also accommodate defaults and markedness in individual grammars: the default interpretation of dominating nodes would be the unmarked one (cf. Sauerland 2008).
Looking at suffixes like Portuguese -eiro, Greek -(a)tz- or the semantically rich affixes in Bella Coola (examples from Haspelmath and Sims 2010, 19–22, where there is some discussion of such affixes), one is faced with elements that appear to bear quite complex and/or concrete meanings: their interpretations look like those of nouns, although they are all clearly affixal. Thus, Portuguese -eiro means ‘tree’, with pinheiro being the word for ‘pine tree’, Greek -(a)tz- means ‘profession’ (at least in older dialects), with pagot-atz-is being the word for ‘ice cream seller’, whereas Bella Coola contains affixes such as -lst (‘rock’), -lik (‘body’), -altwa (‘sky, weather’), -an (‘ear’), -uc (‘mouth’) – and so on.

In a system where pretty much any concept can be fetched by a ‘semantic feature’, it is easy to capture the above: -eiro bears a semantic [tree] feature, -(a)tz- a [profession] feature, -lst a [rock] feature, -uc a [mouth] one. Positing inert semantic features is the typical solution to the rich content of some derivational affixes, i.e. of morphologically bound elements that are seemingly composed exclusively out of features, without any roots involved.

It is of course the wrong answer, because semantic features do not exist. What we are dealing with in affixes like those sampled above is obviously rich lexical meaning, as these derivational affixes pretty ostensibly encode nominal concepts (Acquaviva 2014). Even setting aside the (in)existence of semantic features, the issue of what the syntactic status of derivational affixes would be is a broader one.

This is an important question to ask because “affix” is a morphological analytical category describing how a morpheme combines with other morphemes and “derivational” describes its morphological function (roughly, ‘word making’). Identifying an element as a “derivational affix” reveals hardly anything about what structures these affixes are and what features they are made of. Being content with pretheoretically contrasting them with
inflectional affixes is not enough, even if we somehow get our theory (correctly, I think) to understand inflectional affixes as exponents of functional heads.

It has of course been noted before that distinguishing between roots and derivational affixes is not always a straightforward matter. Panagiotidis (2014, 297–98) cites an empirical point raised by Pullum (2010) who considers “the endings of the words [such as] –like, –esque, –ward, –proof, –(a)thon, [...] –ism, [...] –(o)phile, –(i)licious, and –gasm”. Pullum goes on to make the theoretical judgment “that only –like, –esque, –ward, and –ism should be called suffixes”, with the rest of them roots. Panagiotidis in the above quote sides with Pullum in that “even an apparently easy question, such as whether an element like –proof is a root or an affix, must be decided on principled theoretical grounds” (ibid. 2014, 298).

Now, of course there are well articulated accounts venturing to make such decisions and casting all derivational affixes as (involving) roots, including those in De Belder (2011), Lowenstamm (2014), and Acedo-Matellán and Real-Puigdollers (2014). I agree with the above that all contentful derivational affixes indeed involve roots, as also implied in Pullum’s short treatment, including the examples from Portuguese, Greek, and Bella Coola presented at the beginning of this section, and also Pullum’s -proof, -(a)thon, -ism, -(o)phile, -(i)licious, and -gasm.

The whole issue actually boils down to a choice between these elements being roots (or structures containing roots) and to positing inert semantic features fetching whatever the meaning(s) of -ism would be, or fetching a complex notion of ‘loving something’ as in franco-phile, biblio-phile etc. – even setting aside any nefarious connotations some of the nouns derived from it might have. At the end of the day, we have to choose between
i) lexical meaning being expressible only by root-based structures and

ii) inert semantic features that can fetch any kind of (nominal) concept.

If the latter were the case, one would wonder why it is not the case that all (nominal) concepts be encoded as inert semantic features. Actually this would entail analytically going several steps backwards, even behind Katz and Fodor (1963): nominal concepts such as *tree* or *mouth* would no longer be necessarily decomposed into semantic features but would promptly be featurable as attributes themselves. In other words, we would regress from taking meaning postulates like ‘married’ to be semantic features to taking ‘bachelor’ to be a feature.

Would the above entail that *all* derivational affixes are roots? Not necessarily, given that the analytical category ‘derivational affix’ is morphophonological, not syntactic: it has to do with the realisation and exponence of word-making elements and not with their structure. If no features but formal features exist, then we would expect that pure feature structures that surface as derivational affixes should also exist. A possible candidate for this is English *-ness* / *-ity*: it selects adjectives and yields nouns, usually of a very abstract sort. It is then perhaps the case that *-ness / -ity* is an exponent of the nominaliser *n*, along with *-th* and, perhaps, the likes of *-ment*. Affixes like *-ize* would realise a special verbaliser *v*, one that bears a [causation] formal feature, which is independently motivated for English, next to a categorial feature [V].

If the ‘menagerie’ below, adapted from Panagiotidis (2011, 381), is anything to go by, derivational affixes could therefore belong to any of the four elements predicted below.

(19) *The elements of grammar*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>made of</th>
<th>categorial status</th>
<th>includes</th>
<th>examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>categorisers</td>
<td>formal features</td>
<td>[N] or [V]</td>
<td>n, v</td>
<td>–ment, –th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functional heads</td>
<td>formal features</td>
<td>uninterpretable [N] or [V]</td>
<td>Voice, Asp, T, C, D, Num…</td>
<td>–ing, to, will, if, the, –s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subcategorial elements / “inner morphemes”</td>
<td>formal features</td>
<td>categoryless</td>
<td>particles, low applicatives,, low causatives…</td>
<td>–ee, de–, up, in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>roots</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>categoryless</td>
<td>roots</td>
<td>CAT, WORK, KTB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Derivational affixes could then be roots (De Belder 2011; Lowenstamm 2014; and even a version of Acedo-Matellán and Real-Puigdollers 2014; 2019) or complex structures containing roots. In this case they can encode rich meanings, well beyond the limited language-specific repertory drawn from the pool of featurable concepts – recall (12).

Derivational affixes could also be subcategorial feature structures (Marantz 2000; 2005; 2006; Pylkkänen 2008), made of formal features only and typically contributing to idiosyncratic interpretation due to their close affinity to roots before categorisation (Panagiotidis 2011; 2015, 67–70 and elsewhere). Some potential examples of derivational affixes being ‘rich’ categorisers, i.e. bearing more formal features than just the categorial one, have been mentioned above.

Finally, some derivational elements could also be bona fide functional heads, a suspicion that has already been around at least since Spencer (1991; 2000).
7. (An inevitably provisional) Conclusion

There exist phonological features. These abstractly encode articulatory instructions. There also exist formal features, signs which abstractly encode a limited set of pre-human concepts via grammar – as opposed to concepts realised via structures embedding roots. No other types of features exist, most notably: no grammar internal features and no grammatically inert semantic features.

Functional heads are composed exclusively of formal features. Formal features are perhaps emergent, acquired, and not universally available in a UG inventory for the acquirer to pick from. However, the signifieds of formal features, i.e. the concepts that are ‘featurable’, are restricted by some general cognitive (i.e. UG-external) principle. Formal features may belong to families, in which case they can cross-classify categories. The correct formalism for features should capture their cross-classifying function, but it should also be flexible enough to accommodate privativity when no such function is in place. Finally, derivational affixes may belong to any of the four (or more) types of structures at play in the combinatorial system: roots, inner morphemes, categorisers, and (even) functional heads.

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Acknowledgements: [to be added later]. I remain the proprietor of all misunderstandings and errors.