Person of interest: Experimental investigations into the learnability of person systems *

Mora Maldonado and Jennifer Culbertson
Centre for Language Evolution, University of Edinburgh

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Abstract

Person systems convey the roles entities play in the context of speech (e.g., speaker, addressee). Like other linguistic category systems, not all ways of partitioning the person space are equally likely cross-linguistically. Different theories have been proposed to constrain the set of possible person partitions that humans can represent, explaining their typological distribution. This paper introduces an artificial language learning methodology to investigate the existence of universal constraints on person systems. We report the results of three experiments that inform these theoretical approaches by generating behavioural evidence for the impact of constraints on the learnability of different person partitions. Our findings constitute the first experimental evidence for learnability differences in this domain.

Keywords: person systems, pronouns, artificial language learning, linguistic universals, semantics

1. Introduction

Person systems—exemplified by pronominal paradigms (e.g. ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘she’)—categorize entities as a function of their role in the context of speech: there is the speaker, the addressee and others, who play no active role in the conversation. As in other semantic domains, it has long been observed that person systems exhibit what appears to be constrained variation across languages: some person systems are very frequent, while others are very rare or do not occur at all (Cysouw 2003, Baerman et al. 2005).1

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1These kind of typological tendencies have been seen in other semantic domains, involving both content and logical words. For example, cross-linguistic regularities have been argued to provide evidence for a universal basis
Typological regularities of this sort have led linguists to propose universal constraints on possible person systems (Silverstein 1976, Ingram 1978, Noyer 1992, Harley and Ritter 2002, Harbour 2016, Bobaljik 2008, Ackema and Neeleman 2018). Such constraints are often conceived of (either implicitly or explicitly) as reflecting characteristics of our linguistic capacity which have consequences for learning: specifically, they are assumed to delimit the space of hypotheses entertained by the learner (Chomsky 1965; but see for example Piantadosi 2013). However, while person has been extensively investigated from formal and typological perspectives, the link between hypothesised universal constraints on person systems and learnability remains largely unexplored (though see Nevins et al. 2015 for an artificial learning approach, and Moyer et al. 2015, Hanson et al. 2000, Hanson 2000, Brown 1997 on acquisition). In this paper, we introduce an artificial language learning methodology to investigate the existence of universal constraints on person systems. First we summarize some additional theoretical background from which we will derive a number of specific predictions regarding the learnability of these systems.

1.1. The Person Space

As mentioned above, there are three conversational roles typically delimited in the person space: the speaker, the addressee and others, who are not active participants in the conversation. We follow standard assumptions and represent them as $i$, $u$ and $o$, respectively (e.g., Harbour 2016). From this ontology, we obtain seven logically possible person categories or ‘meta-persons’: $i$, $io$, $iu$, $iuo$, $u$, $uo$, $o$ (Sokolovskaja 1980, Bobaljik 2008, Sonnaert 2018). Research on the typological distribution of person systems, however, has found evidence that only four of these are grammaticalized as person categories: first exclusive ($i$), first inclusive ($iu$), second ($u$) and third ($o$). This asymmetry can be directly captured by assuming that the speaker and addressee are unique—there are no forms which express uniquely multiple speakers, or uniquely multiple addresses—but there can be an undefined number of others (following Harbour 2016). The meanings expressed by the unattested combinations ($io$, $iuo$, $uo$) can be captured as the interaction between person and number; the four core person categories can each be pluralized by adding extra others (see fn. 2; Boas 1911). Table 1a illustrates these person and number (expressed by the presence or absence of the subscript $o$) categories. To account for these restrictions on person categories, theories of the person space have traditionally

for color categorization, reflecting properties of the human perceptual system (Kay and Regier 2007, Gibson et al. 2017, Zaslavsky et al. 2019). Similar arguments have been made to explain the distribution of kinship systems across languages (Kemp and Regier 2012). Relatedly, the study of logical words has also revealed that connectives and quantifiers found in natural languages only cover a very small subset of all possible meanings, indicating the existence of semantic universals (Barwise and Cooper 1981, Steinert-Threlkeld and Szymanik 2019, Piantadosi et al. 2016, Chemla et al. 2019).

2This assumption is not trivial. As soon as multiple speakers and addressees are allowed in the ontology, each logically available combination of the three entities—$i$, $io$, $iu$, $iuo$, $u$, $uo$, $o$—should count as a possible person category independent of number. For example, one form would refer to the speaker alone ($i$), and another form to the speaker plus someone else ($io$), each with a plural alternative ($ii$ vs. $iio$). However, this contrast is never grammaticalized: no language distinguishes between plural expressions referring to multiple speakers/addressees and expressions referring to the speaker/addressee plus others. Indeed, this has been formulated as a typological universal: Pluralities containing participants (speakers or addressees) are never formally distinguished from pluralities containing others. This universal has been extensively discussed in the literature on person systems (Greenberg 1988, Cysouw 2003, Bobaljik 2008, Wechsler 2010), but is not directly investigated here.
posed two primitive binary features: ±speaker and ±addressee (or other equivalent notations; Ingram 1978, Silverstein 1976, Noyer 1992, Bobaljik 2008). The interaction between these two binary features predicts all and only the four attested categories, as can be observed in Table 1b.

1 EXCL $i_o$ +speaker −addressee
1 INCL $iu_o$ +speaker +addressee
2 $u_o$ −speaker +addressee
3 $o_o$ −speaker −addressee
(a) Attested categories

Table 1: Four persons system

An example of a language with a 4-way person distinction in its pronominal system is Mandarin. Each person category in Table 2a is expressed by a different pronoun, with additional morphology marking whether the referent is singular or plural. This system has 7 forms total, since the inclusive is inherently non-singular (it necessarily refers to both the speaker and addressee), and thus always features plural morphology in Mandarin. Another example is Ilocano, which differs from Mandarin in that it makes a minimal/augmented number distinction rather than singular/plural. In this system there are 8 forms, including two distinct inclusive forms, one minimal (‘ta’ = speaker and addressee only) and the other augmented (‘tayo’ = speaker, addressee and others).

In many other languages, the meaning space is partitioned such that not all possible person and/or number categories are expressed by distinct forms. Such languages exhibit homophony. For example, inclusive languages differ from non-inclusive languages (terminology from Daniel 2005) like English, where there is homophony between the first and inclusive persons (in addition to homophony between 2 singular and plural, see Table 2). Feature-based accounts of person often derive a restricted set of partitions of the person and number space as defined by the presence or absence of homophony among cells in the space. Such theories only derive homophony patterns by contrast neutralization or underspecification: a distinction that is made available by the grammar might not be active in a specific language (Halle and Marantz 1994, Harbour 2008, Harley 2008, Pertsova 2011). Specifically, the set of features in Table 1b straightforwardly derives three person homophony patterns based on which contrasts are left underspecified (±speaker, ±addressee or both). For example, neutralizing the ±addressee feature would generate syncretism between 1 EXCL and 1 INCL categories (grouped as [+speaker]), on the one hand, and between 2 and 3 (grouped as [−speaker]), on the other. Other feature-based homophony patterns can also be derived from this system by restricting underspecification to specific natural classes. For example, the aforementioned clusivity distinction is lost when two meanings which share the feature +speaker ($i$ and $iu$) become indistinguishable (e.g. English). That is, the grouping of 1 EXCL and 1 INCL categories relies on them belonging to the same natural class [+speaker].

These kinds of feature-based patterns are often referred to as systematic homophony.

However, many different homophony patterns have been documented both within and across languages (Cysouw 2003, Zwicky 1977, Corbett et al. 2002, Baerman et al. 2005, Baerman...
Table 2: Example personal pronoun systems.

and Brown 2013), not all of which can be derived by feature neutralization. In some cases, two or more meanings which don’t share any feature are nevertheless expressed by the same form in a given language. This so-called accidental or random homophony is therefore not described in terms of contrast neutralisation, as the targeted meanings do not belong to the same natural class (e.g., defined by the features in Table 1b). Partitions that are not derivable by a theory are often assumed to arise through historical accident, target mainly individual paradigms in a given language, and may be marginal typologically (Sauerland and Bobaljik 2013, Halle and Marantz 1994, Pertsova 2011, but see Cysouw 2003). But whether the typological evidence accords with this prediction is not always clear.3

While estimating the frequency distribution over partitions of the person space is complex, a number of theories have recently been developed to make more fine-grained predictions about possible homophony patterns. Harley and Ritter (2002) put forward a universal feature geometry for person based on three privative features, as illustrated in Figure 1. This derives the same set of four person categories as the binary features account in Table 1b but also establishes hierarchical relations between them, in order to make more accurate predictions about the typological frequency of homophony patterns (see also Béjar 2003, McGinnis 2005, Copper and Hall 2009 for similar approaches). For example, this system derives homophony between 1 EXCL, 1 INCL and 2 categories, and therefore predicts this to arise systematically.

In a similar vein, Harbour (2016) posits a theory specifically designed to capture the robust typological generalization in (1), also known as Zwicky’s observation.

(1) Languages that do not have a dedicated phonological form for an inclusive person (‘you and us’) always assimilate it into the first plural person (‘us’) and never into the second (‘you’) or third (‘them’) (Zwicky 1977).

Harbour makes use of two binary features, ±author and ±participant. While the features them-

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3As it turns out, determining the cross-linguistic frequency of different partitions of the person (and number) space is not straightforward. It crucially depends on the specific assumptions made about how to count different systems. Some authors (Cysouw 2003, Sauerland and Bobaljik 2013) include individual person-marking paradigms (e.g., verbal agreement and pronominal systems) within a single language. Using this metric for counting, the frequency distribution across language is extremely skewed: In Cysouw’s data set, of the 4140 possible partitions of an 8-cells person/number space, only 61 are attested (calculated over 265 paradigms). A slightly different approach that also counts paradigms is given in Baerman et al. (2005) and Baerman and Brown (2013). Still another possibility is to count based on an abstract notion of person partition, across all the paradigms in a given language. For example, Harbour (2016) proposes a superposition technique: A distinction is neutralized in a language if and only if it is inactive across all paradigms. Under this superposition approach, there are 15 possible partitions of a 4-cells person space, but only 5 are attested typologically (with one marginal exception, see Appendix A2.1 in Harbour 2016).
Figure 1: Feature geometry account in Harley and Ritter (2002). The underlined daughter node Speaker represents the default interpretation of the bare Participant node. Languages might or might not allow both dependent nodes to be specified together.

selves denote lattices containing referential entities ($i$, $u$, $iu$, $o$), the values of the features are modelled as complementary operations on lattices. Because features are similar to functions, languages can differ not only in which features are active, but also in the order of feature composition. A similar approach is taken in Ackema and Neeleman (2013, 2018), with the main goal of accounting for the typological tendency in (2).\footnote{As an anonymous reviewer points out, the approach taken by Baerman et al. (2005) is a conservative one: their typological counts are restricted to cases where whole forms are identical, disregarding morpheme syncretism. This might result in the exclusion of morphemes that are syncretic but occur in different combinations. Given that person features are often instantiated in morphemes rather than in whole-words, the typological tendency stated in (2) should be considered with some caution.}

(2) Languages that feature homophony between first (inclusive and exclusive) and second plural pronouns (‘us’ = ‘you’) and between second and third (‘you’ = ‘them’) are far more frequent than those instantiating first-third homophony (Baerman et al. 2005).

Each of these approaches (which we will discuss in more detail below) introduces different theoretical apparatus to capture these typological observations. There are, however, a number of obvious limitations which make basing theories exclusively on typological evidence problematic.

1.2. From typology to learning

There is extensive literature now documenting (and in some cases proposing solutions to) the problems posed by typological data samples (for an excellent overview see Cysouw 2005). For one, such data are generally sparse, and in many cases the number of languages behind a given typological generalisation is quite small. For instance, the largest sample of person/number paradigms, from Cysouw (2003), includes only around 200 languages. Sparse data lead to unreliable estimates of relative frequency, particularly in the tail of the distribution. For example, it is not possible to confidently conclude based on small samples that a given partition is impossible (e.g., see Piantadosi and Gibson 2014, and also fn. 3).

Moreover, typological data are also massively confounded: there are many factors that shape typological distributions (e.g. historical accidents, genetic relations between languages, facts about diachrony; see Dunn et al. 2011, Bickel 2008, Pagel et al. 2007, Cysouw 2010, among others), only a subset of which are relevant for building theories of the generative capacity of the linguistic system. The immediate consequence of this is that these data sources typically cannot be used to argue for a causal link between the cognitive or linguistic system...
and particular features of language (e.g., see discussion in Culbertson 2012, Piantadosi and Gibson 2014, Ladd et al. 2015).

As a response to these general issues—which are relevant for typological data in any domain—there has been an increasing attempt to bring behavioural data on learning to bear on linguistic theories. Specifically, artificial language learning experiments have now been used to link typological universals to human learning and inference in a number of domains including phonology (e.g., Wilson 2006, Moreton 2008, White 2017, Martin and Peperkamp 2020), syntax (e.g., Culbertson et al. 2012, Tabullo et al. 2012, Culbertson and Adger 2014, Martin et al. 2019), morphology (e.g., Saldana et al. 2019, Fedzechkina et al. 2012) and lexical categorization (Carstensen et al. 2015, Chemla et al. 2019), for reviews see Culbertson (2012), Moreton and Pater (2012), Culbertson (2019).

The present study uses artificial language learning experiments to test a set of predictions derived from the feature-based theories of person described above. By incorporating this new source of data, we can corroborate—or not—the universal constraints on person partitions hypothesized based on typological data. The paper proceeds as follows: in Experiment 1, we establish an experimental set-up to test some basic assumptions of feature-based systems including whether systematic and random homophony are treated differently by learners acquiring a new person system. In Experiment 2, we investigate whether the universal typological tendency known as Zwicky’s observation is supported by a learnability advantage, as predicted by Harbour (2016). Finally, Experiment 3 explores potential asymmetries in the learnability of different partitions of first, second and third person categories, as predicted by different theories (e.g., Harley and Ritter 2002, Ackema and Neeleman 2018).

2. **Experiment 1: Something about us**

While different theories of person have hypothesized different inventories of features to constrain the person space, they all assume the features to be universal, i.e. part of the human linguistic capacity (Harbour 2016, Bobaljik 2008, Harley and Ritter 2002, among many others). This assumption predicts that all things equal, humans should have access to, and therefore be able to learn, feature distinctions that are not at play in their native language (first prediction). Feature-based theories also predict that learners should be sensitive to natural classes as defined by feature-structure: categories that share a feature should be more readily mapped onto the same phonological form. These systematic homophony patterns are predicted to be (easily) learnable (second prediction) in contrast to random homophony, where there is no featural basis for meanings to share a form.

In Experiment 1, we target these two predictions by focusing on person categories that involve the speaker (first exclusive and inclusive persons), and their interaction with number features. We investigate here the contrasts that arise by the interaction of two binary features, one for person (±addressee) and one for number (±minimal) (see Noyer 1992, Bobaljik 2008, Harbour 2014, for more developed accounts). The ±addressee feature ensures a clusivity contrast: it distinguishes between groups of individuals that include both speaker and addressee (i.e., $iu, iu_o$), and those that exclude the addressee (i.e., $i, i_o$). The ±minimal feature distin-

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5We are not committed to this specific inventory; our predictions would hold for any theory which posits the contrasts themselves, regardless of the structure of the feature space.
guishes the minimal elements that satisfy each person category (i.e., \(i, iu\)) from non-minimal (augmented) pluralities, where the reference may includes other(s) as well (i.e., \(i_o, iu_o\)). The resulting 4-cell partition of this person-number space is given in Table 3a.

\[
\begin{array}{c|cc|c|c}
& \text{MIN} & \text{AUG} \\
\hline
\text{EXCL} & +\text{min} & -\text{min} \\
\text{MIN} & +\text{sp} \text{--add} & \text{add} \\
\text{INCL} & (\text{sp}) +\text{add} & \text{add} \\
\end{array}
\]

(a) Reduced person space

There are multiple partitions of this space as defined by homophony. We focus here on bi-partitions, where two pronominal forms cover the 4-cells space. One possible bipartition uses only the \(\pm\text{addressee}\) distinction, thus contrasting EXCL and INCL, but neutralizing number (‘Person-contrast’ in Table 3b). A second possible bipartition uses the \(\pm\text{minimal}\) distinction resulting in one form for both minimal categories, and another for both non-minimal (augmented) categories (‘Number-contrast’ in Table 3b). Interestingly, to make this particular distinction, this paradigm also relies on (or presupposes) the \(\pm\text{addressee}\) person contrast: the individuals \(i\) (speaker alone) and \(iu\) (speaker and addressee alone) are only “minimal” if the speaker-addresssee dyad (\(iu\)) is treated as a smallest element that satisfies the \(+\text{addressee}\) feature. That is, the \(+\text{minimal}\) feature can only pick up the smallest element of the inclusive category if there is an inclusive person category to begin with. Thus we must assume the \(\pm\text{addressee}\) contrast is active in this system, even if the \(\pm\text{addressee}\) contrast is not encoded by different phonological forms. A schematic derivation of the bipartitions in Table 3b and Table 3c using \(\pm\text{addressee}\) and \(\pm\text{minimal}\) features is given in the Appendix (Figure A.1).

Partitions with random, non-feature-based, homophony are also possible. For example, exclusive minimal (\(i\)) and inclusive augmented (\(iu_o\)) may share one form, and inclusive minimal (\(iu\)) and exclusive augmented (\(i_o\)) another. This meaning-to-form mapping cannot be expressed in terms of neutralizing a single semantic distinction (‘Random-contrast’ in Table 3d). Put differently, there is no natural class grouping only exclusive minimal and inclusive augmented. Note that there are three other random partitions of this reduced person space.

Our experiment targets English-speaking learners. In order to make clear learnability predictions for this population, it is important to briefly discuss how non-inclusive systems of first person pronouns (as in English singular ‘I’ versus plural ‘we’) are typically derived in feature-based theories. As observed above, inclusive systems may differ in whether they make a number distinction within the inclusive: languages like Mandarin do not, whereas languages like Ilocano distinguish pronouns referring to speaker and addressee alone from pronouns referring to speaker, addressee and others (cf. Table 2). To account for this variation, theories of number morphology often distinguish the classical singular/plural contrast, based on the \(\pm\text{atomic}\).
feature, from a minimal/augmented one, based on the ±minimal distinction (Noyer 1992, Harbour 2011, 2014). Informally, the ±atomic feature picks up elements from the domain as a function of whether or not they have proper parts, whereas the ±minimal feature picks out the smallest element(s) in the domain. On their own, these two contrasts only yield different partitions for languages that distinguish an inclusive person category, namely for systems where the smallest pronominal referent might be non-atomic (i.e., *iu*). In non-inclusive languages, by contrast, the set of minimal and atomic pronominal referents are identical; both ±atomic and ±minimal contrasts will always lead to the same results (see Figure A.1 in Appendix). Here, we follow much previous literature in assuming that minimal/augmented pronominal systems are necessarily inclusive, and take languages like English, which only make a singular/plural distinction, to be based on the simpler ±atomic contrast (e.g., Noyer 1992, Harbour 2014, 2016). Under these assumptions then, both the ±minimal and the ±addressee features are non-native for English speakers in the context of first person partitions. Note, however, that even if languages like English were described as making use of the ±minimal feature, this contrast alone would still be insufficient to derive the bipartitions in Table 3b-d as the ±addressee feature is also required (see also discussion in Section 2.3).

In this experiment, we therefore test the two predictions laid out above: first, that English speakers should be able to learn contrasts (Table 3) that are not directly instantiated in their language but are broadly attested typologically, namely the inclusive/exclusive distinction and the minimal/augmented distinction (e.g. in Ilocano, Thomas 1955, Cysouw 2003); second that these unfamiliar feature-based paradigms in are easier for English-speakers to learn than random homophony paradigms (Table 3d). If these predictions are borne out, then we can conclude that the person-number space is indeed based on a set of universal features, such as those posited by the theories described above. We can then take the next step of testing different predictions made by particular feature-based theories. As a sanity check, we also test whether English-speaking learners are biased in favor of a person system that resembles their own, as in Table 3e. If participants perceive the similarity between the new system they are learning and the English person-number system, then this is a good indication that our experimental methodology is successfully engaging the linguistic space we intend.

To test these predictions, we use two complementary artificial language learning paradigms. In Experiment 1A, participants are taught a pronominal system that matches one of the four paradigms in Table 3, and are then tested on how accurately they are able to learn each pattern (‘Ease of learning’ paradigm; Culbertson et al. 2017, Tabullo et al. 2012). In principle, two paradigms might be equally learnable (after some amount of exposure), and yet one of them might still be preferred. In Experiment 1B, we therefore investigate differences in the likelihood of inferring a given paradigm in the absence of explicit data (‘Poverty-of-the-Stimulus’ paradigm, Wilson 2006, Culbertson and Adger 2014). Participants are trained on only two cells of the paradigm in Table 3a, and must then use the forms they have learned to express all the cells in the paradigm. In other words, they must extrapolate the taught forms to the remaining

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6 Another argument that has been used to support the existence of both ±atomic and ±minimal contrasts comes from languages that make a singular-dual-plural distinction, but this is not relevant for our purposes (Harbour 2014, Martí 2020).

7 Crucially for us, the ±addressee distinction is non-native in the presence of the +speaker feature (i.e., \{+sp, ±add\} is non-native). Of course, English speakers do have experience with this feature: it is used to distinguish first person (collapsing inclusive and exclusive) from second person.
two categories. How they should extrapolate is ambiguous on the basis of their training, and how they do so will indicate which underlying paradigm learners have inferred. For example, a learner may be trained on two distinct forms for exclusive minimal (speaker only) and exclusive augmented (speaker plus others), and then tested on how they map these forms to the two remaining categories including the addressee. If they use the augmented form for both new categories, then they have inferred an English-like paradigm.

2.1. Methods

Both experiments, including all hypotheses, predictions, and analyses, were preregistered: Experiment 1A and Experiment 1B. Materials, data and scripts are provided here. All analyses are as per the preregistration unless we explicitly say otherwise. These experiments were implemented using JavaScript and presented to participants in a web browser.

2.1.1. Design

Participants in Experiment 1A were randomly assigned to one of four possible conditions: English-like, Person-contrast, Number-contrast, and Random-contrast (see Table 3). Participants in all conditions were taught two pronominal forms mapped into four person categories (exclusive minimal, inclusive minimal, exclusive augmented and inclusive augmented). All conditions instantiate bipartitions of the person space with two-to-one mappings, but differ on which contrast was directly reflected in the forms (and which one was neutralized): an English-like contrast (± atomic), a person contrast (± addressee), a number contrast (± minimal) or a random homophony pattern.

In Experiment 1B, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, illustrated in Table 4. Conditions differed in which subset of two first person categories was trained (critical training set) and held-out (critical held-out set). This determines which alternative full paradigms are consistent with the two categories participants have learned. Condition 1 is consistent with an English-like pattern (or with feature-base homophony). Conditions 2 and 3 are consistent with either a person or a number contrast system (i.e., feature-based homophony), or a random contrast system (i.e., random homophony).

All participants in both experiments 1A and 1B were additionally exposed to another four pronominal forms which mapped into the second and third person singular and plural categories. These forms were used as fillers, and were not analysed.

2.1.2. Materials

The same materials were used in Experiment 1A and 1B. In both cases, the language consisted of 6 different pronoun forms, used for the filler categories (2SG/PL, 3SG/PL), plus the critical first person forms. For each participant, these 6 lexical items were randomly drawn from a list of 8 CVC words created following English phonotactics: ‘kip’, ‘dool’, ‘heg’, ‘rib’, ‘bub’, ‘veek’, ‘tosh’, ‘lom’. Items were presented orthographically.

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8 Two additional conditions were also run, but are not reported here. Since these are orthogonal to the main aim of the experiment, the reader is referred to Maldonado and Culbertson (2019) for more details.
### Table 4: Summary of Conditions in Experiment 1B.

There are two training and two held-out categories per condition. Each training category is mapped to a different pronominal form (here called A or B), schematically represented with light and dark gray. Participants can use the training forms they learned (A or B) to express the held-out meanings (cells with ‘A or B?’). There are four different paradigms compatible with the training per condition, as specified in the right-most column.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>MIN</th>
<th>AUG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EXCL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 1</td>
<td>A or B?</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 2</td>
<td>A or B?</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition 3</td>
<td>A or B?</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To express the pronoun meanings, we commissioned a cartoonist to draw scenarios involving a family of three sisters and their parents. Each family member has a clearly-defined role in the conversational context. The two older sisters are speech act participants (in all scenarios they are either speaker or addressee). The third (little) sister was spatially close, but never a speech act participant. The parents were seated in the background (serving as additional others).

Pronouns were used as one-word answers to questions like ‘Who will be rich?’. Meanings were expressed by visually highlighting subsets of family-members, as in Table 5. In some cases, more than one pattern of visual highlighting could match the target meaning, options were then randomly selected. An example illustrating the INCL.MIN trial is provided in Figure 2. All questions were English interrogative sentences of the form ‘Who will...?’, which were randomly drawn from a list of 60 different tokens.

#### 2.1.3. Procedure

The basic procedure was the same in Experiments 1A and 1B. Participants were first introduced to the family, including the names of the sisters, and were told they were going to see the sisters playing with a hat that had two magical properties: whoever wore it could see the future but would also talk in a mysterious ancestral language. Participants were instructed to figure out the meanings of words in this new language. They were given a hint that the words were not names, and an example trial with an English pronoun (‘her’). In addition, the speaker and addressee roles switched several times during the experiment to highlight that the words were dependent on contextually-determined speech-act roles. This was induced by swapping who had the magical hat.
Table 5: Highlighted family members for each person category. To ensure that forms were not associated with specific quantities, critical augmented categories randomly include one or two additional others. Third person singular meanings were always expressed with a female other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Highlighted set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 EXCL.MIN</td>
<td>speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 INCL.MIN</td>
<td>speaker, addressee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 EXCL.AUG</td>
<td>speaker, other(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 INCL.AUG</td>
<td>speaker, addressee, other(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2MIN</td>
<td>addressee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2AUG</td>
<td>addressee, other(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3MIN</td>
<td>one other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3AUG</td>
<td>multiple others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Experiment 1A had two phases. In the training phase, participants were first exposed to 6 pronominal forms in the new language, corresponding to the 4 filler and 4 critical person categories. Each exposure trial had two parts: a scene where a question is asked, and a scene where the question is answered with a pronoun form in the language (e.g., Figure 2a). To check that participants were paying attention, they were then asked to select the pronominal form they had just seen from two alternatives. There were 12 training trials (2 repetitions per form). After this initial exposure, participants were given a test of the trained forms in what we call what if... trials. What if... trials consisted of a question and answer scene, as in exposure, followed by a ‘what if?’ scene in which a new set of individuals was highlighted. Participants were asked to pick the correct word for that meaning from two alternatives (e.g., Figure 2b). There were 32 such trials (3 repetitions per control form, 6 per critical form). Participants were given feedback on their answers. Participants were then given a final critical test. Trials consisted of a question scene, followed by a scene highlighting the referent(s), but no pronominal form. They had to pick the word corresponding to the meaning from two alternatives (e.g., Figure 2c). This phase consisted of 24 trials (3 repetitions per form). Participants received no feedback during this phase.

In Experiment 1B, there was also a training and a testing phase. Crucially, during the training phase, participants were only trained on the pronouns in the filler and critical training sets (6 person categories). There were 12 exposure trials (2 repetitions per form) and 16 what if... trials (2 repetitions per filler form, 4 per critical training form). Participants were given feedback on their answers. The critical testing phase included trials for the two remaining critical categories, i.e. the held-out set. This phase consisted of 48 trials (6 repetitions per form). Participants received no feedback during this phase.

Both experiments included a pre-training phase where participants were exposed only to the three singular person pronouns. This was done to familiarize participants with the set-up by using the less complex stimuli in terms of highlighting. At the end of both experiments, participants were given a debrief questionnaire, which included questions targeting how they interpreted the meanings they were taught. Importantly, most participants reported having understood the words as pronouns. For example, participants in Experiment 1B (Condition 2) described the meaning of form ‘A’ as ‘Me or us not including you’ and the meaning of form ‘B’
as ‘Us including you’. More details about the procedure of these experiments can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix.

2.1.4. Participants

A total of 197 English-speaking adults were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk for Experiment 1A (English-like group: 48, Person-contrast: 49, Number-contrast: 50, Random: 50). Two further participants were excluded for not being self-reported native speakers of English. Of these, 171 participants (English-like group: 44, Person-contrast: 41, Number-contrast: 41, Random: 45) responded accurately on more than 80% of exposure trials during the training phase and were considered for further analysis, according to our preregistered plan. Participants were paid 2 USD for their participation which lasted approximately 15 mins.

A different group of 253 English speakers were tested in Experiment 1B (Conditions 1: 87; Condition 2: 87; Condition 3: 79). Per our preregistered plan, participants were excluded if (a) their accuracy rates during exposure training were below 80%, or (b) they had not answered correctly more than 2/3 of the training trials. Note that high accuracy rates on trained critical items is important here because extrapolation of these forms is only interpretable if participants have learned them. This resulted in analysis of 131 participants (Conditions 1: 46; Condition 2: 49; Condition 3: 36). Participants were paid 2.5 USD for their participation which lasted approximately 20 mins.

2.2. Results

2.2.1. Experiment 1A

Figure 3 shows the proportion of correct responses in critical trials per experimental condition (English-like, Person-contrast, Number-contrast and Random-contrast) during the testing phase. We ran two logistic mixed-effects models (using the lme4 software package (Bates et al. 2014) in R (R Core Team 2018)) to evaluate the effect of the experimental condition on accuracy rates (coded as 0 or 1). Both models included by-participant random intercepts. Here and throughout, the standard alpha level of 0.05 was used to determine significance, and p-values were obtained based on asymptotic Wald tests.

A first model assessed whether the English-like pattern was learned better than the alternative paradigms. We used treatment contrast coding with the English-like paradigm as baseline, with each of the remaining conditions compared to this fixed level. The model revealed that the proportion of correct responses in the English-Like group was significantly higher than chance ($\beta = 1.78, p < .001$). Accuracy in the Person-contrast and Number-contrast groups did not differ significantly from the English-Like baseline (Person-contrast: $\beta = -.6; p = 0.093$; Number-contrast: $\beta = -0.38, p = .28$), however accuracy in the Random group was significantly lower than the baseline ($\beta = -1.24; p < .001$). This matches the visual pattern in Figure 3.

9Not all participants reported pronouns for these meanings. Interpreting participants’ responses in these cases is not straightforward. For example, a highly accurate participant reported the meaning of form ‘A’ to be ‘sisters’. This suggests that questionnaire responses do not necessarily convey what participants’ have implicitly learned. We therefore use questionnaire responses as a general sanity-check but rely on accuracy rates to draw conclusions about participants’ performance in the experiment.
Figure 2: Illustration of Exposure, What if... and Testing trials. Feedback was presented for 2000ms after response Exposure and What if... trials.
We ran a second model to explore the difference between feature-based and random patterns. The analysis was restricted to Number-contrast, Person-contrast and Random conditions. We used treatment coding with the Random condition as baseline. The proportion of correct responses in this baseline group was significantly higher than chance ($\beta = .58, p < .001$), but significantly lower than both feature-based conditions (Number-contrast: $\beta = .80, p < .01$; Person-contrast: $\beta = .62, p = .03$). This suggests that participants trained to make a (non-native) person or number contrast were more accurate than those trained on a random contrast.

2.2.2. Experiment 1B

Recall that participants in Experiment 1B were taught two pronominal forms (coded as forms ‘A’ and ‘B’), which they had to use to describe both a critical trained set, and a held-out set of person meanings involving the speaker (levels: EXCL.MIN, EXCL.AUG, INCL.MIN, INCL.AUG). Figure 4 shows the proportion of trials on which participants chose the form ‘A’ (pronoun) for each critical trained and held-out meaning during the test phase. Choice of the same form across categories indicates homophony. A visual inspection of Figure 4 suggests that participants in Condition 1 are consistently using one form for the EXCL.MIN category, and the other for the remaining three categories: this indicates inference of an English-like paradigm. Participants in Conditions 2 and 3 appear somewhat noisier in their responses, however, distinct patterns are evident. In Condition 2, one form is used for the two first person categories, and, at least for some participants, the other form is used for the two inclusive categories (consistent with maintenance of the person contrast, i.e., number homophony). In Condition 3, one
Figure 4: Proportion of form ‘A’ (as opposed to form ‘B’) choices for each first person category during the
test phase in Experiment 1B. Choice of the same form (A or B) across categories indicates homophony.
Error bars represent standard error on by-participant means; dots are means of individual participants.

form is used for the minimal categories, and the other for the plurals (consistent with mainte-
nance of the number contrast, i.e., person homophony). Note, however, that this figure shows
by-participant averages for each meaning category rather than which patterns individual partic-
ipants produced.

Figure 4 suggests that there is relatively little variation across participants in Condition 1
compared to the other conditions; almost all participants chose the same form for each cat-
egory, and they tended to do so categorically. To confirm this statistically, we calculated the
joint entropy of the held-out set for each individual. This value indicates the degree of uncer-
tainty or variability in each participants’ mapping of the trained forms to the held-out cate-
gories. Participants who are less consistent in their mapping will have higher joint entropy val-
ues. We then fit a linear regression model predicting joint entropy by Condition (3 levels). We
used treatment coding, with Condition 1 as baseline. No random effects were included in the
model, as each participant had a single joint entropy value. As predicted, joint entropy rates
were significantly higher for Conditions 2 and 3 (intercept: $\beta = .28$; vs. 2: $\beta = .44 \pm .13,$
$\ p < .001$; vs. 3: $\beta = .64 \pm .12,$ $\ p < .001$).

A second analysis evaluated whether individual participants in Conditions 2 and 3 were
more likely to infer feature-based rather than random patterns (as suggested by Figure 4).¹⁰
We calculated the probability that participants were deriving a feature-based pattern (either a
person contrast in Condition 2 or a number contrast in Condition 3) given their responses to
held-out meanings (see Figure A.2 in Appendix). In Condition 2, we computed the probability
of choosing form ‘A’ for the EXCL.MIN and form ‘B’ for the INCL.MIN; in Condition 3, the
probability of choosing form ‘A’ for the EXCL.MIN and form ‘B’ for the EXCL.AUG.

We then ran non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests per Condition to determine whether

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¹⁰This analysis diverges from our preregistered plan, which was designed to address this test this same prediction
with a different analysis method. We believe the current analysis is both simpler and also more technically sound.
the probability of deriving a feature-based pattern was higher than chance. Given that there were four paradigms compatible with the training in each condition, chance level was set at 25%. The results of these tests indicate that the probability of deriving a person contrast in Condition 2 was not significantly different than chance ($p = .406$), but the probability of deriving a number contrast in Condition 3 was above chance ($p < .001$). The same procedure was followed in Condition 1 with respect to the probability of deriving an English-like pattern. As expected, this probability was significantly higher than chance ($p < .001$).

2.3. Discussion

The main aim of these first two experiments was to test whether learners are sensitive to feature combinations, or contrasts, which are not present in their native language. We exposed English-speaking learners to paradigms expressing four person/number categories in a new language. We focused on systems instantiating either the inclusive/exclusive or the minimal/augmented contrasts, which have been argued to have a universal basis in two features, encoding person and number respectively (e.g. ±addressee, ±minimal). Our experiments also included an English-like paradigm, as a sanity check. We predicted that participants would find the English-like paradigm easiest to learn, followed by the two non-native-like feature-based homophony patterns, with random homophony being least learnable.

In Experiment 1A, we tested these predictions by training participants on one of four paradigms, and comparing how accurately they learned each one. Results confirmed a numeric advantage for native-like pronouns systems: learners found it easier to learn a paradigm with the same structure as English. Interestingly, there was no statistically significant difference in learnability between English-like systems and systems instantiating number or person homophony, suggesting that participants can readily learn other feature-based partitions as well. Results also confirmed that participants trained on a pronominal system with a (non-native) person or number homophony pattern outperformed those trained on a random homophony pattern. This supports the claim that learners perceive this 4-cell person space as the interaction of two distinct features, rather than as a conjunction of four different categories, fully independent from each other (in line with Sauerland and Bobaljik 2013). If learners divide the exclusive, inclusive, minimal and augmented categories into two natural semantic classes, one for person and one for number, then learning our systematic homophony paradigms simply involves one non-native contrast each.

These results were for the most part confirmed in Experiment 1B, where participants were trained on ambiguous data which required them to extrapolate trained forms to new meanings. Here, learners were significantly more likely to infer an English-like pattern. They were also more likely to infer a paradigm with a feature-based number contrast (and person-based homophony) than a random contrast, thus making productive use of the non-native ±minimal distinction. As noted above, in order to do so—i.e., to treat the $i$ (speaker only) and the $iu$ (speaker and addressee only) references as ‘minimal’—participants need to be sensitive not only to the minimal/augmented contrast but also to inclusive/exclusive one, as the dyad of speaker and addressee can only be considered a minimal unit if there is an inclusive category.

We did not find a significant difference in participants’ likelihood of inferring a feature-based person contrast (and number homophony) over a random one. In other words, after being trained on an inclusive/exclusive distinction in part of the paradigm (EXCL and INCL aug-
mented), participants did not generalize this contrast to the held-out cells of the paradigm. This suggests that although the non-native clusivity distinction is indeed learnable (in Experiment 1A), English learners do not necessarily make a productive use of it. The apparent difference between number and person homophony is supported by a posthoc analysis showing that accuracy rates on trained categories (before exclusion) are higher in Condition 3 than in Condition 2 ($p < .001$). The ±addressee person distinction in pronominal forms was thus harder to learn than the ±minimal distinction.

One possible explanation for this difference is that it reflects participants’ experience with homophony in English: since English encodes a (±atomic) number distinction, it is possible to characterize it as a system with (only) person homophony (i.e., a non-inclusive language Harbour 2016). In other words, English speakers have more experience with distinctions in number (in general) than in clusivity. 11

Alternatively, the fact that English speakers do not generalize this person contrast could be thought of as the result of applying a native constraint against such inclusive systems. In contrast with binary features accounts, some approaches (e.g., (Harley and Ritter 2002)) describe non-inclusive systems as making use of two privative features (Speaker and Addressee) together with a constraint that prevents these features co-occurring. Arguably, the apparent difficulty in generalizing the inclusive/exclusive distinction might suggest that English speakers have a harder time learning a distinction that violates a native constraint against the simultaneous specification of the Speaker and Addressee features. 12

To summarize, this study presents the first experimental evidence for differences in learnability between alternative person paradigms. Native-like paradigms, unsurprisingly, are easiest to learn and most likely to be inferred when input are ambiguous. More interestingly, paradigms exhibiting homophony within a natural class are learned (and in some cases inferred) more readily than paradigms with random homophony. In what follows, we build on these basic results to investigate more specific constraints on the person space hypothesized by feature-based theories of person.

3. Experiment 2: Within you, without you

In a classic paper from 1977, Zwicky made the following observation regarding the cross-linguistic distribution of person systems: In languages that do not distinguish clusivity (e.g. English), the you and us inclusive meaning is always expressed as a form of ‘us’, and never as a form of ‘you’ (or ‘them’). 13

11Importantly, our findings are not compatible with participants being only sensitive to the specific number distinctions found in English. Specifically, both Conditions 2 and 3 involve collapsing categories which are expressed as distinct pronouns—‘I’ and ‘we’—in English. While one could in principle argue that this explains why participants in Condition 2 are less likely to collapse exclusive minimal and augmented categories, this would not explain why participants in Condition 3 readily collapsed the exclusive and inclusive minimal.

12Note that the advantage for a paradigm with a number contrast over a person contrast (i.e., for person over number homophony) found in Experiment 1B contrasts with typological data, which suggests that languages with different pronominal forms for exclusive and inclusive persons but no number distinction are more common than minimal/augmented languages that do not make an inclusive contrast (Cysouw 2013). However, these counts are very sparse.

13This is a generalization about languages and not about individual paradigms within a language, which might show accidental homophony (see Harbour 2016, and examples therein).
At first glance, Zwicky’s generalization is quite surprising. Most feature-based approaches to person systems (e.g., Bobaljik 2008) assume that the inclusive person shares features with both the first exclusive (e.g. +speaker) and the second exclusive (e.g. +addressee). Indeed, a number of languages have inclusive pronouns that can be morphologically decomposed into first plus second forms (e.g., in Bislama, Harbour 2011). This leads naturally to the expectation that languages should be as likely to assimilate the inclusive with the second person as they are to assimilate it with the first. In contrast, no theory would predict the inclusive meaning to be homophonous with the third person, as the inclusive and the third person do not have any features in common (although see Rodrigues 1990, for a potential exception).

There have been two general approaches to Zwicky’s generalization in the literature. The first maintains the traditional set of features, but posits default feature specifications in order to predict an asymmetry between first-inclusive and second-inclusive (Harley and Ritter 2002, McGinnis 2005). Harley and Ritter (2002)’s feature-geometry account maintains both Speaker and Addressee features as dependent nodes of the feature Participant, but the Speaker feature is considered to be less marked than the Addressee feature. Consequently, in languages without an inclusive distinction, a preference for assimilating the inclusive meaning into the first person is expected, as they share the default feature. Defaults can be overridden, therefore the second-inclusive homophony pattern can still arise. By contrast, a third-inclusive system is impossible.

The second approach is to use a different set of features. Harbour (2016) posits ±author and ±participant, denoting the semi-lattices \{i\} and \{i, iu, u\} respectively, with the values of the features modelled as complementary operations on lattices. While in Harbour’s system the inclusive and second person categories do share “ontological” primitives—both of them contain \(u\)—the absence of an ±addressee feature—and of a lattice consisting of only \{u\}—creates an inherent asymmetry in how speaker and addressee roles can be represented in a person partition. This asymmetry derives Zwicky’s observation as a strong constraint on possible person systems. A language which makes use of the ±author feature will have a bipartition of the person space in which \(i\) and \(iu\) are homophonous and \(u\) and \(o\) are homophonous. Similarly, a language with both ±author and ±participant can have a tripartition (if ±participant feature composes last, see Harbour 2016, for details) in which \(i\) and \(iu\) are homophonous (with two additional forms for \(u\) and \(o\)), or a quadripartition (if the participant feature composes first). Without a corresponding ±addressee feature, though, there is no way to have a system which picks out the set including \(iu\) and \(u\). Indeed tripartitions involving homophony between inclusive and second person or inclusive and third person are both equally impossible.

The theories outlined above differ critically in how second-inclusive and third-inclusive are treated. For Harley and Ritter (2002), third-inclusive is singled out as underivable, while second-inclusive is possible but more marked than first-inclusive. By contrast, Harbour (2016)
takes as its starting point the idea that only first-inclusive tripartitions can be generated by the grammar. Based on the typology alone, it is impossible to adjudicate between these theories: both second- and third-inclusive patterns are unattested. Moreover, neither theory provides an explicit mechanism for linking the feature-based representations (and operations) they posit to typology. The implicit link is learnability: only a subset of possible person partitions are learnable by humans, or alternatively, some are learned more readily than others. In Experiment 2, we investigate learners’ sensitivity to predicted asymmetries among non-inclusive paradigms. To do this, we use an ease-of-learning design: we train English-speaking learners on a new language with an inclusive that is a form of ‘us’ (first-inclusive), a form of ‘you all’ (second-inclusive) or a form of ‘them’ (third-inclusive), and compare how well they are learned. Given that English features first-inclusive homophony and this is the only tripartition systematically attested in the typology, learners are predicted to prefer such paradigms over alternatives. Regarding second-inclusive and third-inclusive homophony, if both patterns are directly ruled out by the grammar (à la Harbour 2016), learners should be equally unlikely to learn either of them. By contrast, if learners are sensitive to the featural commonalities between the inclusive and the second person (e.g. +addressee), a second-inclusive system should be easier to learn than a third-inclusive one (Harley and Ritter 2002, McGinnis 2005). This pattern of results would suggest that an asymmetry between first-inclusive and second-inclusive languages should not be encoded as a hard constraint on person systems (contra Harbour 2016).

3.1. Methods

This experiment, including all hypotheses, predictions, and analyses, was preregistered here. All materials, data and scripts are provided here. This experiment was implemented using the JavaScript library JsPsych (De Leeuw 2015), a presented in a web browser.

3.1.1. Design

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, summarized in Table 6. Participants in all conditions were taught three pronominal forms mapped to four plural person categories (first exclusive, inclusive, second exclusive, and third). Note that in this experiment we rely on a singular/plural (not minimal/augmented) number contrast, with no number distinction in the INCL. Conditions differed in whether the inclusive meaning was assimilated into the first plural (First-Inclusive condition), the second plural (Second-Inclusive condition), or the third plural (Third-Inclusive condition).

Table 6: Conditions in Experiment 2. Grayed cells are mapping to a single pronominal form, white cells to different and distinct forms.
Table 7: Highlighted family members for each person category. 1 EXCL, 2 and 3 plural categories randomly include one or two additional others; the inclusive category could refer to speaker and addressee alone or include as well one or two others. In this experiment, there is no distinction between minimal and augmented but rather between singular/atomic and plural.

Participants in all three conditions were also exposed to three additional distinct pronominal forms corresponding to the first, second, and third singular persons. Participants’ learning of these forms was used as an exclusion criteria (see below).

3.1.2. Materials

The language consisted of 6 different pronominal forms: 3 forms were used for the plural pronouns (critical categories), and 3 different forms were used for the singular pronouns (filler categories). For each participant, these were randomly drawn from a list of 8 CVC words (see Experiment 1).

Pronouns were again used as one-word answers to English interrogative sentences of the form ‘Who will...?’, randomly drawn from a list of 60 different tokens. Meanings were expressed by highlighting a subset of family-member, as in Table 7. Visual stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1.

3.1.3. Procedure

The general backstory was as in Experiment 1. Participants were instructed to figure out the meanings of the words in the new language, and they were told that the words they were learning were not names. As in Experiment 1, the speaker and addressee roles switched several times during the experiment to highlight that the words were context dependent.

The experiment had two phases, each composed of exposure and testing blocks (e.g., Figure 5). Trials in each of these blocks were analogous to those used in Experiment 1, except that participants had to select the correct word for that meaning among three different options (not two).

During the first phase, participants were trained and tested on the three singular pronouns. There were a total of 12 exposure and 12 testing trials (4 repetitions per form/meaning). Participants who responded accurately to at least 2/3 of the testing trials in this phase (8 correct responses) moved on to the second critical phase. This phase was composed to two alternating exposure and testing blocks targeting the mapping between three plural pronouns and four person meanings. There were a total of 24 exposure trials (6 repetitions per meaning) and 48
Figure 5: Illustration of Exposure and Testing trials for the EXCL.PL category.
testing trials (12 repetitions per meaning). More details about the experimental procedure are provided in Table A.2.

The order of presentation of meanings was fully randomized within exposure and testing blocks for each participant. As in Experiment 1, participants were given a debrief at the end of the experiment to check how they interpreted the forms they were trained on. For example, participants in the Second-Inclusive condition described the critical form as ‘me and you or you all’ or as ‘group containing Ann or Mary’.

3.1.4. Participants
A total of 320 English-speaking adults were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (First-inclusive group: 109, Second-inclusive group: 101, Third-inclusive: 110). This does not include workers who were excluded for not being self-reported native speakers of English (10) and participants who failed to pass an attention check (AC) included at the very beginning of the experiment (35). This AC was added because our exit questionnaires in Experiment 1 revealed that many participants had not read the instruction or were bots (Rouse 2015). While these participants were usually excluded by our other criteria, the AC allowed us to filter them out in advance, distinguishing them from participants who just found the experiment hard. 167 participants responded accurately on more than 8 singular testing trials and were allowed to continue with the critical plural pronoun phase, according to our preregistered plan (First-inclusive group: 57, Second-inclusive group: 55, Third-inclusive: 55). These participants were paid 3.5 USD for their participation (which lasted approximately 20 mins), and 1 USD otherwise.

3.2. Results
Mean accuracy rates on testing trials during the critical phase are given in Figure 6. The effect of Condition and Block on accuracy rates was analyzed using logistic mixed-effect models with random by-participant intercepts and by-block slopes.17

We first compared First-Inclusive with Second-Inclusive and Third-Inclusive conditions (contrasts were treatment coded, with First-Inclusive and Block 2 as baselines). The model intercept was significant, indicating that accuracy in the First-Inclusive (Block 2) was above chance ($\beta = 1.59; p < .001$). In addition, compared to the First-Inclusive, accuracy was significantly lower in the Third-inclusive ($\beta = -1.83; p < .001$), and marginally lower in the Second-inclusive ($\beta = -0.572; p = .055$).

We then compared the Second-inclusive and Third-inclusive conditions (contrasts were treatment coded, with Second-inclusive and Block 2 as baseline). The model intercept was significantly, indicating that accuracy in the Second-inclusive (Block 2) was above chance ($\beta = 0.97; p < .001$). Accuracy was significantly lower in the Third-inclusive ($\beta = -1.2; p < .001$).18

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17There were two testing blocks in the critical phase, each preceded by an exposure block. Participants were generally expected to improve with accumulated exposure, but this improvement could vary across conditions. Each model included the effect of Block on accuracy, as well as the interaction with Condition. However, we report here only simple effects regarding the second testing block. The complete model output can be found here.

18Following our preregistration, we ran a second version of each of these models, restricting the analysis to inclusive meanings (since our hypotheses targets the inclusive category specifically). The same pattern of results emerged.
Figure 6: Accuracy rates in critical testing trials by condition in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard error on by-participant means; gray dots represent individual participant means. Dashed black line indicates chance value (for three-options forced-choice.)

3.3. Discussion

These findings confirm that participants are most successful at learning a new language that features homophony between inclusive and first person meanings. This is as expected since this pattern is systematically found in the typology, and reflects our English-speaking participants’ native system. If Harbour (2016) is correct in deriving a hard constraint on tripartitions which generates only first-inclusive homophony, then we might expect this preference to be very strong indeed. However, the difference in accuracy between the First-inclusive and Second-inclusive conditions was only marginally significant. This result is consistent with the idea that learners are sensitive to the featural overlap between inclusive and second person, as predicted by Bobaljik (2008), Harley and Ritter (2002), McGinnis (2005). Participants in the Second-Inclusive condition may be treating these as a natural class, relying on a shared feature to learn the partition. This result supports a theory in which first- and second-inclusive tripartitions are both generated by the grammar, but the latter is dispreferred (contra Harbour 2016, and possibly Ackema and Neeleman 2013, 2018, but see fn. 16).¹⁹

¹⁹Alternatively, as Daniel Harbour (p.c.) points out, one could argue that our participants are treating the pronominal system we teach them as an instance of syncretism within an otherwise inclusive language. If this were the case, theories like Harbour (2016) could still account for our results. In Harbour’s system, inclusive languages are quadripartitions of the person space. Underlying quadripartitions might show feature-based syncretism of inclusive and second person in some paradigms, as these categories do share a +participant feature. However, given that our participants are speakers of a non-inclusive language, it seems very unlikely that they would infer an underlying quadripartition based on a 3-forms pronominal system. Alternatively, because Harbour (2016) posits a shared ontological primitive, u, potentially linking inclusive and second person, one could reason that participants in the experiment are relying on this ontological/semantic overlap to learn the system, without paying attention to the features
Importantly, we also found that learners have a bias against systems that assimilate the inclusive into the third person. This result reveals that second- and third-inclusive systems, despite being (generally) unattested in the typology, are not equal from a learnability perspective: there is a stronger pressure against third-inclusive than second-inclusive homophony. This is again as predicted by theories like Bobaljik 2008, Harley and Ritter 2002, McGinnis 2005 (but arguably also by Ackema and Neeleman 2013, 2018) which posit that, unlike first and second person, third person does not form a natural class with the inclusive category (cf. e.g., Rodrigues 1990). As a result, homophony between inclusive and third persons is not predicted to occur systematically, though it might arise accidentally. The learnability cost for third-inclusive systems can be therefore seen as another case of a bias against random homophony.

Returning to Zwicky’s observation, our findings suggest that the typological asymmetry between alternative non-inclusive systems may not have a simple correlate with learning. In the typology, first-inclusive systems are attested systematically, while second- and third-inclusive systems are not; in our experiment, third-inclusive systems were clearly dispreferred, but the advantage for first-inclusive over second was much weaker. While this is consistent with a theory positing weak learning biases (i.e., constraints that can be over-ridden given sufficient evidence) which penalize third-inclusive most, it still leaves the typological data partially unexplained.

One possibility is that there is an additional weak bias, not at play in our experiments, which further advantages first-inclusive systems. An obvious such candidate is a general egocentric bias, i.e., increased importance or salience of the speaker to him or herself (Charney 1980, Loveland 1984, Moyer et al. 2015). If individuals perceive the world as a function of their presence in it, they may be more likely to adopt categorization systems which preserve this distinction. This would lead to an asymmetry between first-inclusive and second-inclusive systems. This bias may be weakened in the context of our experiment, where participants are passive learners and do not themselves feature in the meanings they are learning. We return to this issue in the General Discussion.

In the next section, we investigate a second typological generalization that appears to challenge the categorical distinction between participants and non-participants suggested by Zwicky’s generalization.

4. **Experiment 3: I me mine**

It has long been observed that there is a fundamental difference between person categories involving speech act participants (first exclusive, inclusive and second persons) and the third person, which refers to other, non-participant individuals. Besides having a fixed reference, which does not depend on discourse roles, in a number of languages the third person is treated as morphologically distinct from other person categories (Forchheimer 1953; see summary in Harley and Ritter 2002). These facts have often led researchers to propose that the third person is unmarked with respect to first and second person categories (Benveniste 1971), which are instead encompassed by the same natural class—participant (Hale 1973, Silverstein 1976, Noyer 1992). Here we will focus on one specific instantiation of this proposal, Harley and Ritter themselves. However, if that were the case, one would need to explain why this does not lead to second-inclusive systems in the typology.
ter (2002)’s feature-geometry approach (henceforth, H&R).

H&R capture the intuition that the third person is unmarked by treating it as the default interpretation of the base node (called Referring Expression). First exclusive, first inclusive and second require the presence of the dependent node Participant. An illustration of H&R’s geometry is reproduced from above in Figure 7.

![Figure 7: Feature geometry account in Harley and Ritter (2002). The underlined daughter node Speaker represents the default interpretation of the bare Participant node. Languages may or may not allow both dependent nodes to be specified together. If they do, the inclusive category is obtained when Speaker and Addressee are present simultaneously.](image)

Despite accounting for a number of interesting typological patterns, H&R’s system (and others alike, McGinnis 2005, Béjar 2003) is potentially challenged by the cross-linguistic distribution of person homophony patterns. Specifically, these approaches cannot account for the following typological observation, repeated from above

(2) Languages that feature homophony between second and third person categories and between first and second are more frequent than those instantiating first-third homophony (Baerman et al. 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2+3 homophony</th>
<th>1+2 homophony</th>
<th>1+3 homophony</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Pr: 5/200</td>
<td>Pr: 1/200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agr: 13/111</td>
<td>Agr: 11/111</td>
<td>Agr: 5/111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Illustration of 1+2, 2+3, and 1+3 homophony patterns. Colours indicate forms: cells with the same color use the same form. Typological counts for pronominal systems (Pr) are from Cysouw’s data set (Baerman et al. 2005, from Cysouw 2003), and counts for verbal agreement (Agr) are from the Surrey Person Syncretism database Baerman et al. (2005), Corbett et al. (2002).

The numerically higher frequency of first with second (1+2) and second with third (2+3) systems relative to first with third (1+3) systems is illustrated in Table 8. This tendency is found in both free pronouns and in verbal agreement, but it is restricted to non-singular or

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20This generalisation does not directly concern the inclusive category, as it mostly holds for non-inclusive languages, where the inclusive is collapsed with the first exclusive person. For the sake of simplicity, we therefore remove the inclusive from the discussion, and refer to the both first inclusive and exclusive persons as the first (1) person category.
number-neutral contexts (i.e., it doesn’t hold for singular cases). Note that 2+3 homophony is also numerically more common than 1+2 patterns. We return to this in the Discussion section.

In H&R, 1+2 homophony can arise through neutralization of the Addressee node, and 1+2+3 can arise through complete underspecification of the Participant distinction. By contrast, there is no way for 1+3 or 2+3 homophony patterns to be derived via feature neutralization. This leads to the expectation that 1+2 homophony will arise systematically and will therefore be more common than both 1+3 and 2+3 homophony, which should in turn be equally unlikely to arise (i.e. only through accidental homophony). This does not match up with the typological counts in Table 8.

Ackema and Neeleman (2013, 2018) (henceforth A&N) propose an alternative theory of person partly designed to better account for the relative frequency of these homophony patterns. A&N redefine the person space in terms of two privative person features, PROX (for ‘proximate’) and DIST (for ‘distal’). In line with Harbour (2016), they interpret these features as functions that operate on an input set to deliver a subset as output. The crucial aspect of this account for our purposes is that the semantic specification of these two features implies that one is shared by first and second person (PROX), while the other is shared by second and third person (DIST). The immediate consequence is that both 1+2 and 2+3 homophony can be generated, depending on which one of the two features (PROX or DIST) is left underspecified. In contrast, no feature is shared uniquely by the first and the third person (while excluding second person), ruling out the existence of a 1+3 homophony pattern.

A&N also predict an asymmetry between 1+2 and 2+3 homophony patterns (Peter Ackema, p.c.). In their system, the second person category is the product of applying first PROX and then DIST. If a language doesn’t have a spell-out rule for this feature structure, it might in principle collapse the second person with the first (based on the PROX feature) or with the third (based on the DIST feature). However, according to the authors, there is a general principle (the ‘Russian Doll principle’) such that spell-out rules cannot apply to ‘inner’ features without also mentioning ‘outer’ features, while the reverse is possible. Given that PROX is the inner-most feature in the second person structure, 2+3 homophony patterns are predicted to be more common than 1+2 ones.

To summarize, the cross-linguistic observation outlined above is well accounted for by A&N (and Harbour 2016), whereas it is problematic for H&R (and similar approaches). However, the typological data this generalization is built on is extremely sparse and the magnitude of the differences is small: of approximately 200 languages sampled in Cysouw (2003), the

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21 The counts in Baerman et al. (2005) for personal pronouns and verbal agreement are drawn from two different typological samples, making the counts not fully comparable to each other. In what follows, we specifically focus on pronoun systems.

22 In a nutshell, A&N assume that PROX and DIST features operate on a set containing all the possible sets of person referents as nested subsets. That is: the set containing all potential referents (S_iuo) contains a subset containing only speaker and addressee referents (S_iu), which in turn contains a subset of only speaker referents (S_i). The feature PROX operates on an input set and discards its outermost “layer”, whereas DIST selects this outermost layer. It is easy to see that in order to obtain, for example, the first person referent one would need to apply the PROX feature twice, as PROX(S_iuo) = (S_iu) and PROX(S_iu) = S_i.

23 A similar asymmetry can roughly be derived by Harbour (2016). Note that this is generally in line with traditional accounts of person systems in which 2 and 3 are grouped as a natural class under the feature [−speaker] (Forchheimer 1953, Noyer 1992, Pertsova 2011).
most frequent 2+3 homophony pattern is attested in the pronominal systems of only 14 languages, and the least common 1+3 is attested in one (see Baerman et al. 2005, p.60). The limitations discussed above for typological data are therefore present here in spades. But the issue is an important one: is the traditional and perhaps more intuitive distinction between discourse participants and non-participants central to the organisation of the person space? Or alternatively, is it one asymmetry among potentially many? In what follows, we use the experimental paradigm developed above to bring learnability data to bear on this question.

Using the extrapolation paradigm (cf. Experiment 1B), we measure learners’ likelihood of inferring each of the relevant patterns after training on an incomplete paradigm. Participants are taught the meaning of two pronominal forms, which correspond to a subset of person categories, and they are then tested on how they extrapolate these forms to the remaining category. For example, some learners are taught two distinct forms for first and second person, and then tested on which of those forms they use to express the held-out third person meaning. If they use the first person form to express the new third person meaning, then they have inferred a 1+3 homophony pattern. A different pattern of extrapolation would indicate 2+3 homophony, as described in Table 9. Harley and Ritter (2002) predict that learners will be more likely to infer 1+2 homophony relative to both 2+3 and 1+3 homophony patterns. Ackema and Neeleman (2013, 2018) predict that learners will be equally likely to infer either 2+3 or 1+2 homophony patterns, but less likely to infer 1+3 homophony.

4.1. Methods

This experiment, including all hypotheses, predictions, and analyses, was preregistered here. All materials, data and scripts can be found here. This experiment was implemented using JavaScript, and presented in a web browser.

4.1.1. Design

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, summarized in Table 9. Conditions differ on which subset of two person categories was used for training and which category was held-out. The training set determines which patterns of homophony participants can extrapolate to: Condition 1 is consistent with 1+2 and 1+3, Condition 2 with 1+2 and 2+3, and Condition 3 with 2+3 and 1+3 patterns. The specific predictions of each account given this design are summarized in the two right-most columns of Table 9. Note that both accounts make the same predictions for Condition 1, but differ in their predictions for Conditions 2 and 3.

All participants were additionally exposed to another two pronominal forms which correspond to the singular alternatives of the plural pronouns they are trained on. The person categories for singular forms were always the same as the critical plural forms for a given participant, and were determined by condition (see Table 9). For example, participants in Condition 1 were additionally exposed to second and third singular pronouns.

4.1.2. Materials

The language consisted of four different pronominal forms: two plural forms (critical categories) and two singular forms (filler categories). These four lexical items were drawn from
Table 9: Summary of Conditions in Experiment 3. There are two training and one held-out (in bold) categories per condition. Each training category is mapped into a different pronominal form (A or B), schematically represented with light and dark gray. Participants must use the training forms they learned (A or B) to express the held-out meaning (white cells with ‘A or B?’). The two right-most columns state which of the compatible paradigms participants are predicted to infer under Harley and Ritter (2002, H&R) and Ackema and Neeleman (2013,2018, A&N) accounts.

the same list of 8 CVC items used in Experiments 1 and 2. The reference of the pronouns was expressed by highlighting a subset of family-members, as in Table 5, except that in this experiment the inclusive category was never expressed. Visual stimuli were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2.

4.1.3. Procedure

After being introduced to the general backstory (cf. Experiments 1 and 2), participants were instructed to figure out the meanings of the words in the new language. Participants were given an example trial with an English pronoun (‘her’ or ‘me’ depending on the condition) that would help them understand that the words they were learning were pronouns. As in the previous experiments, the speaker and addressee roles switched during the experiment to reinforce the context dependent meaning of the forms.

The experiment had two training phases followed by a testing phase, the structure of which were exactly as described for Experiment 1B. The only difference was in the person categories instantiated by the highlighting (see Figure 8). Briefly, the two training phases were composed of exposure and what if... trials; the testing phase involved trials in which a referent set was highlighted and participants had to choose the corresponding form. Participants were given feedback after exposure and what if... trials, but not after testing trials. The order of presentation of meanings was fully randomized within phases for each participant.

In the first training phase (16 trials), participants were trained on two singular (filler) forms. After this first training, participants were asked to type in a meaning for the two words they had learned, and they were given feedback on their answers. Unlike Experiment 2, participants were not excluded based on their performance with these singular items in this phase, since participants were told what they mean and they are not used for extrapolation. In the second
Figure 8: Illustration of Exposure and Testing trials in Experiment 3.
training phase (28 trials), participants were trained on both filler and critical meanings. Finally, in the testing phase the critical held-out meanings were added. There were 24 trials in this phase, eight of which were repetitions of the held-out meanings. As in previous experiments, participants completed a debrief questionnaire at the end of the experiment. A summary of the procedure is given in the Appendix (Table A.3).

4.1.4. Participants

259 English-speaking adults (Condition 1:74, Condition 2:86, Condition 3:99) who had not participated in one of our previous experiments were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Five additional participants were excluded for not being self-reported native speakers of English, and 30 for failing to pass the attentional checks (ACs) included in the experiment. We included two ACs: one at the very beginning of the experiment (before starting the training), and a second one before starting with the testing. Per our preregistration, participants who did not pass both attentional checks did not contribute to our sample. Per pre-established exclusion criteria (as in Experiment 1), participants who failed to perform accurately in at least 66% of each training category (4/6) during the testing phase were excluded from the analyses. The data of 152 participants were kept for the analyses (Condition 1:48, Condition 2:54, Condition 3:50). All participants were paid 2.5 USD for their participation which lasted approximately 15 minutes.

4.2. Results

Recall that participants were taught two pronominal forms (coded as forms ‘A’ and ‘B’), which they had to use to describe both a critical set of two trained categories as well as a third held-out meaning. Figure 9 shows the proportion of trials on which participants chose the pronominal form coded as ‘A’ during the testing phase, for each category and condition. For Condition 1, Figure 9 shows a mixed pattern of responses for the held-out meaning (first person plural): some participants used the trained second person form (coded as ‘A’), some the third person form (coded as ‘B’), and others behaved randomly (i.e. no consistent pattern of response). By contrast, participants in Conditions 2 and 3 appear to have inferred a consistent paradigm: in both cases, participants largely used the same form (coded as ‘A’) for second and third person meanings (regardless of what the trained meaning was).

To compare performance across conditions, we ran a logistic mixed-effect model predicting form ‘A’ choices in held-out trials by Condition (3 levels). Recall that the meaning of the pronominal form coded as ‘A’ differed depending on Condition (see Mapping in Table 9). The model used treatment coding, with Condition 2 as baseline, and included random by-participant intercepts.

The model revealed that participants in Condition 2 (baseline) were significantly above chance in selecting ‘form A’ for the held-out category ($\hat{\beta} = 4.15; p < .001^{***}$). In this condition, the trained meaning of form ‘A’ was third person, and the held-out category was second, therefore this result confirms that participants inferred a 2+3 (rather than a 1+2) homophony pattern. In Condition 3, the trained meaning of form ‘A’ was second person, and the held-out category was the third. Therefore if participants in this condition are not significantly different from the baseline, this would suggest they also inferred 2+3 homophony, and to the same de-
gree as participants in Condition 2. This is confirmed by the model (\(\beta = 0.614; p = 0.047\)). By contrast, the model revealed a significantly lower proportion of form ‘A’ responses for held-out items in Condition 1 compared to the baseline (\(\beta = -4.8; p < 0.001^{***}\)). In this condition, the trained meaning of form ‘A’ was second person, and the held-out category was first person. Therefore we can conclude that participants did not infer 1+2 homophony to the same degree that participants in Conditions 2 and 3 inferred 2+3 homophony.

These results were further confirmed by two separate, intercept-only models for Conditions 1 and 3. For Condition 3, the proportion of form ‘A’ responses was significantly above chance (\(\beta = 3.78; p < 0.001^{***}\)), again indicating that as in Condition 2, they inferred a 2+3 rather than a 1+2 system. By contrast, the proportion of form ‘A’ responses was not above chance for Condition 1 (\(\beta = -0.72; p = 0.29\)), indicating that they did not show a clear preference between 1+2 or 1+3 homophony.\[24\]

Figure 9: Proportion of form ‘A’ choices by condition during the testing phase. Choice of the same form across categories indicates homophony. Error bars represent standard error on by-participant means; dots represent individual participant means.

4.3. Discussion

Results from Experiment 3 show that participants consistently inferred paradigms that feature 2+3 homophony whenever their training was compatible with this (Conditions 2 and 3). That is, learners preferred systems that collapse the second and third person categories to alternative homophony patterns. When 2+3 homophony was not available to participants (Condition 1), there was no stable pattern of responses: some participants used the same form for first and second, some used the same form for first and third, and others alternated randomly between the two.

\[24\]This is further confirmed by a debrief questionnaire where participants were asked to provide information about the meanings of each of the pronouns. Most participants in Conditions 2 and 3 reported that the second and third person meanings were mapped into the same form.
This result is in direct contrast to the prediction we derived from Harley and Ritter (2002). This theory is designed to derive 1+2 homophony, and not 2+3 homophony. Further it does not distinguish 2+3 from 1+3 homophony. Ackema and Neeleman (2013, 2018) fare slightly better, as their theory posits that second and third person form a natural class (DIST) that excludes the first person. This predicts that 2+3 homophony patterns should be preferred over 1+3 patterns, in accordance with our results (Forchheimer 1953, Bobaljik 2008, see also binary features accounts:). However, by also positing a feature shared between first and second (PROX), this theory predicts an asymmetry between 1+2 and 1+3 homophony, not attested in our findings (similar predictions are made by Harbour (2016)). Thus, while the pattern of results in our experiment are quite clear, they do not straightforwardly match the predictions of either account.

Our results, however, do mirror what one might deem the most obvious typological asymmetry in Table 8: paradigms featuring 2+3 homophony are the most common (see Table 9). Interestingly, an analogous pattern is found in the distribution of person systems across sign languages, where second and third person are consistently homophonous in both pointing signs and in other grammatical constructions (Meier 1990, Neidle et al. 2000), as well as in the spatial deixis domain: most locative systems (e.g. here/there in English) rely on a distinction between spaces in the vicinity of the speaker (1) and spaces not in the vicinity of the speaker (2+3) (Harbour 2016). This match between our results and typology suggests the possibility that some additional force is at play, which distinguishes first and second person, even if they do form a natural class.

To summarize, recall that at issue here was the special status of the ±participant distinction in driving homophony. Theories based on the traditional set of binary features, like Harley and Ritter (2002), are designed to capture this particular natural class, thus predicting systematic homophony between speech act participants, i.e., first and second person. Our results do not bear this out. Rather, behavior appears to be consistent with a preference to distinguish the speaker from others: Person systems that distinguish between participants and non-participants—making use of the PROX or the ±participant features—seem to be dispreferred over systems that make use of the ±speaker or DIST features. The preference for 2+3 systems in our experiment might then lie in participants’ unwillingness to lose a distinction they have learned between forms that include and forms that exclude the speaker.

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25 In principle, English speakers might be extrapolating their experience with the locatives here and there, which make a 2+3 partition of the space, to the person space (Daniel Harbour, p.c.). However, this would be rather surprising in our view.

26 It’s worth briefly discussing two alternative interpretations of our experimental results. First, it could be that the little sister was treated as a speech-act participant rather than as a third person referent—for example because she is spatially close to the speaker and hearer (Peter Ackema, p.c.). To address this possibility, we re-ran one condition of this experiment with a different set of images where the little sister was seated in the background together with the parents. The results replicate the findings reported here, suggesting this is not an issue (see Appendix; Figure A.3). Second, participants might think the speaker (the girl with the hat) is in some cases directly addressing the others (e.g., parents) instead of the intended hearer (the girl asking the questions). If an addressee-shift of this sort were at play, there would be no ‘true’ third person, explaining why participants derive what seems to be a 2+3 pattern (as suggested by Klaus Abels, p.c.). However, in the post-experiment debrief, most participants (across all three conditions) use a third person pronoun to describe the meaning of the form referring to others as ‘them’, and not ‘you’. This suggests they do not in fact interpret the speaker as directly addressing the others.

27 The extrapolation paradigm we use is designed to target precisely this kind of effect. An ease of learning design, by contrast, may be more likely to tap purely into learners’ perceptions of how natural it is for two categories (e.g.,
speaker-distinctiveness was partly discussed in the context of Zwicky’s generalization and Experiment 2 above. We therefore return to this issue in the General Discussion below.

5. General discussion

The main aim of the experiments reported here was to bring behavioral evidence from learning to bear on how person systems are represented, and whether they are subject to universal constraints on possible partitions. We see our results as making three main contributions: (i) we provide confirmatory evidence that the person space is represented in terms of primitive features, (ii) we point to the need for restrictions on patterns of inclusive homophony based on weak biases rather than hard-and-fast constraints, (iii) we provide new evidence for an asymmetry between 2+3 and other two-way homophony patterns involving 1 (EXCL+INCL), 2 and 3 person categories. We first summarize each of these in turn, and then discuss a number of broader issues raised by our results as a whole.

In Experiment 1, we sought to provide evidence that the person space is represented as an interacting set of universal features. While this idea forms the basis of most theories of Person in the theoretical linguistics literature, to-date the link with learnability has been left implicit. However, these theories make testable predictions: if learners represent the person space as the interaction of a (primitive) set of person features, then categories which form a natural class should be readily mapped to the same phonological form (as formalized in Pertsova 2011, among many others). The learner must simply determine which feature(s) are underspecified. A set of cells which cannot be characterized as constituting a natural class arguably requires learners to first learn the different categories (i.e., as feature bundles) and then independently learn to map the relevant set to a phonological form. Thus a feature-based theory of the person space predicts that paradigms with this kind of random homophony should be less readily learned than homophony among meanings with a shared feature. By contrast, if learners perceive the person space as a simple conjunction of four person categories (first, inclusive, second and third), then there is no basis for predicting that some homophony patterns should be more learnable than others.

The predictions of feature-based approaches to person were borne out in Experiment 1: homophony patterns among forms sharing a feature were indeed easier to learn, and more likely to be inferred when extrapolating a known form to a new meaning. This was the case even though the specific features involved are not active in participants’ native language, suggesting that this is how these systems are represented. These findings draw an obvious parallel with recent work in phonology, showing that rules that can be characterized based on features (or natural classes) are easier to learn than rules which group together a set of featurally-distinct segments (e.g., Saffran and Thiessen 2003, Cristià and Seidl 2008, Moreton and Pater 2012, among many others). This suggests that feature-based representations are relevant for learning across domains, although the set of relevant features is of course domain-specific.

In Experiment 2, we turned to Zwicky’s well-known observation that person partitions without an inclusive distinction assimilate inclusive with the first person (rather than the second or third). Different approaches to person treat this apparently strong asymmetry differently. Harbour (2016) and Ackema and Neeleman (2018) are purpose-built to derive first+inclusive

1st and 2nd) to share a form. For some evidence suggesting this, see here.
tripartitions only (though Ackema and Neeleman 2018, may also be able to generate second+inclusive homophony). However, approaches like Harley and Ritter (2002) can derive both first+inclusive and second+inclusive (though the latter is more marked).

Again, cashing out the predictions of these theories in terms of learnability, we tested whether homophony of the inclusive with first, second, or third were treated distinctly by learners. We found that third+inclusive homophony was particularly problematic, while first+inclusive had only a weak advantage over second+inclusive. In accordance with Harley and Ritter (2002), this suggests that there is no hard constraint against systems which systematically collapse second and inclusive persons, rather inclusive can form a natural class with both the first and second, though not (readily) with the third.

Finally, in Experiment 3, we provided new evidence for a learning-based asymmetry between partitions with homophony between second and third person (2+3) on the one hand, and both first-second (1+2) and first-third (1+3) homophony patterns on other. While the former were readily inferred by our participants, the latter were not. This result roughly matches an asymmetry found in the typological distribution for pronominal systems. However, it is problematic under the assumption that all homophony patterns targeting meanings that share a feature should be equally possible. Indeed, theories like Harley and Ritter (2002), which posit that first and second person form a salient natural class—of speech act participants—would predict that 1+2 homophony should if anything have a learnability advantage. Alternative approaches such as Ackema and Neeleman (2018) and Harbour (2016) posit common features between both first and second categories, and between second and third, therefore the most straightforward prediction from this is a specific learnability disadvantage for 1+3 homophony. Participants in Experiment 3 instead consistently inferred 2+3 whenever this was consistent with the input they were trained one, while 1+2 and 1+3 were equally dispreferred.

To summarize, our results suggest that learners represent the person space in units which are smaller than person categories (features) and that instantiate natural classes. Natural class-based similarity therefore clearly plays an important role in determining how humans partition this person space. Indeed, a bias towards patterns based on natural class similarity pushes learners to preferentially collapse categories that share features (when they are required to do so). Our results support the claim that inclusive and second person should be included in the set of natural classes in this domain. However, there is also reason to believe that a bias for keeping the speaker distinct may also be at play. Indeed, our findings are compatible with the idea that natural class-based similarity, and speaker- (or ego-)based distinctiveness may be two independent forces influencing the learnability of person systems. In Experiment 2, the partition characterized by first-inclusive homophony was learned most readily and is consistent with both of these pressures: it involves homophony among meanings which share a feature, +speaker, and keeps person categories implicating the speaker distinct from other categories. The second-inclusive homophony pattern is the next best, involving homophony among shared meanings, but not maintaining speaker categories as distinct from others. In Experiment 3, these two pressures led learners to infer 2+3 whenever they can—again among the options presented to learners in this case, 2+3 homophony is the only one to both involve categories.

28 Ackema and Neeleman’s system does derive second-inclusive systems (violating Zwicky’s generalization) whenever (a) PROX and PROX-PROX have different phonological realisations, and (b) there is an impoverishment of DIST in the plural when it’s a dependent of PROX.
that are highly similar and forms which keep the speaker category distinct. The fit is not perfect: in principle, as noted above, we might have expected the first-inclusive advantage to be stronger, and 1+2 homophony to be preferred over 1+3. One possibility is that our failure to find these differences might be the result of particular features of our experimental design. For example, a difference in learnability between 1+2 and 1+3 might be revealed in an ease of learning experiment (cf. Experiment 2), where resorting the preferred 2+3 pattern is not possible.

In our discussion of Experiment 2, we suggested that a speaker distinctiveness bias may be the result of the cognitive importance of the ego (see Dixon 1994). As mentioned above, research on early pronoun acquisition has argued for an egocentric bias, whereby children perceive the world as a function of their presence on it and adopt categorisation systems that carry this distinction (Charney 1980, Loveland 1984, Moyer et al. 2015). This is also supported by the fact that perspective-taking appears to be a capacity that takes time to develop; infants and young children do not always succeed on so-called theory of mind tasks which require them to recognize that their internal knowledge states are not the same as other people’s (e.g., see Ruffman 2014). If the pressure for keeping the speaker distinct in pronoun systems comes from a general egocentric bias, then we might expect (i) the bias to be stronger in children, and (ii) the bias to be stronger when learners are active speakers of the language. The experiments reported here are of course on adults, and our participants were never themselves the speaker. Further research could, however, test both predictions.

An alternative is to build a speaker-based asymmetry between natural classes directly into a theory of person—at the same level of representation as the domain-specific primitive features. In a nutshell, the idea would be that the natural class ‘speaker’ is somehow represented as special within the person space. The pressure for speaker distinctiveness would then be a special type of natural-class-based similarity that comes not directly from the set of primitive features but from the particular status of the speaker feature. This sketch is very speculative, and a worked out implementation is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this idea is in the spirit of Harbour (2016) and Ackema and Neeleman (2018), whose theory encodes an inherent asymmetry between speaker and addressee, built into the ontology (see fn. 15). Crucially, we would argue that this asymmetry should be treated as a bias, which shapes but does not strictly delimit the space of possible partitions.

Before moving on, an anonymous reviewer raises concerns about whether our results could be accommodated by a non-feature-based approach of Person. This is a sensible worry, as it questions whether our approach truly provides evidence that the person space is represented in terms of a set of universal primitives. To address this concern, let us say a few words about whether the results reported here are compatible with putative non-featural representations of the person space.

Our experiments show that learners are sensitive to whether certain semantic values (e.g., speaker, addressee) are included in the pronominal reference, regardless of the specific person category. This suggests that person categories form natural classes along these semantic dimensions. Here we have treated these natural classes as defined by primitive features. Arguably, an alternative, non-feature-based approach would be one that does not decompose person categories into smaller units, but treats them as primitives themselves; for example, first, inclusive, second, and third would be four different primitives, as well as all other plural combinations (see Cysouw 2007, for discussion). We see a problem with this type of alternative view: in or-
der to account for our main findings, this approach would need to explain why is it that learners are more likely to collapse some person categories than others, even when these categories are non-native.

As a response to this issue, the same reviewer conjectures that some additional pragmatic mechanism might result in more accurate learning predictions. For the time being however, we remain agnostic as to how this proposal could be further developed into a full theory of person that accounts for our results (and for the typology). Instead, we maintain that, to the extent that learners are shown to be sensitive to the semantic overlap between categories, a feature-based account of our results is more parsimonious (as well as in line with already established theories of Person).

6. Conclusion

Person systems have been extensively explored from a theoretical standpoint: a number of approaches have been proposed, each of which constrains the set of possible person partitions that humans can represent, with the aim of explaining the prevalence of certain partitions of the person space cross-linguistically. The set of experiments reported here inform these theoretical approaches by generating direct behavioral evidence for the impact of hypothesized representations and constraints on the learnability of different person partitions. Indeed, our results constitute the first experimental evidence for learnability differences in this domain.

Specifically, we have provided evidence that there is a universal basis for a set of primitives organizing the person space that learners are sensitive to regardless of their native language. Looking more closely into the nature of these primitive features, we have shown that a theory of the person space needs to account for the semantic similarity between inclusive and second persons, on the one hand, and between second and third person categories, on the other. Each of these pairs of categories were treated as natural classes by learners, suggesting that they have features in common (e.g., an addressee feature possibly shared between second and inclusive persons). Besides a preference for feature-based patterns, there was evidence across our experiments that participants have an additional bias towards partitions of the person space where the speaker is distinct from other categories. Thus even though both speakers and addressees are participants in the conversation, there is an inherent asymmetry in how learners treat them. We sketched two possible accounts of this, the first in terms of a general egocentric bias, and the second in terms of a special type of natural class-based similarity.

More generally, our results suggest that the experimental methods developed here provide a novel tool for testing theoretically-motivated questions about how languages carve up the person space. While these kinds of methods have gained traction in investigating learning biases in a number of linguistic domains, here we have highlighted the sparsity of typological data as underscoring the need for new sources of evidence in building theories of person.

References


