Control is not Movement: evidence from overt PRO in Ewe*

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This paper presents novel data from the Anlo dialect of Ewe to show that the pronoun yè in the subject position of irrealis clauses has the properties of PRO, rather than the properties of logophoric pronouns. Given the overt nature of PRO, this paper sheds further light on control phenomena such as partial control. This paper presents four main arguments against Hornstein (1999)’s control as A-movement: partial control exists, contra Boeckx et al. (2010); deriving split control may violate minimality constraints, contra Fujii (2006); Ewe has control but not raising, which is unexpected if they are similar processes; and finally, that the phonetic form of PRO in Ewe is the same as the logophoric pronoun is coincidental under Hornstein (1999), Chierchia (1990)’s approach to control in which PRO is bound by an operator in the left periphery of the embedded clause provides a straightforward account of the facts seen in Ewe. Assuming Charnavel (2019)’s theory of logophoricity, control and logophoricity are treated alike, rather than control and raising.

Keywords: control, movement, PRO, partial, split, logophoric, pronouns

1 Introduction

Since the inception of PRO as a syntactic object, it has been noted that PRO almost always seems to be phonetically null crosslinguistically. As a result, some theories of obligatory control (OC) have stipulated that PRO is always phonetically null but syntactically present, as in Chomsky (1981), Manzini (1983) and Landau (1999), and its nullness is due to the licensing properties of control predicates. In other theories of control, some authors have argued that it is not represented at all, as in Chierchia (1984), Wurmbrand (1998) and Jackendoff and Culicover (2003).

I present novel data from the Anlo dialect of Ewe to show that PRO is instantiated in the phonetic form of the so-called logophoric pronoun. Ewe’s logophoric pronoun, yè, was first noted by Clements (1975). Yè can only appear in clauses introduced by the complementizer be, which can optionally also mean say, and yè must refer to the subject of the higher clause. It cannot refer to the speaker (index s). This is shown in (1a). In (1b), we see that the generic third person pronoun cannot refer to the matrix subject unlike languages like English; only yè may do so. [1]

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1 Collins (1994) reports that this is possible in the Kpele dialect of Ewe; however, I have been unable to replicate his findings in Anlo.
The logophoric pronoun refers to the individual whose thought or speech is reported in a given context. Similarities between obligatorily controlled (OC) PRO and logophoric pronouns have been noted. Heim (2002), for example, proposed a unified approach to both due to their obligatory de se reading, in which they were both bound by an abstraction operator in the left-periphery of the embedded clause. However, one important difference between the two is that logophoric pronouns can have long-distance antecedents; OC PRO cannot.

As we will shortly see, if yè is in the subject position of an irrealis clause, it obtains the properties of PRO and becomes less like a logophoric pronoun; for example, it cannot have a long-distance antecedents. The central question of this paper, then, is to explain why these two yè with different properties should have the same phonetic form. I provide an analysis of yè, and discuss its theoretical consequences. In doing so, I have three main goals:

(i) Goal 1: Show that yè behaves as an overt PRO in the subject of an irrealis clause.
(ii) Goal 2: Propose an analysis of yè which assumes both Chierchia (1990)’s theory of control and Charnavel (2019)’s theory of logophoricity, accounting for Heim (2002)’s intuition that PRO and logophoric pronouns have very similar properties.
(iii) Goal 3: Present four arguments against Hornstein (1999)’s movement theory of control based on the overtness of PRO in Ewe.

For goal (i), four tests out of eight show that this pronoun has opposite properties depending on whether it is the subject of a realis or irrealis clause. The strongest piece of evidence is the grammaticality of (2), due to the fact that inanimate objects cannot have attitudes or thoughts; the perspectival center cannot be the referent of yè.

(2) Ati-i dziyegome be yè-a iye.
Tree-NOM begin COMP YÈ-POT break.
‘The tree began PRO to break.’

I argue that in the Anlo dialect of Ewe, yè is not a logophoric pronoun; it is instead just a pronoun that has to be bound at the left-periphery of the embedded clause, regardless of whether or not the predicate that embeds the clause is attitudinal.

That overt pronominal elements appear in controlled positions is not new. Overt anaphors may occur in control complements in Chinese, Korean and Japanese. In Chinese, the anaphor ziji normally accepts any c-commanding subject (see Giblin (2016), among others), even a long distance one, as an antecedent, but in (3) ziji must refer to the local antecedent.

(3) Zhangsan_i bi Lisi_j [PRO_j/ziji/_xie zuoye].
John force Bill PRO/self write homework
‘John_i forced Bill_j to do the homework.’

See Landau (2013) for more details on these three languages.
This paper goes a step further; I do not merely claim that \textit{yè} is a controlled pronoun. The Anlo dialect of Ewe is a language which makes control phonetically overt, in both realis and irrealis contexts. The pronoun \textit{yè} is seen when a control relation is established and nowhere else.

For goal (ii), I present an analysis, based on a suggestion by \textcite{Heim2002}, in which she uses Chierchia (1990)’s approach to control. Under this approach, both PRO and logophoric pronouns are bound by an abstraction operator in the left-periphery. I argue that the data that is presented in this paper was in fact predicted by Heim.

By assuming Charnavel (2019)’s theory of logophoricity, in which all logophors are bound locally by null perspectival centers, I propose that the data from Ewe shows that control and logophoricity, rather than control and raising, are similar phenomena. This allows us to analyze the logophoric–as Kuno (1975) points out–non-obligatory control (NOC) PRO as just a subspecies of OC PRO. As such, I argue that both control and logophoricity involve binding by an abstraction operator. But the controller of \textit{yè} is either a local antecedent in the cases of control–in the subject of an irrealis embedded clause–and a perspectival center in the subject of a realis embedded clause. In other words, logophoric pronouns are controlled by a null logophor whereas PRO is usually controlled by the most local antecedent.

In defense of goal (iii), I will argue that the similarities are not between control and raising as Hornstein (1999) points out, but rather between control and logophoricity. But more importantly, I propose four empirical arguments against control being movement in Ewe. The overtness of PRO allows us to probe the actual structure of control phenomena such as partial and split control. For example, (4) might help us conclude that partial control does exist in Ewe, challenging current accounts of it such as in Boeckx et al. (2010), according to which it does not exist.

\begin{quote}
(4) Kofi dzi \textit{be \textit{yè-wo-a/*yè-a} kpe \textit{ga ade}.}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Kofi want COMP \textit{YÈ-PL-POT/YÈ-POT} meet time 6
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
‘Kofi wanted PRO\textsubscript{i}/*PRO\textsubscript{i} to meet at 6.’
\end{quote}

Here are the four arguments. First, partial control exists in Ewe in the sense of Landau (1999), in which PRO refers to a group that includes the controller. Second, the phonetic equivalence between the realis and irrealis pronoun seem coincidental if control is movement. Third, the structure of split control seems difficult to account for via movement given that it would lead to minimality violations. Finally, Ewe does not seem to have any raising predicates, which seems troubling if control and raising are the same, apart from the additional movement to a \(\theta\)-position.

Most of the problems for the movement theory of control (MTC) that I will discuss here can be accounted for by the control as movement theory with further stipulations, but it is unclear whether the stipulations would be independently motivated or lead to true insight. Accounting for the data that will be presented in section 2 of this paper via the approach presented in this paper leads to more insight than what the MTC would have to assume in order to account for them.

This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I present the novel data from the Anlo dialect of Ewe. Section 3 presents the background needed for this paper. I present the foundations for the two theories of control that I will discuss in this paper, in addition to summarizing Landau (2004), given that control is instantiated in embedded finite clauses in Ewe. I also introduce the reader to Charnavel (2019)’s theory of logophoricity, and provide the aforementioned analysis of this data in section 4. In section 5, I go over the aforementioned four problems to the control as movement account, and section 6 discusses further theoretical problems and concludes.
2 Ewe

In this section, I present novel data from the Anlo dialect of Ewe in which I conclude that the logophoric pronoun, in the subject of an embedded irrealis clause, has the properties of overt PRO rather than the properties of a logophoric pronoun. For simplicity, for the rest of this paper I refer to yè in the subject position of an irrealis clause as irrealis yè and yè in the subject position of a realis clause as realis yè.

Table 1 below is a summary of the results of the tests that will be seen in this section. As the reader can verify, overt PRO and irrealis yè share more similarities than irrealis and realis yè do.\footnote{Of course, it is difficult to determine whether PRO has $\phi$-features, given that it is invisible. Agreement with PRO is possible in languages such as Spanish, as will be discussed in section 6, indicating that PRO does indeed get $\phi$-features from its controller. Pearson (2015)’s prediction (footnote 36), in which she predicts that there might be a dialect of Ewe in which yè would have the properties of PRO and no $\phi$-features, is incorrect; in the Anlo dialect, irrealis yè possesses third person features. A sentence such as *Me be yè-a dzo ‘I said I am likely to leave’ is not acceptable due to a $\phi$-feature mismatch.}

Table 1: A comparison of the noted properties of yè in the subject position of realis embedded clauses, yè in the subject position of irrealis embedded clauses and OC PRO.\footnote{Some clarifications are to be made: a long distance antecedent is possible with the predicate promise with both irrealis yè and, as has been noted in the literature, OC PRO. Control shift is not possible in Ewe due to the fact that passivization is not present.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Properties</th>
<th>Realis yè</th>
<th>Irrealis yè</th>
<th>OC PRO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Must be c-commanded</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must be read de se</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-distance antecedent</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bound variable</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanimate possible</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sloppy reading only</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial possible</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split possible</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 Preliminaries

Ewe is a Niger-Congo language spoken in southeastern Ghana. It is a tenseless language in which aspect is prominent, making it difficult to determine whether there is a finite-nonfinite distinction in this language. The dialect of Ewe that data will be presented from in this paper is the Anlo dialect, which Standard Ewe is based on; the speakers are from the Atiavi region of Ghana.

This data was obtained from one primary native speaker consultant. Two other consultants, also native speakers of the Anlo dialect, went over the data to determine if they agreed with the intuitions. The data was obtained through a mixture of in-person and Skype sessions and follow-up questions via email. Two other speakers of different Ewe dialects also provided their input on the sentences that were obtained after the elicitation sessions concluded.

It is important to note that there is significant variation based on one’s dialect. For example, Anne Bimpeh (p.c.), a speaker of the Ewedome dialect, does not get de re reading of yè, first noted by Pearson (2015). For this reason, I want to make it clear that the data in this
paper applies at the very least to the Anlo dialect of Ewe spoken in the Atiavi region. But Grano and Lotven (2016) notes that the logophoric pronoun je in Gengbe—another dialect of Ewe—is controlled in the subject position of an irrealis embedded clause, as well. Therefore, there is independent evidence corroborating the findings of this fieldwork on the Anlo dialect.

In embedded clauses, we see OC with the potential or subjunctive marker, both of which belong to the irrealis category of mood markers, both pronounced -a. Given that Ewe does not have agreement markings or tense, it is harder to determine whether it has finite or nonfinite clauses. Clauses with -a may stand alone, because they do not need to be embedded, as in (5).

(5) Kofi a dzo.
Kofi POT leave
Potential meaning 1: ‘Kofi can leave.’
Potential meaning 2: ‘Kofi could have left.’
Potential meaning 3: ‘Kofi could be leaving.’

Essegbey (2008) studies the potential variant of -a, arguing that because sentences like (5) can refer to possible states of affair in the past, present and future, it is merely a modal morpheme which marks potentiality. But it usually has a meaning in the future sense.5

As Clements (1975) notes, although the logophoric pronoun prima facie seems to be a reflexive, the pronoun and the reflexive have a different syntactic distribution, hence it being called a pronoun rather than a reflexive. For example, like in English, the reflexive must be complex, and it is made up of a pronoun and qokui ‘self.’ Ewe does not allow a reflexive in the subject position of an embedded clause headed by the complementizer be, whether or not the reflexive is made up of the generic third person pronoun or yè, as seen in (6).6

(6) a. Kofi fo e-qokui
Kofi hit 3SG-self
‘Kofi hit himself.’

b. * Kofi be e-/yè-qokui dzo
Kofi COMP 3SG-/YÈ-self
‘Kofi hit himself.’

More recent work on Ewe has shed further light on the properties of its logophoric pronoun. For example, Pearson (2015) shows that, contrary to assumptions by Heim (2002) among others, yè need not be read de se. This is problematic for the Heim approach, given that the ATC predicts binding by an abstraction operator to lead to a de se reading. (7a), my own example below, is good with the logophoric pronoun in Ewe; the embedded clause is in the realis:

(7) Scenario: Kofi is taking his dog out for a walk, and his dog constantly poops on the ground, but Kofi doesn’t realize it. There are other people walking their dogs down the same path. He starts to walk back to his home, and he sees the trail of poop that he made on the ground. He gets very angry at whoever did this (but doesn’t realize that it was him). He thinks whoever this guy is, he is stupid.

a. Kofi bou be yè nyi honvi. (Kofi thinks he is stupid.)

5 For more details, the reader is referred to Ameka (2008) and Essegbey (2008).

6 This is not because the anaphor is in a subject position; as Ewe is a language without any subject agreement, in line with Rizzi (1990), this does not preclude the possibility of a reflexive appearing in the subject position in Ewe. Languages without subject agreement such as Chinese and Balinese allow anaphors in the subject position. but we see in (6b) that it is still not allowed, allowing us to distinguish between a reflexive and a pronoun.
Before presenting the control constructions, it is important to determine whether irrealis embedded clauses are finite or nonfinite, like English infinitivals. It seems that embedded realis clauses, like embedded finite clauses in other languages, are more independent, as aspectual marking can be added. Clauses containing -a seem to be less independent, as aspectual marking cannot be added. This test was used by Huang (1982) to distinguish between finite and nonfinite clauses in Mandarin Chinese, which is also a language without tense-marking. This is seen in (8a)-(8b).

\[
\text{(8) a. Kofi} \text{ be yè; dzo dzo-m.} \\
\text{Kofi COMP YÈ leave RED-PROG} \\
\text{‘Kofi said he was leaving.’} \\
\text{b. * Kofi be yè-a dzo dzo-m.} \\
\text{Kofi COMP YÈ-POT leave RED-PROG} \\
\text{‘(Intended reading) Kofi said that he is likely to be leaving.’}
\]

Like Hebrew subjunctive clauses, NPI licensing can take place with irrealis embedded clauses in Ewe, but not realis ones. This is seen in (9a)-(9b), in which the meaning of the verb shifts depending on the embedded clause; in (9a) be is a realis verb, but in (9b) it is an irrealis verb, meaning something more like intend:

\[
\text{(9) a. * Kofi me-be yè; dzo o.} \\
\text{Kofi NEG1-COMP YÈ leave NEG2} \\
\text{‘Kofi didn’t say that he left.’} \\
\text{b. Kofi me-be yè-a dzo o.} \\
\text{Kofi NEG1-COMP YÈ-POT leave NEG2} \\
\text{‘Kofi didn’t say that he could leave.’}
\]

There is therefore conflicting evidence as to whether these are finite or nonfinite. However, more recent works on finiteness such as by Wurmbrand and Lohninger (2019) have made it clearer that finiteness is a scale, in which certain embedded clauses are more integrated and more independent than others—rather than concluding whether such clauses are actually finite or nonfinite, we might just conclude that they are more independent than, for example, English infinitivals.

### 2.2 Overt PRO tests

In the controlled position—which is the subject of an irrealis embedded clause—it is usually pronounced as ya in the Anlo dialect, which has a great deal of vowel coalescence. But it may optionally be pronounced as yèa, indicating the presence of the so-called logophoric pronoun.

In (10), I give multiple examples of yèa with predicates that would involve PRO and control in other languages such as English. More tests will be provided in order to determine that irrealis yè, unlike realis yè, is indeed being controlled here:

\[
\text{(10) a. Agbe; dzagbagha/globe/dzina/v;v;m/wosusu/dzi/susum be yè-a dzo.} \\
\text{Agbe try/forget/want/afraid/decide/like/intend COMP YÈ-POT leave} \\
\text{‘Agbe tried/forget/wanted/is afraid/decided/likes/intends PRO to leave.’} \\
\text{b. Kofi; dzagbagha/dzina/v;v;m/wosusu/dzi be yè-a kpo dzidzɔ.} \\
\text{Kofi try/want/afraid/decide/like COMP YÈ-POT experience happiness} \\
\text{‘Kofi tried/wanted/is afraid/decided/likes PRO to be happy.’}
\]
As Landau (2013) among others have noted, PRO is interpreted as a bound variable. Yè is also interpreted as a bound variable, and this is easy to verify in (11):

(11) a. Ame adeke me be yè-a dzo o.  
    person no-one NEG1 COMP YÈ-POT leave NEG2  
    ‘No one said to leave.’

b. Ame adeke me dzagbagba be yè-a kpo dzidzo o.  
    person no-one NEG1 try COMP YÈ-POT experience happiness NEG2  
    ‘No one tried to be happy.’

I previously noted, with my own example in (7), that realis yè need not be read de se, at least in a realis embedded clause. However, I provide one example in (12) in which irrealis yè must be read de se. This is especially strong evidence we are dealing with control here given that, as Chierchia (1990) first noted, PRO must be read de se. This sentence is from Hornstein (1999) (p. 73) while the context is from Landau (1999) (p. 36), translated to Ewe:

(12) Kofi is a war hero who suffers from amnesia and remembers nothing of his wartime experiences. Suppose this person sees a TV program describing his own exploits, and is impressed with the courage exhibited by that person, who he does not know is himself. Kofi comes to believe that the hero will win a medal.

a. # Kofi, emo kpom be yè-ia ho kpl.  
   Kofi expect see COMP YÈ-POT COP medal  
   ‘#Kofi expects PRO to get a medal.’

Like PRO, irrealis yè must be c-commanded; it cannot refer to a non-commanding DP embedded in the matrix subject and must refer to the entire phrase containing the possessor; it is easy to determine that this is correct with the overt plural marking on yè, in which case it is yèwo.

(13) a. [Agbe, fe velia-wo], dzagbagba be yè-*a(wo)u/k-a dzo.  
    Agbe GEN friend-*PL try COMP YÈ-PL-POT leave  
    ‘Agbe’s friends tried to leave.’

b. [Kofi, fe dzila-*(wo)], wosusu be yè-wo u/k-a ho ekplu  
    Kofi GEN parent-PL decide COMP YÈ-*PL-POT COP medal  
    ‘Kofi’s parents decided to get a medal.’

It’s been well-known since Clements (1975) that realis yè can have long-distance antecedents, and Pearson (2015) has independently confirmed this; her example is given in (14) below. This sentence is ambiguous: each yè may refer to Kofi or Marie.

(14) Marie, be Kofi, xh se be yè / na yè cadeau  
    Mary say Kofi believe COMP YÈ give YÈ gift  
    ‘Mary, said that Kofi believed that he/she gave him/her a gift.’

7 In (13), if the embedded clause were in the realis, yè would still have to be apparently c-commanded. But I have marked whether realis yè can be c-commanded or not with a question mark on table 1. Since control does not have to involve an attitude holder with certain predicates such as try, the c-command test can be used. However, realis yè does require an attitude holder, so the c-command test would not work. The attitude holder in (13) must be the entire phrase containing the possessor and realis yè must refer to the attitude holder. The possessor itself is not the attitude holder, and therefore, realis yè cannot refer to it, so the c-command test would not show anything.
Irrealis yè, on the other hand, cannot usually have a long-distance antecedent—that is, referring to a DP that is not the nearest one. This contrasts with the logophoric pronoun, as PRO also cannot have long-distance antecedents:

(15) a. Agbej kadedzi be Kofi dzagbagba yè-wo-a kpo dzidza.
    Agbe believe COMP Kofi try COMP YÈ-POT experience happiness
    ‘Agbej believes that Kofi tried PRO to be happy.’

b. Agbej be Kofi dzi-be yè-wo-a yide sukuu.
    Agbe COMP Kofi want-COMP YÈ-POT go-to school
    ‘Agbej said that Kofi wants PRO to go to school.’

The one case that it can have a long-distance antecedent is the same as OC PRO: it can only have a long-distance antecedent in the case of promise; and as expected, we get subject control in (16).

In the subject position of an irrealis clause, if the matrix predicate is promise, yè can only refer to the matrix subject across the object of the predicate:

(16) Agbej do enugble ne Fafak be yè-wo-k a fo ụtsu-a.
    Agbe make promise to Fafa COMP YÈ-POT man-DEF
    ‘Agbej promised Fafak to beat the man.’

Split and partial readings have been known to be possible with PRO. Partial control is also common in this dialect, as shown in (17). Further discussion of this will be provided in section 5.2. In these examples, we see that the pronoun is at the very least syntactically plural despite having a singular controller; this is particularly strong evidence in favor of the existence of partial control. The speaker intuition is that it is also semantically plural, where it is a group including Kofi:

(17) a. Kofi dzi be yè-wo-i+/k yè-i+a kpe ga ade.
    Kofi want COMP YÈ-PL-POT/YÈ-POT meet time 6
    ‘Kofi wanted PRO to meet at 6.’

b. Zimenola wosusu be yè-wo-i+/k yè-i+a fofu.
    Chair decide COMP YÈ-PL-POT/YÈ-POT gather
    ‘[The chair] decided PRO to gather.’

For split control, irrealis yè either has the same phonetic form as that of partial and plural control, yèwo as in (18a), or an optional pronoun doubling that is more specific as in (18b):

(18) a. Agbej gblo ne Fafak be yè-woi+/k a fo ụtsu-a.
    Agbe told to Fafa COMP YÈ-PL-POT man-DEF
    ‘Agbej told Fafak PRO to beat the man (together).’

b. Agbej gblo ne Fafak be [yè-woi+/k meve yè-woi+/k+]i+/k a fo ụtsu-a.
    Agbe told to Fafa COMP YÈ-PL two.person POT man-DEF
    ‘Agbej told Fafak PRO to beat the man (together).’

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8It is important to note that the object is itself embedded in a PP, allowing for the avoidance of minimality violations. This is unlike English, but one might treat the object of promise as containing a null preposition in English as well.

9Anlo Ewe fits in with Landau (2013)’s generalization that split control is most commonly found with verbs of communication and proposal. This is precisely the case in the Anlo dialect of Ewe as well.
Discussing the nature of pronoun doubling would go beyond the scope of this paper. But note that the word that the pronoun doubles on is made from the coalescence between two words two and man, and this coordinate structure cannot be used for lexical NPs.\(^{10}\)

\[(19)\]
\[\begin{align*}
a. & \text{Wo meve wo fo Ɗutsua.} & b. & \text{Agbe kple/*meve Fafa fo Ɗutsua.} \\
& 3PL two+men 3PL beat man & & \text{Agbe and/*two+men Fafa beat man}
\end{align*}\]

‘They beat the man.’ ‘Agbe and Fafa beat the man.’

A final test to distinguish between the realis \(yè\) and irrealis \(yè\) is the availability of the strict and sloppy readings. Irrealis \(yè\) can only have a sloppy reading under ellipsis like overt PRO, as has been noted by Landau (2013) among others, as seen in (20a), but realis \(yè\) may have a strict or sloppy reading, as in (20b).

\[(20)\]
\[\begin{align*}
a. & \text{Kofi, dzagbagba be yè-\(i\) fle agbale afi Agbe.} & b. & \text{Kofi try COMP YÈ-POT buy book before Agbe} \\
& \text{Kofi try COMP YÈ-POT buy book before Agbe} & & \text{Kofi, be yè \(i\) fle agbale afi Agbe.} \\
& \text{‘Kofi tried to buy a book before Agbe tried to buy a book. (sloppy only)’} & & \text{Kofi COMP YÈ buy book before Agbe} \\
& \text{‘Kofi said he bought a book before Agbe said he bought a book. (strict too)’}
\end{align*}\]

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, inanimate control with irrealis \(yè\) is a possibility.\(^{11}\) Even in English, there is a sense in which the sentences below don’t involve personification and are still grammatical, and they are similarly good in Anlo:

\[(21)\]
\[\begin{align*}
a. & \text{Emo\(_i\), dzagbagba be yè-\(i\) dzegome.} & b. & \text{Emo\(_i\), wosusu be yè-\(i\) dzudzu.} \\
& \text{Machine try COMP YÈ-POT start} & & \text{Machine decide COMP YÈ-POT stop} \\
& \text{‘The machine\(_i\), tried PRO\(_i\) to reboot.’} & & \text{‘The machine, decided PRO\(_i\) to stop.’}
\end{align*}\]

Further examples with \(yè\) are provided in (22), in which the predicates are all non-attitudinal control predicates. Usually, these predicates would be analyzed as raising constructions due to inanimate matrix subjects, but I will provide a discussion of control vs. raising in Ewe in section 5.4.

\[(22)\]
\[\begin{align*}
a. & \text{Ati-\(i\), dzegome/dzudza/yidzi be yè-\(i\) \(ŋ\)e.} & \\
& \text{Tree-NOM begin/stop/resume COMP YÈ-POT break.} & \\
& \text{‘The tree, began/stopped/resumed PRO\(_i\) to break.’}
\end{align*}\]

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\(^{10}\)Pronoun doubling in general seems to be unique to the Anlo dialect of Ewe studied in this paper. Anne Bimpeh (p.c.), a speaker of the Ewedome dialect of Ewe, did not think that this sentence was acceptable.

\(^{11}\)I have not been able to find any examples in which realis \(yè\) is grammatical and there is no metaphorical animacy. In addition, it is difficult to find genuine examples of inanimate control in Ewe due to it having serial verb constructions (SVCs); something like John forced the car to stop, which has the predicate force, a classic example of inanimate control, does not work. I have also not been able to find any cases of adjunct control, which easily admit inanimate control, ex. PRO\(_i\), to count as a house, [an object], must have four walls and a roof (David Pesetsky p.c.). It is possible that control is strictly with control predicates that take an irrealis embedded clause in this language, precluding the possibility of adjunct control.
If we follow Charnavel and Sportiche (2016) in using inanima cy as a test for non-logophoricity, this would mean that \( yè \) is not actually a logophoric pronoun. It would be unlikely for trees and other inanimate objects to be logophoric as they cannot possess attitudes, thoughts or report speech, unless we are dealing with a metaphorical context. Indeed, with a realis verb, the sentence is unacceptable unless referring to an actually talking and conscious tree:

\[(23) \quad \# \, \text{Athey-}i \, \text{be} \, \text{yè-}i \, \text{ne.} \]

Tree-NOM COMP YÈ break.

‘The tree, said that it is breaking.’

I have only provided examples of subject control in this section. For the most part, I will not discuss object control in this paper. Examples with object control are difficult to come across given that Ewe is a language with SVCs; Ewe speakers choose to translate object control sentences in English to SVCs. However, it seems possible to have object control in embedded clauses with the jussive mood (\( nè \)), and this is instantiated with control predicates such as *persuade*:

\[(24) \quad \text{Agbe-} \, \text{ble} \, \text{Fafa-}k \, \text{nu be} \, \text{nè-}i/k \, \text{fo} \, \text{ntsu-}a. \]

Agbe persuade Fafa thing COMP JUSS beat man-DEF

‘Agbe, persuaded Fafak PRO to beat the man.’

This is the only context that I have seen in which the subject of the embedded clause can be null; this language does not otherwise have a phonetically null PRO. But as Ameka (2008) points out, we have independent reason for thinking that the jussive mood marker erases third person singular subject pronouns. The lexical subject of a sentence in the jussive mood is not erased in (25a), but the pronoun is in (25b):

\[(25) \quad \text{a. gli} \, \text{nè-va} \]

folktales JUSS-come

‘Let the folktales come.’

\[(25) \quad \text{b. né-} \, \text{ga-} \, \text{mi} \]

JUSS-REP-meet 1PL

‘Let it come to meet us again (in response to New Year’s wish).’ Ameka (2008)

In section 4, I will discuss a simple way to account for the identical phonetic form between the two \( yè \) despite them having different properties.

### 2.3 \( yè \) is not an emphatic pronoun

I would like to conclude this section by pointing out that \( yè \) does not seem to be an emphatic pronoun, or an intensifier. As noted in (3) above, overt anaphors may occur in the subject position of a control complement in Chinese, Korean and Japanese; an example from Chinese is seen in (26):

\[(26) \quad \text{Zhangsan} \, \text{i bi} \, \text{Lisi} \, [\text{PRO} \, j/v1/zj\, \text{jizhi} \, \text{xie zuo} \text{yel}.] \]

John force Bill PRO/self write homework

‘John, forced Bill PRO to do the homework.’ Madigan (2008)

\[\text{12} \, \text{The jussive mood has an irrealis nature and the desire of the speaker for a state of affairs to occur, as Ameka (2008) points out. Given that it is closely related to the subjunctive, it is not surprising for it to also be able to instantiate control in embedded clauses with control predicates.}\]
But as Landau (2013) points out, these are likely to be intensifiers, or emphatic doubles. Anaphors such as *ziji are commonly used as intensifiers in Chinese, or even in English (ex. *he himself came). These anaphors cannot be used in the same range of syntactic contexts as PRO. Indeed, I have found that partial (in (27a)) and split control (in (27b)) cannot be lexicalized with *ziji in Chinese below. Only PRO may be used for these cases.13

(27)  
(a) Lisi_{i} xiang [PRO_{i}/*ziji_{i} liudian jianmian].
    Bill want PRO/self 6 meet
    ‘Bill wanted PRO to meet at 6.’
(b) Zhangsan_{i} daying Lisi_{j} [PRO_{i+j}/*ziji_{i+j} huxiang cabei].
    John promise Bill PRO/self perform-on-each-other backrub
    ‘John promised Bill to bathe each other.’

Of course, this is not an issue with *yè; we have seen that partial and split control can be lexicalized. But perhaps *yè as overt PRO is an even more convincing emphatic double than Chinese anaphors. So what reasons do we have to rule out *yè as an emphatic pronoun? First, let me note that Ewe does not have a covert PRO, unlike Chinese and these other languages.

(28)  
Agbe_{i} dzagbagba be 0 a dzo.
    Agbe try COMP 0 POT leave
    ‘Agbe tried PRO to leave.’

If *ziji really is an emphatic double, then the nominal that it is emphasizing in constructions such as (26) is PRO. But given that there is no covert PRO in Ewe and the fact that Ewe does not seem to have subject pro-dropping of any kind, unlike Chinese, makes the possibility of *yè being an emphatic double unlikely.[14]

The second fact which allows us to rule out *yè being an emphatic double is the fact that Ewe already has the emphatic pronoun *yé, which Badan and Buell (2012) discusses. Notice that the logophoric pronoun has a low tone while the emphatic pronoun has a high tone. An example is given below in (29a). Likewise, the high tone *yé cannot be used in place of *yè ((29b)):

(29)  
(a) Mango-nye-wo (*yè/*yè) Kofi du.
    mango-1SG-PL (FOC/*YÈ) Kofi eat
    ‘Kofi ate [my mangos]F.’
    *Agbe_{i} dzagbagba be *yé_{i} a dzo.
    Agbe try COMP FOC POT leave
    ‘Agbe tried PRO to leave.’

The very different syntactic distribution between *yé and *yè seems to indicate that the latter is not an emphatic double in PRO constructions, unlike *ziji and other examples that have been reported in the literature.[15] It is likely that we are dealing with a genuine overt PRO.

3 Background

This section presents background on the two theories of control that will be compared in this paper: the movement theory of control (MTC) of Hornstein (1999) in section 3.1 and the commonly

13 See Lee (2009) for the same arguments in Korean.
14 See Collins (1993) for more details on the lack of subject pro-drop in Ewe.
15 See Szabolcsi (2009) for an argument that PRO is represented overtly in Hungarian infinitives.
assumed treatment for de se attitudes from Chierchia (1990) which I dub the abstraction theory of control (ATC) in section 3.2. Section 3.3 summarizes Landau (2004) and introduces finite control. Providing this foundation after presenting novel data on Ewe control will help us determine which of these theories is better equipped at handling the overtness of PRO in this dialect.

3.1 Movement Theory of Control

There are two ways in which the minimalist program paved the way for the potential removal of PRO as a theoretical tool. First, the removal of D-structure as a linguistic level relaxed restrictions on movement, making it more plausible for them to target θ-positions. Prior to the program, all θ-positions had to be filled at D-structure, making the possibility of movement into θ-positions at S-structure less likely.

Another principle that blocked movement into a θ-position for arguments that already possessed a θ-role was the θ-Criterion. Chomsky (1981)'s definition of the θ-Criterion is given in (30a)-(30b) below:

\[
\begin{align*}
(30) & \quad \text{a. Each argument bears one and only one θ-role.} \\
& \quad \text{b. Each θ-role is assigned to one and only one argument.}
\end{align*}
\]

The θ-Criterion is defined as such in order to avoid (31a) having the same meaning as (31b); in principle it might be possible for send to assign both of its object θ-roles to just one object.

\[
\begin{align*}
(31) & \quad \text{a. Mary sent John.} \\
& \quad \text{b. Mary sent John to himself.}
\end{align*}
\]

With D-structure already removed, the MTC required changing (30a) to Each argument must receive at least one θ-role\(^\text{16}\) With this, we could make the structures of control and raising sentences look very similar, apart from the θ-roles assigned, and get rid of PRO. An example of a derivation is given in (32a)-(32b) below.

\[
\begin{align*}
(32) & \quad \text{a. \quad \{TP Sally \ [VP Sally v+tried \ [TP Sally to \ [VP Sally v+take out the trash]]]\}} \\
& \quad \text{b. \quad \{TP Sally \ [VP seemed \ [TP Sally to \ [VP Sally v+take out the trash]]]\}}
\end{align*}
\]

θ-role assignment is reduced to feature checking, and it is a local operation given that movement also is. The only difference between (32a) and (32b) is that there is an additional step of movement into the θ-position of the matrix predicate. This eliminates the need to posit PRO.

Since Chomsky (1981, 1986) and Manzini (1983), given that the existence of PRO is a troubled one, this is desirable. PRO seems to have both the properties of a pronoun and an anaphor, which seems contradictory. It has been a goal of syntactic analysis to find an antecedent for occurrences of PRO which do not seem to be controlled. This seems to be difficult\(^\text{17}\)

\[^{16}\text{There might be independent reasons to change this, for example, in resultatives such as Sally hammered the beavers flat in which it seems the beavers receives a θ-role from both hammer and flat. As a result, the presence of PRO in resultatives has been assumed by Bowers (1993) among others. It seems plausible that the MTC might want to assume A-movement in resultatives as well. However, this is problematic given that the issue raised by (31a)-(31b) remains unsolved.}\]

\[^{17}\text{Lebeaux (1984), Epstein (1984) and Bhatt and Izvorski (1998) attempt to find an antecedent for such occurrences of PRO. Some examples from Bhatt and Izvorski (1998) are given in (ia)-(ib): the general idea is that the implicit controller is the crossed out argument of the control predicate.}\]
Using movement to eliminate the "control module" of the grammar has the following consequences. The controller must c-command the controllee, since movement targets c-commanding landing sites. The controlled position is unpronounced, perhaps due to the specifier of nonfinite TP being a Caseless position as Nunes (2004) suggests. But unfortunately, movement precludes the possibility of genuine partial control, given that the head of an A-chain would not be identical to its trace. In the case of split control, two discontinuous NPs cannot move from the same position—there can be no split antecedents.

The MTC has attempted to find solutions to these problems: the usual attempt to deal with partial control, for example in Boeckx et al. (2010) has been to deny its existence and posit a null comitative in the structure, while split control is derived via positing additional structure, such as a null PP layer, inside split-controlled PRO. These arguments were made possible due to evidence being based on languages in which PRO was null. But we have already seen in the section prior, when PRO is phonetically overt, we can get an idea of what partial and split control actually look like, and whether the MTC is equipped to handle them.

3.2 Abstraction Theory of Control

In section 2, I gave evidence for thinking that the pronoun yè is not a logophoric pronoun in the Anlo dialect of Ewe due to it potentially having an inanimate reading. Even so, we still want a unified analysis of the two uses of this pronoun despite its different properties. I will provide a background in this subsection to a theory which I call the abstraction theory of control (ATC) that will be able to account for the facts seen in Ewe straightforwardly in section 4.

The similarity between genuine logophoric pronouns and PRO have been noted since Heim (2002), in which she attempted to provide a unified approach to account for the distribution of both, by adapting the Chierchia (1990) approach to obligatory control to logophoric pronouns; Anand (2006) further adapted this to logophors. I will propose that we have strong evidence in favor of Heim’s original observation from the novel data in this paper.

In Chierchia (1990)’s theory of obligatory control, in order to account for the necessity of the de se reading, Chierchia proposed that a sentence such as Mary claimed to be happy reports Mary’s self-ascription of the property of being happy. He implemented this with an individual abstractor in the left-periphery of the embedded clause. PRO itself is just a bound variable:

(i)  
| a. PRO_{arb} to write haiku is fun for people. |
| b. It is difficult for people PRO_{arb} to dance the tango. |

However, Kawasaki (1993)’s example in (ii) shows that genuine cases of PRO_{arb} do exist, given that there seems to be no possible location for an implicit controller. PRO_{arb} does not refer to the antecedent, the babies.

(ii) It is dangerous for babies [PRO_{arb} to smoke around them].

But I will suggest in section 4 that one possible antecedent for cases of NOC PRO such as this is a null perspectival center, which reduces NOC PRO to OC PRO.
Verbs such as claim are attitude verbs, like most control predicates. Such verbs often take a nominal (ex. Mary) and a clausal (ex. PRO to be happy) argument. The nominal argument which is the bearer of the attitude is the attitude holder, and if a main verb of a sentence is attitudinal, the sentence is called an attitude report. Most control sentences are therefore attitude reports.

The assumption is that abstraction operators bind coindexed variables just in case they are of the same type, and this process happens in the Logical Form component. Although the left peripheries of matrix clauses have abstractors over worlds, PRO is bound by an individual abstractor. An example of the lexical entry for claim is given in (34), where (34b) is the embedded clause built-up from the bottom up and (34c) is the matrix clause:

(34) a. $\llbracket \text{claim} \rrbracket_{c,g} = \lambda x, w. \forall <w', y> \in \text{claim}_{x, w}, P(y)(w')$ where $\text{claim}_{x, w} = \{<w', y>: \text{what } x \text{ claims in } w \text{ is true } w' \text{ and } x \text{ identifies herself as } y \text{ in } w'\}$

b. $\llbracket \text{CP}_2 \rrbracket_{c,g} = \lambda x, w. x \text{ is clever in } w$

c. $\llbracket \text{CP}_1 \rrbracket_{c,g} = \lambda w. \forall <w', y> \in \text{claim}_{\text{John}, w}, y \text{ is clever in } w' \text{ (Pearson, 2015, p. 82)}$

This semantics is based on Hintikka’s (1969) semantics for attitude reports where the content of an attitude is not a set of worlds. Chierchia and Pearson’s semantics makes it possible for one to bear an attitude de se towards a property just in case that property is self-ascribed. This is because the attitude predicate does not quantify merely over worlds; it quantifies over sets of claim-alternatives $<w', y>$ such that it is compatible with the attitude holder saying she is $y$ in $w'$.

This semantics will ensure that a sentence with a non de se scenario—or a sentence in which the attitude holder does not know she is referring to herself—will turn out false. This is because in the definition such as that given in (34), the attitude holder would be willing to refer to the person in the claim-alternative worlds as herself, and this is not possible in a non de se scenario.

The ATC is capable of getting the fact that the controller is almost always the most local one, with the exception of promise, vow and so forth. For example, in (35)-(36), both the ATC and MTC derive the controller of PRO being the attitude holder in both sentences. For the MTC, Mary in (35) is embedded in a PP and it cannot move to a non-c-commanding position, and for the ATC the attitude holder is the one who makes the claim, which is John.

(35) John claimed to Mary PRO to be a genius.

---

18Multiple tests exist to determine the attitude holder in a given sentence; for example, epithets such as the idiot are anti-attitudinal, and sentences such as John, claimed that Mary kissed the idiot, are ruled out because John is the attitude holder in this sentence. Furthermore, epithets are subject to condition B. The reader is referred to Charnavel for more on the epithet test, and other tests for attitudinal.
Similarly, Mary in (36) is not embedded in a PP so movement is possible, and the object of persuading is also the attitude holder rather than the subject.19

(36) John persuaded Mary, PRO, to take out the trash.

As Pearson (2015) notes, it is an advantage for Chierchia’s ATC that it can account for non-attitudinal control predicates such as force, which quantify over worlds rather than pairs of worlds and individuals. For example, in Anand and Nevins (2004) control predicates are quantifiers over evaluation indices. Along with the world coordinate, an individual coordinate of this evaluation index is assumed which PRO has as its semantic value.

This is not compatible with the existence of predicates like force, and Pearson notes that in the Chierchia approach they would take properties as arguments instead. We will see multiple examples of inanimate control in this paper, which raise problems for an attitudinal theory of control like that of Anand and Nevins (2004).

Heim (2002) notes that this approach may also be used to account for the distribution of the logophoric pronoun in Ewe. For Heim, logophors necessarily pick out the attitude holder and only occur in the scope of an attitude predicate.20 Due to this similarity, Heim proposes that both PRO and logophoric pronouns are bound by an individual abstractor, and this is formalized via an uninterpretable feature [log] on both. This must be checked by the operator which bears the interpretable [log]. The attitudinal predicate passes on [log] to PRO and the logophor:21

(37) a. [CP₁ λw₁ [w₁ John claimed [log] [CP₂ λx₂[log] λw₃ [w₃ PRO₂[log] to be clever]]]]
   b. [CP₁ λw₁ [w₁ John claimed [log] [CP₂ λx₂[log] λw₃ [w₃ ye₂[log] was clever]]]]

In non-attitudinal contexts, logophoric PRO and logophoric pronouns will not be licensed.

One outstanding problem is Pearson (2015)’s observation that the logophoric pronoun of Ewe need not be read de se. Though this will be discussed at length in the next section, it is important to note that Heim (2002)’s approach predicts otherwise: that logophoric pronouns should only be able to be read de se. For the time being, I present Pearson’s solution below which can derive the potential de re reading in the ATC approach and assume that it is correct. We define a concept generator as follows:22

(38) G is a concept generator in w iff:
   a. G is of type <e,<s,e>>
   b. For all y, G(y) is a y-concept in w
   c. For all y, if there is a w’ such that <y,w’> ∈ DoxAlt(x,w), then G(y)=G(x)

The de re LF is as follows.

(39) a. [Aw₁ [John [[say W₁] [xG₂ [1 [Aw₃ [LOG₁ G₂] [is clever W₂]]]]]]]
b. \([\lambda w: \exists_{e,se}. G\text{ is a concept generator for John in } w \& \forall w' \in \text{Say(Kofi; } w\text{)}, G(y) \text{ is clever in } w']\)

c. \([\lambda w: \exists_{e,se}. G\text{ is a concept generator for John in } w \& \forall w' \in \text{Say(Kofi; } w\text{)}, G(\text{John}) \text{ is clever in } w']\)

A concept generator wraps the pronoun in a projection called resP, allowing a de re reading. Meanwhile, the de se reading is obtained when there is no resP wrapping the pronoun. We now need to find a way to block PRO from getting embedded in a resP and therefore obtaining de re readings: for Pearson it is PRO’s lack of \(\phi\)-features, but as we have seen in section 2, overt PRO in Ewe does have \(\phi\)-features, contradicting this assumption. An account of this issue would go beyond the scope of the paper however, and I must leave it open to future research.

3.3 Finite control

We will see that control in Ewe is likely a form of finite control. Some may find this objectionable given that control is often understood to take place only in nonfinite complements. However, finite control is attested and surprisingly common: examples are seen in the Balkan languages, Persian, Hebrew, Spanish, Dogrib and Kannada.\(^{23}\)

An example of finite control from \(\text{Landau (2013)}\) is given in (40) below. PRO is actually the subject of a finite embedded clause, and the embedded verb has tense and agreement inflection. Landau argues that PRO is present and not pro is because even in finite control, the subject of the subjunctive clause must be read de se, showing that this property is not unique to nonfinite clauses. It must have a sloppy reading with ellipsis, just like PRO and unlike pro.

\[(40) \quad \text{Rina bikša me-Gil} \ [\text{še-PRO} \ yivdok \ Šuv \ et \ ha-toca’ot}.\]  
Rina asked from-Gil that would.check.3SG again ACC the-results

Hebrew

According to \(\text{Landau (2004)}\), these complements are obligatorily in the future tense, and these complements can never have a realis mood. Landau notes that it is not an accident that finite control is always interpreted in this way. One might take this to mean that there is a scale of finiteness: PRO may be inserted into certain finite clauses (with future tense, irrealis mood) which are not as independent as others (past tense).\(^{24}\) Indeed, Landau shows that subjunctive clauses such as (41a) pattern with infinitives in allowing NPI licensing; indicatives do not allow it, as in (41b):

\[(41) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{Lo darašti me-Gil ledaber im af-exad} \\
& \quad \text{not demanded.1SG from-Gil to-speak with anybody} \\
& \quad \text{‘I didn’t demand of Gil to speak to anybody.’}
\end{align*}
\]

\[\begin{align*}
\text{b.} & \quad * \text{Lo he’emanti še-Gil yedaber im af-exad} \\
& \quad \text{not believed.1SG that-Gil will-speak-3SG.M with anybody} \\
& \quad \text{‘I didn’t believe that Gil would speak to anybody.’}
\end{align*}\]

In the Balkan languages, finite control is seen with control complements which have a subjunctive mood marker. In Greek, this marker is \(na\), and like Hebrew this passes the aforementioned tests for OC, such as the obligatory de se reading in attitude contexts:

\(^{23}\)See \(\text{Landau (2004, 2013)}\) for a more detailed discussion on finite control.

\(^{24}\)The reader is referred to the hierarchies seen in \(\text{Wurmbrand and Lohninger (2019)}\) for further discussion.
This is precisely what we have seen in Ewe, which can instantiate control with both an irrealis subjunctive marker or a potential marker. We therefore do not have to give up the hypothesis of this paper that overt PRO exists in Ewe, just because Ewe has no nonfinite clauses.

4 Analysis

I attempt to answer the most central question that arose in our investigation of yè in different contexts in section 2. Is there a way we can maintain the same analysis for this pronoun which has the same phonetic form despite having different properties depending on the mood of the embedded clause? I will propose that the phonetic form yè arises via the control operation—that is, local binding via an abstraction operator in the embedded clause—in both realis and irrealis embedded clauses. The only difference is that, following Charnavel (2019), realis embedded clauses contain a logophoric projection LogP and a null logophor to bind yè.

4.1 Charnavel (2019)

It has long been noted that, in some contexts, anaphors are subject to Chomsky (1986)'s Condition A, which states that anaphors must be bound inside their local domain. I illustrate this with examples from Charnavel and Sportiche (2016), who refers to anaphors which obey Condition A as plain anaphors, as in (43a):

(43) a. [The moon] spins on itself.
   b. * [The moon] influences [people sensitive to itself].

However, it has been observed that there are contexts in which anaphors do not seem to be subject to Condition A. For example, himself can be bound by Noah, despite Noah being the farthest possible antecedent for the anaphor in (44) according to any definition of locality:

(44) Noah said to Mary that nobody would believe linguists like himself were necessary.

Exempt anaphors are ones like himself in (44), which seem to be exceptional. The goal of Charnavel (2019) is to account for why, in so many languages, plain and exempt anaphors are phonetically identical despite apparent differences in their licensing conditions. Contrary to appearances, she argues that plain and exempt anaphors are the same: exempt anaphors are locally bound by a phonetically null logophoric pronoun, prolog, that is identified with the individual whose perspective is adopted by the speaker, even though exempt anaphors lack an overt local antecedent. In this way, even seemingly exceptional anaphors satisfy Condition A.

Charnavel and Sportiche (2016) makes the important observation that exempt reflexives are necessarily animate. For example, notice that (43b) seems to improve if the moon is replaced with himself: The moon influences people sensitive to itself.

25 I follow Charnavel and Sportiche (2016) in assuming that it is the Spell-Out domain of a phase head, although different authors define different local domains; for example, Chomsky (1986) defined it as the domain containing the anaphor and a subject distinct from that anaphor.
with an animate subject in (45a). But a stronger contrast is observed in (45b) and (45c), where we see that the newspaper cannot antecede a reflexive in the embedded clause despite being a source of information:

(45) a. Trump influences [people sensitive to himself].
    b. Caitlin learned from John that there was a story about himself on TV.
    c. * Caitlin learned from [the newspaper] that there was a story about itself on TV.

Charnavel’s hypothesis predicts the importance of animacy: only animate individuals can serve as perspectival centers, so only animate reflexives can be bound by pro\textsubscript{log}. As such, Charnavel (2019) makes two empirical generalizations:

(46) a. An exempt anaphor must be anteceded by an attitude holder or an empathy locus. This is its logophoric antecedent.
    b. The constituent containing an exempt anaphor has to express the first-personal perspective of its antecedent. This is its logophoric domain.

Charnavel adopts a phase-based formulation of Condition A, given in (47):

(47) **Phase-based formulation of Condition A:**
An anaphor must be bound within its smallest Spell-Out domain.

We can now get into the more theoretical aspects of this proposal. According to Charnavel, every Spell-Out domain optionally contains a logophoric projection, LogP, headed by a perspectival operator OP\textsubscript{LOG}. This operator licenses a covert logophoric pronoun, pro\textsubscript{log}, as its specifier and requires that its complement, schematized as P in (48a), is compatible with the first-personal perspective of the referent of pro\textsubscript{log}, as captured in the denotation in (48a). Each phase can be specified as being presented from the perspective of a certain individual:

(48) a. \[[\text{LogP pro}_{\text{log}-i} \text{OP}_{\text{LOG}} [P \ldots \text{logophor}_{i} \ldots]]\]
    b. \[[\text{OP}_{\text{LOG}}] = \lambda P. \lambda x: P \text{ from } x \text{'s first-personal perspective}\]

The difference between plain and exempt anaphors is schematized below. Ph\textsubscript{0} refers to a phase head, and XP is the Spell-Out domain of Ph\textsubscript{0} in (49b), and LogP is the domain in (49a). This is to illustrate the very similar syntactic structure between the two, where the only difference between an exempt and plain anaphor is the binder: the former is covertly locally bound by a perspectival center while the latter is still locally bound, but not by pro\textsubscript{log}. It should be noted that, like other forms of covert pro, pro\textsubscript{log} does not require a local binder.\footnote{See Charnavel and Sportiche (2016) for motivation from French.}

(49) a. **Exempt anaphor:** \[[\text{PhP} \text{Ph}_{0} \text{LogP pro}_{\text{log}-i} \text{OP}_{\text{LOG}} [XP \ldots \text{exempt anaphor}_{i} \ldots]]\]
    b. **Plain anaphor:** \[[\text{PhP} \text{Ph}_{0} [XP \ldots \text{DP}_{i} \ldots \text{plain anaphor}_{i} \ldots]]\]

\footnote{One more potential issue is as follows. Notice that in a sentence such as John kicked himself, under the little v hypothesis John would be Merged to Spec,vP, which itself is the phase edge, and not inside the Spell-Out domain. This would have the unfortunate consequence, under Charnavel’s approach, that anaphors can never be bound in such simple sentences, incorrectly predicting the ungrammaticality of John kicked himself. Charnavel and Sportiche (2016) propose several arguments for a rethinking of the "vP edge": they propose that the agent of vP is first Merged inside the Spell-Out domain, then attracted to Spec,vP as v\textsubscript{0} probes for the nearest DP, which is the agent. This applies to any XP with a subject, and not just vP. The reader is referred to Charnavel and Sportiche (2016) for further discussion on this matter.}
We will now apply Charnavel’s account to the data from Ewe seen in section 2. The novel observation in this paper that I will make is as follows: PRO, in other languages including Ewe, is effectively a plain anaphor—it must be bound by the most local antecedent—whereas the logophoric pronoun must be bound by an attitude holder, so it is effectively an exempt anaphor.

4.2 A unified account of the two \textit{yè}

With a synthesis of Chierchia (1990) and Heim (2002)’s approach to control and logophoric pronouns respectively, we can provide a unified analysis of this pronoun in Ewe. It has the same phonetic form in different contexts because it is the phonetic form that arises when it is bound by an operator in the left-periphery of the embedded clause. I noted that \textit{yè} can only appear after \textit{be}; I propose that it is bound by it.  I will propose two structures: (50) for irrealis \textit{yè} and (51) for realis \textit{yè}. In both structures, \textit{yè}, or overt PRO is a variable bound by \textit{be}. This is precisely what we saw in (49a)-(49b). In essence, I am proposing that PRO is semantically interpreted as a plain anaphor, as in (50), while the logophoric pronoun is interpreted as an exempt anaphor, as in (51):

\begin{align*}
\text{(50)} & \quad \text{CP}_{\text{irrealis}} \\
& \quad \text{C}_{\text{OP}} \quad \text{be} \\
& \quad \lambda x \\
& \quad \text{DP}_i \quad \text{yè} \quad x \\
& \quad \text{T'} \\
& \quad \text{is clever}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{(51)} & \quad \text{LogP} \\
& \quad \text{pro}_{\text{log}} \quad \text{CP}_{\text{realis}} \\
& \quad \text{C}_{\text{OP}} \quad \text{be} \\
& \quad \lambda x \\
& \quad \text{DP}_i \quad \text{yè} \quad x \\
& \quad \text{T'} \\
& \quad \text{is clever}
\end{align*}

Both structures involve control. This might seem at odds with my claim that the logophoric pronoun is not an anaphor. I noted in section 2 that the logophoric pronoun has a different syntactic distribution than the anaphor. This is not problematic to my account; although they are both interpreted semantically as plain anaphors, but they may have different syntactic and pragmatic properties that lead to differences in distribution between the two.

Moving on, the recent Wurmbrand and Lohninger (2019) (W&L) will help us to better understand the difference between the two constructions. W&L argue that certain embedded clauses—such as those in the irrealis—contain less structure, and as a result are more integrated and less complex than those which are in, for example, the realis. I am suggesting that this is precisely what is going on between (50) and (51): (51) is more complex, and therefore has at least a perspectival center, and perhaps additional structure that is not shown.

As a result, the only difference between the two \textit{yè} is that in irrealis embedded clauses—perhaps because irrealis clauses are less complex, as \textit{yè} lacks a perspectival center, and this leads to it being semantically interpreted as a plain anaphor. By contrast, because the realis embedded

\footnote{However, unlike Anand (2006) and Heim (2002), given the existence of inanimate control I claim that this operator need not be in the left periphery of an attitudinal embedded clause.}
clause is more independent and more complex, it has a perspectival center, and this requires that it be semantically interpreted as an exempt anaphor. Why exactly the embedded clause being in the realis mood goes together with the addition of the perspectival center is a question I am not able to answer fully at this time, however.

There seems to be strong empirical evidence in Ewe that these two phenomena should be treated in the same way, given that they have the same phonetic form. However, we have seen strong evidence that this pronoun is not logophoric in the subject position of a irrealis clause. I propose that yè, rather than being a logophoric pronoun, might be better characterized as a left-periphery bound pronoun: a pronoun which just needs to be bound in the left-periphery of the embedded clause. This accounts for yè’s distribution always being after the complementizer be, and the identical phonetic form between the realis and irrealis versions of this pronoun.

For the semantics of the construction, both CP_{irrealis} and CP_{realis} in (50) and (51) respectively have the same semantics, which I give below; this is the same as that of Pearson (2015):

\begin{equation}
[\text{CP}] = \lambda w \lambda x. \text{x is clever in w}
\end{equation}

I have noted in section 2 that cases of inanimate control exist. Of course, PRO in these contexts cannot be read de se, since de se readings require animacy. This is not problematic for the ATC presented in 3.2, however. Whether or not a de se reading is possible depends entirely on the semantics of the control predicate; an abstraction operator can still be present in the embedded clause and not lead to a de se reading.

### 4.3 Further questions

Ewe’s so-called logophoric pronoun stands out when compared to Yoruba. According to Nike S. Lawal (p.c.), the logophoric pronoun of Yoruba can never have an inanimate referent, and it cannot be controlled. I have been able to verify that the logophoric pronoun òun in Yoruba must be read de se in realis contexts, unlike in Ewe.\(^{29}\) The sentence below is not possible in a context in which Taiwo does not know that he is referring to himself as fat.

\begin{equation}
\text{(53) \# Taiwo, ro pè òun, sanra}
\text{Taiwo thinks COMP YÈ \text{ fat}}
\text{‘Taiwo, thinks that he, is fat.’ (attempted de re reading, but fine if read de se)}
\end{equation}

Another way in which Ewe and Yoruba’s logophoric pronouns differ is that òun undergoes the de re blocking effect, as Anand (2006) points out, but Ewe does not, according to Pearson (2013). Anand (2006)’s de re blocking effect is defined as follows: no obligatory de se anaphor can be c-commanded by a de re counterpart.

Evidence of this is provided below. In Yoruba, ordinary pronouns, the ò-forms, cannot c-command the logophoric pronoun òun, which is an obligatory de se logophor. This is despite the fact that ordinary pronouns and logophoric pronouns may both co-occur in the same logophoric environment (which is the subject of an attitudinal embedded clause).

\(^{29}\)The fact that so-called logophoric pronouns in Ewe can be read de re is problematic for Charnavel. Under Charnavel’s theory, logophors are expected to always be read de se, and this is indeed a diagnostic for logophors. Coming up with an explanation of this problem is something that would go beyond the scope of the paper. However, it seems that realis yè requires that it be embedded in a resP, which forces a de re reading. This can be diagnosed via the lack of the de re blocking effect. By contrast, irrealis yè does not, and a de re blocking effect is obtained, because there is no embedding in a resP. Future investigations will be left to future research.
(54) Olu_{i} so pe o_{i/j} ri baba òun_{i}
Olu say that o see father YÈ
‘Olu said that he_{i/j} had seen his father.’

On the other hand, Ewe’s yè does not behave like Yoruba’s òun in this regard. Pearson (2013) provides evidence that the so-called logophoric pronoun yè in Ewe is not subject to the de re blocking effect in a dream report, unlike Yoruba:

(55) John koudrin be yè nyì Obama koudo yè na yè qòkui cadeau
John dream COMP YÈ COP Obama CONJ YÈ give YÈ REFLEX gift
‘John dreamed he was Obama and Obama gave John a gift.’ (third yè is de re)

Indeed, most pronouns (such as ordinary pronouns in non-dream reports) are not subject to the blocking effect. This is further evidence to distinguish Ewe’s yè.

The other question we have to ask is why this pronoun has different properties in different contexts. One answer is provided by Pearson (2015) in terms of φ-features. For Pearson, PRO is a minimal pronoun in the sense of Kratzer (2009), which inherits φ-features from its controller. It inherits these φ-features by binding with the abstraction operator; this means that it must be inside PRO’s local domain. For Kratzer, such φ-features unification must be local, so it cannot take a long-distance antecedent.

But given that yè has a third person feature, no feature unification is needed and long-distance binding should in theory be possible. However, we have seen clear evidence that irrealis yè, despite having φ-features, cannot have a long-distance antecedent and has other properties associated with control, so this account cannot be right. We need to find an alternate solution: might the necessity of irrealis yè being read locally arise simply from the fact that it has to be controlled?

Some evidence for this might be the following: yè can also appear in the object position of a control complement with -a, as in (56), but in this case it may always be read long-distance and therefore does not instantiate overt PRO. It is unsurprising that control is instantiated only in the subject position of the control complements in this dialect:

(56) Agbe_{j} kadedzi be Kofi_{i} dzagbagba be yè_{i/j} -a fo yè_{j/k}.
Agbe believe COMP Kofi try COMP YÈ-IRR hit YÈ
‘Agbe_{j} believes that Kofi tried to hit him_{i}.’

This is a plausible explanation for Pearson (2015)’s puzzle. But (56) raises another interesting concern for the analysis of yè given in this paper, most of which I must leave to future research, but I will include a brief discussion here. How can object yè be licensed, with long-distance readings, subject yè is already bound by the one be heading the embedded clause? In other words, where is the abstraction operator for the second yè in (56)?

Charnavel (2019) gives us a possible explanation to account for the distribution of object yè. Under her account, a logophoric projection can be inserted into the Spell-Out domain of any phase. This includes phases such as vP, so it is plausible for there to be a perspectival center present—in the Spell-Out domain of vP—that can bind the second yè in (56).

30But this leaves two questions open. First, why is object yè not licensed in matrix clauses as well? Second, isn’t vP less complex and more integrated than CP_{irrealis}; why would the former have a perspectival center but not the latter? It would go out of the scope of the paper to answer these questions fully, but for the time being, I would have to stipulate that vP can license a null abstraction operator only if the embedded clause as a whole is headed by be.
Before concluding, let me point out that there seems to be no non-obligatory control (NOC) PRO in Ewe; I have found no examples of irrealis yè that might instantiate this. As such, arbitrary control is also impossible in Ewe. In the example below, arbitrary control is possible in English, in a context where Marie told contextually salient people to leave:

(57) * Marie be yè_{arb}-a dzo  
    Marie COMP YÈ-POT leave  
    ‘(Intended) Marie; said PRO_{arb} to leave. (arbitrary reading possible in English)’

But Charnavel’s analysis of logophoric constructions can be applied to the distribution of NOC PRO, given that it is logophoric. The logophoricity of NOC PRO was first noted by Kuno (1975), but it has been defended by others since, such as Landau (1999) and Charnavel (2019). Notice that in the examples below, no purely syntactic analysis can explain the following contrast, which differ in the preposition used (to vs. about).

(58) a. John said to Mary that there was a picture of herself with a Mafia figure in the newspaper.  
    b. * John said about Mary that there was a picture of herself with a Mafia figure in the newspaper.

If Charnavel’s analysis here is right, then NOC PRO is a subspecies of OC PRO, given that they both have the semantic interpretation, except what we would usually call OC PRO is not bound by a null logophor. But there is one catch: in Ewe, perspectival centers for yè do not seem to allow the attitude holder to be arbitrary; the attitude holder must be present in the sentence.

To conclude, I have proposed an analysis of PRO in (50) for Ewe that might be carried onto languages such as English: PRO is semantically interpreted as a plain anaphor, while logophors such as logophoric pronouns are semantically interpreted as what seem to be "exempt" anaphors, but are really just plain anaphors bound by perspectival centers. In other words, control is mainly just binding by a local antecedent with the right sort of predicate, which requires a de se reading and an embedded clause argument that is not finite, or realis in Ewe and perhaps other finite control languages. This is the only difference between the two yè; and indeed, this treatment of control and logophoricity treats the two as very similar phenomena.

5 Problems for the MTC

My goal here is to discuss some issues for the MTC which, in principle, can be accounted for with further stipulations. However, we then have to ask if these additional stipulations would be independently motivated and not merely redescribe the facts. It doesn’t seem clear that the MTC would be able to provide any insight on the problems that I present here. That is, the ATC presented in section 3.2 is better equipped at accounting for the data provided here.

This section is structured as follows. In section 5.1, I discuss the phonetic identity between the realis and irrealis yè despite them having different properties, which is coincidental under the MTC. In section 5.2 I present the problem of partial control and argue for its existence and the lack of any null comitative as proposed by Boeckx et al. (2010). In sections 5.3 and 5.4, I discuss the overtness of split control and whether it can be derived by movement without violating minimality constraints, and the seeming lack of raising in this dialect of Ewe respectively.
5.1 Phonetic identity between realis and irrealis yè

A crucial argument against the MTC is the fact that, despite the numerous differences between realis and irrealis yè, they have the same phonetic form and even the same tone. Under the analysis of control and logophoricity that I have given in Anlo Ewe, this is explained because they are both bound by the complementizer be in the left-periphery of the embedded clause.

However, this is coincidental in the MTC. Why should two pronouns with very different properties have the same phonetic form? Why should the logophoric pronoun of Ewe be the resumptive pronoun used for control? The MTC doesn’t seem to have the tools to derive this similarity. One could then argue that as resumptive pronouns being used to relativize subjects is an unusual occurrence crosslinguistically, as McCracken (2013) points out, so the phonetic form of the resumptive pronoun might be yè.

However, what one might expect based on comparison with other Niger-Congo languages is that the resumptive pronoun should not be yè; instead it could be the weak third person pronoun e. Sulemana (2018) points out that the third person pronoun wa is also a resumptive pronoun in Buli; it is required in long-distance extraction of a subject.

(59)  (ká) wänã (*ati) fi pä:-chım *(wà) àli ëg ëlùmù:
      Q who ? 2SG think 3SG ? cook meat.DEF
      ‘Who do you think cooked the meat?’ Buli

Fortuitously, Sulemana (2018) argues in favor of the MTC, claiming that wà is a resumptive pronoun that is overt PRO derived by A-movement. We might have expected Ewe to behave similarly in this regard by also using the weak third person subject pronoun, but it doesn’t.

In Asante Twi, which like Buli and Ewe is a Niger-Congo language spoken in Ghana, the third person subject pronoun o is a resumptive pronoun used to relativize subjects, according to McCracken (2013).

(60)  ábrántié n(o)-å: ɔ-bɔ: wo no
       boy DEF-REL 3SG-hit 2SG DET
       ‘the boy who hit you’ Asante Twi

Ga, another Niger-Congo language spoken in Ghana, shares the same third person pronoun as Ewe, e, and is treated as a resumptive pronoun in Amfo and Norgbe (2009).

(61)  Neke gbeke ne: e ëtue wa
      PD child PDD 3SG ear hard
      ‘This child is stubborn.’ Ga

To recap, there doesn’t seem to be an insightful answer from the MTC as to why the resumptive pronoun should be the logophoric pronoun. It misses a greater generalization that the meaning of both controlled and logophoric elements is derived via binding by an abstraction operator.

A defender of the MTC might attempt to argue that all logophoric pronouns are just resumptive pronouns derived by movement to a perspectival center in the left-periphery of the embedded clause, and then to its surface position. This could also be extended to account for the distribution of realis yè. But one crucial difference between the distribution of PRO and realis yè in general is the latter may have long-distance antecedents. I repeat (14) in (62) below.

(62)  Marie be Kofì xe xe yèik na yèik cadeau
       Mary say Kofi believe COMP YÈ give YÈ gift
‘Mary said that Kofi believed that he/she gave him/her a gift.’

Hornstein (1999) attempted to derive the fact that control requires local c-commanding antecedents—apart from the notable exception of promise—via movement. But the fact that realis yè can freely have long-distance antecedents shows that its distribution is unlikely to be accounted for via movement.

Here is another path for the MTC. Both realis and irrealis yè in embedded Spec,TP can start out differently, but they both end as bound variables, spelled out as yè. Both cases involve movement, but to different positions: in irrealis contexts, the DP moves to the matrix clause to pick up another θ-role; the lower copy becomes a bound variable and is pronounced as yè. In realis contexts, an operator moves to Spec,CP, and again leaves a variable, which is pronounced as yè.

Such an account would lead to minimality violations, however. Recall that if yè is an object it can always be read long-distance, even if the embedded clause is in the irrealis. So object yè is an operator, which must therefore move to embedded Spec,CP. Let us now turn the embedded clause in (62) into an irrealis one, as in (63), where the subject yè is PRO while the object yè is a logophoric pronoun, so that the subject yè cannot refer to the long-distance Marie:

(63) Marie believe COMP YÈ-POT give YÈ gift

‘Mary said that Kofi believed that he/she will give him/her a gift.’

The embedded clause would have the following structure at one point of the derivation:

(64) [CP OP/₀ [C] [TP [Marie/Kofi] ...]]

Both the operator and Marie or Kofi are DPs, but the operator is higher up at one point of the derivation. Due to minimality constraints, no movement would be able to take place above the operator. Of course, one could stipulate a story as to how the operator is unable to move to a θ-position so θ-role probing can look further downwards.

No movement is required in my account of (63). As mentioned in section 4, object yè is antecedced by a perspectival center in the Spell-Out domain of Spec,vP; pro_log can refer to either of the attitude holders, which are Marie and Kofi, and this binds object yè. By contrast, the subject yè has no perspectival center, so it must refer locally, that is to Kofi:

(65) [CP [C λx [TP yè [T- [vP LogP prlog₀ [VP yè₀]]]]]]

In the previous section, I have attempted to argue that the distribution of the yè provides us evidence for thinking that the distribution of OC PRO and logophoric pronouns should be treated similarly. And if the treatment of the logophoric pronoun is not similar to the treatment of obligatory control, the MTC misses a strong parallel between control and logophoric pronouns that have been pointed out since Heim (2002), which I have further reinforced in this paper.

5.2 Partial control

Another important problem for the MTC comes from the existence of partial control (PC) in Ewe. The overall problem is that the MTC attempts to deny the existence of PC given that the head of an A-chain must be identical to its trace, and not merely "partially" identical in some sense. But Ewe makes it difficult to deny that genuine PC exists, especially considering the null comitative
analysis is difficult to defend here, for reasons that I will illustrate. (17) is repeated in (66) below, in which the embedded predicate *kpe* ‘meet’ precludes the possibility of exhaustive control.

(66) Kofi i dzi be *yè-wo*-a/*yè*-a kpe ga ade.
Kofi want COMP YÈ-PL-POT/YÈ-POT meet time 6
‘Kofi wanted PRO$_i$/PRO$_j$ to meet at 6.’

Furthermore, like English, *Marie kpe ga ade* ‘Mary met at 6’ is ruled out. The observation that *yè* does not need an equivalent antecedent is not new; it may also have a partial referent in realis contexts. *Sells* (1987) (p. 449) was the first to make this observation:

(67) Kofi kpɔ be *yè-wo-do* go.
Kofi see COMP YÈ-PL-gone out
‘Kofi saw that they (including Kofi) had gone out.’

He also notes that the opposite situation is impossible, where there is a plural antecedent and a singular logophoric pronoun that refers to part of the antecedent. *Hyman and Comrie* (1981) and *Frajzyngier* (1985) have also noted that *yèwo* is allowed with a singular antecedent.

To see why this poses a problem for the MTC, let us see how partial control is handled in that framework. For *Boeckx et al.* (2010), PRO cannot be partially controlled: control must always be exhaustive, or in other words, a controller must always have an identical referent to its controllee. The PC reading is obtained from a null comitative phrase inside the complement. The examples below are reproduced (Boeckx et al., 2010, p. 185):

(68) a. [The chair i hoped [t$_i$ to meet pro$_{comitative}$ at 6]]
b. [The chair i hoped [t$_i$ to apply together pro$_{comitative}$ for the grant]]

The problem for the MTC is simple. It is easy to verify that partial control is allowed in (66), but exhaustive control is not. The embedded predicate in (66) is *meet*, which requires that its subject be semantically plural in Ewe and in other languages like English. This also shows that we are not dealing with mere syntactic plurality but semantic plurality as well. The head of the A-chain must therefore differ in reference from its trace, but this is impossible via movement. If the plural marker *-wo* in Ewe was attached to the lower Copy, then it would have to move together with *-wo*; it wouldn’t be able to be left below. Therefore, the matrix subject c-commanding the lower Copy with *-wo* is unlikely, unless some complex additional structure was stipulated.

One might make the following assumption: *yèwo* in the context of partial control is actually semantically singular, but it is spelled out as syntactically plural due to the presence of the null comitative. But there are reasons to think that a null comitative isn’t present in Ewe. Let us first consider English: *Landau* (2016) points out that we would expect PC PRO to be able to saturate a secondary predicate which has a domain that is restricted to non-plural individuals.

This is not possible in English. If we take the expression *as an adult*, we see that PC PRO in (69c) rejects *as an adult* like (69b) and unlike (69a). Imagine a context in which Kofi’s 18th birthday will happen the next day, and Kofi and Marie will meet then:

31 Notice that this is reminiscent of PRO, in which although a controller may merely "partially" control an antecedent, the opposite is not possible where an antecedent contains the referent of PRO:

(i) The group$_{i+}$ wanted PRO$_i$ to take out the trash.

32 There are problems outside of Ewe with assuming the existence of a null comitative. The reader is referred to *Landau* (2016) for further discussion on assuming null comitatives in partial control constructions.
(69) a. Kofi will meet Marie as an adult tomorrow.
   b. * Kofi and Marie will meet as an adult tomorrow.
   c. * Kofi told Marie to meet as an adult tomorrow.

In Ewe, (70a)-(70c) translate similarly to their respective counterparts in (69a)-(69c):

(70) a. Kofi a kpe Marie a be ame tsitsi ene etsor.
    Kofi POT meet Marie like person adult as tomorrow
    ‘Kofi will likely meet Marie as an adult tomorrow.’

b. * Kofi kple Marie a kpe a be ame tsitsi ene etsor.
    Kofi CONJ Marie POT meet like person adult as tomorrow
    ‘Kofi and Marie will likely meet as an adult tomorrow.’

   c. * Kofi dzi be yè-wo-a kpe a be ame tsitsi ene etsor.
    Kofi want COMP YÈ-PL-POT meet like person adult as tomorrow
    ‘Kofi wants to meet as an adult tomorrow.’

Another problem is that in Ewe, as noted prior, proper names and other nominal phrases can be put into the subject position of an irrealis clause. This leads us to another concern: if we assume the null comitative account, we would have to say comitatives can appear only if yè is present, even if the embedded clause is in the irrealis, a stipulation which seems unjustified.

An example is given in (71) below where a proper name is present as the subject of the embedded irrealis clause and its closest possible English translation is given. If the null comitative account was correct, we would expect this sentence to be grammatical:

(71) * Kofi dzi be Agbe a kpe ga ade
    Kofi want COMP Agbe POT meet at 6
    ‘(Intended meaning) Kofi wanted for them (including Agbe) to meet at 6.’

The ATC can account for this data straightforwardly, given that it argues partial control does exist and PRO may be semantically plural. At the very least, my goal in this subsection has been to give evidence for the existence of genuine partial control, for which assuming the null comitative analysis seems to lead to several complications, even outside of Ewe.

5.3 Split control

It has been noted by Fujii (2006), Boeckx et al. (2010) and Landau (2013), among others, that split control remains one of the most difficult aspects of control to account for, especially for the MTC. Due to this, in some papers such as Hornstein (1999), the entire existence of split control was questioned. However, the consensus today, even among the proponents of the MTC, is that split control does exist.

The overtess of split control in Ewe, repeated in (72) with the communicative predicate ‘gblo’ ask, allows us to probe its structure. The same pronoun for plural and partial control, the plural form of yè, is used:

33See Pearson (2016) for a semantic account of partial control.
34The reader is referred to Fujii (2006) and Boeckx et al. (2010) for accounts of split control in the MTC.
However, sentence (73) below with pronoun doubling is preferred over the plural \( y\text{è} \) option as it is more specific. For simplicity I will stick to \( y\text{è}w\text{o} \) throughout the rest of this section, treating the pronoun doubling as an immaterial PF-level phenomenon.

At least at first glance, it’s clear why this would be a problem for the MTC. The usual problem with split control, as Landau (2013) puts it, is simply that the head of an A-chain must be identical to its trace and cannot be split. Yet if the MTC is correct, the resumptive pronoun is formed from the trace of a split A-chain.

In addition, there would be minimality violations in order to derive movement from the subject position of the embedded clause to the object of the control predicate and to its subject. The matrix subject would have to "skip over" the object of the control predicate.

To find a solution, we could turn to Fujii (2006), who provides the most fleshed out treatment of split control in the MTC. Fujii (2006) proposes that the split control PRO might be treated as a complex coordinate structure, which contains both of the controllers. In the case of Japanese, the complex pronoun is a specifier of a MoodP:

\[
[\text{MoodP} [A + B] [\text{Mood TP}]]
\]

+ is assumed to be a phonetically null coordinator. There is pied-piping of the matrix subject: after \( [A + B] \) moves to the object of the control predicate, \( A \) moves to the specifier position of the matrix clause. This is seen in (76). This could provide a straightforward solution, with the stipulation that the phonetic form of \( [A + B] \) as a resumptive pronoun is \( y\text{è}w\text{o} \) because it is plural.

This solution is problematic. First, there isn’t a second resumptive pronoun even though \( Agbe \) is deleted in the object position of the control predicate. We would expect not only \( Fafa \) to be spelled out in this position, but also potentially another \( y\text{è} \) instead of \( Agbe \). The MTC would have to stipulate that \( y\text{è} \) must be spelled-out after the complementizer \( be \), but null anywhere else.

Another problem is that it is not clear in Fujii (2006)’s solution whether \( [A + B] \) is a DP or something else entirely, or perhaps a PP. If it is a DP, movement of a DP from inside another DP would violate minimality conditions. If it is not a DP, then there is no minimality violation, but the data in Ewe makes it likely that the subject of the embedded clause in a split-controlled construction is a DP, simply because the spelled-out form is a pronoun.

Another way to verify that the complex pronoun is indeed a DP is to verify that it is the external argument of the embedded verb and refers to both controllers. One way of doing so is to make the object of the embedded verb into a reflexive, as in (75), given that the external argument must c-command the internal argument reflexive:

\[
\text{Agbe}_{i} \text{gblo ne Faf}_{a} \text{be } y\text{è}-w_{o_{i+k}} \text{a fo } 3\text{PL-self}\text{wo-qoku}. \\
\text{Agbe told to Fafa COMP YÈ-PL (two.person YÈ-PL) POT beat 3PL-self} \\
\text{‘Agbe}_{i} \text{told Faf}_{a} \text{PRO}_{i+k} \text{to beat themselves (together).’}
\]
As \([A + B]\) is a DP, to avoid minimality violations, the movement that we would expect is given in (77), where we would expect there to be two resumptive pronouns, both spelled out as \(yèwo\). This is not the desired outcome:

\[
\begin{align*}
(76) & \quad \text{vP} \\
& \quad \text{DP} \\
& \quad A \\
& \quad \text{Agbe} \\
& \quad v' \\
& \quad \text{v VP} \\
& \quad [A + B] \\
& \quad \text{Agbe} + \text{Fafa} \\
& \quad V' \\
& \quad \text{V CP} \\
& \quad [A + B] \\
& \quad \text{Agbe} + \text{Fafa} \\
& \quad \text{yèwo} \\
(77) & \quad \text{vP} \\
& \quad \text{DP} \\
& \quad [A + B] \\
& \quad v' \\
& \quad \text{v VP} \\
& \quad \text{DP} \\
& \quad [A + B] \\
& \quad V' \\
& \quad \text{V CP} \\
& \quad [A + B] \\
\end{align*}
\]

Another approach to split control in the MTC framework is briefly suggested in Boeckx et al. (2010). It is similar to Fujii’s, but the only difference is that there is movement of only \([+ B]\) to the matrix object position and \(A\) to the matrix subject position. An illustrative tree of this account is provided in (79) with the desired result:

\([+ B]\) is a PP, given that the \(+\) is treated as a null comitative preposition. This does have the advantage of fixing the aforementioned problem of why the trace of \(Agbe\) is not spelled out as \(yè\) in the object position, since there is no trace of \(Agbe\). But this brings about two further problems. First, notice that in (72), the object of the control predicate is a PP, and not a DP unlike in English and Japanese. The structure of this would look as follows:

\[
(78) \quad [\text{PP ne } [\text{PP + Fafa}]]
\]

This would mean that the preposition \(ne\) ‘to’ can c-select other PPs and not just DPs, which is an incorrect prediction; \(ne\) in Ewe can only take DP arguments and is never seen with overt prepositions. The MTC would have to make the stipulation that null comitative PPs may be Merged with, but not any other PP.

In addition, the same problem involving violation of minimality constraints remains. Once again, I have argued that \([A + B]\) is a DP; it’s not clear how you can still get another DP, \(A\), out of it given minimality constraints, and the same problem remains in (80):

\[35\]This is motivated by the need to fix an incorrect prediction in (1a)–(1b): \(John washed Bill\) cannot mean that John washed Bill and himself, yet this is derived if the entire complex structure \([A + B]\) is capable of moving up.

\(i\) a. \(\ast\) John washed Bill. (meaning John washed Bill and himself)

b. John washed \([\text{John} + \text{Bill}]\)
To recap, I have presented the split controlled construction in Ewe and tried to derive it in the MTC. With additional assumptions, it might be possible to do so, but it’s not clear whether the solutions would provide insight.

5.4 Does Ewe have (hyper)raising?

What seems unusual about Ewe is that, based on the results of my fieldwork, I have not been able to find any instances of (hyper)raising. This is important, given that if control is A-movement and it is possible, raising should also be expected. The only difference is that control involves A-movement into a \( \theta \)-position in the MTC, and it’s unclear as to why a language should allow A-movement into a \( \theta \)-position but not other kinds of A-movement.

It is important to note that if Ewe had raising, it would instantiate hyperraising, which involves raising out of a finite clause. This is because as mentioned in section 2, Ewe does not seem to have infinitival clauses; all instances of control involve finite irrealis embedded clauses. Some examples of hyperraising from Brazilian Portuguese are given below:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(81) a. } & \text{ Parece [que os alunos vão fazer pão],} \\
& \text{seems that the students will make bread} \\
& \text{‘It seems that the students will make bread.’} \\
\text{b. } & \text{Os alunos parecem [que vão fazer pão].} \\
& \text{the students seem that will make bread} \\
& \text{‘Lit. the students seem that will make bread.’} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Fong (2019)

Like Brazilian Portuguese above, other Niger-Congo languages such as Zulu (Halpert (2016)) have optional hyperraising. On the whole, it is difficult to find predicates which do not assign a \( \theta \)-role to their subject and take irrealis clause arguments in Niger-Congo languages, because almost all predicates we would consider raising predicates in English, such as seem and likely, only take
realis clause complements in Ewe, as in (82a)-(82b):

(82) a. E wo be e hodzo
    It feel COMP 3SG hot
    ‘It seems that it is hot.’

b. * E wo be e-a hodzo
    It feel COMP 3SG-POT hot
    ‘It seems it will be hot.’

As Sulemana (2018) notes, the situation is the same in Buli, another Niger-Congo language. He does note that one predicate in Buli, màgsi which means ‘right/appropriate’ takes a nonfinite complement and allows optional raising, which is given in (83a)-(83b) below. However, this contrasts with Ewe in which hyperraising is not possible with the same predicate, as in (83c)-(83d). This is possibly because Ewe does not have nonfinite clauses. Finite clauses could constitute of a CP phase, and Ewe does not allow the possibility of movement from such a clause.

(83) a. Kù màgsi Asouk chéj sükü
    it right Asouk go school
    ‘It is right (for) Asouk to go to school.’

b. Asouk, màgsi wài chéj sükü
    Asouk right 3SG go school
    ‘It is right (for) Asouk to go to school.’

Buli

c. E nyo be Agbe na yi sukuu.
    It right COMP Agbe NA go school
    ‘It is right for Agbe to go to school.’

d. * Agbe nyo be yèi-a na yi sukuu.
    Agbe right COMP YÈ-POT NA go school
    ‘Agbe is right to go to school.’

Ewe

There are a few predicates in Ewe that we would call raising predicates in English, in that they do not take irrealis embedded clause arguments and do not assign a θ-role to the subject: these are dzegome ‘begin’, dzudzo ‘stop’ and yidzi ‘resume’, which we have already seen in (22), which is repeated in (84a) below. Notice that the expletive-constructions in (84b) are impossible in this case; expletive-insertion is one of the classical tests to distinguish between raising and control predicates because a raising predicate does not assign a θ-role to its matrix subject.

(84) a. Ati-a_i dzegome/dzudzo/yidzi be yèi-a ŋe.
    Tree-NOM begin/stop/resume COMP YÈ-POT break.
    ‘The tree, began/stopped/resumed to break.’

b. * E dzegome/dzudzo/yidzi be ati-a_i ŋe.
    It begin/stop/resume COMP tree-NOM break.
    ‘It began/stopped/resumed (for) the tree to break.’

Another test for raising is the idiom test. ‘Adoglo lia ati’ the lizard climbed the tree (meaning ‘one is hungry’) is one such idiom. The idiomatic meaning cannot be obtained in a sentence such as (85), in which case it is completely unacceptable, but the sentence is fine without the idiomatic meaning (in which case there would be a lizard that climbed the tree at 6):

36I omit the examples in which attempts to raise out of the irrealis embedded clause fail. That raising is not possible in this case is not surprising given that realis embedded clauses constitute phases and movement out of them is not possible. As I will discuss later in the section, hyperraising does not seem to be possible either.
6 Conclusion

In some sense, this paper raises more questions than it answers. Some examples are given in (86a)-(86c) below.

(86) a. The Chierchia (1990) theory of control is purely semantic and doesn’t get the syntactic agreement facts noted by Landau (2015).

b. Why are genuine logophoric pronouns in other languages always read de se?

c. What is the semantics for split control?

At this point, I leave most of these questions open for future research. For (86c), it is reasonable to suppose that split control might have a similar semantics to that of partial control, given that they share the same phonetic form (apart from the optional pronoun doubling) for which a semantics has been proposed by Pearson (2016).

But the most pressing concern is the problem noted by Landau (2015): the ATC, which provides a semantics for control, does not get the syntactic agreement facts although it can derive the de se reading. For example, in the Spanish sentence below, the gender features on the matrix subject are represented on the embedded clause:

(87) La víctima intentó ser transferida/??transferido

the victim.FEM tried.3SG be.INF transferred.FEM/transfered.MASC
‘The victim tried to be transferred.’

Nothing in the ATC gives us syntactic agreement, as there is no syntactic relation between the controller and PRO.\(^{37}\) By contrast, an approach to control mediated by the operation Agree such as\(^{37}\)\(^{38}\) Landau (1999)’s is able to get the syntactic agreement facts but not that the de se reading of PRO is required. This shows us the need for a theory of control which can account for control being both a syntactic and semantic phenomenon. For the time being, I leave this question open to future research, but there have been attempts to derive syntactic agreement in the ATC framework, though Landau (2015) objects that this is stipulatory.\(^{38}\)

Based on this issue,\(^{38}\) Landau (2015) builds a theory of control that places equal importance in both syntax and semantics. The approach intends to solve two problems: why PRO must be read de se in attitude contexts and why there is syntactic agreement between PRO and the controller. The "two-tier" theory of control is named as such because control complements, according to Landau, divide into two types: in non-attitudinal contexts OC is a kind of prediction which is made possible via movement of PRO, where PRO abstracts over the complement. The predicative head is designated as \(\text{Fin}\), and an example derivation is given in (88).

The second tier of control, for attitudinal complements, is established by logophoric anchoring, which builds on the predicative tier. The attitude complement is a function from concept generators to propositions. A de re variable, pro, is embedded inside a concept generator, and the de se reading is obtained via a presupposition. I give a simplified derivation of a sentence with logophoric control in (89); although it is simplified, I have kept the essence of the approach.

(88) **Predicative control**

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{John forced the car, } \text{PRO}_i \text{ to stop.}
\end{array}
\]

(89) **Logophoric control**

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{John, tried PRO}_i \text{ to eat.}
\end{array}
\]

But based on the findings of this paper, I am unsure if it is necessary to posit a second tier for logophoric control. In Ewe, the two tiers of control look identical: (90), for example, has two meanings. It could be the same as in English, where it just means that a specific tree began to break. Or it could have the logophoric meaning, where the tree is trying to communicate to you that it is beginning to break. The addition of a second tier does not change the sentence at all:

(90) \(\text{Ati}_i\-\text{a} \text{ dzegome be } \text{yè}_i\-\text{a} \text{ nje.}\)

Tree-NOM begin COMP YÉ-POT break.

\(^{37}\)Perhaps this might be accounted for by\(^{37}\)\(^{38}\) Kratzer (2009)’s notion of feature transmission. But if semantic agreement takes place in LF, and then we wouldn’t expect gender agreement to be present on the embedded predicate.\(^{38}\) See (Pearson, 2013, p. 147) for more details.
Possible reading 1: ’The tree, began PRO₁ to break.’
Possible reading 2: ’The animate tree, began PRO₁ to break.’

By contrast, the account proposed in this paper provides an identical syntactic structure to the two readings of (90), but the animate version of the sentence requires de se binding while the inanimate version does not; overt PRO in both sentences is controlled by the matrix subject.

It could of course still be possible that there is an invisible second tier for logophoric anchoring. I do not intend for this to be a solid argument against the two-tier theory of control, but I do want to propose a simplification that might have empirical basis. There might not be any need to posit a second tier for control; we need only posit that there is an abstraction operator present in the left-periphery of any control complement.

Regardless, the central concern of this paper has been to accomplish these three goals:

(i) Goal 1: Show that yè behaves as an overt PRO in the subject of an irrealis clause.
(ii) Goal 2: Propose an analysis of yè which assumes both [Chierchia (1990)]’s theory of control and [Charnavel (2019)]’s theory of logophoricity, accounting for [Heim (2002)]’s intuition that PRO and logophoric pronouns have very similar properties.
(iii) Goal 3: Present four arguments against [Hornstein (1999)]’s movement theory of control based on the overtness of PRO in Ewe.

In section 2, I have attempted to provide empirical evidence for goal (i), arguing that yè cannot be a logophoric pronoun—at least as defined in the literature—because it does not have the properties of a logophoric pronoun in the subject position of an irrealis clause. Rather, it has the exact same properties as OC PRO.

As mentioned in goal (ii), I have proposed an analysis for this, in which I argue that the phonetic output, yè, is one that is associated with the control relation. Both realis and irrealis yè involve binding by an abstraction operator, but the only difference is the controller. Irrealis yè must be bound by a local antecedent, because it is missing a perspectival center, whereas realis yè is not missing its perspectival center, so it is controlled by it. In this way, control and logophoricity are very similar phenomena—treated much like how [Hornstein (1999)] treats control and raising.

I have argued in favor of the final goal, (iii), with four empirical arguments. First, I have demonstrated that partial control seems to exist, and second, that split control is difficult to derive without violating minimality constraints. Third, Ewe is a language without raising but with control, which seems to be unexpected given [Hornstein (1999)], and finally, it would be coincidental.

There is one more potential argument against Landau’s two-tier theory of control, though I have left the details of this open for future research. Landau, contrary to Chierchia’s approach, assumes that PRO’s de se reading is a special kind of de re. This semantics would actually predict that PRO would not undergo the de re blocking effect noted by [Anand (2006)], which seems to be contrary to fact. The definition of de re blocking effect is that de se anaphors cannot be c-commanded by de re pronouns. Paired with the context below, (i) was judged to be unacceptable by all 10 native English speakers consulted (many other control predicates and contexts were tested):

(i) Context: Kofi is a criminal who lost his memories years ago, is watching a security camera recording of himself and does not realize it was him trying to run from the police.
   a. #Kofi said that he de re tried PRO to run from the police.

This sentence seems to be unacceptable due to the de re blocking effect. Preliminary data suggests that this blocking effect is also present in the Anlo dialect of Ewe, as well.
for yè to have the same phonetic form as the logophoric pronoun if control were movement, despite their different properties.

To recap, in this paper, I have attempted to provide empirical evidence for Heim (2002)’s observation that OC PRO and logophoric pronouns should be treated in the same way. That the two have the same form in this dialect of Ewe does not seem to be a coincidence. It is an advantage for the Chierchia (1990) theory of control that it can explain why these two should have the same phonetic form. This similarity between two seemingly distant phenomena—control and logophoricity—which I have argued for based on empirical evidence from the Anlo dialect of Ewe leaves a great deal of exciting avenues for future research.

References


