Function alternations of the Mandarin particle *dou*: Distributor, free choice licensor, and ‘even’

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Abstract  Semantic variations of logical particles should be either non-existent or very limited, otherwise the logical system of the universal grammar would be too complex to acquire. Nevertheless, a number of functional particles possess various logical uses. Take the Mandarin particle *dou* for example. Varying by the item associated with and the prosodic pattern of the environment appearing in, *dou* can trigger a distributivity effect, license a pre-verbal free choice item, or evoke an *even*-like inference. To maintain the simplicity of the universal grammar, it is crucial to figure out which function or functions are primary, what parameters are responsible for the alternations of the logical functions, and how these alternations are conditioned.

In this paper, I argue that the seemingly unrelated functions of *dou* share the same source: *dou* is a pre-exhaustification exhaustifier operating on sub-alternatives. Uniformly, *dou* affirms the truth of its propositional prejacent, negates the exhaustification of each sub-alternative, and presupposes the existence of at least one sub-alternative. Function alternations result from minimal weakening operations on the semantics of sub-alternatives. In particular, sub-alternatives are primarily weaker alternatives, and thus the presupposition of *dou* yields a distributivity effect. Further, when the semantics of sub-alternatives is weakened under particular syntactic or prosodic conditions, *dou* gains its other logical functions.

1. Introduction

The Mandarin particle *dou* is known for its function diversity. As a rough classification, *dou* can be used as a quantifier-distributor, a free choice item (FCI-)licenser, and a scalar additive operator. This paper presents a uniform semantics of *dou* to capture its seemingly diverse functions. I propose that *dou* is a special exhaustifier with a pre-exhaustification effect. The basic idea of my proposal is as follows. For a *dou*-sentence of the form “*dou*(S_A)” where S is the prejacent clause and A is the associate of *dou*, its meaning is roughly ‘S_A and not only S_A’ where A’ is what I call a “sub-alternative” of A, which can be a proper subpart of A, a weak scale-mate of A, or a disjunction of A, and so on. For example, “John and Mary *dou* came” means that John and Mary came, not only John came, and not only Mary came; “it’s *dou* five o’clock” means that it’s five o’clock, not just four o’clock, not just three o’clock, .... I will argue that function alternations of *dou* come from the variations on what counts a sub-alternative.

The function diversity of *dou* raises two fundamental questions for the semantics of natural languages: what is the underlying logical system of the universal grammar (UG), and how is it developed? The underlying logical system of UG is the core system of the semantics of human languages. It is made up of connectives (such as negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditional), quantifiers, and so on. This system should be simple and consistent, otherwise we wouldn’t have been able to acquire it so easily (Chierchia 2016). Nevertheless, cross-linguistically, many functional particles possess various basic functions. As Gil (2013) reports, 67% of world’s languages possess such multi-functional particles. Typical examples include Mandarin particles *dou* and *ye*, and
Japanese particles *ka* and *mo*, and so on. For each of these particles, its diverse functions should have primarily the same source, otherwise the logical system of UG would be unrecognizable. The alternations of the functions should be triggered by minimal variations, otherwise function diversity would not be cross-linguistic. The Mandarin particle *dou*, with a long history for at least 1800 years (Gu 2015), is an excellent case to study the development of the logical system in UG.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the three basic uses of *dou*, including the quantifier-distributor use, the FCI-licenser use, and the scalar additive operator use. Section 3 discusses the advantages and problems of two representative approaches to the semantics of *dou*, including the distributor approach (Lin 1998) and the maximizer approach (Giannakidou and Cheng 2006; Ming Xiang 2008). Section 4 starts with Alternative Semantics and the meaning of the canonical exhaustifier *only*. Then it outlines a preliminary treatment for the semantics of *dou* in parallel to that of *only*. Section 5 derives the three basic uses of *dou* and explains the relevant semantic effects. Section 6 discusses the alternations of the functions of *dou*. Appendix I reviews a competing approach suggested by reviewers, which contributes the derivation of FC to recursive exhaustifications. Appendix II reviews the analyses by Liao (2011) and Liu (2016b,c, 2018), which also implement Alternative Semantics and exhaustification.

2. Describing the uses of *dou*

2.1. Quantifier-distributor

In a basic declarative sentence, *dou* is associated with a preceding nominal expression and universally distributes over the subparts of the denotation of its associate, as exemplified in (1). This use of *dou* is similar to the post-nominal use of the English particle *all*. Here and throughout this paper, the associate of *dou* is enclosed in “[•]”.

(1) a. [Tamen] **dou** dao -le.
   they **dou** arrive -ASP
   ‘They all arrived.’

   b. [Tamen] **dou** ba naxie wenti da dui -le.
   they **dou** BA those question answer correct -ASP
   ‘They all correctly answered these questions.’

   they BA those question **dou** answer correct -ASP
   ‘They correctly answered all of these questions.’

Under the quantifier-distributor use, *dou* brings up three semantic consequences in addition to universal quantification, namely, a “maximality requirement,” a “distributivity requirement,” and a “plurality requirement.” Names of these requirements are quoted because they are used in a descriptive manner. Later, I will argue that both of the latter two requirements are illusions. The “maximality requirement” means that the presence of *dou* forces the predicate denoted by the

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1 There is a rich literature on the semantics of Japanese particles *ka* and *mo*. Representative works in contemporary semantics include: Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002); Mitrović (2014); Slade (2011); Szabolcsi (2010, 2015); Mitrovic and Sauerland (2014), among others.
remnant VP to be applied to the maximal element in the extension of *dou*’s associate (Ming Xiang 2008). For instance, in a discourse that a large group of children, with one or two exceptions, went to the park, the sentence in (2) is acceptable only when *dou* is absent.

(2) [Haizimen] (#*dou*) qu -le gongyuan.

children *dou* go -PERF park

‘The children (#all) went to the park.’

The “distributivity requirement” says that if a sentence admits both collective and (atomic or non-atomic) distributive readings, then adding *dou* to this sentence blocks the collective reading (Lin 1998). For instance, the presence of *dou* in (3) is infelicitous if the considered individuals all together participated in only one house-buying event.

(3) (Scenario: *The considered individuals all together bought only one house.*)

[Tamen] (#*dou*) mai -le fangzi.

they *dou* buy -PERF house

‘They (#all) bought house(s).’

The “plurality requirement” says that the associate of *dou*, overt or covert, must be non-atomic. If the prejacent clause of *dou* does not contain an overt non-atomic nominal item, *dou* has to be associated with a covert non-atomic item. For example, in (4), since the overt part of the prejacent clause has no non-atomic item, *dou* is associated with a covert item such as *mei-ci* ‘every time.’

(4) Yuehan [(mei-ci)] *dou* qu de Beijing.

John *dou* every-time go de Beijing

‘Every time, the place that John went to was Beijing.’

2.2. FCI-licenser

As a well-known fact, in Mandarin, pre-verbal *wh*-expressions and *renhe* ‘any’-expressions can function as universal (∀-)FCIs when preceding the particle *dou*, as exemplified in (5).

(5) [Shui/ Na-ge-ren/ Renhe-ren] *(dou)* keyi jiao jichu hanyu.

who/ which-ci-person/ any-person *dou* can teach introductory Chinese

‘Anyone can teach Intro Chinese.’

More interestingly, in Yimei Xiang (2016b), I observe that associating *dou* with a pre-verbal disjunction also evokes a ∀-FC inference, as shown in (6a). Here, while the prejacent clause is a disjunction, associating the pre-verbal disjunction with *dou* yields a conjunctive inference.

3One might find it appealing to interprete *dou* in (4) as ‘only’ and associate it with *Beijing*, paraphrasing the sentence as ‘for all the times, John only went to Beijing.’ However, the following example excludes this possibility: the covert *mei-ci* ‘every time’ appears under the predicate *xiang* ‘want’, forcing *dou* to appear within the embedded clause.

(i) Wo (*dou*) xiang [(mei-ci)] (dou) qu Beijing.

I *dou* want every-time *dou* go Beijing.

Intended: ‘I want it to be the case that I go to Beijing every time.’

3My own intuition doesn’t accept a ∀-FC reading for the without-*dou* sentence (6a). But, in an informal survey,
2.3. Scalar marker

There are two types of structures where dou functions as a scalar additive operator: one is the [lian Foc dou ...] construction where dou is associated with lian+Foc, and the other is where dou is associated with an in-situ focused scalar item.

First, the [lian Foc dou ...] construction evokes an even-like inference, namely, it implies that the prejacent proposition is less likely than at least some of its contextually relevant alternatives, as exemplified in (7). In the [lian Foc dou ...] construction, the presence of lian is optional, but the associate of dou must be stressed. In particular, an indefinite phrase of the form “one-cl-NP” can be licensed as a minimizer at the focal position of a [lian Foc dou neg ...] construction, as shown in (8a). Interestingly, as C.-T. James judgments from 52 Mandarin native speakers were divergent: 22 speakers accepted only the simple disjunction reading, 24 accepted only the FC reading, and the rest 6 accepted both readings but their preferences were divergent. Crucially, 4 out of the 6 speakers who accepted both readings reported that they got the FC reading if unconsciously inserting a silent dou into the sentence, and that they got the simple disjunction reading if consciously avoiding doing so. Hence, there seems to be two types of speakers: “disjunction speakers” and “FC speakers”. FC speakers read sentences like (6a) with a covert dou. While disjunction speakers resist a covert dou, due to probably the economy principle that a language-specific operator shall not be used covertly if it can be used overtly (Chierchia 1998).

In many cases, a non-subject associate of dou can also be left in-situ, as exemplified in the following:

(i) a. Ta (lian) [NANJII]F dou qu -guo -le.  
   he lian Antarctica dou go -exp -asp
   ‘He even has been to Antarctica.’

   he dou go -exp Antarctica -asp
   ‘He even has been to Antarctica.’

(ii) a. Ta (lian) [XIAOXUE]F dou mei shang -guo.  
    he lian primary-school dou neg go -exp
   ‘He hasn’t even been to primary school.’

   b. Ta dou mei shang -guo [XIAOXUE]F.  
   he dou neg go -exp primary-school
   ‘He hasn’t even been to primary school.’

But, there are still quite a few exceptions, which seem to be conditioned by the aspectual class of the sentence: to place the focused associate of dou in the in-situ position, the prejacent of dou has to express an accomplishment. Since the aspectual system of Mandarin is very complex, I will not dive into this puzzle in this paper.
Huang (pers. comm.) points out, the post-

*post-dou* negation is sometimes optional, as seen in (8b). In the presence of negation, (8b) means that John doesn’t want any money; in the absence of negation, (8b) means that John is very greedy and wants to take any money regardless of how little amount that is.

(8) a. Yuehan (lian) [YIF-ge ren] *(dou) *(mei) qing.
   John LIAN one-CL person DOU NEG invite
   ‘John didn’t invite even one person.’

   b. Yuehan (lian) [YIF-fen qian] *(dou) (mei) yao.
   John LIAN one-cent money DOU NEG request
   With negation: ‘John doesn’t want even one cent.’
   Without negation: ‘Even if it is just one cent, John wants it.’

Second, *dou* can also be associated with an in-situ scalar item. In this case, the presence of *dou* implies that its prejacent proposition ranks relatively high with respect to the contextually relevant measurement. For example, in (9a), *dou* is associated with the numeral phrase WU-dian ‘five o’clock’, and the alternatives are ranked in chronological order. When *dou* takes this use, its associate can stay in-situ but must be focus-marked with stress.6

(9) a. **Dou** [WU-dian] -le.
   DOU five-o’clock -ASP
   ‘It is five o’clock.’
   \[\sim \text{It’s too late.}\]

   b. Ta **dou** yijing lai -guo zher [LIANGF-ci] -le.
   he DOU already come -EXP here two-time -ASP.
   ‘He has already been here twice.’
   \[\sim \text{Being here twice is quite a lot (for him).}\]

2.4. Disambiguation

If a sentence has multiple items that are eligible to be associated with *dou*, the function of *dou* and the association relation can be disambiguated by stress. Compare the following three sentences with different prosody forms:

(10) a. [Tamen] **DOU**/**dou** lai -guo liang-ci -le.
   they DOU/DOU come -EXP two-time -ASP
   ‘They ALL have been here twice.’

   b. (Lian) [TAMEN]F **dou** lai -guo liang-ci -le.
   LIAN they DOU come -EXP two-time -ASP
   ‘Even THEY have been here twice.’
   \[\sim \text{Compared with some other people, they are less likely to come here twice.}\]

6Note that the scalar additive operator use of *dou* in (9) is different from the non-scalar use in the following sentences, where *dou* is associated with the main verb, which is clearly non-scalar.

(i) a. Yuehan **dou** [LAI]F -guo zher yi-ci -le.
   John DOU come -EXP here one-CL -ASP
   ‘John has been here once.’

   b. Yu **dou** [TING]F -le.
   rain DOU stop -ASP
   ‘The rain has stopped.’

Intuitively, here *dou* suggests a contrast between the status where a change has taken place (such as the status where John has been here, or it starts raining) and the status where this changed hasn’t taken place (such as the status where John hasn’t been here, or the rain hasn’t started yet). So far, I don’t have a full story on this use of *dou.*
    they DOU come -EXP two-time -ASP

'They’ve even been here TWICE.'
∽ Being here twice is a lot for them.

In (10a), where the prejacent of dou has no stressed item, dou functions as a quantifier-distributor and is associated with the preceding plural term tamen ‘they’. While in (10b-c), dou functions as a scalar additive operator and is associated with the stressed item.

3. Previous studies

There are numerous studies on the syntax and semantics of dou. Earlier approaches treat dou as an adverb with universal quantification power (Ma 1983; Lee 1986; Cheng 1995; Pan 2006; Jiang 1998; among many others). Huang (1996) and Yuan (2005) treat dou as a sum operator operating on the event variable. Portner (2002) analyzes the scalar additive operator use of dou in a way similar to the inherent scalar semantics of the English focus sensitive particle even. Liao (2011) and Liu (2016b,c, 2018) also define dou as even, and derive the distributor use of dou based on a universal scalar presupposition. Hole (2004) treats dou as a universal quantifier over the domain of alternatives. This section will review two representative views on the semantics of dou, including the distributor approach by Lin (1998) and the maximizer approach by Giannakidou and Cheng (2006) and Ming Xiang (2008). Reviews on Liao (2011) and Liu (2016b,c, 2018) are postponed to Appendix II since they involve technicalities to be introduced in later sections.

3.1. The distributor approach

Lin (1998) provides the first extensive treatment of the semantics of dou. He treats dou as an overt counterpart of the generalized distributor Part in the sense of Schwarzschild (1996), as defined in (11), where x stands for the associate of dou and P for the predicate that dou combines with.

(11) **Semantics of dou (Lin 1998)**

\[
"x \text{ dou } P" \text{ is true iff } \text{Part}_C(P, x) = 1, \\
\text{iff } \forall y \in C[y \leq x \rightarrow P(y)] \text{ where } C \text{ is a cover of } x. 
\]

The Part-operator distributes over the cover of the associated item. A cover of an entity X is a set of atomic or non-atomic subparts of X, as defined in (12). The value of a cover is determined by both linguistic and non-linguistic factors.

(12) C is a **cover** of X (formalized as ‘Cov(C, X) = 1’) iff

a. C is a set of subparts of X;

b. every subpart of X belongs to some member in C.

When a cover consists of only atomic elements, Part distributes down to atoms, yielding an atomic distributive reading. When a cover is singleton, distributivity is trivial, and applying Part returns a collective reading. In other cases, applying Part gives rise to a non-atomic distributive reading. For example, if the cover of a ⊕ b ⊕ c is \{a ⊕ b, c\}, ‘abc dou bought houses’ means that ab together bought a house and c alone bought a house.
(13) Possible covers of $a \oplus b \oplus c$ and the corresponding readings of $abc$ \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} bought houses:

- $\{a, b, c\}$ : Atomic distributive ‘$abc$ each bought houses’
- $\{a \oplus b, c\}$
- $\{a \oplus b, b \oplus c\}$ : Non-atomic distributive
- $\{a \oplus b \oplus c\}$ : Collective ‘$abc$ together bought houses’

The distributor approach by Lin only considers the quantifier-distributor use of \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}}. It is unclear how to extend it to the other uses, such as the FCI-licenser use and the scalar operator use. Moreover, even for the quantifier-distributor use, this approach faces two challenges. First, \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} evokes a distributivity requirement, but the \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Part}}-operator does not. As Ming Xiang (2008) argues, if \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} were a generalized distributor, it should be compatible with a collective reading. For example, in (14), repeated from (3), if \textit{tamen} ‘they’ denotes the plural individual $a \oplus b \oplus c$, there can be a discourse under which the cover of \textit{tamen} ‘they’ is $\{a \oplus b \oplus c\}$, and then Lin predicts \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} to trivially distribute over this singleton set, yielding a collective reading, contra fact.

(14) [\textbf{Tamen}] \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} mai -le  fangzi.
they  \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} buy -PERF house
‘They \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} bought houses.’ (#collective)

Second, as shown by the contrast between (15a-b) and (15c), unlike English distributors like \textit{each} and \textit{all}, Mandarin \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} can be associated with a distributive expression such as NP-\textit{gezi} ‘NP each’.

(15) a. Each of the five investors (*each/*all) invested in one startup.
    b. The five investors each (*each/*all) invested in one startup.
    c. [\textbf{Zhe} \textbf{wu-ge touziren gezi} (\textbf{dou}) touzi -le yi-jia changye gongsi].
       \textit{This} five-\textit{cl} investor each \textbf{dou} invest \textbf{PERF} one-\textit{cl} startup \textbf{company}
       ‘The five investors each \textbf{dou} invested in one startup.’ (atomic distributive)

3.2. The maximizer approach

Another representative approach, initiated by Giannakidou and Cheng (2006) and extended by Ming Xiang (2008), is to treat \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} as a maximizer. Briefly, this approach assumes \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} to have the following semantic characteristics: (i) it operates on a non-singleton cover of its associate and returns

\footnote{Champollion (2015) argues that all is a distributor that distributes down to subgroups, while that each distributes all the way down to atoms.}

\footnote{In (15c), the NP-\textit{gezi} is not a constituent — \textit{gezi} is a distributive adverbial associated with the subject NP. More precisely, (15c) shows that \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} can appear in the scope of a distributor and associated with the distributed phrase. Similar arguments have been reached by Cheng (2009) and others, but they mostly draw on the fact that \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} can be associated with the distributive quantificational phrase \textit{mei-cl}-NP ‘every NP’, as exemplified in (i). This fact, however, cannot knock down the distributor approach: observe in (i) that stress falls on the distributive phrase \textit{mei-cl}-NP, not the particle \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}}; therefore, here \textcolor{red}{\textbf{dou}} might function as a scalar additive operator, not a quantifier.

(i) a. [\textit{MEI-ge ren}] \textbf{dou} youyedian.
    every-\textit{cl} person \textbf{dou} have advantage
    ‘Everyone \textbf{dou} has some advantages.’
    b. ??[\textit{Mei-ge ren}] \textbf{DOU} youyedian.
    every-\textit{cl} person \textbf{DOU} have advantage
    ‘Everyone \textbf{DOU} has some advantages.’}
the maximal plural element in this cover, and (ii) it presupposes the existence of this maximal plural element. Since their original papers don’t have a formal definition, I schematize this idea as follows:

(16) **Semantics of dou** (based on Giannakidou and Cheng 2006 and Ming Xiang 2008)
Let Cov(C, x) = 1, then \([dou](x) = |C| > 1 \land \exists y \in C[\neg \text{Atom}(y) \land \forall z \in C[z \leq y]].\)

\([dou](x)\) is defined only if the cover of \(x\) is non-singleton and has a unique non-atomic maximal element; when defined, the reference of \([dou](x)\) is this maximal element.

The maximizer approach of dou is similar to the standard treatment of the definite determiner the (Sharvy 1980, Link 1983): the picks out the unique maximal element in the extension of its NP-complement and presupposes the existence of this maximal element.

(17) \([\text{the}](P_{(a,t)}) = \exists x_a [x \in P \land \forall y \in P[y \leq x]].(\forall x_a [x \in P \land \forall y \in P[y \leq x]]\)

\([\text{the}](P_{(a,t)})\) is defined only if there is a unique maximal object \(x\) such that \(P(x)\) is true; when defined, the reference of \([\text{the}](P_{(a,t)})\) is this maximal element.)

On the upside, the maximizer approach predicts the maximality requirement, and it can extend to the scalar use of dou (see Ming Xiang 2008). But, this approach is problematic in two respects. First, it predicts no distributivity effect at all. Under this approach, a dou-sentence “[x] dou did f” only asserts that the maximal element in the cover of \(x\) did \(f\), not that each element in the cover of \(x\) did \(f\). For instance in (14), if the cover of tamen ‘they’ is \(\{a \oplus b, a \oplus b \oplus c\}\), then predicted assertion would be ‘a \oplus b \oplus c bought houses,’ which says nothing as to whether \(a \oplus b\) bought houses. Second, the plurality requirement comes as a stipulation on the presupposition of dou: dou presupposes that the selected maximal element is non-atomic. It is unclear why this is so, because the definite article the does not trigger such a plural presupposition. Moreover, as we will see in section 5.1.2, the so-called “plurality requirement” is illusive. This plural presupposition is neither sufficient nor necessary for accounting for the relevant facts.

4. **Defining dou as a special exhaustifier**

This section will start with Alternative Semantics and the meaning of the canonical F-sensitive exhaustifier only, and then will define the particle dou as a special exhaustifier in parallel to only.

4.1. **Alternative Semantics**

Rooth (1985) assumes that a meaningful linguistic expression \(\alpha\) is associated with a set of focus (F-)alternatives ‘F-Alt(\(\alpha\))’ (also called the focus value of \(\alpha\) and written as ‘\([\alpha]\)’). F-alternatives of a simple expression are derived by replacing the focused item with meanings of the same semantic type, as in (18a). The F-alternative set grows point-wise (Hamblin 1973, Rooth 1992), as in (18b).

(18) **F-alternatives**

a. For any lexical entry \(\alpha\), \(\text{F-Alt}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} \text{D-type}[[\alpha]] & \text{if } \alpha \text{ is focused} \\ \{[[\alpha]]\} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}\)

b. \(\text{F-Alt}(\beta(\alpha)) = \{b(a) \mid b \in \text{F-Alt}(\beta), a \in \text{F-Alt}(\alpha)\}\)
The following tree diagram illustrates the composition of F-alternatives. This structure is annotated with the set of F-alternatives at every node.

(19) Mary invited JOHN$_F$.

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ \text{invite}(m, y) \mid y \in D_e \} \\
\{ \lambda x. \text{invite}(x, y) \mid y \in D_e \} \\
\{ \lambda y \lambda x. \text{invite}(x, y) \} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Focus placement itself doesn’t affect truth conditions. For example, in responding to the question in (20), stressing Mary makes the answer infelicitous but not false. However, when associated with the exclusive particle only, focus placement can affect the truth conditions, as seen in (21).

(20) Who did Mary invite?
   a. Mary invited JOHN$_F$.
   b. #MARY$_F$ invited John.

(21) a. John only introduced BILL$_F$ to Sue.  \( \sim \) John didn’t introduce anyone to Sue except Bill.
    b. John only introduced Bill to SUE$_F$.  \( \sim \) John didn’t introduce Bill to anyone except Sue.

We call only a F-sensitive operator (Jackendoff 1972). Prototypical F-sensitive operators also include exclusive particles such as merely, just, exclusively, and additive particles such as also, even, additionally, too. Rooth (1992, 1996) captures the F-sensitivity effect of only through a condition that constrains the domain of only: for a sentence of the form “only$_C$(S)” where C is a context-dependent domain variable and S is the prejacent clause, \([\text{only}_C(S)]\) is defined only if \(C \subseteq \text{F-Alt}(S)\). More generally:

(22) **Focus Condition**

For any F-sensitive operator \(\Theta\) quantifying over a domain \(C\) and combining with a focus-containing expression \(\delta\), \([\Theta_C(\delta)]\) is defined only if \(C \subseteq \text{F-Alt}(\delta)\).

In addition to F-alternatives, subsequent works of Alternative Semantics discuss another two types of alternatives, namely, scalar (\(\sigma\)-)alternatives of scalar items (Sauerland 2004) and domain (D-)alternatives of disjunctions or quantifiers (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Sauerland 2004; Katzir 2007). Following Rooth’s idea that F-alternatives are activated by a grammatical feature [F], Chierchia (2006, 2013) assumes that \(\sigma\)- and D-alternatives are activated by the [\(\sigma\)] and [D] feature, respectively. \(\sigma\)-alternatives are derived by replacing the scalar item with meanings belonging to the same scale,

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9Strictly speaking, F-sensitive operators cannot access F-alternatives directly. Instead, Rooth (1992) assumes that only makes reference to F-alternatives indirectly through a focus interpretation operator, written as ‘\(\sim\)’. As illustrated in (i), the \(\sim\)-operator first combines with a contextually determined F-domain variable C and then with the prejacent of only, presupposing that C denotes a subset of the F-alternative set F-Alt(S). Further, Rooth (1992, 1996) assumes that only directly combines with a quantification domain variable, and that this quantification domain variable is co-indexed with the F-domain variable. In consequence, the quantification domain of only is restricted to a set of contextually relevant F-alternatives of the prejacent sentence.

(i) \(\text{only}(C_1) \sim [C_1 [S \ldots X_F \ldots]] \)

\([\sim C_1(S)] = [S]\), defined only if \([C_1] \subseteq \text{F-Alt}(S)\)
as in (23b). D-alternatives of a disjunctive include the disjunctive itself and functions to its disjuncts, as in (24). As for quantifiers, Chierchia (2013: pp. 138) assumes that a quantificational determiner carries a syntactic domain variable \( D \), interpreted via an assignment function as \( g(D) \), and that the D-alternatives are derived by assigning this variable a value that is a subset of \( g(D) \), as in (25). The same as F-alternatives, \( \sigma \)-alternatives and D-alternatives grow point-wise.

(23) For any basic expression \( \alpha \):

a. \( \text{F-ALT}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} D_{\text{type}}(\alpha) & \text{if} \ \alpha \ \text{carries a [F] feature} \\ \{\alpha\} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \)

b. \( \text{\( \sigma \)-ALT}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} \{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\} & \text{if} \ \alpha \ \text{carries a [}\sigma\text{] feature and} \ \{\alpha\} \ \text{is part of a scale} \ \langle\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\rangle \\ \{\alpha\} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \)

(24) If \( \alpha \) is a disjunctive:

\( \text{D-ALT}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} \{\alpha, \lambda b \lambda a. a, \lambda b \lambda a. b\} & \text{if} \ \alpha \ \text{carries a [D] feature} \\ \{\alpha\} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \)

(25) If \( \alpha \) is a quantifier with a syntactic domain variable \( D \):

\( \text{D-ALT}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} \{\alpha\}^{g[D \rightarrow D']} | D' \subseteq g(D) \} & \text{if} \ \alpha \ \text{carries a [D] feature} \\ \{\alpha\}^g & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \)

For illustration, the following lists the features and activated alternatives of a nominal disjunction. The [F] feature is assigned to the entire disjunction, while the [\( \sigma \)] and [D] features are assigned to the disjunctive or.

(26) a. \( [\text{Andy or Billy}] = \lambda P. P(a) \lor P(b) \)

b. \( \text{F-ALT}([\text{Andy or Billy}]_F) = D_{(et,t)} \)

c. \( \text{\( \sigma \)-ALT}([\text{Andy or Billy}]_\sigma) = \{\lambda P. P(a) \lor P(b), \lambda P. P(a) \land P(b)\} \)

d. \( \text{D-ALT}([\text{Andy or Billy}]_D) = \{\lambda P. P(a) \lor P(b), \lambda P. P(a), \lambda P. P(b)\} \)

I extend Focus Condition to a more general condition as follows:

\textbf{(27) Domain restriction condition}

For any operator \( \Theta \) quantifying over a domain \( C \) and combining with an expression \( \delta \), if \( \Theta \) agrees with an alternative-activating feature \([x] \), \( \text{[Theta}(\delta) \text{]} \) is defined only if \( C \subseteq x\text{-ALT}(\delta) \).

4.2. Defining \textit{only}

It is standardly assumed that \textit{only} presupposes the truth of its prejacent proposition and asserts an exhaustivity inference (Horn 1969), as exemplified in (28).

(28) Mary only invited JOHN\textsubscript{F}.

a. \( \rightsquigarrow \text{Mary invited John.} \) Prejacent presupposition

b. \( \rightsquigarrow \text{Mary didn’t invite anyone other than John.} \) Exhaustivity inference

The exhaustivity inference is derived by negating all the contextually relevant F-alternatives of the prejacent clause that are excludable, as formalized in (29). Standardly, an alternative is excludable iff it is not entailed by the prejacent, as in (30).
The meaning of only (To be revised in (32))

\[ [\text{only}_C] = \lambda p \lambda w : p(w) = 1. \forall q \in \text{Excl}(p, C)[p \nsubseteq q \rightarrow q(w) = 0] \]

(30) Excludable (excl)-alternatives (Standard)

\[ \text{Excl}(p, C) = \{ q \mid p \nsubseteq q \wedge q \in C \} \]

Note that the definition of F-alternatives in (18) doesn’t require F-alternatives to be contextually relevant, while the exhaustivity inference of only is only concerned with contextually relevant meanings. Hence, alternatives negated by only are chosen out of the domain \( C \), a set of contextually relevant F-alternatives, not out of the full set of F-alternatives.

In addition to the above inferences, I argue that only also triggers a non-vacuity presupposition, which requires the existence of an excludable (excl)-alternative. Consider (31) for illustration:

(31) Which of John and Mary will you invite?
   a. Only JOHN
   b. #Only BOTH
   c. BOTH

The which-question restricts the domain of only to the following set: \( C = \{ \phi_j, \phi_m, \phi_j \oplus m \} \) where \( \phi_x = I \text{ will invite } x \). The response in (31b) is infelicitous because the propositional argument of only, namely \( \phi_j \oplus m \), is the strongest proposition in \( C \) and has no excl-alternative in \( C \). This non-vacuity presupposition comes from a general economy condition that an overt operator cannot be applied vacuously (Martin Hackl pers. comm.; compare Al Khatib 2013). In comparison, the bare stressed BOTH in (31c) is felicitous. Following the grammatical view, we can assume that the bare BOTH is associated with a covert exhaustifier and that covert exhaustifiers are not subject to non-vacuity.

To sum up, I define the meaning of only as follows: only presupposes the truth of its prejacent proposition and the existence of an excl-alternative in its quantification domain; when the presuppositions are satisfied, it negates all the excl-alternatives of its prejacent clause.\(^{10}\)

(32) The meaning of only (Final)

\[ [\text{only}_C] = \lambda p \lambda w : \exists q \in \text{Excl}(p, C) \wedge p(w) = 1. \forall q \in \text{Excl}(p, C)[q(w) = 0] \]

a. Non-vacuity presupposition: The prejacent has at least one excl-alternative.
   b. Prejacent presupposition: The prejacent is true.
   c. Exhaustivity assertion: All the excl-alternatives are false.

4.3. Defining dou in analogous to only

\(^{10}\) For simplicity, this paper treats all F-sensitive operators propositional. A cross-categorical semantics of only is given in (i), where \( f \) and \( P \) stand for the left argument (i.e., restrictor) and the right argument (i.e., scope), respectively. By Focus Condition, the quantification domain \( C \) is a set of F-alternatives of the left argument.

(i) Cross-categorical semantics of only

\[ [\text{only}_C] = \lambda f \lambda P_{[n,s]} \lambda w_x : P(f)(w) = 1 \wedge \exists f' \in C[P(f) \nsubseteq P(f')]. \forall f' \in C[P(f) \nsubseteq P(f') \rightarrow P(f)(w) = 0] \]
I define the Mandarin particle *dou* as a special exhaustifier, in analogous to the canonical exhaustifier *only*. The same as *only*, as an overt functional particles, *dou* is subject to non-vacuity and presupposes the existence of an alternative that it operates on.

\[(33) \text{ The meaning of } dou\]

\[
[dou] = \lambda p \lambda w : \exists q \in \text{Sub}(p, C) \cdot p(w) = 1 \wedge \forall q \in \text{Sub}(p, C)[O_C(q)(w) = 0]
\]

a. *Non-vacuity presupposition*: The prejacent has at least one sub-alternative.
b. *Prejacent assertion*: The prejacent is true.
c. *Anti-exhaustification assertion*: The exhaustification of each sub-alternative is false.

However, the semantics of *dou* and *only* have two contrasts.

I. Excl-alternatives versus sub-alternatives While *only* operates on excl-alternatives, *dou* operates on sub-alternatives, which are complementary to excl-alternatives, as defined in (34).

\[(34) \text{ Sub-alternatives}\]

\[
\text{Sub}(p, C) = (C - \text{Excl}(p, C)) - \{p\}
\]

(Alternatives that are non-excludable and distinct from the prejacent)

If excl-alternatives are defined standardly as non-entailed alternatives, as in (30), sub-alternatives are simply alternatives asymmetrically entailed by the prejacent, as in (35).

\[(35) \text{ Sub-alternatives as weaker alternatives} (\text{By standard excludability})\]

\[
\text{Sub}(p, C) = \{q \mid p \subset q, q \in C\}
\]

However, as to be seen in section 5, what counts an excl-alternative is subject to variations, depending on the quantification domain of the F-sensitive operator (namely, whether this domain consists of F-, σ-, or D-alternatives of the prejacent) and the measurement for ordering alternatives (such as logical strength, likelihood, and various contextually determined measurements). Consequently, what counts a sub-alternative is also subject to variations, causing function alternations of *dou*.

II: Exhaustivity versus anti-exhaustivity While *only* asserts an exhaustivity inference, *dou* asserts an “anti-exhaustivity” inference, derived by negating the exhaustification of each sub-alternative. Hence, we say that *dou* has a “pre-exhaustification” effect (a la Chierchia 2013). In a basic case, the pre-exhaustification effect is realized by applying an O-operator (also written as ‘Exh’) to each sub-alternative.\(^{11}\) The O-operator is a covert counterpart of the exclusive particle *only*, coined by the grammatical view of scalar implicatures (Fox 2007, Chierchia et al. 2012, Fox and Spector 2018, among others). As defined in (36), this O-operator affirms the prejacent and negates all the excl-alternatives of the prejacent.\(^{12}\)

\(^{11}\)When *dou* is used as a scalar operator, the pre-exhaustification effect is realized by applying a scalar exhaustifier (*≈ just*) to each sub-alternative. This change is a logical consequence of redefining excl- and sub-alternatives based on likelihood. See section 5.3.

\(^{12}\)Note that the O-operator is defined based on excludability, and that excl-alternatives are complementary to sub-alternatives. Hence, the semantics of *dou* purely depends what counts a sub-alternative, as computed in the following:

\[(i) \text{ Defining } dou \text{ based on sub-alternatives}\]

\[
O_C = \lambda q \lambda w : q(w) = 1 \wedge \forall r \in \text{Excl}(q, C)[r(w) = 0]
\]
This paper uses the more intuitive definition of dou particle quantifier-distributor use. Let me sketch out this idea informally: the assertion of inference (iiib), giving rise to a maximality requirement, is identical to the inference in (iiia), which is tolerant of non-maximality; but (ii) also implicates the anti-non-maximality of stress discussed in section 2.4: when it the case that John and Mary both arrived or that only one of them arrived? This idea is supported by the distribution only part of non-maximizers like One possibility, raised by the audience at LAGB 2015, is that cross-linguistically. For instance, in (i), the distributor realized by the meaning variation of sub-alternatives.

In the domain, the two alternatives in (37d) are asymmetrically entailed by the prejacent, which is weaker than the prejacent inference (i.e., the anti-exhaustivity inference is true whenever the prejacent is true). [Proof: Whenever p is true, any alternative of p that is weaker than p has a true excl-alternative r, where r = p. End of proof.] Hence, the default meaning of dou is vacuous in assertion. However, as to be seen in section 5.2, the assertion of dou can be non-vacuous under other definitions of excludability.

The following illustrates how the proposed definition of dou derives the quantifier-distributor use. In (37), the prejacent and the domain of dou are schematized in (37b) and (37c), respectively. In the domain, the two alternatives in (37d) are asymmetrically entailed by the prejacent, which are therefore sub-alternatives of the prejacent. Applying dou affirms the prejacent and negates the exhaustification of each sub-alternative, yielding the inference in (37e): John and Mary arrived, not only John arrived, and not only Mary arrived. The anti-exhaustification inference given by the not only-clauses is entailed by the prejacent and thus doesn’t affect the truth conditions.\(^\text{13}\)

\[\text{(36) The O-operator (Chierchia et al. 2012)}\]

\[O_C = \lambda p \lambda w : p(w) = 1 \land \forall q \in \text{Excl}(p, C)[q(w) = 0]\]

(The prejacent is true, while all the excl-alternatives are false.)

If excludability is defined standardly as in (30), the prejacent is excludable relative to its sub-alternatives, and the anti-exhaustivity inference collapses under the prejacent inference (i.e., the anti-exhaustivity inference is true whenever the prejacent is true). [Proof: Whenever p is true, any alternative of p that is weaker than p has a true excl-alternative r, where r = p. End of proof.]

One might wonder why dou is used even though it does not change the truth conditions. Such uses are observed cross-linguistically. For instance, in (i), the distributor both adds nothing to the truth conditions.

(i) John and Mary both arrived.

One possibility, raised by the audience at LAGB 2015, is that dou and both are used as contrast focus in comparison with non-maximizers like only part of or only one of. If this is the case, the question under discussion for (37) and (i) would be ‘is it the case that John and Mary both arrived or that only one of them arrived?’ This idea is supported by the distribution of stress discussed in section 2.4: when dou functions as a quantifier-distributor, stress can only be assigned to to the particle dou, not to the associate of dou. Moreover, this idea also explains the maximality requirement of dou under the quantifier-distributor use. Let me sketch out this idea informally: the assertion of the dou-sentence (ii) (repeated from (2)) is identical to the inference in (iii), which is tolerant of non-maximality; but (ii) also implicates the anti-non-maximality inference (iiib), giving rise to a maximality requirement.

(ii) (Context: The children, with only one or two exceptions, went to the park.)

\[\text{[Haizimen] (#dou) qu -le gongyuan.}\]
\[\text{children dou go -PERF park}\]

‘The children (#all) went to the park.’

(iii) a. The children went to the park.

b. Not [only part of the children went to the park.]
d. \( \text{Sub}(\{S\}, C) = \{ \text{arrive}(j), \text{arrive}(m) \} \)

e. \( [\text{dou}_{C}(S)] = \text{arrive}(j \oplus m) \land \neg O[\text{arrive}(j)] \land \neg O[\text{arrive}(m)] = \text{arrive}(j \oplus m) \)

In contrast, in (38), it’s ungrammatical to associate \textit{dou} with an atomic proper name \textit{John} (unless \textit{John} is stressed): regardless of the context, the prejacent clause has no sub-alternative, failing to satisfy the non-vacuity presupposition of \textit{dou}.

(38) \[ \text{[John]}(*\text{dou}) \text{ arrived.} \]

5. Deriving the uses of \textit{dou}

5.1. Deriving the quantifier-distributor use

Recall that, when used as a quantifier-distributor, \textit{dou} has no effect on the truth-conditions of an assertion but evokes three requirements: (i) the “maximality requirement,” namely, that \textit{dou} forces maximality with respect to the domain denoted by the associated item; (ii) the “distributivity requirement,” namely, that the prejacent sentence cannot take a collective reading; (iii) the “plurality requirement,” namely, that the item associated with \textit{dou} must take a non-atomic interpretation. This section will focus on the latter two requirements. (See footnote 13 for a rough idea regarding to the “maximality requirement”.) I will argue that these two requirements are both illusions. Moreover, I will show that all the facts that are thought to result from these two requirements actually result from the non-vacuity presupposition of \textit{dou}.

5.1.1. Explaining the “distributivity requirement”

To generate sub-alternatives and satisfy the non-vacuity presupposition of \textit{dou}, the prejacent of \textit{dou} needs to be strictly stronger than some of its alternatives. In case that the associate of \textit{dou} is an entity (of type \textit{e}), this requirement is satisfied only when the predicate denoted by the remnant VP is (atomically or non-atomically) distributive or divisive.

Consider (39) for illustration. For simplicity, I follow the well-known cover-based treatment of generalized distributivity by Schwarzschild (1996), ignoring its problems in generating alternatives.\textsuperscript{14} To disambiguate, this section uses \( C \) for the cover variable and \( C_{F-Alt} \) for the set of contextually relevant F-alternatives that \textit{dou} quantifies over. The prejacent clause of \textit{dou} is interpreted as in (39a), where a generalized distributor \( \text{Part} \) distributes over the contextually determined cover of \( a \oplus b \oplus c \). Alternatives of the prejacent clause are derived by replacing \( a \oplus b \oplus c \) with a

\textsuperscript{14}In the alternatives, the value of \( C \) always equals to the contextually determined cover of the associated item in the prejacent (viz. the cover of \( a \oplus b \oplus c \)), and \( \text{Part} \) only distributes over \( C \). (See Liao 2011: chap. 4.) For example, if \( C = \{a, b, c\} \), the alternative \( \text{Part}_{C}(f, d) \) is vacuously a tautology (it is true iff \( f \) holds for every subpart of \( d \) that is in \( \{a, b, c\} \)), and the alternative \( \text{Part}_{C}(f, a \oplus b \oplus c \oplus d) \) is logically equivalent to \( \text{Part}_{C}(f, a \oplus b \oplus c) \). These consequences are harmless for now. But problems arise if we want to characterize an operator that operates on excl-alternatives. For example, to derive the exhaustification inference of (i), the alternative ‘\textit{d} bought houses’ shall not be a tautology.

(i) Only \( abc \text{f} \text{ bought houses.} \quad \sim \text{d didn't buy houses.} \)

See a solution in Liu (2016c) based on Link-Landman’s approach of encoding distributivity/collectivity distinction. Details regarding to Liu’s formal implementations are omitted due to the scope of this paper.
contextually relevant individual, as in (39b). Sub-alternatives are (roughly) the ones formed based on the sum of a proper subset of C, as in (39c).\(^{15}\)

\[(39)\quad \textbf{Dou}_{C_{F-Alt}} \quad \{a \oplus b \oplus c \text{ bought houses}\}
\]

a. \([S] = \text{Part}_C(f, a \oplus b \oplus c)\)
b. \(C_{F-Alt} = \{\text{Part}_C(f, X) \mid X_e \text{ is relevant}\}\)
c. \(\text{Sub}([S], C_{F-Alt}) = \{\text{Part}_C(f, X) \mid X_e \text{ is relevant and } \exists C' \subset C[X = \oplus C']\}\)

The quantification domain of \textit{dou} is illustrated in the following. For simplicity, I ignore alternatives based on individuals that are not parts of \(a \oplus b \oplus c\). Shading marks sub-alternatives, box encloses the prejacent proposition, and arrows indicate entailment relations. If \(C\) is non-singleton, the prejacent clause of \textit{dou} takes an atomic or non-atomic distributive reading and does have some weaker/sub-alternatives, which therefore satisfies the non-vacuity presupposition of \textit{dou}. In contrast, if the prejacent clause takes a collective/single-cover reading, it does not have a weaker/sub-alternative, making \textit{dou} undefined.

\[(39 \text{ cont.})\quad \text{Quantification domain of } \textit{dou}:
\]

\[\sqrt{\text{Atomic distributive: If } C = \{a, b, c\}, \text{ then } ...}
\]

\[C_{F-Alt} = \begin{cases}
\text{Part}_C(f, a) & \text{Part}_C(f, a \oplus b) \\
\text{Part}_C(f, a \oplus b) & \text{Part}_C(f, a \oplus b \oplus c)
\end{cases}
\]

\[= \begin{cases}
f(a) \land f(b) \land f(c) \\
f(a) \land f(b) \land f(c) \\
f(a) \land f(b) \land f(c)
\end{cases}
\]

\[\times \quad \text{Collective: If } C = \{a \oplus b \oplus c\}, \text{ then } C_{F-Alt} = \{f(a \oplus b \oplus c)\} \text{ and } \text{Sub}([S], C_{F-Alt}) = \emptyset
\]

In conclusion, the particle \textit{dou} itself is not a distributor, but in certain cases, its non-vacuity presupposition forces the application of a distributor, or the application of any operation that makes the.

\(^{15}\)Under the cover-based account of distributivity, it doesn’t matter if \(X\) contains parts that are not members of \(C\), as seen in footnote 14. Thus, more accurately, sub-alternatives shall be formulated as follows:

(i) \(\text{Sub}([S], C_{F-Alt}) = \{\text{Part}_C(f, X) \mid X_e \text{ is contextually relevant and } \{y \mid y \leq X \land C(y)\} \subset C\}\)

An alternative is a sub-alternative iff it is based on a contextually relevant individual \(X\) such that \(X\) has subparts not in \(C\).
prejacent clause distributive. We can now easily explain why *dou* can be associated with the distributive expression NP-gezi ‘NP-each’. The presence of the distributor gezi ‘each’ is not redundant; instead, it is required for satisfying the non-vacuity presupposition of *dou*. If gezi is not overtly used, there would still be a covert distributor present in the LF.

(40) [Tamen gezi] **dou** you yixie youdian.
    They each *dou* have some advantage
    ‘They each *dou* has some advantages.’

This account also explains why *dou* can occur in some collective sentences: *dou* can combine with a collective predicate as long as this collective predicate is divisive.

(41) A predicate $P$ is **divisive** iff $\forall x [P(x) \rightarrow \forall y \leq x [y \in \text{Dom}(P) \rightarrow P(y)]]$
    (Whenever $P$ holds of something $x$, it also holds of every subpart of $x$ defined for $P$.)

For instance, *dou* is compatible with divisive collective predicates such as *shi pengyou* ‘be friends’, *jihe* ‘gather’, and *jianmian* ‘meet’, as seen in (42a-c). Consider (42a) for a concrete example. Let *tamen* ‘they’ denote the sum of three individuals *abc*. The set of sub-alternatives is {ab are friends, bc are friends, ac are friends}. Applying *dou* yields inference that *abc* are friends, not only ab are friends, not only bc are friends, and not only ac are friends. In comparison, *dou* cannot be applied to a collective statement if the predicate is not divisive, as shown in (42d).

(42) a. [Tamen] *(dou)* shi pengyou.
    they *dou* be friends
    ‘They (all) friends.’

b. [Tamen] *(dou)* zai dating jihe -le.
    they *dou* at hallway gather -ASP
    ‘They (all) gathered in the hallway.’

    they *dou* see-exp-face -ASP
    ‘They (all) have met.’

d. [Tamen] (*dou*) zucheng -le zhe-ge weiyuanhui.
    they *dou* form -ASP this-cl committee
    ‘They (*all) formed this committee.’

5.1.2. Explaining the “plurality requirement”

The “plurality requirement” says that the associate of *dou* has to take a non-atomic interpretation. I argue that this requirement is also illusive, and that the related facts all result from the non-vacuity presupposition of *dou*.

On the one hand, the plurality requirement is unnecessary: *dou* can be associated with an atomic item as long as the predicate denoted by the remnant VP is divisive. For instance, in (43a), *dou’s* associate *na-ge pingguo* ‘that apple’ is atomic. With a divisive predicate $\lambda x.\text{John ate }x$, the prejacent clause of *dou* does have some sub-alternatives formed based proper subparts of *that*
apple, as schematized in (44a), which supports the non-vacuity presupposition of dou. In contrast, in (43b), the predicate \( \lambda x. \text{John ate half of } x \) is not divisive, and hence the prejacent of dou has no sub-alternative, as shown in (44b), which makes the presence of dou deviant.

(43) a. Yuehan [na-ge pingguo] (dou) chi-le.
    John ba that-cl apple dou eat-perf
    ‘John ate that apple.’

    John ba that-cl apple dou eat-perf one-half
    Intended: ‘John ate half of that apple.’

(44) a. John ate that apple \( \Rightarrow \) John ate \( x (x < \text{that apple})\)
    Sub (John ate that apple) = \{John ate \( x (x < \text{that apple})\}\)

b. John ate half of that apple \( \not\Rightarrow \) John ate half of \( x (x < \text{that apple})\)
    Sub (John ate half of that apple) = \( \varnothing \)

On the other hand, the plurality requirement is insufficient. When applied to a statement with a divisive collective predicate, dou requires its associate to denote a group consisting of at least three distinct individuals, as exemplified in (45).

(45) [Tamen -sa/*-lia] dou shi pengyou.
    they -three/-two dou be friends
    ‘They three/*two are all friends.’

The non-vacuity presupposition of dou also accounts for this fact. The proper subparts of a dual-individual (e.g., \( a \oplus b \)) are atomic individuals, which however are undefined for the collective predicate be friends. Hence in (45), if the associate of dou denotes a dual-individual, the prejacent clause of dou has no sub-alternative, which yields a presupposition failure.

5.2. Deriving the FCI-licenser use

The particle dou can license the FCI use of pre-verbal polarity items, wh-items, and disjunctions. In this section, I show that the assertion of dou turns a disjunctive/existential inference into a conjunctive/universal inference. I will also explain why the licensing of a pre-verbal FCI requires the presence of dou and why the licensing of a pre-verbal FC-disjunction is subject to modal obviation.

5.2.1. Predicting \( \forall \)-FC inferences

As seen in section 4.1, a disjunction or existential quantifier that carries a [D] feature is associated with a set of D-alternatives. Thus in the disjunctive sentence (6b), paraphrased in English in (46), the quantification domain of dou consists of the D-alternatives of its disjunctive prejacent, as in (46c). Sub-alternatives of the prejacent are the disjuncts, as in (46d). Applying dou affirms the prejacent and negates the exhaustification of each disjunct, yielding a \( \forall \)-FC inference, as in (46e). In a word, dou turns a disjunction into a conjunction. Crucially, contrary to the derivation of the quantifier-distributor use, here dou does change the truth condition, because the prejacent disjunctive does not entail the anti-exhaustification inference.
This analysis extends to other pre-verbal FCIs. As assumed by Chierchia and Liao (2015), Mandarin 
*renhe* ‘any’-phrases and non-interrogative *wh*-phrases are ≥3-quantifiers with a [D] feature.

Now, a problem arises as to why disjuncts count as sub-alternatives of disjunctions. In (35) in 
section 4.3, sub-alternatives are weaker alternatives by the regular definition of excludability. But, 
in (46), the disjuncts are stronger than the disjunction, why are they sub-alternatives? This problem 

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16Another commonly seen definition of I-excl-alternatives is as in (i), which is however inadequate. For example, 
in sentence “EVERY student came,” where the prejacent is the strongest among the alternatives and thus has no excl-
alternative, the condition underlined in (i) is vacuously satisfied; therefore, the definition in (i) predicts that every 
alternative of *p* is I-excludable, which is apparently implausible.

(i) $\text{IExcl}(p, C) = \{ q \in C \mid \neg \exists q' \in \text{Excl}(p, C) \mid [p \land \neg q \rightarrow q'] \}$

(The set of alternatives *q* such that affirming *p* and negating *q* does not entail any excl-alternatives)
Semantics of *dou* (Interim)

\[
[dou_C] = \lambda p \lambda w : \exists q \in \text{Sub}(p, C). p(w) = 1 \land \forall q \in \text{Sub}(p, C)[O_C(q)(w) = 0]
\]

where \( \text{Sub}(p, C) \) is defined as in a or b:

a. Def strong (Based on regular excludability)
\[
\text{Sub}(p, C) = (C - \text{Excl}(p, C)) - \{p\}
\]

b. Def weak (Based on innocent excludability)
\[
\text{Sub}(p, C) = (C - I\text{Excl}(p, C)) - \{p\}
\]

Compare the two definitions of sub-alternatives: Def strong is only compatible with the quantifier-distributor use of *dou*, while Def weak also extends to the FCI-licenser use. As such, there are two ways to view the semantics of sub-alternatives.

(i) *The unifying view*. Sub-alternatives are uniformly defined based on innocent excludability. Def strong is just a special case where the I-excl-alternatives are excludable.

(ii) *The weakening view*. Sub-alternatives are primarily defined based on regular excludability. Def weak is available only when non-excludability is weakened to non-I-excludability. This weakening operation is licensed only when the associate of *dou* carries a [D] feature.

The unifying view predicts that the quantifier-distributor use and the FCI-licenser use are both primary, while the weakening view predicts that the FCI-licenser use is derived from the quantifier-distributor use. I argue that the weakening view is more preferable than the uniform view. First, empirically, the quantifier-distributor use of *dou* emerged as early as the Eastern Han Dynasty (25AC-220AC) (Gu 2015), while the other uses came much later. Second, theoretically, the ‘even’-like use of *dou* can be derived easily by weakening the strong definition of sub-alternatives, but not the weak definition. Hence, it is hard for the uniform view to explain the alternation between the ‘even’-like use and the other two uses. I will return to this point in section 6.

5.2.2. Licensing conditions of Mandarin FCIs: Facts

In English, an *any*-phrase is licensed as a \(\forall\)-FCI when it precedes a possibility modal (e.g., *can*), but not licensed when it appears in an episodic sentence or before a necessity modal, as shown in (49).

The phenomenon that a possibility modal licenses a pre-verbal \(\forall\)-FCI is called *Modal Obviation*.

(49) a. Any guest can/*must come in.
    b. *Any guest came in.

It is crucial to differentiate between pre-verbal and post-verbal FCIs. First, appearing pre-verbally or post-verbally, some FCIs yield different truth conditions. Take Mandarin *shenme* ‘what’-NP for example. (50a) is true only if every relevant individual has a possibility of being seen by John; while (50b) allows exceptions. Therefore, we consider pre-verbal *shenme*-NP a \(\forall\)-FCI while post-verbal *shenme*-NP an \(\exists\)-FCI that allows partial variation.\(^{17}\)

\(^{17}\)For discussions on partial variation, see Fălăuş (2009, 2014) on Romanian *vreun*, Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito (2010) on Spanish *algun*, and Chierchia (2013) on Italian *un qualche* and *un N qualsiasi*. 19
(50) a. Yuehan shenme-ren **dou** keneng jian-guo  
    John what-person **dou** perhaps meet-exp  
    Intended: ‘Everyone is such that John might have seen him/her.’

  b. Yuehan keneng jian-guo shenme-ren.  
    John perhaps meet-exp what-person  
    Intended: ‘Perhaps John has met someone. [I don’t know which.]’

Second, even in cases where a post-verbal FCI yields the same truth conditional meaning as its pre-verbal counterpart, they are subject to different licensing conditions. Compare (49a) with (52-51). A post-verbal *any*-NumP/NP yields a universal inference if embedded under a possibility modal, as in (52a)/(51a). But, in contrast to a pre-verbal *any*-phrase, a post-verbal *any*-NumP can also be licensed in the presence of a necessity modal, as in (51b). A simple *any*-NP cannot appear directly under a necessity modal, but it can occur in a supplementary construction, as in (52b). (Dayal 2004)

(51) a. John can read any two books.  
    b. John must read any two books.

(52) a. John can read any book.  

As for disjunctions, it’s widely known that post-verbal disjunctions can function as FCIs when embedded under a modal. (Alonso Ovalle 2005; Fox 2007; Santorio and Romoli 2017; among others).

(53) a. You can invite Andy or Billy.  
    ~~~ You can invite Andy and you can invite Billy.  
    b. You must invite Andy or Billy.  
    ~~~ You can invite Andy and you can invite Billy; you must invite one of them.

Mandarin post-verbal disjunctions behave the same as above. But strikingly, Mandarin pre-verbal disjunctions can also function as $\forall$-FCIs in the presence of *dou*. Moreover, the licensing of this use is subject to modal obviation. (Xiang 2016b)

(54) a. [Yuehan huozhe Mali] **dou** keyi/*bixu jiao jichu hanyu.  
    John or Mary **dou** can/must teach intro Chinese  
    Intended: ‘Both John and Mary can/must teach Intro Chinese.’

    John or Mary **dou** teach -exp intro Chinese  
    Intended: ‘Both Johan and Mary have taught Intro Chinese.’

To license of the $\forall$-FCI use of pre-verbal *wh*-items and polarity items (e.g., renhe ‘any’-NP), *dou* also must be present. But requirements related to modal obviations are quite unclear. For example, Giannakidou and Cheng (2006) claim that the bare *wh*-word *shei* ‘who’ can be licensed as a $\forall$-FCI in an episodic *dou*-sentence like (55a). But, this distributional pattern is very unproductive: the other episodic *dou*-sentence (55b) sounds very odd. Hence, there must be some salvaging effect from the experiential maker *-guo* on FCI-licensing. I leave this puzzle open.

(55) a. [Shei] **dou** jiao -guo jichu hanyu.  
    *who **dou** teach -exp intro Chinese.  
    ‘Everyone has taught Intro Chinese.’

  b. ?? [Shei] **dou** jinlai -le.  
    *who **dou** enter -asp.  
    Intended: ‘Everyone came in.’
The licensing conditions of pre-verbal *na*-NP ‘which-NP’ and *renhe*-NP ‘any-NP’ are even harder to generalize. Giannakidou and Cheng (2006) claim that the ∀-FCI use of these items are only licensed in a pre-*dou*+◇ position. Their judgements are illustrated in (56). Nevertheless, it is difficult to justice the data because judgements on (56) vary greatly among native speakers.

(56)  
   which-*cl/*any -person *dou* can/must enter
   Intended: ‘Everyone can/must come in.’
- b. ??[Na-ge/Renhe -ren] *dou* shou dao -le yaoqing.
   which-*cl/*any -person *dou* get arrive -asp invitation
   Intended: ‘Everyone got an invitation.’

Given the individual variations in grammaticality judgments and the unproductiveness of ∀-FCIs in sentences without a possibility modal, I neglect the licensing conditions of ∀-FCI uses of Mandarin *wh*-*any*-expressions related to modal obviations. For other recent studies on Mandarin ∀-FCIs, see Liao (2011), Cheng and Giannakidou (2013), and Chierchia and Liao (2015).

In summary, the licensing of Mandarin ∀-FCIs is subject to (at least) two conditions. First, to license the ∀-FCI use of a pre-verbal *wh*/*any*-expression, *dou* must be present and associated with this *wh*/*any*-expression. Second, the licensing of the ∀-FCI use of a pre-verbal disjunction is subject to modal obviation and requires the presence of a post-*dou* possibility modal. The following two sections explain these two conditions. The modal obviation effect in the licensing of the ∀-FCI use of a preverbal *wh*/*any*-expression is yet unclear and will not be discussed.

5.2.3. The role of *dou* in licensing FCIs

This section explains why in Mandarin the presence of *dou* is mandatory in a declarative containing a pre-verbal *wh*/*any*-expression. Following Chierchia and Liao (2015), I assume that the sub/D-alternatives associated with a Mandarin *wh*/*any*-expression are obligatorily activated when this expression takes a non-interrogative use, and that these sub/D-alternatives must be used up via employing a c-commanding exhaustifier. Hence, if the particle *dou* is absent, these sub/D-alternatives would be have to used by a basic O-exhaustifier, as in (57b). As to be shown in the following, the application of a basic O-exhaustifier has an undesired semantic consequence.

(57)  
- a. The LF in presence of *dou*:
  
  *dou* [sheiD can teach Intro Chinese]
  douC [sheiD can teach Intro Chinese]

- b. The LF in absence of *dou*:
  
  O [sheiD can teach Intro Chinese]

Compare the computation in (58) with (46). In (46) where *dou* is present, applying *dou* to a disjunction returns a conjunction, yielding a FC inference. While in (58), applying a basic O-exhaustifier to a disjunction affirms this disjunction and negates both of its disjuncts, yielding a contradiction and making the *wh*-declarative ungrammatical.

(58) Consider only two relevant individuals a and b:

- a. \[ S = \Diamond \phi_a \lor \Diamond \phi_b \]  
  S = ‘shei can teach Intro Chinese’

- b. \[ C = D-Alt(S) = \{ \Diamond \phi_a, \Diamond \phi_b, \Diamond \phi_a \lor \Diamond \phi_b \} \]
c. \( \text{Excl}([S], C) = \text{Sub}([S], C) = \{ \Diamond \phi_a, \Diamond \phi_b \} \)

d. \( [O_C(S)] = [\Diamond \phi_a \lor \Diamond \phi_b] \land \neg \Diamond \phi_a \land \neg \Diamond \phi_b = \bot \)

The case of disjunctions is different. Unlike those of \( wh/any \)-items, the sub-alternatives of disjunctions are not mandatorily activated (Chierchia 2006, 2013). Hence, in absence of \( dou \), a sentence with a pre-verbal disjunction takes a simple (inclusive or exclusive) disjunctive interpretation.

The explanation above faces the following challenge: why it is that the sub-alternatives of a \( wh \)-declarative cannot be used by a covert pre-exhaustification exhaustifier, such as the \( O_{dou} \)-operator proposed by Xiang (2016c) and Xiang (2016a: chap. 2) for interpreting mention-some questions? A covert \( O_{dou} \)-operator cannot be placed here due to a fundamental principle for the architecture of human languages, roughly, “Language-particular choices win over universal tendencies” or “Don’t do covertly what you can do overtly.” (Chierchia 1998) We consider an exhaustification over the sub-alternatives of a polarity item as a grammatical operation. Given that \( dou \) must be associated with a preceding item in most declaratives, we predict the following distributional pattern of overt and covert \( dou \), illustrated by the polarity item \( renhe \) ‘any’:

(59) a. Ni [\( renhe-ren \)] *\( dou \) keyi jian. You any-person \( dou \) can meet. ‘Anyone is such that you can meet.’

b. Ni (*\( dou \)) keyi jian [\( renhe-ren \)]. You \( dou \) can meet any-person ‘You can meet anyone.’

\( a' \). ok\( dou/O_{dou} \) [\( renhe-ren \)] [\( renhe-ren \)] [\( renhe-ren \)] [\( renhe-ren \)] [\( renhe-ren \)] [\( renhe-ren \)]. You can meet anyone.

b’. *\( dou/O_{dou} \) [\( renhe-ren \)]. You can meet anyone.

If a \( renhe \)-phrase appears in or can be overtly raised to a pre-verbal position, the sub-alternatives of a \( renhe \)-sentence can be exhaustified by the overt particle \( dou \), which therefore blocks the use of a covert \( O_{dou} \)-operator, as seen in (59a). In contrast, when an exhaustification operation cannot be done by \( dou \) due to other syntactic constraints (such as that \( dou \) in general cannot be associated with an item appearing on its right side), a covert pre-exhaustification exhaustifier would be feasible, as seen in (59b). In one word, since \( dou \) is Mandarin-particular, the covert \( O_{dou} \) cannot be used whenever the overt \( dou \) can be used.

5.2.4. Modal obviation of licensing pre-verbal FC-disjunctions

In the realm of exhaustification theories, representative explanations of modal obviation include Dayal (2009), Menéndez-Benito (2010), Chierchia (2013), and Dayal (2013). I will first show that the former three analyses do not extend to disjunctions, because they involve assumptions incompatible with the semantics of disjunctions. Next, I will introduce the Variability Constraint (Dayal 2013) and adapt it to a compositional analysis.

Dayal (2009) proposes a Fluctuation Constraint: in an \( any \)-sentence of the form \( [any \ \text{NP} \ \text{VP}] \), the intersection of the restriction (i.e., \( \text{NP} \)) and the scope (i.e., \( \text{VP} \)) which verifies the sentence should not be constant across the accessible worlds. This analysis defines pre-verbal \( any \) a \( \forall \)-quantifier and

\[\begin{align*}
(\text{i}) \quad \text{a. } & \text{dou}(\Diamond p \lor \Diamond q) = (\Diamond p \lor \Diamond q) \land \neg \Diamond \Diamond p \land \neg \Diamond \Diamond q = \Diamond p \land \Diamond q \\
& \text{For pre-verbal FCI} \\
\text{b. } & \text{O}_{dou}(\Diamond (p \lor q)) = \Diamond (p \lor q) \land \neg \Diamond \Diamond p \land \neg \Diamond \Diamond q = \Diamond p \land \Diamond q \\
& \text{For post-verbal FCI}
\end{align*}\]
thus does not extend to disjunctions. Menéndez-Benito (2010) uses local exhaustification to explain the modal obviation effect in licensing Spanish cualquiera. Her analysis is also incompatible with the lexical meaning of the disjunctive; she defines a FCI as a simple predicate and derives the FC inference via a propositional ∀-quantifier. I will not dive into the details of these two analyses. See Chierchia (2013: section 6.6) for review.

Chierchia (2013) defines any-phrases uniformly as ∃-indefinites and derives ∀-FC inferences via an exhaustification mechanism similar to (46). His explanation of the modal obviation effect is two fold. First, he assumes that an any-phrase evokes a scalar implicature (SI). The episodic sentence (60) is ungrammatical because its SI contradicts the ∀-FC inference.

(60) *Anyone came.
   a. ⋆ Everyone came. FC inference
   b. ⋆ Not everyone came. Scalar implicature

For modalized sentences, Chierchia (2013) assumes that FC and SI are assessed with respect to different modal bases Mfc and Msi. In the presence of a possibility modal, the contradiction between FC and SI can be rescued if Msi ⊂ Mfc.19 This analysis also doesn’t extend to ∀-FC disjunctions. It relies on the interactions between FC inferences and SIs and has to assume that SIs are mandatory, but SIs of disjunctions are optional.20 As seen in (61a), a disjunctive episodic sentence doesn’t not trigger a SI if embedded in the antecedent of a conditional. Despite of the absence of SIs, in (61b), associating dou with the contained pre-verbal disjunction makes the sentence ungrammatical. In conclusion, the failure of licensing a pre-verbal FC-disjunction has nothing to do with SIs.

(61) a. Ruguo Yuehan huozhe Mali jiao-le jichu hanyu, wo jiu bu-danxin.
   If John or Mary teach-perf Intro Chinese, I then not-worry
   ‘If John or Mary (but not both) has taught Intro Chinese, I won’t be worried’
   If John or Mary dou teach-perf Intro Chinese, I then not-worry

Compared with the aforementioned three accounts, Dayal (2013) has the greatest potential to extend to Mandarin pre-verbal FC-disjunctions. This account assumes FCI to be lexically existential and doesn’t require SIs, which are compatible with the semantics of disjunctions. For modal obviation, Dayal (2013) proposes a Viability Constraint: every exhaustified alternative is true with respect to a modal base made up of a subset of the accessible worlds. This constraint is unsatisfied in episodic sentences immediately since there is no modal base to start with. For modalized any-sentences, with two relevant individuals ab and a modal base M, their FC inferences and viability

19 For illustration, let the domain of anyone be \{a, b\}, the inferences would be as in (i) and (ii). If Mfc = \{w1, w2, w3\} and Msi = \{w1, w2\}, the two inferences in (i) are not contradictory — both inferences are true if φa is true only in w1 and φb is true only in w3. In contrast, the two inferences with necessity modals in (ii) are contradictory regardless of the modal containment relation. Hence, possibility modal can obviate the ungrammaticality but necessity modal cannot.

(i) Consistent if Msi ⊂ Mfc
   a. ◊Mfc φa ∧ ◊Mfc φb
   b. ¬[◊Mfc φa ∧ ◊Mfc φb]

(ii) Contradictory even if Msi ⊂ Mfc
   a. □Msi φa ∧ □Msi φb
   b. ¬[□Msi φa ∧ □Msi φb]

20 In Xiang (2016b), I provided another analysis of modal obviation. This analysis also attributes the obviation effect to a syncategorematic treatment of SIs in modalized contexts and problematically requires mandatory SIs.
conditions are schematized as in (62). The two conditions for the \( \Diamond \)-sentence (62a) are consistent. For example, both formulas are true if \( M = \{ w_1, w_2, w_3 \} \) and \( f = \{ \langle w_1, \{ a \} \rangle, \langle w_2, \{ b \} \rangle, \langle w_3, \{ a, b \} \rangle \} \). (The pair \( \langle w_1, \{ a \} \rangle \) is read as ‘only a comes in \( w_1 \)’.) In contrast, the two conditions for the \( \Box \)-sentence (62b) are contradictory: for any modal \( M \) such that \( \Box_M f(a) \) is true, \( \Box_M [f(b) \land \lnot f(a)] \) is false.

(62) a. Anyone can come.
   FC: \( \Diamond_M f(a) \land \Diamond_M f(b) \) \hspace{1cm} (\( f \) stands for the property \textit{came})
   Viability: \( \Diamond_M [f(a) \land \lnot f(b)] \land \Diamond_M [f(b) \land \lnot f(a)] \)

b. *Anyone must come.
   FC: \( \Box_M f(a) \land \Box_M f(b) \)
   Viability: \( \Box_M [f(a) \land \lnot f(b)] \land \Box_M [f(b) \land \lnot f(a)] \)

The Viability Constraint yields desired predictions but is quite syncategorematic. In what follows, I offer a compositional analysis that reaches similar results. I assume that the disjunctive \( \Diamond \)-sentence (54a) has the LF (63). Compared with the LF in (46a), the only new assumption is that the modal verb mandatorily embeds a covert \( O \)-exhaustifier, which checks off the [F] feature of the VP-internal trace of the pre-verbal disjunction.\(^{21}\) Composing this LF yields a FC inference.\(^{22}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
(63) \quad \text{\textsc{dou}}_C [s \text{ [John or Mary]}_D \lambda x \text{ can } [O_{C'} [\text{VP } x_{F} \text{ teach Intro Chinese }]]] \\
\quad \text{a. } C' = \text{F-Alt(VP)} = \{ \phi_x \mid x \in D_c \} \quad [\phi_x \text{ stands for } x \text{ \textit{teach Intro Chinese}}] \\
\quad \text{b. } [S] = \Diamond_{O''} \phi_m \lor \Diamond_{O''} \phi_j \\
\quad \text{c. } C = \text{D-Alt(S)} = \{ \Diamond_{O''} \phi_m \lor \Diamond_{O''} \phi_j, \Diamond_{O''} \phi_m, \Diamond_{O''} \phi_j \} \\
\quad \text{d. } \text{\textsc{dou}}_C([S]) = [\Diamond_{O''} \phi_m \lor \Diamond_{O''} \phi_j] \land \lnot O_c \Diamond_{O''} \phi_m \land \lnot O_c \Diamond_{O''} \phi_j \\
\qquad = \Diamond_{O''} \phi_j \land \Diamond_{O''} \phi_j \\
\qquad (\text{John and Mary can each teach Intro Chinese alone.})
\end{align*}
\]

In absence of a possibility modal, locally exhaustified conjunctive inferences are contradictory. Therefore, the corresponding episodic sentence and \( \Box \)-sentence are ungrammatical.

(64) a. *\text{\textsc{dou}}_C [s \text{ [John or Mary]}_D \lambda x \text{ [O}_{C'} [\text{VP } x_{F} \text{ teach Intro Chinese }]]]
\quad \text{\textsc{dou}}_C([S]) = O_{C'} \phi_j \land O_{C'} \phi_m = \bot

\(^{21}\)This assumption was originally proposed by Xiang (2016c,a) for interpreting questions (such as \textit{where can we get gas?}) that are ambiguous between mention-some readings and mention-all readings. Since mention-some questions contain a possibility modal, and their disjunctive answers receive FC interpretations, it is not surprising that this analysis extends to the Modal Obviation effect in the licensing of \( \forall \)-FCIs.

\(^{22}\)Chierchia (2013: section 6.6.1) argues that locally exhaustified FC inference is too strong. This argument was first made against the local exhaustification approach by Menéndez-Benito (2010) but also extends to Dayal (2013) and the presented analysis. For example, composed with a local exhaustifier, the first clause of (i) means \( \Diamond \Diamond \phi_d \land \Diamond \Diamond \phi_b \land \Diamond \Diamond \phi_c \) (\( \phi_x \) stands for ‘you invite x’), which requires the possibility of inviting exactly one person and contradicts the second clause. This problem extends to other pre-verbal \( \forall \)-FCIs.

\( (i) \) [Andi Bili huo Xindi] ni dou keyi qing, dan ni bixu qing qizhong zhishao liang-ge-ren.
   Andy Billy or Cindy you dou can invite, but you must invite among at-least two-ci-person
   ‘You can invite Andy, Billy, or Cindy. But you must invite at least two of them.’

Anna Szabolcsi (pers. comm.) points out a related challenge. Consider the following sentence:

\( (i) \) Any student can sit next to another student.

The relation \textit{sit next to} is symmetric: student \( x \) sits next to student \( y \) iff \( y \) sits next to \( x \). As such, any exhaustified sentence of the form ‘\( O [x_F \text{ sits next to a student}]’ is a contradiction. I leave this issue open.
b. * dou\textsubscript{C} [S [John or Mary] \lambda x \text{must} [O\textsubscript{C'} [VP x \text{teach Intro Chinese }] ]]
\text{dou\textsubscript{C}([S])} = \Box O\textsubscript{C'} \phi_j \land \Box O\textsubscript{C'} \phi_m = \bot

5.3. Deriving the scalar operator use

There are two cases where \textit{dou} functions as a scalar operator. One is in a [\textit{lian} ...\textit{dou}] construction, where \textit{dou} is associated with the preceding \textit{lian}-Foc and evokes an \textit{even}-like inference. The other case is where \textit{dou} is associated with an in-situ scalar item. This section starts with the semantics of English \textit{even} (section 5.3.1), and then derives the \textit{even}-like reading of \textit{dou} in the [\textit{lian} Foc \textit{dou} ...] construction based on the proposed semantics of \textit{dou} (section 5.3.2). Section 5.3.3 explains the minimizer-licensing effect of the [\textit{lian} Min \textit{dou} ...] construction. Section 5.3.4 extends to cases where \textit{dou} is associated with an in-situ scalar item.

5.3.1. The semantics of \textit{even}

The English particle \textit{even} is sensitive to focus. As seen in (65), associating \textit{even} with different focus yields different scalar comparative inferences.

(65) a. Mary \textit{even} introduced BILL\textsubscript{F} to Sue.
\text{~~} Compared with Mary introducing (some of) the others to Sue, it is unlikely/surprising that she introduced Bill to Sue.

b. Mary \textit{even} introduced Bill to SUE\textsubscript{F}.
\text{~~} Compared with Mary introducing Bill to (some of) the others, it is unlikely/surprising that she introduced Bill to Sue.

Due to the Focus Condition, the domain of \textit{even} is a subset of F-alternatives of the prejacent clause: \([\textit{even}\textsubscript{C}(S)]) is defined only if \(C \subseteq \text{F-Alt}(S)\). However, unlike the case of \textit{only}, excludability for the scalar exclusive particle \textit{even} is defined based on likelihood, not logical strength.

\textit{Even} is standardly defined as a F-sensitive operator with a vacuous assertion and a scalar presupposition. But there are dissenting views on the quantificational force of the scalar presupposition. \textit{Karttunen and Peters} (1979) assumes that this presupposition is \textbf{universal}: it requires that the propositional argument of \textit{even} is the less likely than all of its contextually relevant F-alternatives.

(66) \textbf{Semantics of even} (Karttunen and Peters 1979)
\[ \textit{[even}\textsubscript{C}] = \lambda p \lambda w : \forall q \in C[p \neq q \rightarrow q >\text{likely} p], p(w) = 1 \]
(For any proposition \(p\): \([\textit{even}](p)\) is defined only if \(p\) is less likely than all of its contextually relevant F-alternatives that are not identical to it; when defined, \([\textit{even}](p) = p\).)

In contrast, \textit{Bennett} (1982) and \textit{Kay} (1990) argue that a universal scalar presupposition is too strong and thus define an \textbf{existential} scalar presupposition: \textit{even} presupposes that its propositional argument is less likely than \textbf{at least one} of its contextually relevant F-alternatives.

(67) \textbf{Semantics of even} (Bennett 1982; Kay 1990)
\[ \textit{[even}\textsubscript{C}] = \lambda p \lambda w : \exists q \in C[q >\text{likely} p], p(w) = 1 \]
(For any proposition \(p\): \([\textit{even}](p)\) is defined only if \(p\) is less likely than at least one of its contextually relevant F-alternatives; when defined, \([\textit{even}](p) = p\).)
As the following sentences show, taken from Kay (1990), *even*-sentences can describe non-extreme cases. For example, (68a) is felicitous although the prejacent ”Mary made it to the SEMI-finals” is less extreme than that Mary made it to the finals.

(68) a. Not only did Mary win her first round match, she *even* made it to the SEMI-finals.
   b. The administration was so bewildered that they *even* had [lieutenant colonels] making policy decisions.

One way to restore the universal scalar presupposition is to assume that the most extreme case, that Mary made it to the finals, is not included in the alternative set used by *even* (Lahiri 2008; Greenberg 2016, 2019). Moreover, Greenberg argues against the existential scalar presupposition with examples like (69): *even* cannot be used in a non-extreme case once the extreme case has been made explicitly in the context.

(69) (Harry, John and Bill participated in the sports competition.) Harry made it to the finals, John won his first round match, and Bill (? ?*even*) made it to the SEMI-finals.

Contra Greenberg (2016, 2019), I argue that the oddness of *even* in (69) isn’t due to a failure of satisfying the scalar presupposition of *even*. Instead, it is due to the oddness of not using *even* when the option of using *even* is clearly available: a conjunction of the form “*S*₁ and *even*-*S*₂” implicates that *even*-*S*₁ is infelicitous (or more precisely, that the evaluative scalar presupposition, that *S*₁ is unlikely, is false). In consequence, if *even* is used for a less extreme case, it should also be used for the more extreme case(s). Consider, in contrast to (69), *even* felicitously appears in the *semi-finals*-clause in (70) as it also appears in the *finals*-clause.

(70) [— Harry, John and Bill participated in the sports competition. I heard that Harry won his first round. How exciting! — Well,] not only that Harry won his first round, John *even* made it to the finals, and Bill also *even* made it to the semi-finals!

The above condition of *even*-clauses can be descriptively generalized as follows:

(71) **Condition of coordinating clauses with evaluatives**
For an evaluative expression *δ*, a coordination with clauses \{ *p, *δ*(q) \} is felicitous only if the evaluative inference of *δ*(p) is false.

Consider the evaluative word *surprising(ly)* for illustration of this condition. As shown in (72a-b), in a conjunction, modifying one conjunct with *surprising(ly)* but not the other implicates that the conjunct without *surprising(ly)* is not/less surprising.

(72) a. Harry made it to the finals, and Bill (also) made it to the semi-finals.
   \(\not\Rightarrow\) *It is not/less surprising that Harry made it to the finals.*
   b. Harry made it to the finals, and *surprisingly*, Bill (also) made it to the semi-finals.
   \(\Rightarrow\) *It is not/less surprising that Harry made it to the finals.*

The condition (71) also extends to exclusive scalar particles like *only* and *just*, which are considered to be pragmatic antonyms of *even* (Klinedinst 2005; Zeevat 2009; Beaver and Clark 2009; Alxatib 2013; contra Greenberg 2019). In (73), using *just* triggers an evaluative inference that the speaker
considers the said price cheap. It is odd to use only for a higher price while not using it for a lower price, as in (73a), compare with (73b).

(73) [— How much are these shoes? — Well, ...]
   a. ... this pair is $40, and that pair is (#only) $50.
   b. ... this pair is only $40, and that pair is (only) $50.

In conclusion, the infelicity of (69) is not due to the failure of the scalar presupposition of even. The rest of the paper adopts the view of Bennett (1982) and Kay (1990) and assumes an existential scalar presupposition for even.

5.3.2. Deriving the even-like inference

The [[lian] Foc dou ...] construction has an even-like reading. I assume a toy surface structure as in (74). Details of tense and aspect are ignored. In this structure, dou serves as a VP-adjunct, and lian is a focus marker which takes the focused or focus-containing phrase as its complement. To check off the [+EPP] feature of dou, lian together with the focused phrase (or the focus-containing phrase) moves to the spec of FP.

(74) Lian [LINGDUI] F dou chidao -le.
    lian team-leader dou late -PERF
    ‘Even the team leader was late.’

When dou is associated with lian-FocP, the measurement used for ordering alternatives gets shifted from logical strength to likelihood. This shift brings changes to both the meaning of sub-alternatives as well as the exhaustifier encoded within the lexicon of dou used for pre-exhaustification. First, a proposition that is logically weaker is usually more likely to be true,23 and thus sub-alternatives of the prejacent propositional argument of dou are the alternatives that are more likely than this prejacent proposition. Second, the pre-exhaustification effect of dou is realized by

\[ \Pr(q) = \Pr(p \cup (q - p)) = \Pr(p) + \Pr(q - p) \leq \Pr(p) \]

The above computation shows that a weaker proposition \( q \) and the stronger proposition \( p \) are equally likely if their difference \( q - p \) is assigned with zero-possibility, which amounts to saying that \( p \) and \( q \) are contextually equivalent.

(i) Two propositions \( p \) and \( q \) are contextually equivalent with respect to context \( c \) iff \( \forall w \in c \rightarrow p(w) = q(w) \).

For the purpose of this paper, we can ignore this special case by strengthening the non-vacuity presupposition as follows: “dou\text{C}(S)” is defined only if \( S \) has a sub-alternative in \( C \) and that this sub-alternative is not contextually equivalent to \( S \). I thank Benjamin Spector and Manuel Križ for discussions. All errors are mine.
the scalar exhaustifier just (not the O-exhaustifier). Analogous to the O-exhaustifier, just affirms the prejacent and states a scalar exhaustivity condition that no true alternative is more likely.

(75) **Subalternatives as more likely alternatives (By likelihood)**

$$\text{SUB}(p, C) = \{q \mid q \in C \land q > \text{likely } p\}$$

(76) **just**

$$\text{just}(q) = \lambda w : q(w) = 1 \land \forall r \in C[r(w) = 1 \rightarrow q \leq \text{likely } r]$$

(\text{q is true, and q is the least likely proposition among its true alternatives in C.})

The above two changes adapt the definition of **dou** to (77). Compared with the default lexical entry in (48), the only parameter gets changed is the semantics of subalternatives, or more specifically, the measurement of ordering alternatives.

(77) **Semantics of dou** (in the [lian Foc dou ...] construction)

$$\text{dou}(p) = \lambda p : \exists q \in \text{SUB}(p, C).p(w) = 1 \land \forall q \in \text{SUB}(p, C)\text{[just}(q)(w) = 0]$$

where $$\text{SUB}(p, C) = \{q \mid q \in C \land q > \text{likely } p\}$$

(For any proposition p: **[dou]**(p) is defined only if p has at least one sub-alternative in C. When defined, **[dou]**(p) means ‘p, and for any sub-alternative q in C, not just q.’)

The assertion of **dou** can be further simplified. The anti-exhaustification condition provided by the not just-clause (underlined in (78)) that ‘every alternative that is more likely than p is more likely than some true alternative of p,’ is asymmetrically entailed by the rest asserted part that ‘p is true.’

[Proof: Whenever p is true, then any alternative of p that is more likely than p is less likely than some true alternative r, where r = p. End of proof.] Hence, the asserted component of **dou** simply affirms its propositional argument, or equivalently, is vacuous. Finally, we get a **dou** semantically equivalent to even: the non-vacuity presupposition of **dou** is equivalent to the existential scalar presupposition of even, and the assertion is vacuous.

(78) **[dou]**

$$\begin{align*}
\text{dou}(p) &= \lambda p : \exists q \in \text{SUB}(p, C).p(w) = 1 \land \forall q \in \text{SUB}(p, C)\text{[just}(q)(w) = 0] \\
&= \lambda p : \exists q \in \text{SUB}(p, C).p(w) = 1 \land \forall q \in \text{SUB}(p, C)\exists r \in C[r(w) = 1 \land q > \text{likely } r] \\
&= \lambda p : \exists q \in C[q > \text{likely } p].p(w) = 1 \land \forall q \in C[q > \text{likely } p \rightarrow \exists r \in C[r(w) = 1 \land q > \text{likely } r]] \\
&= \lambda p : \exists q \in C[q > \text{likely } p].r(w) = 1 \\
(\text{For any proposition } p: \text{[dou]}(p) \text{ is defined only if } p \text{ is less likely than at least one of its contextually relevant alternatives; when defined, } \text{[dou]}(p) = p.) \\
&= \text{[even]}(p)
\end{align*}$$

Thus, it is plausible to say that the even-like interpretation of the [lian Foc dou ...] construction comes from the non-vacuity presupposition of **dou** (Portner 2002, Shyu 2004, Paris 1998, Liao 2011,

---

24The O-to-just change is a logical consequence of defining subalternatives as more likely alternatives:

(i) $O_C(q) = \lambda w : q(w) = 1 \land \forall r \in ((C - \text{Sub}(q, C)) - \{q\})[r(w) = 0] \\
= \lambda w : q(w) = 1 \land \forall r \in ((C - \{r' \mid r' \in C , r' > \text{likely } q\}) - \{q\})[r(w) = 0] \\
= \lambda w : q(w) = 1 \land \forall r \in C[r < \text{likely } q \rightarrow r(w) = 0] \\
= \lambda w : q(w) = 1 \land \forall r \in C[r(w) = 1 \rightarrow q \leq \text{likely } r] \\
= \text{just}_C(q)$
Liu 2016c), while that the particle lian is simply a focus marker and is present just for syntactic purposes. I define lian as follows: it asserts the meaning of its argument, and presupposes that this argument is focused. Following Rooth (1985, 1992, 1996), we say that a focused or focus-containing expression α has at least one F-alternative distinct from itself.

\[ \text{lian}(α) \] = \[ α \], defined only if \{ \[ α \] \} ⊂ F-Alt(α).

5.3.3. Minimizer-licensing

Minimizers (including also emphatic weak scalar items such as YI-ge ren ‘ONE person’) can occur at the focal position in the [lian Foc dou...] construction. Usually, to license a minimizer, a post-dou negation must be present, as exemplified in (80). But, there are also cases where the post-dou negation is optional, as seen in (81).

(80) Yuehan (lian) [YI-ge ren]F dou *(bu) renshi.
John LIAN one-CL person DOU NEG know
‘John doesn’t know anyone.’

(81) Yuehan (lian) [YI-fen qian]F dou (bu) yao.
John LIAN one-cent money DOU NEG request
Without negation: ‘John doesn’t even want one cent.’ (≈ ‘John doesn’t want any money.’)
With negation: ‘John wants it even if it is just one cent.’ (≈ ‘John wants any amount of money, however small amount it is.’)

Minimizers must occur under a non-upward-entailing (i.e., downward-entailing or non-monotonic) operator. An operator is upward-entailing if it preserves the entailment pattern of its argument, downward-entailing if it reverses this pattern, and non-monotonic if it does neither. For instance, the entailment from Li is a syntactician to Li is a linguist is preserved in the modalized sentences (82a) and reversed in the negative sentences (82b). We thus say that might is upward-entailing while not is downward-entailing. In comparison, neither direction of entailment holds in the bi-conditional sentences (82c), which suggests that iff is non-monotonic in its second argument.

(82) a. Upward-entailing b. Downward-entailing c. Non-monotonic
Li might be a linguist. Li isn’t a linguist. I’ll invite Li iff she is a linguist.
Li might be a semanticist. Li isn’t a syntactician. I’ll invite Li iff she is a syntactician.

In what follows, I will show that the distributional pattern of Mandarin minimizers in [lian MIN dou...] constructions mirrors the distributional pattern of English minimizers and emphatic weak scalar items in even-sentences. Next, I extend Crnič (2011, 2014)’s analysis of minimizer-licensing in English even-sentences to minimizer-licensing in Mandarin [lian ... dou ...] constructions.

I. Minimizer-licensing in even-sentences: scalar presupposition + operator movement

In English, a minimizer (such as a canonical minimizer like lift a finger or an emphatic weak scalar item like ONE video) can appear under the scope of even only if the propositional complement of even is downward-entailing or non-monotonic with respect to this minimizer (Crnič 2011, 2014). Consider
the distribution of the emphatic weak scalar item ONE video in even-sentences for illustration. It is licensed only if the even-sentence involves a downward-entailing operator such as negation n’t, as in (83b), or a non-monotonic predicate such as the desire predicate hope, as in (83c).

(83) a. *John made even ONE video.
    b. John didn’t make even ONE video.
    c. I hope to someday make even ONE video of that quality.

Crnič (2011, 2014) argues that the distribution of minimizers in even-sentences is a consequence of the scalar presupposition of even. For his analysis, it doesn’t matter whether the scalar presupposition is universal or existential. I present his idea with an existential scalar presupposition. Further, Crnič bridges logical strength and likelihood via the following principle (see also footnote 23):

(84) **Entailment and Scalarity** (Crnič 2011: 15)

If \( p \subseteq q \), then \( p \leq_{\text{likely}} q \).

(If a proposition \( p \) entails a proposition \( q \), then \( p \) is at most as likely as \( q \).)

Conversely, if \( p >_{\text{likely}} q \), then \( p \nsubseteq q \). Therefore, to satisfy an existential scalar presupposition, the propositional prejacent of even must have an alternative that does not entail the prejacent. This requirement immediately predicts the ungrammaticality of (83a). With a focus-mark on the weak scalar item ONE, alternatives in the domain of even are formed by replacing ONE with other positive integers: \( C = \{ \text{John made } n \text{ videos} : n \in \mathbb{N}^+ \} \). Hence, the existential scalar presupposition of even requires the prejacent proposition to be more likely than, and thus not entailed by, at least one of the alternatives in \( C \). Nevertheless, because the prejacent is entailed by all the alternatives in \( C \), this requirement cannot be satisfied, leaving the use of even infelicitous and the minimizer unlicensed.

(85) *John made even ONE video.
    a. Even \( C \) [John made one\(_F\) video ]
    b. For any \( n \) s.t. \( n > 1 \): John made 1 video \( \supset \) John made \( n \) videos

As for the grammatical cases in (83b-c), Crnič proposes that the LFs of these sentences involve covert movement of even. This movement does not leave a trace, but it makes even take wide scope. When even is associated with a minimizer across a downward-entailing operator (e.g., not) as in (86a), the prejacent is logically stronger than all the other alternatives. When even is associated with a minimizer across a non-monotonic operator such as the desire predicate hope (Heim 1992) as in (87a), the prejacent is logically independent from other alternatives. In both cases, with proper contexts, the prejacent of even can be less likely than (at least) some of the alternatives in \( C \).

(86) John didn’t make even ONE video.
    a. Even \( C \) [\( \text{DE not} \) [even \( C \) [John made one\(_F\) video ]]]
    b. For any \( n \) s.t. \( n > 1 \): not [John made 1 video] \( \subset \) not [John made \( n \) videos]

(87) I hope to someday make even ONE video of that quality.
    a. Even \( C \) [\( \text{NM I hope to} \) [even \( C \) [someday make one\(_F\) video of that quality]]]
    b. For any \( n \) s.t. \( n > 1 \): I hope to [...] make 1 video [...] \( \not\supset \) I hope to [...] make \( n \) videos [...]  
I hope to [...] make 1 video [...] \( \not\supset \) I hope to [...] make \( n \) videos [...]

30
II. Minimizer-licensing in [lian ... dou] constructions: scalar presupposition + F-reconstruction

Similar to the minimizer-licensing condition in English even-sentences, in Mandarin, the minimizer in a [lian MIN dou ...] construction is licensed iff the prejacent clause of dou is downward-entailing or non-monotonic with respect to this minimizer. Briefly, the post-dou negation bu in (80) provides a downward-entailing environment, while the desire predicate yao ‘want’ in (81) provides a non-monotonic environment.

Since the Mandarin particle dou in a [lian ... dou ...] construction is semantically identical to English even, we can easily extend Crnič’s analysis of minimizer-licensing in English even-sentences to minimizer-licensing in Mandarin [lian ... dou ...] constructions. Briefly, the minimizer-licensing condition is a logical consequence of the non-vacuity presupposition of dou, which requires the propositional argument of dou to be less likely than some of the alternatives, and hence not to be weakest proposition among the alternatives. The only difference between my treatment of dou and Crnič’s of even is the following: while Crnič assumes an operator movement of even over a non-upward-entailing operator, I assume that the minimizer undergoes reconstruction and gets interpreted below the non-upward-entailing operator.

In (80), repeated below, the non-vacuity presupposition of dou forces the minimizer YI-ge ren ‘one person’ to take reconstruction and get interpreted below negation. Hence, without negation or if the minimizer scopes above negation, the propositional argument of dou would be logically the weakest among its alternatives, leaving the presupposition of dou unsatisfied.

(88) Yuehan (lian) [YI_F-ge ren] dou *(bu) renshi.
    John    LIAN one-cl person DOU NEG know
    ‘John doesn’t even know ONE person.’

a. * Dou [UE [lian (one_F person)]], NOT [John knows ti_i] MIN > NEG
   for any n > 1: ∃1x¬[know(j, x)] ⊃ ∃nx¬[know(j, x)]

b. Dou [DE NOT [John knows lian (one_F person)]] NEG > MIN
   for any n > 1: ¬∃1x[know(j, x)] ⊂ ¬∃nx[know(j, x)]

The F-reconstruction analysis is supported by the ungrammaticality of (89): a minimizer cannot be licensed if it cannot be reconstructed to a position below negation (or other non-upward-entailing operator). In (89), the minimizer YI-ge ren ‘one person’ serves as the subject, whose surface position and reconstructed position are both higher than negation bu, and hence the ungrammaticality of (89) cannot be salvaged by reconstruction.25

(89) *(Lian) [YI_F-ge ren] dou bu renshi Yuehan.
    LIAN one-cl person DOU NEG know John.

Intended: ‘No one knows John.’

25Mandarin is highly isomorphic. It doesn’t allow scope inversion (for subjects at least). For example:

(i) a. Mei-ge-ren dou mei lai.
   every-cl-person DOU NEG come
   (ok every ≫ neg, # neg ≫ every)

b. You yi-ge-ren mei lai.
   exist one-cl-person NEG come
   (ok some ≫ neg, # neg ≫ some)
The optional presence of a post-\textit{dou} negation in (81) can also be accounted for in the same way. The desire predicate \textit{yao} ‘want (to have)’ is a non-monotonic operator (after Heim 1992). Hence, when the minimizer \textit{YI-fen qian} ‘one cent’ takes scope below \textit{yao}, as in (90b), the alternatives of the propositional argument of \textit{dou} are semantically independent from each other. In a context such as that John is unlikely to be interested in a small amount of money, the prejacent \textit{John wants to have one cent} would be less likely than alternatives such as \textit{John wants to have two cents}. Therefore, the non-vacuity presupposition of \textit{dou} can be satisfied even without the presence of post-\textit{dou} negation.

\begin{align*}
(90) \hspace{1em} a. \hspace{1em} \text{Yuehan (lian) [YI-fen}_F \text{ qian]} \hspace{0.5em} \text{dou} \hspace{0.5em} \text{yao.} \hspace{3em} \text{(Intended: John wants any money, however little money it is.)}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
(90) \hspace{1em} b. \hspace{1em} \text{Dou [ John, wants}_{NM} \hspace{0.5em} \text{[lian one-cent}_F \text{ λ} \text{x} \hspace{0.5em} \text{[e; has x]]]}
\end{align*}

5.3.4. Association with a scalar item

Associating \textit{dou} with an in-situ scalar item implies that the prejacent proposition ranks relatively high with respect to some contextually relevant measurement. A simple way of thought would be to order the alternatives based on the contextually relevant measurement, and to define the sub-alternatives as the ones that rank lower than the prejacent proposition with respect to this measurement.\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{align*}
(91) \hspace{1em} \text{Sub-alternatives as lower ranked alternatives (by contextually relevant measurement)}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Sub}(p, C) = \{ q \mid q <_\mu p, q \in C \}
\end{align*}

(The set of contextually relevant alternatives of \textit{p} that rank lower than \textit{p} w.r.t. \textit{\mu})

In (92), repeated from (9), sub-alternatives are propositions that rank lower than the prejacent in chronological order. The sentence means that it’s 5 o’clock, not just 4 o’clock, not just 3 o’clock, ....

\begin{align*}
(92) \hspace{1em} \text{Dou [WU}_F\text{-dian]} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-asp.}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{dou five-o’clock} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-asp.}
\end{align*}

‘It is \textit{dou} [FIVE] o’clock.’ \textit{\Rightarrow} \textit{It’s too late.}

\begin{align*}
(92) \hspace{1em} a. \hspace{1em} C = \{ \text{it’s n o’clock} \mid n \in \mathbb{N}, 0 \leq n \leq 24 \}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
(92) \hspace{1em} b. \hspace{1em} \text{Sub(it’s five o’clock, C)} = \{ \text{it’s 4 o’clock, it’s 3 o’clock, ...} \}
\end{align*}

To satisfy the non-vacuity presupposition of \textit{dou}, the prejacent scalar clause needs to be relatively strong among its \textit{\sigma}-alternatives. For example, in (93), \textit{dou} can be associated with ‘twice’ but not with ‘once’.

\begin{align*}
(93) \hspace{1em} \text{Ta \hspace{0.5em} dou \hspace{0.5em} yijing \hspace{0.5em} \text{la} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-guo zher [LIANG/*YI}_F\text{-ci]} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-asp.}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{he \hspace{0.5em} dou \hspace{0.5em} already \hspace{0.5em} come \hspace{0.5em} \text{-exp} \hspace{0.5em} \text{here two/one-time} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-asp.}
\end{align*}

‘He has already been here twice/*once.’

\textsuperscript{26}See Greenberg (2018, 2019) for a refined analysis of English \textit{even} that makes use of general gradability instead of likelihood. Her analysis also extends to the Mandarin particle \textit{dou}. 

32
6. Sorting the parameters

In sum, I have defined *dou* uniformly an exhaustifier that negates pre-exhaustified sub-alternatives, as repeated from (33). This semantics derives the three uses of *dou*. For the distributor use and the scalar marker use, the non-vacuity presupposition is responsible for all the observed semantic effects, while the anti-exhaustivity inference collapses under the prejacent inference. For the FC-licenser use, the non-vacuity presupposition is trivially satisfied, while the prejacent inference together with anti-exhaustivity inference yields the FC inference.

\[
[dou_C] = \lambda p \lambda w : \exists q \in \text{Sub}(p, C) . p(w) = 1 \wedge \forall q \in \text{Sub}(p, C) [O_C(q)(w) = 0]
\]

I’ve also shown that the function alternations of *dou* comes from the meaning variation of sub-alternatives. Among the four variants for the definition of sub-alternatives summarized in Table 1, the first two are based on logical strength, varying with respect to the type of excludability (regular excludability or innocent excludability), the third is based on likelihood, and the last is based on a contextually determined scale. This section considers only the first three variants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition of sub-alternatives</th>
<th>Function of <em>dou</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Def (a) Alternatives that are weaker than the prejacent</td>
<td>Distributor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def (b) Alternatives that are <strong>not I-excludable</strong></td>
<td>∇-FCI-licenser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def (c) Alternatives that are more likely than the prejacent</td>
<td>Even</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def (d) Alternatives ranked lower than the prejacent w.r.t. a relevant measurement</td>
<td>Scalar marker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Definitions of sub-alternatives and the corresponding functions of *dou*

Here arise two non-trivial questions: how are these variants related, and which variant is primary? I argue that Def (a) is primary, while that Def (b-c) are derived from (a) by two independent semantic weakening operations, as illustrated in Figure 1.

(a) Weaker/Not excludable

(b) Not I-excludable

(c) More likely

Figure 1: Development path for sub-alternatives

In particular, Def (b) is derived from (a) by weakening unexcludability to un-I-excludability: any non-excludable alternative is also not I-excludable, while not all excludable alternatives are I-excludable. Def (c) is derived from (a) by shifting from logical strength to likelihood: in general, a weaker alternative is less likely. (See footnote 23.) As seen in section 5.3.3, in consequence, the non-vacuity presupposition gets weakened from requiring the existence of a weaker alternative to requiring the existence of a non-entailing alternative, which can be either weaker or logically independent.
The proposed derivational path for sub-alternatives yields two predictions. First, the distributor use of *dou* is primary, while the other two uses are derived, as illustrated in Figure 2. This prediction is supported by diachronic evidence: the two derived uses emerged much later than the primary use. In particular, the distributor use of *dou* emerged as early as the Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220AC) (Gu 2015), while so far there is no reliable evidence to show that *dou* could function as an *even*-like scalar additive operator or a FCI-licenser before the Ming Dynasty.

Second, the likelihood-based semantics of *dou* (i.e., the semantics based on Def (a) of sub-alternatives) is marked and can be less widely used than the logical strength-based semantics (i.e., the semantics based on Def (c) of sub-alternatives). More concretely, the logical strength-based semantics of *dou* is default and should be widely available, while the likelihood-based one is derived and should be marked with further syntactic or prosodic operations.\(^{27}\) This prediction is supported by the synchronic distribution of *dou* in basic declaratives and in [(lian) ... *dou* ...] constructions. The following table summarizes this distribution, broken up into three cases by the logical strength of the prejacent proposition of *dou* relative to its alternatives. The critical case is Case C, where the prejacent of *dou* is neither stronger than any alternative nor is the weakest alternative. In this case, *dou* can be used in a [lian...dou...] construction but not in a basic declarative. This distribution gap shows that the distributor use of *dou* doesn’t come from the likelihood-based semantics, and that the likelihood-based semantics is not the default semantics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If the prejacent of <em>dou</em> is ...</th>
<th>Can the non-vacuity presupposition of <em>dou</em> be satisfied in ...</th>
<th>... basic declaratives?</th>
<th>... [(lian) ... <em>dou</em> ...] constructions?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. stronger than some alternative(s)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. the weakest alternative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. neither</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Distribution of *dou* in declaratives and [(lian) ... *dou* ...] constructions

In what follows, I go through the three cases one by one. Keep in mind that *dou* presupposes the existence of a weaker alternative under the logical strength-based semantics, and the existence of a more likely alternative under the likelihood-based semantics.

**Case A:** When the prejacent of *dou* is logically stronger than one or more of its alternatives, the non-vacuity presupposition of *dou* is satisfied under both the logical strength-based and the likelihood-

\(^{27}\)For the same reason, we expect that the unexcludability-based semantics of *dou* (i.e., the one defined based on definitions (b) of sub-alternatives) is more restrictedly used than the logical strength-based one. For example, the unexcludability-based semantics is licensed only when *dou* is associated with an existential or disjunctive quantifier.
based definitions. For example, in (95a-b), compared with the prejacent \textit{John can eat up three bowls of rice}, alternatives such as \textit{John can eat up two bowls of rice} are weaker and more likely than the prejacent. The logical strength-based semantics yields the quantifier-distributor use of \textit{dou} in (95a). The likelihood-based semantics yields the \textit{even}-like use in (95b).

\begin{itemize}
\item[(95)]
\begin{enumerate}
\item Yuehan ([zhe] san-wan fan) \textbf{DOU} chi-de-wan.
  \begin{itemize}
  \item John \textit{DEM} three-bowl rice \textit{dou} eat-mod-finish
  \item \textit{John can eat up (these) three bowls of rice.}
  \end{itemize}
\item Yuehan (lian) [SAN$_F$-wan fan] \textbf{dou} chi-de-wan.
  \begin{itemize}
  \item John\textit{ LIAN three-bowl rice \textit{dou} eat-mod-finish}
  \item \textit{John can even eat up THREE bowls of rice.}
  \end{itemize}
\end{enumerate}
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Case B:} When the prejacent of \textit{dou} is logically weaker than all the other alternatives, \textit{dou} suffers a presupposition failure under both semantics. For example, as seen in (96a), \textit{dou} cannot be associated with the non-emphatic phrase \textit{‘(this) one person’} when functioning as a quantifier-distributor, because the prejacent proposition is the logically weakest alternative. Likewise, as seen in the [(lian)...\textit{dou}...] sentence (96b), in absence of a non-upward-entailing operator, \textit{dou} cannot be associated with an emphatic \textit{‘one person’} and function as an \textit{even}-like minimizer-licenser, because the prejacent proposition of \textit{dou} is the logically weakest as well as the most likely alternative.

\begin{itemize}
\item[(96)]
\begin{enumerate}
\item Yuehan ([zhe] *yi/san-ge ren) \textbf{dou} renshi.
  \begin{itemize}
  \item John this one/three-\textit{CL} person \textit{dou} know
  \item \textit{John knows all the *one/three people.}
  \end{itemize}
\item Yuehan (lian) [YIF-ge ren] \textbf{dou} *(bu) renshi.
  \begin{itemize}
  \item John\textit{ LIAN one-\textit{CL} person \textit{dou NEG know}
  \item \textit{John does*(n’t) even know ONE person.}
  \end{itemize}
\end{enumerate}
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Case C:} When the prejacent proposition is neither stronger than any alternatives nor is the weakest alternative, \textit{dou} suffers presupposition failure under the logical strength-based semantics but can be defined under the likelihood-based semantics. For example, in sentences (97a-b), the prejacent \textit{John arrived} clause cannot be weaker but can be more likely than its alternatives. The grammaticality contrast between (97a-b) shows that the likelihood-based semantics of \textit{dou}, which allows sub-alternatives to be logically independent from the prejacent, is available in the [(\textit{lian}) Foc \textit{dou}...] construction but not available in a basic declarative.

\begin{itemize}
\item[(97)]
\begin{enumerate}
\item * [Yuehan] \textbf{dou} dao-le.
  \begin{itemize}
  \item John \textit{dou} arrive-\textit{PERF}
  \item \textit{John \textit{dou} arrived.}
  \end{itemize}
\item (Lian) [YUEHAN$_F$] \textbf{dou} dao-le.
  \begin{itemize}
  \item LIAN John \textit{dou} arrive-\textit{PERF}
  \item \textit{Even \textit{JOHN$_F$ arrived.}
  \end{itemize}
\end{enumerate}
\end{itemize}

A similar argument can be drawn based on the contrast between (98a-b). Although both sentences are grammatical, the prejacent clause \textit{they bought houses} admits a collective reading in the [(\textit{lian}) Foc \textit{dou} ...] sentence (98b) but not in the basic declarative (98a). When taking a collective reading, the prejacent of \textit{dou} is logically independent from all the alternatives, but it can be more likely than

\footnote{There is a minor difference between the two examples in (95): \textit{san-wan fan ‘three bowls of rice’} receives a referential interpretation in the basic declarative (95a) but a generic interpretation in the [(\textit{lian}) ... \textit{dou} ...] sentence (95b).}
some of its alternatives in proper contexts. The unavailability of collective readings in (98a) again shows that *dou* cannot be interpreted with a likelihood-based semantics when appearing in a basic declarative.

(98)  

a. Tamen *dou* mai-le fangzi.  
They *dou* buy-perf house  
‘They *dou* bought houses.’  
(#collective, √/distributive)  

b. (Lian) [TAMEN]$_F$ *dou* mai-le fangzi.  
LIAN they *dou* buy-perf house.  
‘Even THEY bought houses.’  
(√/collective, √/distributive)  

7. Conclusions

This paper offered a uniform semantics to capture the seemingly diverse functions of the Mandarin particle *dou*, including the quantifier-distributor use, the ∀-FCI-licenser use, and the scalar use. I define *dou* as a special exhaustifier that operates on sub-alternatives and has a pre-exhaustification effect: *dou* presupposes the existence of at least one sub-alternative, asserts the truth of the prejacent and the negation of each pre-exhaustified sub-alternative.

The semantics of *dou* exhibits minimal alternations caused by semantic weakenings on the definition of sub-alternatives, giving rise to different uses. By default, sub-alternatives are the alternatives that are weaker than the prejacent, or equivalently, the ones that are not excludable and distinct from the prejacent. Under this definition of sub-alternatives, *dou* obtains its primary use as a distributor. Further, with a weakening from unexcludability to un-I-excludability, *dou* gains its FCI-licenser use. Alternatively, with a weakening from logical strength to likelihood, *dou* becomes semantically equivalent to English *even* and functions as a scalar additive operator. The derivational path for the functions of *dou* is supported by both diachronic and synchronic evidence.

The anti-exhaustivity assertion of *dou* is responsible for the derivation of universal FCI inferences. The non-vacuity presupposition of *dou* explains the distributional pattern of *dou* and many of its semantic consequences, such as the requirements regarding to distributivity and plurality, the *even*-like interpretation of the [lian Foc/Min *dou* ...] construction, the distributional pattern of the post-*dou* negation in licensing minimizers, and so on.

Appendix I: Deriving FC with recursive exhaustification

Readers who are familiar with the grammatical view of exhaustifications might find that the proposed meaning of *dou* is similar to the operation of recursive exhaustification proposed by Fox (2007) or to the pre-exhaustification exhaustifier for D-alternatives by Chierchia (2013). This appendix reviews the possibility of using recursive exhaustification to derive the ∀-FCI use of a pre-verbal disjunction in Mandarin. For a detailed comparison of these three operators, especially on computing sentences with post-verbal FCIs, see Xiang (2016a: chap. 2 Appendix).

Fox’s (2007) recursive exhaustification (abbreviated as ‘$O^R$’ ) has two major characteristics. First, exhaustification negates only alternatives that are I-excludable. Second, exhaustification is applied recursively. See (99) for a concrete example for computing a $\Diamond$-sentence with a post-verbal FCI. The inner exhaustification negates the I-excludable $\sigma$-alternative (i.e., $\Diamond[p \land q]$) and F-alternatives (e.g., $\Diamond r$); the D-alternatives are not negated in this round, because they are not I-excludable. The outer
exhaustification affirms the exhaustified prejacent and negates the pre-exhaustified D-alternatives.

(99) **Recursive exhaustifications** (Fox 2007)

\[ O^R \circ [p \lor q] \]

a. The first exhaustification:

\[ O \circ [p \lor q] = \Diamond [p \lor q] \land \neg \Diamond [p \land q] \land \neg \Diamond r \]

b. The second exhaustification:

\[ O' O \circ [p \lor q] = O \circ [p \lor q] \land \neg O \circ (p) \land \neg O \circ (q) \]

\[ = [\Diamond [p \lor q] \land \neg [p \land q] \land \neg \Diamond r] \land [\Diamond p \rightarrow \Diamond q] \land [\Diamond q \rightarrow \Diamond p] \]

\[ = [\Diamond [p \lor q] \land \neg [p \land q] \land \neg \Diamond r] \land [\Diamond p \leftrightarrow \Diamond q] \]

\[ = \Diamond p \land \Diamond q \land \neg \Diamond [p \land q] \land \neg \Diamond r \]

For an easier comparison with *dou*, I formulate the semantics of \( O^R \) as in (100): \( O^R \) affirms the prejacent, negates the exhaustification of each sub-alternative, and negates the I-excl-alternatives.\(^{29}\)

(100) \[ O^R_C (p) = \lambda w : p(w) = 1 \land \forall q \in \text{Sub}(p, C)[O^R_C(q)(w) = 0] \land \forall q' \in \text{IExcl}(p, C)[q'(w) = 0] \]

where \( \text{Sub}(p, C) = (C - \text{IExcl}(p, C)) - \{p\} \)

It can be observed that \( O^R \) is stronger than the proposed meaning of *dou*: unlike \( O^R \), *dou* does not negate I-excl-alternatives and thus does not yield an exclusive inference or scalar implicature. For instance, the sentence “John or Mary *dou* can teach Intro Chinese” (English paraphrase of (6b)) does not imply that no one other than John and Mary can teach Intro Chinese. If *dou* is defined equivalent to \( O^R \), we will have to assume that all the I-excludable F-alternatives are pruned.

Two reviewers suggested an alternative analysis for the FCI-licenser use of *dou*, which attributes the derivation of FC to the application of recursive exhaustification, as summarized in the following. First, *dou* is vacuous in assertion but it presupposes that the prejacent has at least one weaker alternative, as in (101b). Second, when *dou* combines with a disjunctive sentence, since its prejacent is the weakest among its alternatives, its presupposition forces the application of recursive exhaustification, which turns the prejacent disjunction into a conjunction.

(101) John or Mary *dou* can teach Intro Chinese.

a. **LF:** \[ O^R_{dou_C} [O^R_{C'} [\exists q \in C[p \subset q], p(w) = 1] \]

b. \[ [dou_{C'}] = \lambda p : p(w) = 1 \land \forall q \in C[p \subset q], p(w) = 1 \]

c. \[ C = \text{D-Alt}(S) \]

\[ = \{\Diamond \phi_j \lor \Diamond \phi_m, \Diamond \phi_j, \Diamond \phi_m\} \]

d. \[ C' = \{O^R_C(p) | p \in \text{D-Alt}(S)\} \]

\[ = \{O^R_C[\Diamond \phi_j \lor \Diamond \phi_m], O^R_C \Diamond \phi_j, O^R_C \Diamond \phi_m\} \]

This analysis is quite appealing, but it faces two problems. First, it requires the D-alternatives of the prejacent disjunction to be used twice: once is by the recursive exhaustifier for deriving FC inference, and the other is by *dou* for fulfilling the presupposition. However, according to the grammatical view of exhaustifications, if an alternative has been used by a local operator, it will

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\(^{29}\)In particular cases, the definition for \( O^R \) in (100) yields inferences different from what Fox’s proposal would expect: if the exhaustification of a sub-alternative is still not innocently excludable, the exhaustification of this sub-alternative would not be negated by \( O^R \) under Fox’s original definition. See details in Xiang (2016a: footnote 38).
become unavailable to global operators. Second, contrary to the expected consequence of this analysis, recursive exhaustification cannot salvage the presupposition failure of *dou*. Consider the recursively exhaustified alternatives in (101d): these alternatives are derived by applying recursive exhaustification point-wise to the D-alternatives of the prejacent disjunction. The domain for recursive exhaustification, as in (101c), is also the set of D-alternatives of the prejacent disjunction.\(^{30}\) As such, although recursively exhaustifying the prejacent disjunction yields a desired FC inference, if the disjuncts are not alternatives of each other, applying the outer exhaustification yields pruned, while (103b) assumes that \(F\)-alternatives (i.e., presupposition of disjunctions do not carry a syntactic domain variable.

The main trick is that the syntactic domain variable \(\sigma\) is replaced with a subset. Hence, the following considers two possibilities: (103a) assumes that \(F\)-alternatives are pruned, while (103b) assumes that \(F\)-alternatives (i.e., \(\Diamond r\) and \(\Diamond s\)) are not pruned.

\[
\text{(103) a. } O'O\Diamond[p \lor q] = O\Diamond[p \lor q] \land \neg O\Diamond p \land \neg O\Diamond q \\
\quad = \Diamond[p \lor q] \land \neg\Diamond[p \land q] \land \neg\Diamond p \land \neg\Diamond q \\
\quad = \bot
\]

\[
\text{b. } O'O\Diamond[p \lor q] = O\Diamond[p \lor q] \land \neg O\Diamond p \land \neg O\Diamond q \\
\quad = \Diamond[p \lor q] \land \neg\Diamond[p \land q] \land \neg[p \lor \Diamond q] \land \neg[p \lor \Diamond r] \land \neg[p \lor \Diamond s] \\
\quad = \Diamond[p \lor q] \land \neg\Diamond[p \land q] \land \neg[p \lor \Diamond q] \land \neg[p \lor \Diamond r] \land \neg[p \lor \Diamond s] \\
\quad = \bot
\]

Appendix III: Comparing with Liao and Liu

Liao (2011: ch. 4) makes the first attempt to provide a uniform semantics treatment of the three uses of *dou*. Her analysis of the FCI-licenser use is too complex to be reviewed here. Hence, the following

\(^{30}\)In computing the embedded recursive exhaustification, \(F\)-alternatives must be pruned to avoid the undesired exclusive inference. Complications with \(\sigma\)-alternatives are ignored here.

\(^{31}\)Crnič (2017) provides an analysis for post-verbal FC-*any* that overcomes the mutual exclusivity problem. The main trick is that the syntactic domain variable \(D\) of *any* moves over the recursive exhaustifier, as illustrated in (i). Here, corresponding to the “*dou\(_C\)" in (101a), “Op\(_C\)” stands for a F-sensitive operator with a domain \(C\). (In Crnič’s paper, “Op\(_C\)” is a covert even with a universal scalar presupposition.) Thanks to the binding relation between \(D\) and trace \(t_3\), for each recursively exhaustified alternative, the domain of the recursive exhaustifier varies if \(g(D)\) is replaced with a subset.

\[(i) \quad \text{Op}\(_C\) [D 3 Op\(_C\) [ ... any \(t_3\) one ...]]\]

However, this analysis also requires D-alternatives to be used twice — once by the local exhaustifier, and once by the global focus-sensitive operator. Moreover, it doesn’t extend to FC disjunctions: unlike quantificational determiners, disjunctions do not carry a syntactic domain variable.
introduces only the technicalities in her proposal needed for getting the scalar additive operator use and the distributor use. Liao assumes that *dou* has no meaning per se, but that it indicates the existence of focus and is subject to syntactic dependency with a covert c-commanding E-operator, as in (104a). The meaning of this E-operator equals to what Karttunen and Peters (1979) assume for *even*: the E-operator is truth conditionally vacuous but presupposes that its prejacent is the most unlikely proposition among its alternatives.

(104) (Lian) JOHN$_F$ dou arrived.
   a. $[E_C [\text{JOHN}_F, \text{dou } t; \text{arrived }]]$
   b. $[E_C] = \lambda p \lambda w: \forall q \in C[p \neq q \rightarrow q <_{\text{likely}} p].p(w) = 1$

When *dou* applies to a distributive sentence, the scalar presupposition of the E-operator is trivially satisfied: under a distributive reading, the prejacent of *dou* entails all of its alternatives, and hence is not less likely than any of its alternatives.

Liu (2016b,c, 2018) differs from Liao (2011: ch. 4) in two respects. First, instead of placing an E-operator in the logical form, he equivocates the meaning of *dou* and *even*:

(105) **Semantics of *dou*** (Liu 2016b,c, 2018)
    $[[\text{dou}_C]] = \lambda p \lambda w: \forall q \in C[p \neq q \rightarrow p <_{\text{likely}} q].p(w) = 1$

This change is advantageous since it captures the locality of *even*-inferences. In example (106), the *even*-inference is generated within the antecedent *lian* ... *dou* clause and projects over the conditional, as in (106a). If the *even*-inference of a *dou*-sentence were from an E-operator, we would expect the possibility of placing E above the entire conditional (i.e., E [if *lian* JOHN$_F$ *dou* came, Mary will be happy]), which however yields the undesired conditional scalar inference in (106b).

(106) If *lian* JOHN$_F$ *dou* came, Mary would be happy.
   a. $\not\sim$ Compared with others, JOHN is less likely to come.
   b. $\not\sim$ Compared with others’ visits, it is more likely that JOHN’s visit would make Mary happy.

Second, based on Link-Landman’s approach of encoding distributivity/collectivity distinction (Link 1983; Landman 1996, 2012), Liu improves on the treatment of distributivity/collectivity in the derivation of alternatives. (See the problem of cover-based analysis of distributivity/collectivity in footnote 14. Details of Liu’s implementation are omitted due to the scope of this paper.) Liu’s analysis predicts the follows: when taking a distributive reading, the propositional argument of *dou* entails all of its alternatives, and hence is not less likely than any of its alternatives; when taking a collective reading, the propositional argument of *dou* and its alternatives are logically independent, forcing to order the alternatives by likelihood, yielding the *even*-like use of *dou*.

Liu’s account was developed in parallel with the proposed account, as witnessed by preliminary presentations of the two accounts (Xiang 2015, 2016b; Liu 2016a). Although both Liu’s and mine accounts use Alternative Semantics, we ended up with views contradictory with respect to which function(s) and semantics of *dou* are primary. Briefly, Liu assumes that *dou* is primarily equivalent to the likelihood-based particle *even*, and that it takes a distributor-like use when the scalar presupposition of *dou* is trivially satisfied. In contrast, my account predicts that the *even*-like use of *dou* is secondary: it is employed only when the semantics of sub-alternatives is weakened from
logical strength to likelihood. I argue that the prediction of my account is more compatible with
the asymmetric distributions of the distributor use and the even-like use of *dou* in (97) and (98).
If the likelihood-based semantics were the default semantics, *dou* should be licensed whenever
the presupposition of its likelihood-based semantics is satisfied, and hence should have the same
distribution in basic declaratives and [*lian ... dou ...*] constructions, contra fact. For example, for the
basic declarative (107) (English paraphrase of (98a)), if *they bought houses together* is contextually
more likely than *the others bought houses together*, the likelihood-based semantics of *dou* should
have been defined even if the prejacent takes a collective reading, contra fact.

(107) They *dou* bought houses. (#collective, √/distributive)

Liu so far has no published work on the FCI-licenser use of *dou*. But he suggested to me an
attempt through a private conversation, described as follows. When the prejacent proposition of
*dou* is existential or disjunctive, the plain value of this prejacent is too weak to satisfy the universal
scalar presupposition of *dou*; therefore, the prejacent of *dou* is forced to be recursively exhaustified,
giving rise to an FC interpretation. This analysis is pretty much the same as what was described in
(101) in Appendix I, except that here *dou* presupposes a universal scalar presupposition.

(108) John or Mary *dou* can teach Intro Chinese.
   a. LF: *dou*$_C$ [O$_C^R$ [John or Mary can teach Intro Chinese]]
   b. [dou$_C$] = λ$p$λ$q$: ∀$q ∈ C′[p ≠ q → p <likely q], p(w) = 1

This attempt would struggle with the same questions as faced by the recursive exhaustification
analysis reviewed in Appendix. First, it requires the D-alternatives of the prejacent disjunction to be
used twice — once by O$_R$ and once by *dou*. Second, related to the mutual exclusivity problem, this
analysis predicts an unwanted scalar inference. *Dou* quantifies over a set of recursively exhaustified
D-alternatives, the same as in (102). The scalar presupposition of *dou* is not the wanted trivially
true inference (namely, that the FC inference is less likely than both disjuncts), but rather that the
FC inference is less likely than both exhaustified disjuncts. Contra the predicted scalar inference,
one can coherently say the following: “speaking of John and Mary, it’s unlikely that only John can
teach Intro Chinese; it’s more likely that John or Mary *dou* can teach.”

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