Abstract: The main goal of this article is to show that the special interpretations of asymmetrical coordinate structures result from an intricate interplay of syntax, semantics and pragmatics, but that they do not necessitate the introduction of special grammatical mechanisms or stipulations. The article will further focus on one specific type of asymmetrical disjunctive coordination, which has been argued to involve a third type of syntactic relation besides the traditionally distinguished cases of coordination and subordination, and which has been called balanced ordination (Dutch: balansschikking); I will not only argue that the introduction of balanced ordination is unnecessary, and thus unwanted, but also show that the standard arguments put forward in favor of it are flawed.

Keywords: asymmetrical coordination, cooperative principle, logical equivalence, balansschikking, form-meaning correspondence hypothesis

1 Introduction

Asymmetrical coordination refers to coordinate structures like those given in (1), which receive a special interpretation and impose a rigid order on their coordinands. The most prominent reading of example (1a), for instance, is that the event of Jan getting up precedes the event of Jan dressing, and the two (b)-examples can easily receive a conditional interpretation. I will follow propositional logic by using proposition letters (p, q, etc.) for the semantic content of the propositions expressed by the two clauses.

(1)  a. [[Jan stond op] en [hij kleedde zich aan]]. [consecutive: p < q]
   Jan stood up and he dressed REFLEXIVE prt.
   ‘Jan got out of bed and he dressed.’

   b. [[Jan komt binnen] en [hij begint te praten]]. [conditional: p → q]
   Jan comes inside and he starts to talk
   ‘When(ever) Jan comes in, he will start talking.’

   b'. [[Jan moet vertrekken] of [hij komt te laat]]. [conditional: ¬p → q]
   Jan must leave or he comes too late
   ‘If Jan doesn’t leave (now), he’ll be too late.’

The examples in (2) show that the special interpretations of the examples in (1) are nullified when the coordinands are swapped; I have changed the subjects of the two clauses because

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1 Email: hans.broekhuis@meertens.knaw.nl. I owe many thanks to Wim Klooster for discussing with me various issues (sometimes loosely) related to the topic of this study, which have considerably sharpened my thoughts in many respects, as well as for his comments on an earlier draft of this article. Norbert Corver and Crit Cremers have unwittingly contributed to this article thanks to the many conversations about the syntax and the semantics of coordination we have had over the last seven years. Frits Beukema has been a great help in making this text presentable and he also provided many suggestions for improving the clarity of discussion. The usual disclaimers apply.
deictic pronouns normally follow their antecedent, but this does not affect the discussion in any crucial way. Example (2a) shows that changing the order of the two coordinands in (1a) changes the temporal order of the two events: Jan exhibits the somewhat unconventional behavior of getting dressed before getting out of bed (e.g., because it is extremely cold). And the (b)-examples in (2) show that the conditional readings of the (b)-examples in (1) are lost altogether. The hash signs in (2) are used to indicate that the examples in (2) have an interpretation different from those in (1).

(2)  

a. 

[[Jan kleedde zich aan] en [hij stond op]].

Jan dressed REF.L prt. and he stood up

Literally: ‘Jan dressed and he got out of bed.’

b. 

[[Jan begint te praten] en [hij komt binnen]].

Jan starts to talk and he comes inside

Literally: ‘Jan starts talking and he enters.’

b’.

[[Jan komt te laat] of [hij moet vertrekken]].

Jan comes too late or he must leave

Literally: ‘Jan comes too late or he must leave.’

The fact that the examples in (1) and (2) differ in interpretation is normally taken to go against the commutativity laws of propositional logic in (3), in which the symbol \( \equiv \) stands for “is equivalent to”. Many researchers have claimed that this shows that asymmetrical coordination is special in some linguistically relevant sense and may therefore require the introduction of special linguistic mechanisms: Culicover & Jackendoff (1997), for instance, argued that it requires the introduction of specific correspondence rules linking syntactic and semantic structures, which are able to transform a semantic conjunction (or disjunction) into a material implication.

(3)  

- Commutativity of conjunction and disjunction
  
a. Conjunction: \( \varphi \land \psi \equiv \psi \land \varphi \)
  
b. Disjunction: \( \varphi \lor \psi \equiv \psi \lor \varphi \)

Others have argued that we are not dealing with coordination at all. This view seems especially popular among Dutch linguists since Bos (1964), who argued for a specific subset of asymmetrical disjunction constructions that the relation is neither coordination nor subordination but instantiates a third kind of relation, which she dubs *balansschikking* and which I will translate as “balanced ordination”. Two examples illustrating this relation are given in (4a&b): this construction is characterized by the presence of some form of negation (here: *niet* ‘not .... anything’) in the first coordinand and the fact that they can be paraphrased by means of adverbial clauses, as in the primed examples.

(4)  

a. 

[Jan kan niets zeggen] of [Marie bespot hem].

Jan can nothing say or Marie mocks him

Literally: ‘Jan cannot say anything or Marie mocks him.’

Conditional paraphrase: If Jan says anything, Marie mocks him.

a’.

Als Jan iets zegt, bespot Marie hem.

if Jan something says mocks Marie him

‘When Jan says something, Marie mocks him.’

b. 

[Jan kon niets zeggen] of [Marie bespotte hem].

Jan could nothing say or Marie mocked him

Literally: ‘Jan could not say anything or Marie mocked him.’

Temporal paraphrase: As soon as Jan said anything, Marie mocked him.

b’.

Zodra Jan iets zei, bespotte Marie hem.

as.soon.as Jan something said mocked Marie him

‘As soon as Jan said something, Marie mocked him.’
The motivation for introducing the notion of balanced ordination for the primeless examples in (4) is that although the strings given within square brackets both behave syntactically as main clauses (e.g. by requiring the finite verbs to be in second position), the paraphrases in the primed examples show that they entertain a relation that is prototypically expressed by means of subordination.

This article argues against the need of postulating special mechanisms of the kind suggested by Culicover & Jackendoff (1997) or the need of expanding the set of syntactic relations beyond coordination and subordination. I especially take issue with the notion of balanced ordination, which is based on the incorrect presupposition that interpretation should be directly reflected in syntactic structure, as embodied by the (still popular) form-meaning correspondence hypothesis; see, e.g., the introduction by G.F. Bos and H. Roose in their edition of De Groot (1949) and Ellfers-van Ketel (1991:189ff). Section 2 starts by showing that the interpretation of asymmetrical conjunctions is not a matter of syntax only, but results from an intricate interplay of syntactic, pragmatic and semantic factors. Section 3 will show the same for asymmetrical disjunction, but will more specifically investigate the arguments put forward in favor of the notion of balanced ordination.

2  Asymmetrical conjunction

The meaning contribution of the coordinator en ‘and’ prototypically involves logical conjunction: by uttering (5a) a speaker commits himself to the truth of the propositions expressed by the two coordinands. That the semantic contribution of en is purely truth-conditional is reflected in the fact that the order of the clauses can be reversed without affecting the truth conditions of the sentence, in agreement with the commutativity law of conjunction in (3a). Because of this property this type of coordination is sometimes also referred to as symmetrical coordination.

(5)  • Symmetrical coordination
   a. [[Jan is ziek] en [Marie is op vakantie]].  
      Jan is ill and Marie is on vacation
   b. [[Marie is op vakantie] en [Jan is ziek]].  
      Marie is on vacation and Jan is ill

There are, however, many cases of coordination with en ‘and’ that receive an interpretation that goes beyond pure logical conjunction; such coordinate structures are asymmetrical in the sense that reversal of the clauses does affect interpretation. By uttering (6a), the speaker does not only commit himself to the truth of the propositions expressed by the two coordinands but he also expresses that the event referred to by the first coordinand temporally precedes the event referred to by the second coordinand. Example (6b) shows that in this case reversing the two conjuncts does not result in fully equivalent expressions but reverses the temporal precedence relation. The use of the dollar sign indicates that the temporal ordering expressed by (6b) clashes with expectations based on our knowledge of the world.

(6)  • Asymmetrical coordination
   a. [[Jan stond op] en [hij kleedde zich aan]].  
      Jan got out of bed and he dressed.
   b. $[[Jan kleedde zich aan] en [hij stond op]].  
      Jan dressed and he stood up

I will argue that temporal ordering (or perhaps some more general notion such as priority; cf. Schmerling 1975) is the main characteristic of asymmetrical coordination although more
specific (causal, concessive, etc.) interpretations can be triggered by our knowledge of the world.

2.1 Temporal (consecutive) ordering

Two prototypical cases of asymmetrical coordination are given in (7). Although all examples are impeccable from a syntactic point of view, the primed examples are perhaps a little odd in that they clash with our knowledge of the world, due to the fact that the linear order of the coordinands appears to be interpreted such that it coincides with the temporal order of the events expressed by them: cf. Dik (1968:56-7). Example (7a’) is surprising because it refers to the unconventional state-of-affairs of Jan getting dressed in (before leaving) his bed, and (7b’) is odd since it refers to the unconventional state-of-affairs of Jan undressing in (after getting into) the bath.

(7) • Asymmetrical coordination (temporal)
   a. [[Jan stond op] en [hij kleedde zich aan]]. [p & q; p > q]
      Jan stood up and he dressed REFL prt.
      ‘Jan got up and he dressed.’
   a’. 5[[Jan kleedde zich aan en [hij stond op]]. [q & p; q > p]
      Jan dressed REFL prt. and he stood up
   b. [[Jan kleedde zich uit] en [hij ging in bad]]. [p & q; p > q]
      Jan dressed REFL prt. and he went into bath
      ‘Jan undressed and he took a bath.’
   b’. 5[[Jan ging in bad] en [hij kleedde zich uit]]. [q & p; q > p]
      Jan went into bath and he dressed REFL prt.

Asymmetrical coordination normally occurs only if the coordinands entertain a certain semantic relation and form an integrated semantic whole in the sense that “we understand the two events as being connected as part of a larger event” (Culicover & Jackendoff 1997). This is only possible when the events referred to by the coordinands are conceived as being inherently related, for which reason Zhang (2010) refers to such cases as “natural” coordination. All of this amounts to saying that the temporal interpretation is a pragmatic effect triggered by our knowledge of the world. The temporal ordering can of course also be made explicit by means of a deictic temporal adverbial phrase, as in (8), but such cases differ from temporal asymmetrical coordination in that the temporal order of the events expressed by the coordinands does not have to coincide with the linear order of the coordinands: it does if daarna ‘after that’ is used, but not if daarvoor ‘before that’ is used.2

(8)    [[Jan stond op] en ...
   a.  ...  [[hij kleedde zich daarna aan omdat het koud was]]. [p > q]
      he dressed REFL after.that prt. because it cold was
      ‘Jan got up and he dressed after that because it was cold.’
   a.  ...  [[hij kleedde zich daarvoor aan omdat het koud was]]. [p < q]
      he dressed REFL before.that prt. because it cold was
      ‘Jan got up and he dressed before that because it was cold.’

2 In some cases, “natural” coordination seems to give rise to syntactic reanalysis but this does not seem to have taken place in Dutch, so that I will not digress on this issue here. I refer the reader to Zhang (2010: section 5.3) for a concise review and references.

2.2 Reason/cause and concession

The previous subsection has shown that asymmetrical coordination is characterized by the fact that it imposes temporal restrictions on the events referred to by the coordinands, which
Asymmetric coordination are not inherently present in the truth-conditional meaning contribution of the coordinator. Schmerling (1975), Haeseryn (1997: §25.1), Culicover & Jackendoff (1997), Huddleston & Pullum (2002:1299ff.) among others have shown that other, more complex, implicational relations can be expressed as well. The examples in (9) adapted from Dik (1968:57) are like the examples in (7) in that a temporal order of the events expressed by the coordinands is implied but there is yet another additional meaning aspect: (9a) would normally be interpreted such that the death of the female person in question is the reason for burying her, while (9b) gives the burial as the cause of her death.

(9) • Asymmetrical coordination (reason/cause)
  a. [[Ze stierf] en [we begroeven haar]].
     she died and we buried her
  b. [[We begroeven haar] en [ze stierf]].
     we buried her and she died

The examples in (10) show that the implicational relations of reason and cause can be made explicit by adding the deictic adverbials daarom ‘for that reason’ and daardoor ‘because of that’ to the second clause. These adverbials are mutually exclusive in these examples for reasons related to our knowledge of the world, which suggests that the interpretation of the examples in (9) is also pragmatic in nature.

(10) a. [[Ze stierf] en [daarom/daardoor begroeven we haar]].
     she died and for.that.reason/because.of.that buried we her
     ‘She died and we buried her for that reason.’
  b. [[We begroeven haar] en [daarom/daardoor stierf ze]].
     we buried her and because.of.that/for.that.reason died she
     ‘We buried her and she died because of that.’

Another case mentioned by Huddleston & Pullum is illustrated by (11): (11a) is readily interpreted as concessive, while such an interpretation is not easy to get for (11b). Again the implied relation between the two clauses can be made explicit by means of a deictic adverbial: desondanks ‘despite of that’ fits in naturally in (11a) but not in (11b).

(11) • Asymmetrical coordination (concession)
  a. [[Jan eet voortdurend] en [hij blijft (desondanks) te mager]].
     Jan eats continuously and he remains despite.of.that too skinny
     ‘Jan keeps eating and (in spite of that) he remains too skinny.’
  b. [[Jan blijft te mager] en [hij eet (desondanks) voortdurend]].
     Jan remains too skinny and he eats despite.of.that continuously

The restrictions on the adverbials in (10) and (11) show that the information of the available semantic relations between the events expressed by the clausal coordinands is part of the common ground, that is, the information shared by the participants in the discourse. This suggests that the basic characteristic of asymmetrical coordination is temporal ordering, and that the more specific interpretations are superimposed on it on the basis of our knowledge of the world. That the interpretation of (11a) is pragmatic in nature can be further supported by comparing it to (12), in which the predicate te mager ‘too skinny’ is replaced by te dik ‘too fat’. The syntactic structure is identical but the interpretation changes from a concessive into a causal one, as is clear from the fact that adding the adverbial desondanks to the second coordinand in (12) would clash with our expectation; the causal adverbial daardoor is the more natural addition.

(12) [[Jan eet voortdurend] en [hij blijft (daardoor) te dik]].
     Jan eats continuously and he remains because.of.that too fat
     ‘Jan eats continuously and he remains too fat (because of that).’
2.3 Condition

This subsection discusses the even more special cases of asymmetrical coordination in (13) with a conditional interpretation; cf., e.g., Kraak & Klooster (1972:276), Haeseryn et al. (1997:1529) and Van der Heijden (1999: §4.1). At an observational level, these examples differ from those in the previous subsections in that the conditional interpretation cannot be made explicit by means of a deictic adverbial. Another surprising fact is that the first clausal coordinand can be imperative because imperative and declarative clauses normally cannot be coordinated; the rationale for this restriction may be that a run-of-the-mill conjunctive interpretation is blocked because declaratives normally have a truth value in a specific situation, while imperatives do not, as they are used for persuading the addressee to bring about a truth transition (that is, as a request to make some proposition true).

(13) • Asymmetrical coordination (conditional)
  a. [[Jan komt binnen] en [hij begint te praten]].
     Jan comes inside and he starts to talk
     ‘Jan enters and he starts talking’ or ‘When(ever) Jan enters, he will start talking.’
  b. [[Kom hier] en [ik schiet]]!
     come here and I shoot
     ‘Come here and I’ll shoot.’

It seems clear that we are not dealing with some idiosyncratic property of the coordinate structures at hand, because we find the same phenomenon in various languages. However, there does not seem to be an established view on how to account for the conditional interpretation of examples like those in (13). Huddleston & Pullum (2002:1301) suggest that we are dealing with a pragmatic implicature, while Culicover & Jackendoff (1997) suggest that the interpretation is due to specific correspondence rules linking syntactic and semantic structures; however the two proposals are not worked out in sufficient detail to evaluate them. Here I will argue that the pragmatic approach is the most promising one and that, consequently, no correspondence rules are needed. Huddleston & Pullum suggest that the link between the conjunctive and conditional interpretation is that $p \land q$ and $p \rightarrow q$ both exclude cases where $p$ is true and $q$ is false. They thus suggest that the speaker and the addressee only “see” the shaded rows of Table 1.

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Huddleston & Pullum do not spell out the pragmatic reasoning leading to the more restricted window on Table 1, but it is clear that this should be related to the fact that the conditional reading does not (easily) arise in past tense constructions.

(14) a. [[Jan komt binnen] en [hij begint te praten]].
     Jan comes inside and he starts to talk
     ‘Jan enters and he starts talking’ or ‘When(ever) Jan enters, he will start talking.’
  b. [[Jan kwam binnen] en [hij begon te praten]].
     Jan came inside and he started to talk
     ‘Jan entered and he started talking.’
The difference between present and past tense is that the latter is normally used for describing a state-of-affairs that has actually occurred before speech time, while the former can have various functions: it can be used for describing the state-of-affairs at speech time, but it can also be used as an irrealis form for expressing wishes, expectations, etc. about future state-of-affairs or as a form expressing generic statements if the (linguistic or non-linguistic) context provides clues favoring this.

(15)  
| a | Jan wandelt op de hei. | ([preferably] realis; statement) |
|    | Jan walks on the moor | ‘Jan is walking on the moor.’ |
| b | Jan wandelt morgen op de hei. | [irrealis] |
|    | Jan walks tomorrow on the moor | ‘Jan will be walking on the moor tomorrow.’ |
| c | Jan wandelt normaal gesproken op de hei. | [generic] |
|    | Jan walks normally speaking on the moor | ‘Jan normally walks on the moor.’ |

The ambiguity of an example such as (14a) is due to the fact that it allows both for a realis and an irrealis/generic interpretation. The default interpretation seems to be the realis interpretation. For example, if (14a) is used as a stage direction in a play, the author will normally not intend the irrealis/generic reading; it is quite possible that the character Jan will remain/remains silent after coming on stage in other scenes of the play. The conditional reading (14a) is only compatible with an irrealis/generic interpretation. In such cases, the events referred to by the two co-ordinands are normally not (yet) actualized at speech time: \( \neg p \land \neg q \). The pragmatic reasoning in (16), based on Grice’s (1975) cooperative principle, shows that the irrealis interpretation makes it possible to account for Huddleston & Pullum’s intuition that the link between the conjunctive and the conditional interpretation is that \( p \land q \) and \( p \rightarrow q \) both exclude cases where \( p \) is true and \( q \) is false by appealing to the earlier observation that asymmetrical coordination has the characteristic property of temporal ordering. Note that \( p \) and \( q \) in (16) correspond with the propositions expressed by the first and second clause in (14a), respectively.

(16)  
* Pragmatic reasoning leading to a conditional reading of (14a)  
  a. The utterance does not describe an existing state-of-affairs because \( p = 0 \), which entails that \( p \land q = 0 \). The utterance should therefore be interpreted as non-realis; cf. maxim of relation.  
  b. Speaker S commits himself to \( p \land q = 1 \) at some time \( t \); cf. maxim of quality.  
  c. The truth of \( p \land q \) is not checked for any time \( t \) at which \( p = 0 \) because \( p < q \); the truth of \( p \land q \) will only be checked for some/any time \( t \) at which \( p = 1 \).  
  f. Only the first two rows in Table 1 are relevant, and these are compatible both with a conjunctive and with a conditional interpretation of (13a).

Although imperatives cannot be assigned a truth value, it seems even easier to derive the conditional interpretation of utterance (13b). The crucial thing is that because imperatives are used to urge the addressee to bring about a certain truth transition (that is, to make a proposition \( p \) true), we can again account for the conditional reading by appealing to the temporal ordering of the asymmetrically coordinated clauses and Grice’s (1975) cooperative principle. The pragmatic reasoning is given in (17), where \( p \) refers to the proposition that the addressee is urged to make true and \( q \) corresponds to the proposition expressed by the second clause in (13b). For a more detailed discussion of constructions of this type, we refer the reader to Proeme (1984) as well as Fortuin & Boogaart (2009), who also claim that their conditional interpretation is due to pragmatics.
Pragmatic reasoning leading to a conditional reading of (13b)

a. The utterance does not describe an existing state-of-affairs because \( p = 0 \), which entails that \( p \land q = 0 \).

b. The imperative invites the addressee A to make \( p \) true.

c. If A does not make \( p \) true, S cannot make \( p \land q \) true; if A does make \( p \) true, S can make \( p \land q \) true by making \( q \) true. Therefore, S commits himself to making \( q \) true if A makes \( p \) true: cf. maxim of quality.

d. Only the first two rows in Table 1 are relevant, and these are compatible both with a conjunctive and with a conditional interpretation of (13b).

For completeness’ sake, I want to note that examples such as (18a) can be used either as an encouragement or as a warning, depending on the question as to whether or not proposition \( q \) is favorable for addressee A: (18a) will be seen as an encouragement if both A and S know that A would liked to be kissed by S, but as a warning if they both know that A does not want to be kissed by S. The (informal) lines of reasoning leading to these results are given in (18b&b’), which take the conclusion in (17c) as their point of departure. We will see in Section 3.1 that the corresponding disjunctive construction *Kom hier of ik kus je!* ‘Come here or I’ll kiss you!’ with the coordinator of ‘or’ can only be construed as a warning.

(18) a. [[Kom hier] en [ik kus je]]!
   ‘Come here and I’ll kiss you.’

b. If A makes \( p \) true, S will make \( q \) true. Since S knows that A likes \( q \) to become true, (18a) is intended as an encouragement.

b’. If A makes \( p \) true, S will make \( q \) true. Since S knows that A does not like \( q \) to become true, (18a) is intended as a warning.

The discussion above has shown that the conditional interpretation of the clausal coordinate structures with *en* ‘and’ can be derived by appealing to the temporal ordering inherently expressed by asymmetrical coordination in tandem with more or less standard pragmatic reasoning; see Fortuin & Boogaart (2009: Figure 3) for a formulation of the same intuition in a constructional framework. This makes it unnecessary (and therefore undesirable) to introduce special syntactic or semantic apparatus such as the linking mechanisms proposed in Culicover & Jackendoff (1997) to account for such cases.

3 Asymmetrical disjunction

This section will discuss asymmetrical disjunction, which comes in two kinds: one in which the initial coordinand is a positive clause and one in which the first coordinand is a negative clause. The first type will receive a similar treatment as the conjunctive coordinate structures with a conditional interpretation discussed in Section 2.3, and the discussion of this type can therefore be relatively short. The second type comprises the construction types discussed in Bos (1964) under the heading of balanced ordination; we will investigate the arguments for introducing this notion and will conclude that they are flawed. This does not mean that we are able to account for all constructions she ranges under this term: Section 3.3 reviews some arguments given by Terwey (1892) for assigning the remaining cases a special status on historical grounds: there are reasons for assuming that they are idiomatic in nature.

3.1 Asymmetrical disjunction I (\( p \lor q \))

Section 2.3 has shown that coordinate structures with the conjunctive coordinator *en* ‘and’ can sometimes be interpreted as conditionals. The examples in (19) show that we find the same for coordinate structures with the disjunctive coordinator *of* ‘or’; cf. Haeseryn et al. (1997:1534) and Van der Heijden (1999: §4.1) The coordinate structure in (19a) has two
declarative main clauses and can be used to motivate the speaker’s decision to leave due to its conditional reading “If I do not go (now), I will be too late”. The coordinate structure in (19b) contains an imperative and a declarative clause and is normally used as a warning with the conditional interpretation ‘If you don’t go (now), you will be too late’; cf. Kraak & Klooster (1972:276).

(19) • Asymmetrical disjunction (conditional)
   a. [[Ik ga] of [ik kom te laat]].
      I go or I come too late
      ‘I will go (now) or I’ll be late.’
   b. [[Ga] of [je komt te laat]]!
      go or you come too late
      ‘Go (now) or you’ll be late!’

The question as to why the utterances in (19) can receive a conditional interpretation seems less complicated than the same question for their conjunctive counterparts since Table 2 shows that the disjunction $p \lor q$ is logically equivalent to $\neg p \rightarrow q$, which corresponds neatly with the conditional paraphrases given above.

Table 2

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However, that $p \lor q$ and $\neg p \rightarrow q$ are logically equivalent does not imply that coordinate structures with of ‘or’ are always interpreted as conditionals, as is clear from the fact that such an interpretation is not easily available for example (20a): the propositions expressed by the coordinands in (20) are simply presented as independent of each other, as is clear from the fact that they can be reversed without affecting the meaning of the coordinate structure. We are dealing with symmetrical disjunction: both coordinands can be used as an explanation for, e.g., the observation that the lights are on in Jan’s apartment (on the premise that Jan normally switches the light off when leaving home).

(20) • Symmetrical disjunction
   a. [[Jan is thuis] of [hij heeft per ongeluk het licht aangelaten]].
      Jan is home or he has by accident the light on-left
      ‘Jan is at home or he has accidentally left the light on.’
   b. [[Jan heeft het licht per ongeluk aangelaten] of [hij is thuis]].
      Jan has the light by accident left home or he is home
      ‘Jan has accidentally left the light on or he is at home.’

The examples in (19), on the other hand, are clearly asymmetric; reversing the order of the clausal coordinands in (19a), repeated here as (21a), results in the loss of the conditional interpretation. The resulting structure in (21b) is in fact quite marked due to a lack of coherence. Reversing the imperative and declarative clauses in (19b) simply leads to a completely unacceptable result: cf. *[[Je komt te laat] of [ga]]! (literally: “You will come too late or go!”).
Asymmetrical disjunction

a. \([\text{Ik ga} \text{ of } \text{ik kom te laat}]\) [conditional]
   I go or I come too late
   ‘I go (now) or I’ll be too late.’

b. \([\text{Ik kom te laat} \text{ of } \text{ik ga}]\) [non-conditional]
   I come too late or I go

As in the corresponding coordinate structures with *en* ‘and’, the conditional interpretation is normally not possible if the utterance is in the past tense. Example (22) may be syntactically well-formed but is just as incoherent as example (21b), which strongly suggests that the conditional interpretation of asymmetrical disjunction constructions is also restricted to, and possibly even triggered by, non-realis contexts.

\[(22) \quad \text{Ik ging of ik kwam te laat} \]
I went or I came too late

Literally: ‘I went or I came too late.’

The conditional interpretation of (19a) is also related to the characteristic temporal ordering found in asymmetrical coordination: because the event referred to by the first coordinand precedes the event referred to by the second coordinand, manipulation of the truth value of \(p\) may restrict the truth value of \(q\), which is more transparently expressed by means of the “conditional” formula \(\neg p \rightarrow q\) than by the more “neutral” formula \(p \lor q\).

\[(23) \quad \text{Pragmatic reasoning leading to a conditional reading of (19a)}\]

a. The utterance does not describe an existing state-of-affairs: \(p \lor q = 0\). The utterance should therefore be interpreted as non-realis; cf. maxim of relation.

b. Speaker S commits himself to \(p \lor q = 1\) at some time \(t\); cf. maxim of quality.

c. If S makes \(p\) true, \(q\) may be false or true in order for \(p \lor q\) to be true; if S makes \(p\) false, \(q\) must be true in order for \(p \lor q\) to be true.

d. Because \(q\) is undesirable for S, the conditional reading \(\neg p \rightarrow q\) provides a reason for making \(p\) true.

Although imperatives cannot be assigned a truth value, it is even easier to derive the conditional interpretation of utterance (19b). Because the use of an imperative urges the addressee to make a certain proposition \(p\) true, we can again account for the conditional reading by appealing to the temporal ordering of the asymmetrically coordinated clauses and Grice’s (1975) cooperative principle, where \(p\) refers to the proposition that the addressee is urged to make true and \(q\) corresponds to the proposition expressed by the second clause.

\[(24) \quad \text{Pragmatic reasoning leading to a conditional reading of (19b)}\]

a. The utterance does not describe an existing state-of-affairs: \(p \lor q = 0\).

b. The imperative invites the addressee A to make \(p\) true.

c. If A makes \(p\) true, \(p \lor q = 1\) regardless of the truth of \(q\); if A makes \(p\) false, \(p \lor q = 1\) only if \(q = 1\).

d. Because \(q\) is undesirable for A, the conditional reading \(\neg p \rightarrow q\) provides a warning to A not to make \(p\) false.

The fact that the examples in (19a) and (19b) can both be construed as providing a rationale for making \(p\) true is crucially based on the fact that \(q\) is undesirable for, respectively, the speaker and the addressee. This raises the question as to why examples such as (25) sound so weird (on the assumption that being on time is desirable for the speaker/addressee) or receive an ironic interpretation.
(25) a. $[[I_k  blijf]  or  [ik  kom   op tij[d]]].$
    I stay or I come too late
    Compare: ‘I’ll stay or I’ll be in time.’

b. $[[Blijf]  or  [je   komt  op tij[d]]]!
    stay or you come too late
    Literally: ‘Stay or you’ll be in time!’

Pragmatic reasoning along the lines of (24) would lead to the wrong conclusion that the
utterances provide a rationale for making p false, as this would leave open the possibility that
q would become true. The reason for the markedness of (25b) may be that the normal
function of the imperative is to persuade the addressee to make a certain proposition p true
and this is at odds with the conclusion, drawn from the pragmatic reasoning in (24), that it
would be better for the addressee not to make p true. If so, the utterance is incoherent as it
provides the addressee with conflicting signals. This may also be the reason for the
markedness of (25a); the speaker leads the addressee down the garden path by first providing
him with a positive declarative that must be rejected later on the basis of pragmatic reasoning.

The conditional readings of the disjunctive coordinate structures discussed so far are
based on the equivalence rule $p \lor q \equiv \neg p \rightarrow q$. There is a second conditional-like reading,
illustrated in (26), which has been referred to as the exceptive reading. This reading is
triggered when the second clause contains is past tense and contains the modal verb
moeten ‘must’; see Welschen (1999:16ff.) for extensive discussion.

(26)    We gaan wandelen of het moest/zou moeten regenen.
    we go walk or it should/would must rain
    Paraphrase: We will go for a walk, unless it rains.

Assuming that the meaning of tenzij ‘unless’ can be described as “if not”, we can translate the
paraphrase of (26) as: $\neg q \rightarrow p$. Table 3 shows that this reading is expected given that $\neg q \rightarrow p$
is also logically equivalent to $p \lor q$.

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Table 3

We will not go into the precise nature of the trigger of the exceptive reading of (26), which
seems part of formal language, but simply assume that it is related to the conjunctive-like
impact of past tense forms like moet ‘should’, zou moeten ‘would have to’, etc. The main
point we want to make here, though, is that examples such as (26) show again that logical
equivalence plays a crucial role in deriving special interpretations of asymmetric coordinate
structures.

3.2 Asymmetrical disjunction II ($\neg p \lor q$)

The conditional reading of the type of disjunctive coordinate structures discussed in the
previous subsection, illustrated again in (27), is based on the logical equivalence of the two
statements $p \lor q$ and $\neg p \rightarrow q$; cf. Table 2.
(27) a.  [[Ik ga] of [ik kom te laat]].
    I go or I come too late
    ‘I will go or I will be too late.’
    b.  Paraphrase: If I do not go (now) I’ll be too late.

This subsection discusses a second type disjunctive coordinate structure with a conditional reading, in which the first coordindand is a negative declarative clause; the conditional reading of such examples is illustrated in (28).

(28) a.  [[Ik blijf niet langer] of [ik kom te laat]].
    I stay no longer or I come too late
    ‘I won’t stay any longer or I’ll be too late.’
    b.  Conditional Paraphrase: If I stay any longer, I’ll be too late.

We can account for the conditional reading of (28a) by appealing to the logical equivalence of the two statements $\neg p \lor q$ and $p \rightarrow q$, as shown in Table 4.

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Since the conditional interpretation of (27a) and (28a) follows from essentially the same logical reasoning, we would expect that there is little to say about this kind of example. However, there is a complication in that examples of this type can have a somewhat wider range of interpretations. Examples such as (29a), for instance, do not only allow a conditional reading but also a temporal (consecutive) reading. This temporal reading is even more prominent in the past tense counterpart of example (29a) in (29b).

(29) a.  [Jan kan niets zeggen] of [Marie protesteert].
    Jan can nothing say or Marie protests
    Literally: ‘Jan cannot say anything or Marie protests.’
    a’.  Conditional paraphrase: If Jan says anything, Marie protests.
    a”’. Temporal paraphrase: Marie protests as soon as Jan is saying something.
    b.  [Jan kon niets zeggen] of [Marie protesteerde].
    Jan could nothing say or Marie protested
    Literally: ‘Jan could not say anything or Marie protested.’
    b’.  Conditional paraphrase: If Jan said anything, Marie protested.
    b”’. Temporal paraphrase: As soon as Jan said anything, Marie protested.

There are also coordinate structures with a similar internal make-up (disjunction of a negative and a positive declarative clause) that allow neither a conditional nor a temporal reading. One example illustrating this is given in (30), which seems to receive an epistemic reading.

(30) Het kan niet anders of Jan heeft gewonnen.
    it can not differently or Jan has won
    Literally: ‘It cannot be different or Jan has won.’
    Paraphrase: Jan must have won.

The literature on the construction under discussion has traditionally focused on the question as to whether we are really dealing with coordination here. This question has been raised because, although the construction looks like coordination syntactically, the first clause
seems to perform an adverbial-like function. More specifically, the first clauses in the examples in (29) have a similar function as the adverbial non-main clauses in (31a&b). And the first clause in (30a) expresses an epistemic modal meaning comparable to that of the adverbial stellig ‘surely’ in (31c).

(31) a. Als Jan iets zegt, protesteert Marie.
   ‘If Jan says anything, Marie protests.’

b. Zodra Jan iets zei, protesteerde Marie.
   ‘As soon as Jan says something, Marie protests.’

c. Jan heeft stellig gewonnen.
   ‘Jan has surely won.

(32) a. Polyadic disjunction is possible
b. Correlative disjunction is possible
c. Inversion of co-ordinands is possible
d. Conjunction reduction is possible
e. Omission of of is sometimes possible
f. The illocutionary force of the clausal co-ordinands need not be identical
g. Omission of one co-ordinand does not affect the meaning of the other

However, the construction evidently does not involve syntactic subordination either. This is immediately clear from the fact that both clauses have the shape of main clauses with the finite verb (given in italics) in second position; these verbs cannot occur in clause-final position, that is, in a position following the direct object.

(33) • Placement of the finite verbs
   a. Jan kan niets zeggen of Marie bespot hem. [main + main]
      Jan can nothing say or Marie mocks him.
      Literally: Jan cannot say anything or Marie mocks him.
   b. *Jan kan niets zeggen of Marie hem bespot. [main + non-main]
   c. *Jan niets kan zeggen of Marie bespot hem. [non-main + main]
   d. *Jan niets kan zeggen of Marie hem bespot. [non-main + non-main]

Furthermore, if we were dealing with subordination, the string starting with the element of would be the most likely candidate, but this string does not behave like a clausal constituent. The examples in (34) show that it differs from true subordinate clauses such as the object clause of Marie komt in (34a) in that it can neither be topicalized nor pronominalized. Note that the dots in (34b’’’) are used to indicate that the string starting with of cannot be replaced by any proform other than dat ‘that’ either.

(34) • Topicalization and pronominalization of the second clause
   a. Jan weet niet [of Marie komt].
      Jan knows not whether Marie comes
      ‘Jan doesn’t know whether Marie will come.’
   a’’. Of Marie komt weet ik niet.
Bos (1964) suggested therefore that we are neither dealing with coordination nor with subordination but with a relation that she dubs BALANSSCHIKKING, which I will translate as “balanced ordination”. Since the postulation of this new relation is crucially based on the problems with respect to the properties of disjunctive coordination listed in (32), I will review these in what follows. I will further argue that these problems are less problematic for the coordination approach than is generally assumed, which of course casts doubt on the need for introducing the notion of balanced ordination.

Property (32a): Polyadic disjunction is possible.
This property refers to the fact that disjunctive coordination is recursive in the sense that coordinate structures with of ‘or’ may contain more than two coordinands; cf. [Jan leest een gedicht] (of) [Marie zingt een lied] of [Els speelt orgel] ‘Jan recites a poem (or) Marie sings a song or Els plays the organ’. Bos claims that polyadic constructions do not allow a conditional reading. Example (35a) seems to support this claim (at least under a flat intonation contour; see fn.3) but its unacceptability need not be syntactic in nature; it might simply be due to the fact that it expresses an incoherent meaning. That this might indeed be the proper tack to take can be supported by the fact that example (35b), in which the string [Jan kan niets zeggen] of [Marie protesteert] is replaced by the conditional clause Als Jan iets zegt, protesteert Marie is also incoherent.

(35)  a. *[Jan kan niets zeggen] of [Marie protesteert] of [de voorzitter grijpt in].
      Jan can nothing say or Marie protests or the chairman interferes

  b. *Als Jan iets zegt, protesteert Marie] of [de voorzitter grijpt in].
     if Jan something says protests Marie or the chairman interferes

This account of the unacceptability of (35a) is based on the assumption that it has the structure [[XP or YP] or ZP]. We could also assign it the alternative structure [XP or [YP of ZP]], which would lead to a coherent reading corresponding to that of the conditional construction in (37b). According to Wagner (2010), such a structure should be recognizable by a non-flat intonation contour involving an intonation break (prosodic boundary) before the first occurrence of of.

(36)  Wagner’s generalization on polyadic coordinate structures: In a coordinand sequence A < B < C, if the prosodic boundary separating A and B is weaker than the one separating B and C, then [[AB] C]; if it is stronger, then [A [BC]].

This intonation break is indicated by a comma in example (37a), which indeed strikes us as relatively acceptable. If our intuition is on the right track, Bos’ claim is straightforwardly refuted.

(37)  a. [Jan kan niets zeggen], of [Marie protesteert] of [de voorzitter grijpt in].
      Jan can nothing say or Marie protests or the chairman interferes

  b. Als Jan iets zegt, [protesteert Marie] of [grijpt de voorzitter in].
     if Jan something says protests Marie or the chairman interferes

---

3 Both examples in (35) are fully acceptable when the second occurrence of of is preceded by a distinct intonation break. Such cases cannot be used for refuting Bos’ claim, however, because the clause de voorzitter grijpt in would then be interpreted parenthetically, i.e., as an afterthought.
'If Jan says anything, Marie protests or the chairman interferes.'

Because the effect of intonation on the acceptability and interpretation of examples such as (35a) and (37a) has not been discussed in the literature so far, we will not digress on this issue here, especially because our main conclusion does not crucially depend on it. This conclusion is that the unacceptability of (35a) is not a matter of syntax but of semantics. The logical equivalence rule $\neg p \lor q \equiv p \rightarrow q$ can be applied only once to $((\neg p \lor q) \lor r)$, which results in $(p \rightarrow q) \lor r)$. The two examples in (35) are therefore logically equivalent, and we may therefore conclude that (35a) is infelicitous for the same reason as (35b): they are both semantically incoherent.

**Property (32b): Correlative disjunction is possible.**

Disjunctive coordinate structures come in two guises: one with the simplex coordinator of ‘or’ and one with the correlative coordinator of ... of... ‘either ... or ...’. Example (38b) shows that correlative of ... of ... blocks the conditional reading, which we indicate by the hash sign.

(38) a. Of [Jan leest een gedicht] of [Marie zingt een lied].
    either Jan recites a poem or Marie sings a song
b. #Of [Jan kan niets zeggen] of [Marie protesteert].
    either Jan can nothing say or Marie protests

The fact that the conditional reading is not available should not surprise us in light of the fact that correlative of ... of ... expresses exclusive disjunction, and Table 5 shows that $\neg p \lor q$ is not equivalent to $p \rightarrow q$. The fact that (35b) has no conditional reading is thus clearly not related to syntax, but is a straightforward semantic matter.

**Table 5**

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Note in passing that this does not necessarily imply that there are no asymmetrical exclusive-disjunctive structures, but if such structures existed, they would be interpreted as a material equivalence ($p \leftrightarrow q$) given the equivalence rule $\neg p \lor q \equiv p \leftrightarrow q$. Wim Klooster (p.c.) observes that the examples in (39), discussed earlier in Kraak & Klooster (1968:275) may be of this type: the coordinate structure is characterized by the fact that of is accented, which is a hallmark of exclusive disjunction, and the interpretation is something like “p unless perhaps if q”, which comes quite close to “p if and only if q”.

(39) a. Dat beest daar is geen hond OF het is een poedel.
    that animal over there is no dog or it is a poodle
    Literally: ‘that animal over there is not a dog or it is a poodle’.
    Paraphrase: If that animal over there is a dog, it can only be a poodle.
b. Er zit geen fout in het artikel OF het moest een typefout zijn.
    there sits no error in the article or it should be a typo
    Literally: ‘There is no error in the article or it should be a typo.’
    Paraphrase: If this article contains any error, it can only be a typo.

**Property (32c): Inversion of coordinands is possible.**
This property refers to the fact that in agreement with the commutativity law of disjunction in (3b), the coordinands in a disjunctive coordinate structure can often change places without affecting the logical meaning of the structure as a whole: the meaning expressed by example (40a) is logically equivalent to the meaning expressed by example (40a'). The (b)-examples, on the other hand, show that inversion of the coordinand in the conditional construction cancels the conditional reading, which is again indicated by the hash sign. It is not unlikely, however, that this is related to the fact that the antecedent of the conditional temporally precedes the consequence. We may thus be dealing not with a syntactic but the pragmatic effect discussed in Section 2.1 that the order of the coordinands in an asymmetric coordination coincides with the temporal order of the events expressed by them.

(40)  a. [Jan leest een gedicht] or [Marie zingt een lied].
    Jan recites a poem or Marie sings a song
    a'. [Marie zingt een lied] of [Jan leest een gedicht].
    b. [Jan kan niets zeggen] or [Marie protesteert].
    Jan can nothing say or Marie protests
    b'. #[Marie protesteert] of [Jan kan niets zeggen].

Property (32d): Conjunction reduction is possible.
This property refers to the fact that disjunctive coordinate structures such as (41a) can apparently be reduced as in (41a'). The (b)-examples, on the other hand, show that this reduction blocks the conditional reading, which is again indicated by the hash sign.

(41)  a. [Jan heeft een gedicht gelezen] or [hij heeft een lied gezongen].
    Jan has a poem read or he has a song sung
    a'. [Jan heeft een gedicht gelezen] of [hij heeft een lied gezongen].
    b. [Jan kan niets zeggen] of [hij kan vertrekken]
    Jan can nothing say or he can leave
    b'. #[Jan kan niets zeggen] of [hij kan vertrekken].

There are reasons for assuming that forward conjunction reduction of the type in the primed example does not exist and that we are dealing instead with non-clausal coordination, as indicated in (42); we are thus not dealing with two separate propositions but with a single proposition with a complex predicate. As the conditional reading can only arise when we are dealing with two separate propositions, we may conclude that the presumed problem with property (32d) is based on an incorrect presupposition and can ultimately be attributed to semantics.

(42)  a. Jan heeft [[vp een gedicht gelezen] of [vp een lied gezongen]].
    b. Jan kan [[vp niets zeggen] of [vp vertrekken]].

Property (32e): Omission of or is sometimes possible.
The problem related to this “property” refers to the fact that the disjunctive coordinator of can sometimes be left unexpressed, while this is impossible in conditional/temporal constructions such as (43).

(43)  [Jan kan niets zeggen] *(of) [Marie protesteert].
    Jan can nothing say or Marie protests
    Literally: ‘Jan cannot say anything or Marie protests.’

We believe that this argument is invalid in view of the fact that omission of the disjunctive coordinator is rare anyway and seems to be subject to stringent conditions. Bos (1964:242) provides just two examples. Her first example is the following: *Hij wandelde wat in the tuin, ging op het terras zitten, amuseerde zich met steentjes keilen* ‘He strolled in the garden, sat on
the terrace, amused himself with skimming stones’. This example, which was probably constructed on the basis of a polysyndetic construction with of given earlier on the same page, seems marginal out of context; in fact, I can interpret it in a conjunctive fashion at best. Her second example is again highly marked out of context: Je doet het, je doet het niet (mij kan het niet schelen) (literally: “You do it or you leave it (I don’t care)”. The fact that this example must be interpreted as a disjunction is due to the fact that a conjunctive interpretation would lead to a contradiction, which only leaves us with an exclusive-disjunction reading; cf. Van den Toorn (1972:105). All in all, the fact that leaving out the coordinator in examples such as (43) is impossible does not seem to be problematic for assuming that we are dealing with a coordinate structure.

**Property (32f):** The illocutionary force of the clausal coordinands need not be identical. The problem with (32f) concerns the presumed fact that the two clausal coordinands must be declarative, that is, cannot differ in illocutionary force; cf. the infelicitous example in (44a). This problem disappears, however, in view of the acceptability of example (44b).

(44) a. Twijfel er niet aan of [kom terug]!
   doubt there not about or come back
   ‘Don’t come here or I’ll shoot!’

b. [Kom niet hier] of [ik schiet]!
   come not here or I shoot

Property (32g): Omission of one coordinand does not affect the meaning of the other. This property refers to the fact that leaving out one of the coordinands in an example such as (45a) does not affect the meaning of the remaining one: example (45b) has the same meaning as the first coordinand of (45a) and (45c) has the same meaning as the second coordinand.

(45) a. [Jan leest een gedicht] of [Marie zingt een lied]
   Jan recites a poem or Marie sings a song

b. Jan leest een gedicht.

c. Marie zingt een lied.

Bos contends that this does not always hold for the type of conditional construction under discussion. One of her illustrations is given in (46): example (46a) is a generic construction while (46b) is a negative existential construction, and the claim is that the meaning of the clause er is geen mens differs in the two examples.

(46) a. [Er is geen mens] of [hij moet sterven].
   there is no human being or he must die
   ‘All people must die.’

b. [Er is geen mens].
   there is no human being
   ‘There are no people (here).’

Because Bos does not make explicit what the difference in meaning is, arguing against this claim is difficult, but I will assume that what she intends is that a speaker uttering (46a) presupposes that there are human beings while a speaker uttering (46b) explicitly denies this presupposition. The question is, however, whether this is a matter of meaning (in terms of truth conditions) or a matter of pragmatics (in terms of use conditions); we believe the latter to be the case. Because the use of the quantificational article geen ‘no’ and the coreferential pronoun hij greatly complicates the discussion we will not attempt to provide a formal proof, but loosely indicate the line of reasoning. Example (46b) does not pose any particular semantic problem: it will only be true if the set of humans is empty. Because this clashes with our knowledge of the world, a generic interpretation is impossible and the addressee will
conclude that the speaker intends to restrict the contention to the domain of discourse: the contention is only applicable to a contextually determined set of people and/or spatio-temporal situation. The truth conditions for (46a) can be demonstrated by means of the Venn diagrams in Figure 1, where A stands for the property denoted by mens ‘human’ and B for the property denoted by sterfelijk ‘mortal’ (that is, must die). Example (46a) will be true for all entities that are located in the grey area, and will therefore be trivially true for all inanimate entities, which are located external to both A and B, as well as animate, non-human entities, which are located within B but external to A. The truth of (46a) thus crucially depend on human entities, which should all be located within the intersection of A and B. The fact that Figure 1 is also the set-theoretical representation of material implication shows that the generic reading of (46a) can be derived by means of the equivalence rule \( \neg p \lor q \equiv p \to q \).

**Figure 1: Material implication \( p \to q \)**

The main finding of the discussion above is, however, that there are no compelling reasons for assuming that the clause Er is geen mens has a different meaning in the two examples in (46): it simply means \( \neg \exists x \text{MENS}(x) \). There are differences in use conditions for the two examples as such but these are not of a semantic nature but fully determined by pragmatic considerations. This means that Bos’ final objection against attributing a run-of-the-mill coordinate structure to the type of conditional construction under discussion does not hold water and should be rejected. In short, all seven arguments put forward by Bos against the run-of-the-mill coordination analysis are flawed; they therefore cannot be used either in favor of her alternative, the balanced ordination analysis.

### 3.3 Problematic cases

In concluding that there is no compelling reason for introducing the notion of balanced ordination, we do not wish to intimate that all the constructions Bos subsumed under this category are unproblematical: some of them are highly problematical. Following Terwey (1892) we can distinguish three main categories (which return in an adapted form in, e.g., Bos 1964 and Welschen 1999). The first category consists of various construction types that receive a generic or conditional interpretation. Constructions of this type were the focus of our earlier discussion and their interpretation can easily be accounted for by appealing to the equivalence rule \( \neg p \lor q \equiv p \to q \).

(47) a.  
[[Ik blijf niet langer] of [ik kom te laat]].

I stay no longer or I come too late

Literally: ‘I will not stay any longer or I will be too late.’

Paraphrase: If I stay any longer, I’ll be too late.

b.  
[Er is geen mens] of [hij moet sterven].

there is no human being or he must die

Literally: ‘There is no human being or he must die.’

Paraphrase: ‘All people must die.’

c.  
Er is geen probleem zo groot of het kan opgelost worden.’

there is no problem that big or it can be solved

Literally: ‘There is no problem that big or it can be solved.’

Paraphrase: All problems (however big) can be solved.’

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The second category contains constructions that receive a temporal (consecutive) reading, such as the two examples in (48). Van den Toorn (1972) has claimed that such examples can also be accounted for by appealing to equivalence rules, namely \( \neg p \lor q \equiv \neg (p \land \neg q) \).

\[ (48) \]

a. [Jan was nog niet thuis] of [de telefoon ging].
   Jan was not yet at home or the telephone rang
   Literally: ‘Jan was not yet home or the phone rang.’
   Paraphrase: ‘The phone rang immediately after Jan came home.’

b. [Jan was nauwelijks thuis] of [de telefoon ging].
   Jan was hardly (=not long) home or the telephone rang
   Literally: ‘Jan hardly arrived home or the phone rang.’
   Paraphrase: ‘The phone rang immediately after Jan came home.’

Van Hauwermeiren (1973), however, has shown that this clearly does not hold for a subset of these cases. The easiest way of demonstrating Van Hauwermeiren’s point is by considering the entailments in (49) of the clausal coordinands preceding the coordinator of ‘or’ in (48); the entailment in (49a) shows that the first co-ordinate of the coordinate structure in (48a) is a negative declarative clause \((\neg p)\), while the entailment in (49a) shows that the first co-ordinate in (48b) is a positive declarative clause \(p\). This means that the two examples in (48) have the propositional logical translations in the primed examples (contra Welschen 1999, who claims that both examples involve constituent negation for reasons related to the Dutch example given in the footnote).4

\[ (49) \]

a. Jan was nog niet thuis \(\vdash\) Jan was niet thuis [negative declarative]
   a’. (48a): \(\neg p \lor q\)

b. Jan was nauwelijks thuis \(\vdash\) Jan was thuis [positive declarative]
   b’. (48b): \(p \lor q\)

The translations in the primed examples refute Van den Toorn’s suggestion that the consecutive readings are all derived by the equivalence rule \( \neg p \lor q \equiv \neg (p \land \neg q) \); this is evidently not the case for (48b). Observe that this equivalence rule is more likely to play a role in deriving the consecutive reading of example (48a) but this is not easy to show due to the fact that the meaning contribution of the adverbial nog ‘yet’ is not clear. Nevertheless, it seems that the two examples in (50) can be considered each other’s negative counterparts. If so, the application of the equivalence rule \( \neg p \lor q \equiv \neg (p \land \neg q) \) to (48a) would give rise to the paraphrase it was not the case that Jan was already at home and the phone didn’t ring, which correctly accounts for the fact that on the presupposition that Jan was already at home, we must conclude from (48a) that the phone rang.

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4 Van Hauwermeiren illustrates the contrast by substituting the conjunctive coordinator en ‘and’ for of ‘or’; this is possible (for pragmatic reasons) if the coordinate structure expresses \(p \lor q\) but excluded if it expresses \(\neg p \lor q\). The test gives the correct result for examples of the first category, which all resist this substitution, but works less well for examples such as (48a). I believe this to be related to the fact that negation figures prominently in hyperboles such as I haven’t done anything!, which are often used to express that the speaker has done less than he would have liked. That hyperbolic language may be relevant is clear from the following example from Welschen (1999:37/50): Hij had de telefoon nog niet neergelegd of/en hij ging weer (literally ‘He hadn’t put down the phone yet or/and it rang again.’ The example with en ‘and’ cannot be literally true, as standard landline telephones in the 1990’s could only ring when they were put down. The fact that this example can be used in a hyperbolic sense accounts for the fact that Hauwermeiren’s test fails in the case at hand.
The third category distinguished by Terwey contains constructions of the type in (51). Examples like these express several types of functions: *het scheelde niet veel of ...* is a conventional means for expressing approximation, similar to that expressed by the adverbial *bijna* ‘almost’; the meaning of *het kan niet anders of ...* comes very close to that of the epistemic verb *moeten* ‘must’, and *ik twijfel er niet aan of ...* has more or less the same meaning as the modal adverb *ongetwijfeld* ‘undoubtedly’.

(51)  a. Het scheelde niet veel of hij had de eerste prijs gewonnen.
      Paraphrase: ‘He had nearly won the first prize.’

b. Het kan niet anders of hij heeft de eerste prijs gewonnen.’
      ‘He must have won the first prize.’

c. Ik twijfel er niet aan of hij heeft de eerste prijs gewonnen.
      ‘He will undoubtedly have won the first prize.’

The placement of the finite verbs nevertheless strongly suggests that we are dealing with coordination, which is also suggested by the fact that the string of *hij had gewonnen* cannot be topicalized: cf. *Of hij had gewonnen scheelde niet veel*. However, the acceptability of examples in (52) suggests that this string can be pronominalized. It is therefore not very surprising that it has sometimes been suggested that we are dealing with embedded clauses after all.

(52)  a. Dat scheelde niet veel of hij had de eerste prijs gewonnen.
      ‘That was close.’

b. Dat kan niet anders.
      ‘That must be so.’

c. Ik twijfel daar niet aan.
      ‘I don’t doubt that.’

It will be clear that the second and the third category are problematic for a rigid coordination approach. This was in fact already noticed in Terwey (1892), who accordingly provides a special account of these categories. He argues that the conditional examples from the first category developed in the 16th and 17th century out of juxtapositions of two clauses, one negative and one (probably) positive, by adding the coordinator *of ‘or’*. After completion of this development, the second and third category developed in analogy with the first one. It does not seem to be too far-fetched to suggest that this has been made possible by the fact, discussed above below (49), that at least some examples of the second category are akin to the conditional constructions from the first category. According to Terwey, this development was certainly facilitated by the fact that in all three categories the initial clause always includes some form of negation. Terwey’s analogy hypothesis justifies assigning examples of the second and third category an idiomatic status; this certainly holds for examples of the third category, as these are generally of a formulaic nature.
4 Conclusion

This article has shown that the interpretation of asymmetrical coordinate structures is the upshot of an intricate interplay of various syntactic, semantic and pragmatic factors. It has been shown that no special grammatical mechanisms or stipulations are needed to account for the more special readings of such structures. The temporal, causal and concessive reading of asymmetrical conjunction can plausibly be attributed to pragmatics, while the conditional interpretations can be derived straightforwardly by means of the standard equivalency rules from propositional logic. We have further seen that the more special interpretations can be triggered in various ways: the nature of the triggers involved has not been thoroughly investigated in this article but it is clear that pragmatics (and thus knowledge of the actual world) plays an important role; furthermore the presence of certain lexical items (such as modal verbs) may also favor suppression of the run-of-the-mill conjunctive and disjunctive interpretations in favor of the more special ones.

The fact that the special interpretations of asymmetrical coordinate structures can be straightforwardly accounted for by appealing to the interplay of standard syntactic, semantic and pragmatic means shows that they cannot be used for motivating the introduction of special grammatical means such as Culicover & Jackendoff’s (1997) correspondence rules linking syntactic and semantic structures. It also nullifies Bos’ (1964) claim that we cannot account for the relevant facts by adopting the dichotomy between coordination and subordination, but that a third relation is needed: balanced ordination. This is a fortuitous result because it has never become clear how balanced ordination, which seems to be motivated only by the guideline that there should be a strict “one-to-one” form-meaning correspondence (where “meaning” is not used in its standard formal-semantic sense but in the looser sense of “interpretation”), can be implemented in formal-syntactic terms. The “one-to-one” form-meaning correspondence hypothesis remains a useful guideline, of course, and need not be abandoned in full but the discussion above has shown that the crucial notion of meaning should be defined strictly in terms of formal logic.
References


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