A restriction on the distribution of exclusive *only*

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The sentences in (1) license upper-bound inferences, viz. that the alternatives obtained by increasing the numeral are false.

(1) a. Alice read three books.
   b. Four people can fit in this car.
   c. Five students gathered in the hallway.
   d. Bob ran for six minutes.

The sentences in (2) license lower-bound inferences, viz. that the alternatives obtained by decreasing the numeral are false.

(2) a. Three eggs are sufficient to bake this cake.
   b. Five guests drank over half the beers between them.
   c. Bob ran to the store in six minutes.

These bound inferences can be explained as routine scalar implicatures by observing that, in each case, the degree predicate $\lambda n. \phi(n)$ obtained by abstracting over the numeral is either downward scalar ($\phi(n)$ entails $\phi(n - 1)$) or upward scalar ($\phi(n)$ entails $\phi(n + 1)$). For instance, $[\lambda n. \text{Alice read } n \text{ books}]$ is downward scalar, because if she read three books, then she also read two; thus, higher numerals are more informative than lower numerals, and so we draw upper-bound inferences (Horn 1972). Conversely, $[\lambda n. \text{n eggs are sufficient to bake this cake}]$ is upward scalar, because if three eggs are sufficient, then so are four (Beck and Rullmann 1999); thus, lower numerals are more informative than higher numerals, and so we draw lower-bound inferences.

As is well known, the exclusive *only* may attach to the sentences in (1) to turn the upper-bound inference into a semantic entailment, suggesting that *only* happily combines with downward-scalar numerical sentences to exclude higher-numeral alternatives.
Curiously, attaching only to the sentences in (2) yields an unexpected result: only cannot act as a lower-bounding exclusive. For example, (3a) does not have the reading ‘three and no fewer than three eggs are sufficient to bake this cake’. At most, only may have an evaluative construal (‘it is surprising that merely three eggs are sufficient’), and the lower bound is a routine implicature. (The evaluative construal can be accessed by reading the sentences with surprise; it is perhaps more accessible with merely or just.)

(3) a. Only three_F eggs are sufficient to bake this cake.
    b. Only five_F guests drank over half the beers between them.
    c. Bob ran to the store in only six_F minutes.

More to the point, embedding the only-versions of the sentences in (1) in a downward-entailing environment preserves the bound inference, whereas embedding the sentences in (3) in a downward-entailing environment destroys it (but preserves the evaluative component). For instance, (4a) entails that Alice thinks that three eggs or fewer are insufficient.

(4) a. Alice doubts that only three_F eggs are sufficient to bake this cake.
    b. Never have only five_F guests drunk over half the beers between them.
    c. Bob didn’t run to the store in only six_F minutes.

The contrast is striking because it is independent of whether the numerical sentence is episodic or not, existential or generic, distributive or collective, etc. The generalization seems to simply be that only φ(n) is exclusive only if φ is downward entail ing, but why should that be?

It is especially striking from the perspective of Fox (2007), who draws a tight connection between only and the grammatical exhaustification operator exh: they have the same semantics (modulo presupposing vs. entailing its prejacent). If exh is responsible for the bound inferences in (1) and (2), then it is mysterious why only should only act as an exclusive when attaching to the former but not the latter.

References

