That’s a curious copular construction you have there!

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1 Introduction

Sentences like (1a-d) are frequently attested in colloquial English.

(1) a. That’s a beautiful dress you’re wearing.       (The Sight of the Stars, 2004)
    b. That’s a lovely accent you have there…New Jersey? (Dumb and Dumber, 1994)
    c. That’s a fine young man you have here.      (Ella Enchanted, 2004)
    d. Well, Susan, this is a fine mess you are in.      (The Elements of Style, 1959)

These sentences have a surface form that can be schematically represented as in (2), where XP represents a nominal and YP represents a gapped relative clause (RC). And they resemble identificational copular sentences (identificationals) with an RC modifier and cleft sentences (clefts) with a demonstrative (DEM) subject, as one can see from comparing them with (3-4).

(2) [DEM be XP YP]

(3) English identificationals (Higgins 1973:221, (56d, b)):
    a. That is a tiger.
    b. This is the house I mentioned.

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(4) English clefts with a DEM subject (Hedberg 2000:(3c) and (18)):

a. That was John that I saw.

b. That was the platoon sergeant that said that.

Ever since Higgins’s (1973) seminal work, English copular sentences have received much attention in the literature (see, e.g., Hedberg 2000, Mikkelsen 2011, Moltmann 2013, Reeve 2011, and the references there), but sentences like (1a-d) have not been part of that discussion. In this squib, I show how sentences like (1a-d) are both similar and dissimilar to identificationals and clefts, and suggest a formal analysis that may capture their characteristic properties. The upshot of the analysis will be that these sentences are affective identificationals whose DEM subject denotes the object of direct perception which YP appositively modifies, and XP indicates what is noteworthy about that object. In terms of syntax, I propose that DEM and YP in (2) initially occur inside the same nominal projection but due to raising of DEM and XP to higher positions, XP and YP end up forming what I call a Focus Phrase (FocP), and this yields an ostensibly extraposed structure.

What I propose will turn out to be reminiscent of what is referred to as the discontinuous constituent approach to clefts such as Akmajian 1970, Percus 1997, Hedberg 2000, and Reeve 2011, but I do not resort to extraposition though I will treat DEMs in (1) as disguised definite description (DDs). The proposed analysis will also be similar in spirit to Han and Hedberg 2008, which attempts to capture the insights of both discontinuous constituent (e.g., Jespersen 1927, Percus 1997, Hedberg 2000) and
expletive analyses of clefts (e.g., Jespersen 1937, Chomsky 1977, Delahunty 1982, Heggie 1988, É. Kiss 1998), but again, details will differ, as we will see in section 3.

Before proceeding, since sentences like (1a-d) have not been much dealt with, in particular in comparison to typical identificationals or clefts,¹ for ease of reference, I will henceforth call them that-presentational sentences (that-PSs) on the basis of the fact that they typically have that as their matrix subject and are commonly heard in out-of-the-blue contexts in a manner analogous to presentational there-sentences such as There are children playing outside.¹

2 Characteristic properties of that-PSs

One of the first notable properties of that-PSs is that their matrix subjects can only be DEM pronouns whereas identificationals and clefts may allow for ‘DEM + N’ or it subjects, as well as DEM pronoun subjects:²

(5) a. That (animal) is a tiger.  (identificational)
    b. That (fly) is the biggest fly I have ever seen.  (identificational)
(6) {That/it} was {a thief/John} that I saw.  (cleft)
(7) a. That’s a beautiful dress you’re wearing.  (that-PS)

¹ Hedberg (2000:901) briefly discusses the datum given in (i), but she treats it as a th-cleft in the sense of Bolinger (1972) and does not compare it with typical cleft sentences in any great detail.

(i)    That’s the French flag you see flying over there, Pierre Dufour, a former legionnaire, pointed out.

² The grammaticality of data presented in this squib has been verified by 10 native speakers of English.
b. *That {outfit/dress} is a beautiful dress you’re wearing.

c. *It’s a beautiful dress you’re wearing.

The next characteristic property of that-PSs is that, unlike identificationals or clefts, they cannot occur in answer to wh-questions, as shown in (8-10).

(8) A: What’s this?
   B: That’s {a tiger/the house I mentioned the other day}. (identificational)

(9) A: Who did you see?
   B: That was {a thief/John} that I saw. (cleft)

(10) a. A: What’s this?
   B: #That’s a beautiful dress you’re wearing. (that-PS)

   b. A: Who’s this?
   B: #That’s a fine young man you have there. (that-PS)

When it comes to XP of that-PSs, the first thing to note is that its syntactic category has to match the syntactic category of the gap position inside YP. This property is worth noting because there is a sense in which what I call that-PSs are semantically related to pseudo-clefts, yet while pseudo-clefts with a nominal gap may have an adjective phrase (AP) occurring in postcopular position, their “corresponding” that-PSs cannot:

(11) a. [What you have __ there] is [NP a beautiful dress]. (pseudo-cleft)

   b. [What you have __ there] is [AP beautiful]. (pseudo-cleft)

(12) a. That’s [NP a beautiful dress] [you have __ there]. (that-PS)

   b. *That’s [AP beautiful] [you have __ there].
Another characteristic property of *that*-PSs is that XP controls the number marking on the sentential predicate of YP. This is seen by the fact that when XP’s number feature changes, the form of the embedded predicate has to change accordingly. Notably, in the “corresponding” pseudo-clefts, the predicate of the RC in subject position does not change its form according to the number feature of the nominal in postcopular position:

(13)a. That’s a beautiful dress that’s/*are hanging in your closet.  (that-PS)
   
b. Those are beautiful dresses that are/*is hanging in your closet. (that-PS)

(14)a. What’s/*are hanging in your closet is a beautiful dress.   (pseudo-cleft)
   
b. What’s/*are hanging in your closet are beautiful dresses.   (pseudo-cleft)

What is presented above strongly suggests that there is some connectedness between what occurs as XP of a *that*-PS and the gap inside YP. Yet, the ‘XP + YP’ string of a *that*-PS cannot be analyzed as forming a nominal constituent, because it may not occur in object or subject positions, as exemplified in (15b,c).

(15)a. That’s a beautiful dress you’re wearing.   (that-PS)
   
b. ??I bought [a beautiful dress you’re wearing].
   
c. ??[A beautiful dress you’re wearing] was expensive.

I should note at this juncture that, in identificationals, the postcopular material corresponding to a ‘XP + YP’ string may occur in argument positions, but the corresponding material of a cleft may not (Jespersen 1927, Delahunty 1982, Rochemont 1986, Heggie 1988, Han and Hedberg 2008), and this suggests a syntactic affinity between *that*-PSs and clefts:

(16)a. That’s a book written by Chomsky.   (identificational)
b. I bought [a book written by Chomsky].
c. [A book written by Chomsky] was found in my office.

(17) a. It was John that I saw. (cleft)
   b. *Mary ran into [John that I saw].
c. *[John that I saw] is a Canadian.

Yet another notable property of that-PSs is that their XPs can in principle be any type of nominal, but they have to bear focal stress (more on this in section 3). This is exemplified by (18), where the XPs are all definite DPs. Note also that the transcription of the sentence That’s a beautiful dress you have there uttered by an English speaker has the prosodic properties depicted in (19).3 (Here and below, capitalization indicates stress.)

(18) a. Context: Talking to a mother whose daughter just won a chess tournament.

That’s the EIGHTH wonder of the world you have over there!
b. Context: Talking to a twin sister who stole my dress.

That’s MY dress you’re wearing!
c. Context: I’m at Mary’s wedding. And to my knowledge, she was getting married to Bill.

That’s GEORGE standing next to her! Is she by any chance marrying HIM?

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3 I thank Aaron Braver for helping me with the recording and the Praat annotation of (19).
(19) Praat annotation of *That’s a beautiful dress you have there*:

Since clefts have similar prosodic contours to what is given in (19), it may seem that the clefted constituents of sentences like (4a,b) and XPs of *that*-PSs carry the same type of focus. But while a clefted constituent carries what can be notated as *exhaustive focus* (Halvorsen 1978, Szabolcsi 1981, É. Kiss 1998), XP of a *that*-PS does not. And this is evidenced by the contrast between (20) and (21).

(20) It was JOHN that I saw. #And I saw MARY **too**.

(21) That’s a BEAUTIFUL dress you’re wearing. And you’re wearing a LOVELY **SCARF** **too**.

In the literature, the exhaustive semantics of clefts is often talked about in conjunction with their existential and uniqueness presuppositions (e.g., Percus 1997, Hedberg 2000, Han and Hedberg 2008). To illustrate, just as sentences containing DDs come with existential and uniqueness presuppositions, (22a) comes with the presuppositions given in (22b) (Hedberg 2000:904).

(22)a. It was Clinton who won.
b. \( \exists x [\text{won}(x) \land \forall y [\text{won}(y) \rightarrow y = x] \land x = \text{Clinton}] \)

When we look at \textit{that}-PSs in comparison to clefts like (22a), it is already obvious that they do not carry uniqueness presuppositions; if they did, (21) would not fly. When it comes to their existential meaning, however, things are not so cut-and-dried: On the one hand, they seem to carry an existential presupposition (Pss) triggered by their DEM subject. For example, (1a) seems to presuppose that there exists some entity in the discourse context. Yet, whether such a meaning should be characterized as a Pss or not is not easy to decide. One reason is that we cannot apply the relevant projection tests to \textit{that}-PSs; for instance, (1a) cannot be negated, converted into a question, or occur in the antecedent of an \textit{if}-conditional, as shown in (23a,b,c).

(23)  

(a) #That’s not a beautiful dress you’re wearing.  
(b) #Is that a beautiful dress you’re wearing?  
(c) #If that’s a beautiful dress you’re wearing, then your sister will get very jealous.

Furthermore, while the existential Pss of a cleft can be uttered along with the cleft \textit{if} it occurs as the \textit{first} conjunct of a sentence, the alleged Pss of a \textit{that}-PS cannot be:

(24)  

(a) It was a thief that I saw. (cleft)  
(b) There was someone that I saw. (Pss of (a))  
(c) \textit{There was someone that I saw}, and it was a thief that I saw.  
(d) #It was a thief that I saw, and \textit{there was someone that I saw}.

(25)  

(a) That’s a fine young man you have there. (\textit{that}-PS)  
(b) There is someone you have there. (Pss(?) of (a))  
(c) #\textit{There is someone you have there}, and that’s a fine young man you have there.
d. #That’s a fine young man you have there, and there is someone you have there.

Taken together, these facts show that the existential inference of that-PSs may arise from a different source than that of clefts whatever its true nature may turn out to be.  

3 Capturing the properties of that-PSs

I suggest that the discourse function of that-PSs is to identify what is noteworthy about some discourse-new situation that is being perceived by speaker at speech time. More concretely, I submit that (i) the DEM subject of a that-PS (henceforth DEMPS) denotes the object of direct perception in the sense of Moltmann (2013), (ii) YP appositively modifies the referent of DEMPS, and (iii) XP, by combining with be, predicates something of DEMPS’s denotation. In addition, I posit that what I mean by ‘noteworthy’ is conceptually similar to what Ionin (2006) characterizes as a licensing condition for the referential but indefinite use of this in sentences like (26).

(26) There is this man who lives upstairs from me who is driving me mad because he jumps rope at 2 a.m. every night. (Maclaran 1982:85)

Under the present analysis then, that-PSs are a way of encoding speaker affect. That is, they are uttered when speaker has the intent to refer to some contextually salient individual that has a noteworthy property (although DEMPS is a pronoun and it can be either proximal or distal, whereas the DEM occurring in sentences like (26) is a

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4 It may in fact come about as a result of processing the at-issue content of the sentence at hand in a manner similar to what is known as post-supposition in the literature (e.g., Brasoveanu 2013).
determiner and it is almost always proximal and its occurrence does not require focal stress on any of the syntactic constituents).

To more formally implement these ideas, I propose that that-PSs have the predication structure sketched in (27) which serves as the input for semantic computation, but they have the surface syntax in (28), which results from DEM_{PS} and XP moving to Spec,TP and Spec,FocP to value [CASE] and [+NOTEWORTHY] features, respectively, and be moving to V^0 and then to T^0 to pronounce tense/agreement features.

(27) Predication structure of that-PSs and the semantic type of each node:

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PredP, t
  DP[+DEICTIC; +DISCOURSE NEW], e
    [YP DEM]
  Pred', <e, o>
    Pred, <<e, o>, <e, o>>
      be
  XP[+NOTEWORTHY], <e, o>
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(28) Surface structure of that-PSs (Note: strike-throughs indicate feature valuation):

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  [Foc' [Foc [+NOTEWORTHY] t j'] [PredP [DP [YP] tk] [Pred' [Pred t j] t m]]]]]
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To justify (27) and (28), I would like to first propose that DEM_{PS} is a deictic pronoun of type e with lexical entry (29), ignoring the distal or proximal semantics of DEMs for simplicity (compare Kim 2019b for a slightly different semantics for DEM_{PS}).

(29) [[DEM_{PS}]] = \alpha \in C \ s.t. \ \text{object.of.perception}(\alpha), \ \text{where} \ C \ \text{is a contextually salient subset of D_e}.
According to this lexical entry, DEM\textsubscript{PS} has a partly similar semantics to \textit{the} under a Fregean analysis of the definite article such as Heim and Kratzer 1998, but while \textit{the} is presuppositional, DEM\textsubscript{PS} is not for the reasons given in section 2.\textsuperscript{5} In addition, even though it is an indexical expression, its descriptive content is assumed to be fixed to ‘object of direct perception’.

Turning now to YP, I treat it as bearing a semantic relation to DEM\textsubscript{PS} because English speakers intuit that it modifies the subject pronoun in some way. I analyze it as an \textit{integrated} but \textit{non-restrictive} N modifier, however, because DEM\textsubscript{PS} is already individual-denoting and it does not take any NP complement as we saw in (7b), so there is no syntactic room for a restrictive N modifier. Moreover, YP helps identify the referent of DEM\textsubscript{PS} in ways comparable to what pointing does when a deictic pronoun is used in a discourse. To illustrate, in (1a), DEM\textsubscript{PS} refers to the unique, contextually salient dress that YP’s content helps point to, and this shows that YP \textit{appositively} modifies DEM\textsubscript{PS}, just like how a pointing gesture would in a face-to-face conversation.

To capture this intuition, I assume that an RC-shaped YP of a \textit{that}-PS is made up of a CP whose Spec is occupied by an operator (Op) that is co-indexed with the gap position inside of it. But since this RC is appositive in meaning, following Kim’s (2019a) treatment of such N modifiers in English, I hypothesize that it merges at the Spec of a DP

\textsuperscript{5} For example, Heim and Kratzer (1998:81, (5')) suggest the following lexical entry for \textit{the}:

\begin{equation}
[[\textit{the}]] := \lambda f \in D_{\in \mathbb{C}}. \text{ and there is exactly one } x \in C \text{ s.t. } f(x) = 1. \text{the unique } y \in C \text{ s.t. } f(y).
\end{equation}
layer that is generated atop the DP that is headed by DEM$_{PS}$. On this analysis then, YP and DEM$_{PS}$ of (1a) start out inside the same extended DP, as depicted in (30).

\[(30)[\text{DP } [\text{CP Opi } [\text{C } \{[\text{TP you’re wearing e.}]\}]]] [\text{DP that}]]\]

Why do YP and DEM$_{PS}$ surface without forming a nominal constituent in the end, then? My answer is that they become *discontinuous* because, for reasons we do not fully understand as yet, instead of raising to the Spec of an extended DP created above the CP, thereby yielding a ‘DEM > RC’ order as in *that which you’re wearing*—an assumption commonly made in cartographic syntactic analyses (e.g., Svenonius 2008, Cinque 2010, Kim 2019a)—the inner DP headed by DEM$_{PS}$ raises to Spec,TP for [CASE]. As a result of raising of DEM$_{PS}$, the CP is stranded inside the DP shell and it instantiates a *gapped* but *headless* RC. On the surface level, however, it does not seem headless because XP moves to Spec,FocP to value its interpretable focus feature which I label as [+NOTEWORTHY] for convenience, and due to the c-command configuration that obtains and the absence of any intervening nominal, XP functions as the apparent “head” of the RC.

To summarize thus far then, even though YP and DEM$_{PS}$ begin their life inside the same nominal projection, before that DP gets fully formed, DEM$_{PS}$ moves to Spec,TP for [CASE] and XP to Spec,FocP for [+NOTEWORTHY]. Consequently, a seemingly extraposed RC structure obtains in which XP and YP form a FocP.

Now to compositionally derive the truth-conditions of *that*-PSs, first of all, adopting an extensional semantic framework, I posit that the *be* that occurs in *that*-PSs is an identity function of type $<<\text{et},<\text{et}>>$. That is, it takes a property-denoting expression
and yields another property-denoting expression which has the same meaning, as given in (31) (cf. Partee 1986).

(31) \[[\text{be}]\] = \(\lambda P. \lambda x[P(x)]\)

Secondly, I treat indefinite nominals as property-denoting (i.e., of type \(<e,t>\)) and definite nominals as individual-denoting (i.e., of type \(e\)), but I assume that, to resolve the type-mismatch with \(be\), definite XPs undergo a type-shifting by what Partee (1987) calls IDENT, thereby becoming property-denoting expressions (e.g., \([[\text{George}]\] = George = via IDENT = \(\lambda x[x = \text{George}]\)).

Next, I treat all YPs as predicates of type \(<e,t>\), but given their appositive semantics, I posit that they combine with DEMPS’s denotation via the semantic operation that I call Appositive Modification (AM), which I propose in (32) by minimally amending Heim and Kratzer’s (1998) Predicate Modification.

(32) Appositive Modification (AM):

If \(\alpha\) is a branching node, \(\{\beta, \gamma\}\) is the set of \(\alpha\)'s daughters, and \(\llbracket \beta \rrbracket\) is in \(D_{<e,t}>\), yet \(\llbracket \gamma \rrbracket\) is in \(D_e\), then \(\llbracket \alpha \rrbracket = \llbracket \gamma \rrbracket = \lambda x \in D_e.\llbracket \beta \rrbracket(x) = 1\).

Finally, I propose that what I call [+NOTEWORTHY] makes the semantic contribution spelled out in (33).

(33) Noteworthiness-Focus(F)-Marking (NFM) Rule:

When a nominal constituent XP of type \(<e,t>\) is F-marked with [+NOTEWORTHY], the F marking on it is interpreted as that function \(f\) s.t. \(f\) takes XP’s denotation as its input and returns that function \(g\) of type \(<e,t>\) s.t. \(g\)'s value description contains the predicate \(P\) in XP’s denotation and the predicate ‘noteworthy’ s.t. both \(P\) and
‘noteworthy’ hold true of the individual \( x \) in \( g \)’s value description.

When we interpret (1a) and (18c) based on the predication structure in (27), AM, and the NFM rule given above, as well as the lexical entries proposed thus far, we obtain (34) and (35) as their truth-conditions.

(34) \( [[(1a)]] = 1 \text{ iff } \text{beautiful.dress}(x \in C.\text{object.of.perception}(x) = y.\text{wearing}(y)(you)) \)

\& noteworthy(beautiful.dress(x.object.of.perception(x) = y.\text{wearing}(y)(you)))

(35) \( [[(18c)]] = 1 \text{ iff } [x \in C.\text{object.of.perception}(x) = y.\text{standing.next.to.Mary}(y)] = \)

George \& noteworthy([-x \in C.\text{object.of.perception}(x) = y.\text{standing.next.to.Mary}(y)] = George)

Turning now to the consequences: As mentioned in the introduction, the proposed analysis is reminiscent of what is known as the discontinuous constituent approach to clefts proposed by authors like Akmajian (1970), Percus (1997), Hedberg (2000), and Reeve (2011) since it also posits that a pronoun and an RC which are part of the same nominal projection in the underlying syntax become discontinuous in the surface syntax as a result of movement. But there are several non-trivial differences between what is proposed here and the existing discontinuous constituent analyses of clefts.

First of all, while the existing discontinuous constituent analyses simply assume *extraposing* of the YP component of a cleft via rightward movement or right adjunction, I argue for *raising* of the DP headed by DEMPS to Spec,TP for an independently motivated reason, namely, [CASE].
Secondly, unlike in Percus’s or Hedberg’s analysis of clefts, under the present analysis, neither the pronominal matrix subject nor any component of it ever functions as the true syntactic head of the RC constituting YP, and this lets us account for why that-PSs may exhibit an agreement behavior that differs from pseudo-clefts’. To illustrate this, in sentences like (36), the matrix subject is *that*, yet the sentential predicate of YP has the plural form *are*. If *that* were the spell-out of *the* plus the null head of the RC constituting YP as Percus (1997) would assume, or if it were the binder of the Op inside the RC by virtue of c-commanding it as well as being co-indexed with it, as Hedberg (2000) would assume, then the embedded verb should be *is*, contrary to fact.

(36) That’s **John and Mary** who are/*is* standing over there!

Thirdly, under Hedberg’s (2000) and Reeve’s (2011) analyses of clefts, XP and YP form a DP, and this incorrectly predicts that all ‘XP + YP’ strings will occur in argument positions, unlike what we observed in (17). By contrast, the present analysis does not posit that XP and YP form a nominal constituent, so it may even be extended to clefts, thereby capturing data like (17) as well as data like (15).

Having said that, on the proposed analysis, even though XP and YP do not form a nominal constituent, they do form a FocP. Besides, XP ends up c-commanding the Op inside the RC constituting YP. Collectively, these outcomes let us explain: (i) why XP and the gap inside YP match in their syntactic categories and (ii) why XP and the sentential predicate of YP agree in number as we observed in (12) and (13), in contrast to the way the pseudo-clefts in (11) and (14) behave. I should note that Han and Hedberg (2008) also posit that XP and YP of clefts form a FocP (which they notate as FP). But
under their analysis, YP c-commands XP rather than the other way around, as shown in (37). So when applied to what I call that-PSs, their analysis cannot account for the data in (12-13) in ways the present analysis does.

(37) Han and Hedberg 2008 (p. 359, Figure 9):

\[
[TP [DP it] [\text{T} [T \text{ was}k] [\text{Cop} [\text{Cop} t_k] [FP [\text{FP} [DP t] [\text{F} [\text{f}] [DP \text{Ohno}]]) [\text{CP who} [\text{C} [\text{C} [TP t \text{ won}])]])]]] \]

Finally, what I have put forward lets us capture the connections between identificationals, clefts, and that-PSs in ways existing analyses of copular sentences do not. In light of the proposed analysis, all three types of copular sentences exemplified in (1), (3), and (4) can be considered subtypes of identificationals as they are all concerned with predicating something of the referent of a pronominal subject by identifying some property in focus (compare Moltmann 2013). They do not exhibit an identical behavior in all aspects of their syntax or semantics, however, because their subjects do not have the same semantics. More specifically, while the subject of an identificational can be discourse-old/familiar or discourse-new/non-familiar, the subject of a cleft is typically discourse-old/familiar, and the subject of a that-PS is discourse-new/non-familiar. In addition, unlike the subject of an identificational, the subject of a cleft always refers to something like ‘the answer to the question under discussion’ (cf. Chomsky 1977) whereas the subject of a that-PS invariably refers to a contextually salient, unique object of direct perception which has a noteworthy property. Importantly, such semantic differences manifested by their subjects go hand-in-hand with what kinds of focus meaning they can express: for example, clefts can express exhaustivity which that-PSs do
not, and *that*-PSs can express *mirativity* which clefts do not. Correlatively, while identificationals and clefts instantiate *categorical* judgments (i.e., ‘topic-comment’ information structure), *that*-PSs instantiate *thetic* judgments (i.e., ‘all-focus’ information structure), so they are subject to different licensing or felicity conditions.²

In short then, the analysis proposed here lets us explain both similarities and differences between *that*-PSs and other types of copular sentences without running into the same problems as existing analyses of clefts do. Before closing, though, I would like to point out two remaining issues: First, the agreement patterns exhibited by (13) and (36) merit an explanation as they show that while DEM_Ps does not agree with a plural definite XP, it does with a plural *indefinite* XP. Secondly, (38) shows that strong QPs may occur as XPs of *that*-PSs if they contain certain APs. Under the present analysis, this is puzzling because even if the XP of (38) contains AP *conceivable*, it will still be of type <<*et>*, so it cannot combine with be’s denotation without incurring a type-mismatch.

(38) Wow, that’s really every *(CONCEIVABLE) solution* you have there!

### 4 Conclusion

In this squib, I have looked at a subclass of English copular sentences which escaped attention in the extant literature. These sentences resemble both identificationals and clefts, yet they exhibit several distinctive properties. I have argued that their characteristic properties stem from: (i) DEM_Ps not forming a full-fledged DP with its appositive N

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² For *categorical* vs. *thetic* judgments, see, among others, Sasse 1987.
modifier (for some reason) and (ii) their affective meaning necessitating [+NOTEWORTHY] borne by XP. Since what I claim to be responsible for the surface syntax of that-PSs is raising of a discourse-new DEM pronoun to Spec,TP, stranding its N modifier, the present analysis makes an interesting prediction that languages without discourse-new DEM pronouns will not have constructions comparable to what I call that-PSs. From what I have found, languages like Korean and Turkish, which lack discourse-new DEM pronouns, do not have copular constructions corresponding to that-PSs although they do have what is comparable to clefts. While further verification has to be left to future research, this finding may have significant implications for the study of crosslinguistic variation in copular sentences.

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**Sources for the data in (1)**


