Generative Grammar and the Faculty of Language: Insights, Questions, and Challenges

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1. Introduction

Generative Grammar (GG) is the study of linguistic capacity as a component of human cognition. Its point of departure is Descartes’ observation that “there are no men so dull-witted or stupid […] that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an utterance from them in order to make their thoughts understood; whereas there is no other animal, however perfect and well endowed it may be, that can do the same” (Discours de la méthode, 1662).

Studies in comparative cognition over the last decades vindicate Decartes’ insight: only humans appear to possess a mental grammar—an “I-language,” or internal-individual language system—that permits the composition of infinitely many meaningful expressions from a finite stock of discrete units (Hauser et al. 2002; Anderson 2004; Chomsky 2012a, 2017).

The term Universal Grammar (UG) is simply a label for this striking difference in cognitive capacity between “us and them.” As such, UG is the research topic of GG: what is it, and how did it evolve in us? While we may never find a satisfying answer to the latter question, any theory of UG seeking to address the former must meet a criterion of evolvability: any mechanisms and primitives ascribed to UG rather than derived from independent factors must plausibly have emerged in what appears to have been a unique and relatively sudden event on the evolutionary timescale (Bolhuis et al. 2014; Berwick & Chomsky 2016).

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GG’s objectives open up many avenues for interdisciplinary research into the nature of UG. Fifty years ago, Eric Lenneberg published his now-classic work that founded the study of the biology of language, sometimes called “biolinguistics” (Lenneberg 1967). In conjunction with the then-nascent generative-internalist perspective on language (Chomsky 1956[1975], 1957, 1965), this major contribution inspired a wealth of research, and much has been learned about language as a result. The techniques of psychological experimentation have become far more sophisticated in recent years, and work in neurolinguistics is beginning to connect in interesting ways with the concerns of GG (Berwick et al. 2013; Nelson et al. 2017; Friederici to appear).

Important results have emerged from the study of language acquisition, which is concerned with the interaction of UG and learning mechanisms in the development of an I-language (Yang 2002, 2016; Yang et al. in press). Work by Rosalind Thornton and others shows that children spontaneously produce expressions conforming to UG-compliant options realized in languages other than the local “target” language, without any relevant evidence; but they do not systematically produce innovative sentences that violate UG principles. This continuity between children’s seemingly imperfect knowledge and the range of variation in adult grammars suggests that children are following a developmental pathway carved out by UG, exploring the range of possible languages and ultimately converging on a steady state (for review and references, see Crain & Thornton 1998, 2012; Crain et al. 2016; for a theory of the steady state as a probability distribution over I-languages, see Yang 2016). Converging conclusions follow from the spontaneous creation of sign languages by deaf children without linguistic input (Feldman et al. 1978; Kegl. et al. 1999; Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006).

On the whole, we believe that GG has made significant progress in identifying some of the computational mechanisms distinguishing man from animal in the way recognized by Descartes. In this paper, we offer our view of the current state of the field, highlighting some of its central achievements and some of the many remaining challenges, in the hope of inspiring future research. Section 2 discusses the fundamental, “non-negotiable” properties of human language that any theory of UG has to account for. Section 3 focuses on core computational operations and their properties. Section 4 turns to the interfaces of I-language and systems entering into language use, and how conditions imposed by these systems constrain syntactic computation. Section 5 reviews a number of challenges emerging from recent work, which call for resolution under minimalist desiderata. Section 6 concludes.
2. Basic Properties of I-language

A traditional characterization of language, going back to Aristotle, defines it as “sound with meaning.” Building on this definition, we can conceive of an I-language as a system that links meaning and sound/sign in a systematic fashion, equipping the speaker with knowledge of these correlations. What kind of system is an I-language? We consider two empirical properties non-negotiable, in the sense that any theory that shares GG’s goal of providing an explanatory model of human linguistic capacity must provide formal means of capturing them: discrete infinity and displacement. Atomic units—lexical items, whose nature remains the subject of much debate—are assembled into syntactic objects, and such objects can occupy more than one position within a larger structure. The first property is the technical statement of the traditional observation that “there is no longest sentence,” the informal notion “sentence” now abandoned in favor of hierarchically structured objects. The second property is illustrated by a plethora of facts across the world’s languages. To pick one random illustration, consider the familiar active/passive alternation:

\[(1) \ a. \ \text{Sensei-ga \ John-o \ sikar-ta.} \quad \text{(Japanese)}
\]

\[\begin{array}{ll}
\text{teacher-NOM} & \text{John-ACC \ scold-PST} \\
\text{‘The teacher scolded John.’}
\end{array}\]

\[b. \ \text{John-ga \ sensei-ni \ sikar-are-ta.}
\]

\[\begin{array}{ll}
\text{John-NOM \ teacher-by \ scold-PASS-PST} \\
\text{‘John was scolded by the teacher.’}
\end{array}\]

The noun phrase \textit{John} bears the same thematic relation to the verb \textit{sikar} in both (1a) and (1b), but appears sentence-initially (displaced from his base position) in the latter. On the assumption that thematic relations are established in a uniform and strictly local fashion—a guiding idea of GG since its inception—, this entails that the nominal is displaced from its original position in (1b).

\[1\text{ The latter notion is non-negotiable in its abstract sense: there can be multiple determinants of interpretation for some syntactic object. The mechanisms implementing this basic fact vary dramatically across theoretical frameworks, of course.}

\[2\text{ For a sample, see Hale & Keyser 1993, 1999; Borer 2005; Marantz 2001, 2013; Mateu 2005; Ramchand 2008; Starke 2014.}\]
To account for these elementary properties, any theory of GG must assume the existence of a computational system that constructs hierarchically structured expressions with displacement. The optimal course to follow, we think, is to assume a basic compositional operation MERGE, which applies to two objects X and Y, yielding a new one, K = \{X,Y\}. If X, Y are distinct (taken directly from the lexicon or independently assembled), K is constructed by External MERGE (EM); if Y is a term of X, by Internal MERGE (IM). If K is formed by IM, Y will occur twice in K, otherwise once; but the object generated is \{X,Y\} in either case. IM thus turns Y into a discontinuous object (or chain), which can be understood as a sequence of occurrences of Y in K. (2) illustrates for (1b) above (abstracting away from irrelevant details), where MERGE combines K and the internal NP John-ga:

(2) a. \{sensei-ni,\{sikarareta,John-ga\}\} = K \rightarrow MERGE(K,John-ga)
   b. \{John-ga,\{sensei-ni,\{sikarareta,John-ga\}\}\} = K’

MERGE, applying recursively so that any generated object is accessible to further operations,\(^3\) thus suffices in principle to model the basic properties of discrete infinity and displacement. Furthermore, it is the computationally simplest operation that implements the basic properties of an I-language, and as such a conceptually necessary, irreducible component of UG. MERGE(X,Y), yielding K = \{X,Y\}, imposes hierarchical structure (X, Y are terms of K, but not vice versa) but no order (\{X,Y\} = \{Y,X\}). Languages differ in how they ultimately linearize objects constructed by MERGE, an important research topic for the study of the interaction between core syntax and the sensorimotor systems involved in perception and articulation. In (1a) above, the VP is linearized with OV order (John-o sikarta), whereas a corresponding English VP would surface with VO order (scolded John). Interpretation is not affected by this difference, suggesting that the relevant parameter should be a matter of externalization of internally generated expressions alone (see Travis 1984 for original ideas along these lines).

\(^3\) Recursion is thus a “deep” property of the generative procedure; to what extent constructions displaying category recursion are used in some particular language (e.g., English but not German permits recursive possessors, as in Maria’s neighbor’s friend’s house) is an entirely different issue. See Arsenijević & Hinzen 2012; Chomsky 2014.
A corollary of restricting composition to MERGE is the *structure-dependence* of syntactic operations: if order is only established in the morphophonological component, no syntactic operation can make reference to it. This excludes a large class of logically possible languages as not humanly acquirable, namely languages whose rules and operations are defined in linear terms (e.g., “reverse the order of words in the sentence to yield a question”). There is evidence that hypothetical languages of this sort are indeed outside of the spectrum of variation defined by UG. Neurolinguistic studies conducted by Andrea Moro and associates suggest that invented “languages” whose rules operate over linear order are treated by speakers as a puzzle rather than linguistic data, as indicated by diffuse activity in many parts of the brain as opposed to the pattern of activity observed in ordinary language use (Musso et al. 2003). Similar results had been found in the study of a linguistically gifted but cognitively impaired subject (see section 4 below).

There are many illustrations of structure-dependence from syntax-semantics and morphophonology (Rizzi 2013a; Everaert et al. 2015). AUX-raising was used in the earliest days of GG as a straightforward illustration of the poverty of the stimulus: the fact that the input (linguistic data) vastly under-determines the I-language eventually attained. The argument then and now is that the language-learning child never entertains the hypothesis that yes/no questions are formed by moving the *linearly first* auxiliary in the clause—a hypothesis that would receive ample support from cases such as (3) and requires complex examples of the kind in (4) to be refuted. (The symbol ‘_’ marks the gap left behind by the displaced auxiliary.)

(3) Is the tall man from Italy _ happy?
(4) Is the tall man [who is from Italy] _ happy?

The computation choses the *structurally* first (highest) auxiliary for inversion, not the one that happens to be embedded in the subject (at arbitrary depth), despite the fact that identification of the linearly first auxiliary is computationally straightforward. No other hypothesis is ever considered by the child, and consequently cases such as (5) are not attested in children’s production (Crain & Nakayama 1987; Crain et al. in press):

(5) *Is the tall man [who _ from Italy] is happy?
The formally innocuous linearity-based “first auxiliary” hypothesis would furthermore mislead children acquiring verb-final German into postulating questions such as (7), deriving from the verb-final structure underlying (6).

(6) dass [der dicke Mann der aus Italien gekommen war] glücklich war
the fat man who from Italy come was happy was
‘…that the fat man who had come from Italy was happy.’

(7) *War [der dicke Mann der aus Italien gekommen _ ] glücklich war?
was the fat man who from Italy come happy was

Instead, structure-dependence dictates that the highest auxiliary raise, exactly like in English and, crucially, irrespective of linear order:

(8) War [der dicke Mann der aus Italien gekommen war] glücklich _?
was the fat man who from Italy come was happy
‘Was the fat man who had come from Italy happy?’

Children acquiring German do not simply adopt an alternative “last auxiliary” hypothesis, which would falsely produce the result in (9), where the relative clause has undergone optional rightward extraposition. Instead, learners instinctively know that the correct form is (10)—the only form possible if AUX-raising operates over hierarchical structure.

(9) *War der dicke Mann glücklich war [der aus Italien gekommen _ ]?
was the fat man happy was who from Italy come

(10) War der dicke Mann glücklich _ [der aus Italien gekommen war]?
was the fat man happy who from Italy come was
‘Was the fat man happy who had come from Italy?’

As before (and always, it seems), structure trumps linear order. The conclusion is as obvious to the language-learning child as it is to the theorist if linearity-based rules are simply not part of the hypothesis space, i.e. not permitted by UG. Children acquiring German have the same
understanding of structure-dependence as children acquiring any other grammatical system, since it follows from the hierarchical organization of linguistic objects constructed by MERGE. The phenomenon of AUX-raising illustrated above, alongside other classical illustrations of structure-dependence, has been the focus of attention of so-called “usage-based” approaches, which assume that basic facts of language are not rooted in UG but rather the emergent result of statistical analysis over vast amounts of data. Approaches of this kind assume that language acquisition is essentially a matter of memorization and minimal generalizations over a large database. We will not evaluate the specific claims made by these proposals here, a task undertaken elsewhere (Berwick et al. 2011; Crain et al. in press). The approaches fail invariably both at adequately capturing the phenomena they focus on and, more fundamentally, at addressing the only theoretically relevant question: why do languages universally adopt structure-dependent operations while avoiding, in all relevant cases, far simpler computational operations based on linear order? An approach that restricts generation to MERGE provides a principled solution to this long-standing puzzle. In fact, it provides the optimal solution, a straightforward consequence of the simplest computational operation.

In line with a long tradition in linguistics, we take the I-language to derive sound/sign-meaning pairs: objects constructed by MERGE are mapped onto a semantic representation SEM, accessed by conceptual-interpretive systems, and a phonetic representation PHON, accessed by sensorimotor systems, the latter providing instructions to the vocal or gestural articulators. Each derivation thus yields a pair \(<\text{SEM,PHON}>\), whose properties enter into complex thought and intentional planning (e.g., discourse organization) and perception/articulation (internal in self-talk, external in oral or gestural production). We return to these interfaces below.

Displacement as illustrated in (1b) above often has effects on both SEM and PHON: displaced objects are interpreted as chains of occurrences, and derived positions are typically privileged in production. Consider a standard example of wh-movement in French (from Sportiche 2013):

(11) Je me demande de quel livre sur elle-même, [cette loi], a entraîné la publication (α).

I wonder of which book about she-self this law has triggered the publication

‘I wonder which book about itself this law triggered the publication of.’
The *wh*-phrase *de quel livre* ‘of which book’ is displaced by IM from its original position \((\alpha)\) as the complement of the noun *publication* to the left edge of the embedded clause, where it surfaces in the externalized form. At SEM, the resulting chain of occurrences is interpreted as an operator-variable dependency: *(I wonder) which book x about y is such that this law y has triggered the publication of x.* SEM provides access to the original copy of the *wh*-phrase that externally merged in the position marked \((\alpha)\) above, as evidenced by the fact that this is where the reflexive pronoun *elle-même* is interpreted: in the scope of its antecedent *cette loi*. Once again, a state of affairs that would otherwise be highly puzzling can be given a principled rationale in terms of MERGE and its effects at the interfaces.

The structural distance spanned by dependencies of this sort is not clause-bounded but of arbitrary depth. Some well-known evidence suggests that movement leaves intermediate copies, so that “long” dependencies are in effect composed of “shorter” sub-dependencies (see Boeckx 2007 for review). All copies are available at SEM, rendering reconstruction operations of earlier theories obsolete. By contrast, mapping to PHON forces a choice about the realization of the discontinuous object created by IM. The typical choice is the highest position, with all lower copies remaining silent. If, when, and how this preference can be overridden by parametric and other factors remains an important research question (cf. Nunes 2004; Trinh 2011).

Whether other types of displacement commonly found in the world’s languages—semantically vacuous scrambling, extraposition, clitic movement etc.—likewise reflect narrow-syntactic computations or are part of the mapping to PHON is an open question. It is commonly assumed that effects on meaning pertaining to topic/focus articulation necessarily indicate core-syntactic displacements, but the relevant notion of “meaning” encompasses pragmatic as well as externalization-related (e.g., prosodic) properties of expressions. “Meaning” properties in this broad sense plausibly emerge from holistic interpretation of \(<\text{SEM,PHON}>\) pairs, rather than narrow interpretation of SEM itself. We briefly return to related matters in section 5.

Does the basic operation MERGE meet the criterion of evolvability? Any answer to this question is necessarily preliminary given our ignorance about the evolution of UG. Bolhuis et al. (2014) and Berwick & Chomsky (2016) suggest that MERGE plausibly arose as a cognitive innovation in an individual, which ultimately spread to a group. Whether or not this speculation is on the right track, given that MERGE is the minimal computational operation required to generate a discrete infinity of syntactic objects, its emergence is a necessary prerequisite for our species-
specific linguistic mind. The evolutionary origins of the other central component of I-language—the lexicon and its atoms with all their semantic intricacy—remain a deep mystery.

3. Operations and Constraints

We assume that MERGE(X,Y) forms \{X,Y\}, and nothing else. We will occasionally refer to this operation as *Simplest MERGE*, in order to distinguish it from proposals in the literature adopting a more complex operation (for discussion and review, see Epstein et al. 2014; Fukui & Narita 2014; Collins in press).

A computational system comprising a lexicon and MERGE applying freely will automatically satisfy some fundamental desiderata, such as recursive generation of infinitely many structures with internal constituency and discontinuous (displaced) objects. MERGE operates over syntactic objects placed in a *workspace*: the MERGE-mates X and Y are either taken from the lexicon or were assembled previously within the same workspace (for some relevant formal definitions, see Collins & Stabler 2016). There is no motivation for additional representations, such as numerations or lexical arrays, as employed in earlier approaches that assumed trans-derivational comparisons (Chomsky 1993, 1995; cf. Collins 1997 on this point).

We assume that MERGE is strictly binary: given that this is what is minimally necessary to create hierarchical structure, we assume that this is the *only* operation defined by UG (although adjunction structures may necessitate a separate operation, a point to which we return in section 5). Generation by Simplest MERGE thus entails a restrictive class of recursively defined, binary-branching and discrete-hierarchical structures. Anachronistically speaking, early work on “non-configurational languages” by Ken Hale (1983) suggested that there are languages without the binarity restriction, but subsequent work showed this postulation of additional, non-binary combination operations to be unjustified; see, e.g., Webelhuth 1992 on German and Legate 2002 on Warlpiri, and Kayne 1984, 1994 for additional arguments. While challenges remain, we take binarity and the absence of “flat” structures to be a theoretically desirable and empirically feasible property of MERGE-based generation.

Restriction to Simplest MERGE entails an *Inclusiveness Condition* (IC) that precludes the introduction of extraneous objects—for instance, traces and the bar-levels of X-bar Theory and other labels, but not copies and the detection of headedness via search (more on this below). Unlike the production rules of phrase-structure grammars, Simplest MERGE thus incorporates no
notion of “projection” (Chomsky 2013, 2015). IC also bars introduction of features that are not inherent to lexical items, such as the discourse-related features (topic, focus, etc.) assumed in the cartographic tradition and elsewhere (e.g. Rizzi 1997; López 2009). We suggest below that Simplest MERGE is generally not triggered but applies freely. Importantly, IC need not be stipulated as part of UG: it is a corollary of Simplest MERGE.

Having constructed \( K = \{X,Y\} \), we may want to merge \( K \) and some object \( W \). \( W \) is either internal to \( K \) or external to it. If \( W \) is external, then it is taken from the lexicon or has been assembled independently; this is EM. If \( W \) is internal to \( K \), then it is a term of \( K \); this is IM (displacement). If \( W = Y \), \( \text{MERGE}(K,Y) \) yields \( K' = \{Y,\{X,Y\}\} \), with two copies (occurrences) of \( Y \) in \( K' \). Note that there is still only one, discontinuous object \( Y \) in \( K' \), not two distinct objects; for instance, a semantically ambiguous phrase such as \( \text{Mary's book} \) will not be interpreted differently in the multiple positions it occupies after IM (as in the unaccusative construction \( \text{Mary's book arrived Mary's book} \)).

A widely-held but, we believe, unjustified assumption is that MERGE is a “Last Resort” operation, licensed by featural requirements of the MERGE-mates (cf. Chomsky 2000 and most current literature, e.g. Pesetsky & Torrego’s 2006 Vehicle Requirement on Merge). Note that a trigger condition cannot be restricted to either EM or IM: the operation \( \text{MERGE}(X,Y) \) is the same in both cases, the only difference being that one of \( X, Y \) is a term of the other in one case, while \( X \) and \( Y \) are distinct in the other. Simplest MERGE is not triggered. Featurally-constrained structure-building requires a distinct, more complicated operation (defined as Triggered Merge in Collins & Stabler 2016; see Collins in press for additional discussion). The features invoked in the technical literature to license applications of MERGE are typically \textit{ad hoc} and without independent justification, “EPP-features” being only the most obvious case.\(^4\) The same holds for selectional and discourse-related features; the latter in addition violate IC, as noted above (cf. Fanselow 2006). Featural diacritics typically amount to no more than a statement that “displacement happens”; they are thus dispensable without empirical loss and with theoretical

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\(^4\) The “edge features” of Chomsky 2008 are equally dispensable while not technically equivalent, and originally introduced to distinguish elements that enter into computation from those that do not, such as interjections (which may be elliptical in many cases, as argued by Holmberg 2016).
gain, in that Triggered Merge or equivalent complications become unnecessary (cf. Chomsky 2001:32, 2008:151; Richards 2016; Ott & Šimík to appear).\(^5\)

MERGE thus applies freely, generating expressions that receive whatever interpretation they are assigned by interfacing systems. We should be careful to distinguish “interpretive systems” from “performance systems.” The interpretive SM (sensorimotor) and C-I (conceptual-intentional) systems are systems of cognitive competence, involved in the determination of entailment and rhyme relations among expressions, for instance. Actual performance introduces all sorts of other complicating factors, such as memory constraints, irrationality, etc. Surface stimuli deriving from the objects constructed by I-language can have any degree of perceived “acceptability” or “deviance,” from perfect naturalness to complete unintelligibility. Since Chomsky 1955[1975] it has been recognized that no independently given notion of “well-formedness” exists for natural language in the way it is stipulated for artificial symbolic systems (Chomsky & Lasnik 1993:508). Consequently, concerns about “overgeneration” in core syntax are unfounded; the only empirical criterion is that the grammar associate each syntactic object generated to a \(<\text{SEM, PHON}>\) pair in a way that corresponds to the knowledge of the native speaker.\(^6\)

Do we need operations other than MERGE for the construction of syntactic objects? Agreement phenomena indicate that there is an operation AGREE that relates \textit{features} of syntactic objects (Chomsky 2000, 2001). The assumption of much current work is that AGREE is asymmetric, relating initially unvalued \(\varphi\)-features on a \textit{Probe} to matching, inherent \(\varphi\)-features of a \textit{Goal} within the Probe’s search space (structural sister). These dependencies find their expression in morphological inflection in highly variable, language-specific ways. AGREE is structure-dependent: in (12) and (13) below, the verbal morphology indicates agreement with the \textit{in situ} object regardless of whether the linear order is VO or OV (examples from Tallerman 2005).

\(^5\) A trigger-free approach to MERGE also eliminates the motivation for counter-cyclic MERGE in subject/object raising, an extremely complex operation (Epstein et al. 2012); see Chomsky to appear.

\(^6\) By contrast, the conception of syntactic computation as “crash-proof” (Frampton & Gutmann 2002, among others) is based the dubious assumption that an I-language defines a set of well-formed, intuitively “acceptable” expressions. But there is no basis for this assumption, and the informal notion of “acceptability” involves a host of factors that under no rational conception are part of I-language.
(12) ni-k-te:moa šo:čitl. (Nahuatl)       (13) Uqa jo ceh-ade-ia. (Amele)
1sg-3sg-seek flower                    he houses build-3pl-3sg.pst
‘I seek a flower.’                     ‘He built houses.’

AGREE furthermore obeys structurally-conditioned minimality: regardless of the eventual
surface order of constituents in (14) and (15), upon entering the derivation the inflectional Probe
above the verb phrase locates the hierarchically closest Goal (underlined below) in each case—
the singular subject in (14) vs. the plural one in (15), the latter subsequently displaced to the left.

(14) Die Kinder hat / *haben [vP die Lehrerin die Kinder erschreckt]. (German)
    the children has *have the teacher startled
    ‘The teacher startled the children.’

(15) Die Kinder haben / *hat [vP die Kinder die Lehrerin erschreckt].
    the children have *has the teacher startled
    ‘The children startled the woman.’

Embedding the plural subject NP of (15) within a larger singular NP expectedly gives rise to
singular agreement, despite identical adjacency relations at the surface.

(16) [Die Geschichte über [die Kinder]] hat / *haben [vP NP$_{sg}$ die Lehrerin erschreckt].
    the story about the children has *have the teacher startled
    ‘The story about the children startled the teacher.’

Minimality effects have been shown to be subject to cyclic evaluation (Chomsky 2000, 2001)—
the vP and CP “phases” being the relevant cycles, an issue we return to below. For example,
although the wh-phrase which book in (17a), raised to the edge of vP upon its completion, should
block AGREE between the higher inflectional Probe (the C-T complex) and the lower external
argument, the effect is overcome if minimality is calculated at the phase level (17b). At this point
of the derivation, the occurrence of which book at the outer edge of vP is a lower copy in a
movement chain, thus plausibly invisible to AGREE.
At the phase level (17b), both \textit{which book} and \textit{John} have raised, rendering their lower copies invisible to \textit{AGREE}. What matters here is that the invisibility of the lower copy of the \textit{wh}-phrase is the result of \textit{IM}, which by hypothesis takes place at the phase level (Chomsky 2007, 2008).

Empirically, \textit{AGREE} or some equivalent operation is clearly required; we set aside here many intricacies of agreement phenomena uncovered in much detailed work on the topic (e.g. Bobaljik 2008; Harbour et al. 2008; Legate 2008). In earlier work it was commonly assumed that \textit{IM} is parasitic on \textit{AGREE}, but this, like the assumption that applications of \textit{MERGE} are licensed by formal features, requires a more complicated, separate movement operation. It is also empirically unfounded, since the effects of \textit{AGREE} can be observed in the absence of \textit{IM} and vice versa. Consider (18), where the matrix verb \textit{parecen} ‘seem’ agrees with the \textit{in situ} NP \textit{varios sobornos a políticos} ‘many bribes to politicians’ (as well as with the participle \textit{descubiertos} ‘discovered’).

(18) Parecen haber sido descubiertos varios sobornos a políticos. (Spanish)
    seem.3pl have.inf been discovered.3pl many bribes to politicians
    ‘Many bribes to politicians seem to have been discovered’

The NP can raise into the matrix clause but it need not, unlike in languages such as English. Cases of this short show that \textit{IM} and \textit{AGREE} are independent operations.\footnote{Further arguments are needed to establish the absence of covert raising in such cases (with English-style \textit{IM} but pronunciation of the original copy); see Wurmbrand 2006 on German and Icelandic. But such movements are dubious on grounds of learnability alone.}

Objects constructed in core syntax must be mapped onto representations that can be accessed by C-I and SM systems: \textit{SEM} and \textit{PHON}, respectively. Consequently, there must be an operation \textit{TRANSFER} that hands constructed objects over to the mapping components. The mapping to \textit{PHON} is complex, involving the “flattening” of hierarchical structure and computation of stress, prosody etc. (see Collins in press for a partial theory of this mapping, and Idsardi & Raimy 2013 for general discussion). The mapping to \textit{SEM} is more direct, given that hierarchical structure is
the input to semantic interpretation; just how complex it is depends on the obscure question of where the boundary between the generative procedure and C-I systems is to be drawn.

A further open question is what the effects of TRANSFER are on the syntactic derivation. Ideally, TRANSFER should impose some degree of cyclicity on the system, such that for a given syntactic object K assembled in the course of the derivation, further computation cannot modify K. This is achieved if TRANSFER renders the objects to which it applies impenetrable to later operations, thereby providing an upper bound to the internal complexity of syntactic objects operated on at any given stage of the derivation. In Chomsky 2000 and subsequent works it is suggested that the derivational phases subject to TRANSFER correspond to the thematic domain (the verb phrase, vP) and the propositional domain (the clause, CP). A common assumption in the literature is that TRANSFER to PHON (or Spell-Out) eliminates structure, such as the interior of a phase, from the derivation. This cannot be literally correct, however: transferred phases are not spelled out in their original position but can be realized elsewhere, such as when a larger object containing the phase is displaced (Obata 2010). To illustrate, in (19) the NP α contains the clausal phase β:

(19)  \[ \alpha \text{ the verdict } [\beta \text{ that Tom Jones is guilty }] \]

Suppose we were to eliminate β and then raise α to a higher position, obtaining (20):

(20)  \[ \alpha \text{ the verdict } [\beta \text{ that Tom Jones is guilty }] \text{ seems to have been reached } (\alpha) \text{ by the jury} \]

The clausal phase β is pronounced in its derived position internal to displaced α; it is not pronounced in its original position (or eliminated from the final string). This means that Spell-Out does not exist in a literal sense, and no structure is eliminated: there is only TRANSFER, which renders β inaccessible to subsequent manipulation.\(^8\)

At the C-I interface, global principles of interpretation such as Condition C of the Binding Theory and the unbounded character of operator-variable dependencies (including “reconstruction” effects,

\(^8\) We thus avoid what Collins & Stabler (2016) dub the assembly problem, first discussed in Uriagereka 1999.
as in (11) above) suggest the same conclusion: transferred phases remain accessible, but they cannot be modified later cycles. This is a version of the *Phase Impenetrability Condition* (PIC) that permits Probe-Goal relations across phase boundaries, as long as these only affect properties of the Probe. Examples are the well-known quirky-subject configurations in which C-T agrees (at least optionally) with an internal argument *in situ* and cases of long-distance agreement across finite-clause boundaries (D’Alessandro et al. 2008; Richards 2012).9

While permitting Probe-Goal relations and interpretive dependencies, PIC blocks IM of X “out of” a phase P on the plausible assumption that the resulting discontinuity of X alters P’s internal structure.10 Suppose X is raised from within P by IM. If syntactic objects are defined as sets of occurrences, it follows that P subsequently no longer contains X, since it does not contain all of X’s occurrences. Consequently, inter-phasal IM is barred by the PIC, as it affects the internal constitution of previously-transferred P. PIC thus requires raising of X to the edge of P before or at TRANSFER, as well as the assumption that the edge remains accessible at the next phase. In this way, PIC gives rise to successive-cyclic movement and its reflexes in externalization.

If smaller units such as NPs, PPs, etc. are also phases (as assumed in Uriagereka 1999, Den Dikken 2007, Marantz 2007, Bošković 2014, and various other works), PIC forces movement of any internal element that will undergo modification at a later stage of the derivation. While technically possible, this inflation of phasal categories creates significant additional complexity and threatens to render the notion phase vacuous. The fact that the effects associated with successive cyclic movement seems to be absent from these categories (Gallego 2012; Van Urk 2016) supports the thesis that vP and CP are the only phases.

The verbal and clausal phases in essence capture the “duality of interpretation” stated in terms of the D-structure/S-structure distinction of earlier theories. EM within the vP phase gives rise to configurations expressing generalized argument structure, whereas IM at the CP cycle yields chains that enter into the determination of scope/discourse properties (Chomsky 2004, 2007;

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9 See Epstein et al. 2016a for a theory of “phase cancellation” that may permit a stronger formulation of the PIC, with no access to what has already been transferred. For alternative ways to cancel, extend, or parametrize phases, see Gallego 2010a, den Dikken 2007, Alexiadou et al. 2014, and Chomsky 2015.

10 The *No-Tampering Condition* (NTC) sometimes assumed in the literature is a general desideratum of computational efficiency, but the case of IM shows that it cannot hold in its strictest form: if X is a term of Y contained in W, MERGE(X,W) affects both X (now a discontinuous object) and W (now no longer containing X), but doesn’t change X or Y, e.g. by replacing either with a distinct object. This suggests that the NTC is reducible to the PIC (Gallego 2017).
Gallego 2013a, 2016). While this is a reasonable approximation of the effects of EM and IM at the C-I interface, apparent exceptions (such as semantically vacuous displacements) pose interesting research questions. To be sure, the basic operations MERGE, AGREE, and TRANSFER require much further formal explication; we will address some relevant issues in the following two sections.\(^{11}\) Despite many remaining questions, it is important to appreciate the fact that a minimal system as outlined so far can accommodate a significant range of facts about natural language that are equally fundamental and surprising from a naïve point of view, such as hierarchical structure and structure-dependence, the cross-linguistically variable externalization of head-complement structures, the ubiquity of displacement and “reconstruction,” and the duality of interpretation.

4. Interfaces

At the completion of each derivational cycle, the object \(W\) constructed in narrow syntax is subject to TRANSFER to the interfaces, mapping \(W\) onto SEM and PHON, accessed by C-I and SM systems, respectively. Let us refer to the mapping from narrow syntax to PHON as externalization (EXT). How and when does EXT take place? There are several possibilities. It could be that EXT takes place “all at once,” applying to the final output of the narrow-syntactic derivation. Or it could be that the units rendered inaccessible by PIC are spelled out partially, while not being eliminated from the syntactic representation (permitting phasal objects to be moved as part of larger objects, as discussed above).

The interpretive and perceptual/articulatory performance systems accessing PHON and SEM impose constraints on the expressions freely constructed by MERGE that map onto these representations. For instance, the C-I system imposes a general requirement of Full Interpretation: all terms of a syntactic object must be interpreted, none can be ignored.\(^{12}\) As a

\(^{11}\) We will not discuss here the operation of FEATURE INHERITANCE (F-I), introduced in Chomsky 2008 in order to account for the deletion of \(\varphi\)-features of phase heads. Ouali (2008) explores three possible manifestations of this operation, whereas Gallego (2014) argues that F-I can be eliminated under the Copy Theory of Movement. For reasons given in Richards 2007, F-I, like AGREE, must apply at the phase level, avoiding countercyclicality (Chomsky 2007:19 fn. 26).

\(^{12}\) Sportiche (2015) argues that Full Interpretation permits “neglect” of elements that are meaningless or multiply represented. On this view, agreement features valued in the course of the derivation remain without consequence at C-I; no additional mechanism that removes these features is required.
result, (21) cannot be interpreted at C-I as either “Who did John see?” or “John saw Mary,” ignoring the theta-less object Mary or the vacuous operator who, respectively.

(21)  \{who,\{John,\{T,\{see,Mary\}\}\}\}\}

So-called “crash-proof” models seek to bar generation of structures such as (21), given the intuitive “ill-formedness” of the derivative string (Frampton & Gutmann 2002). We think this is a mistake, for both conceptual and empirical reasons (see note 6). On methodological grounds, constraints imposed on MERGE are typically redundant with more general interface conditions, such as Full Interpretation in the case of (17) (Chomsky 1986). The same is true for theta-theoretic violations, e.g. when the derivation fails to supply a strongly transitive verb with an object: the deficiency of the resulting expression is independently detected at the C-I interface and there is no need to block generation of the “deviant” object, e.g. by complicating MERGE. Furthermore, “deviant” expressions typically do have some interpretation, however inexpedient. More specific constraints are imposed by C-I on particular elements within SEM, such as those governed by the principles of Binding Theory. Thus, different types of pronouns receive interpretations that relate them to c-commanding antecedents in specific ways, accounting for the fact that Himself likes John does not mean “John likes himself,” the impossibility of a coreferent interpretation of “John” and “him” in John likes him, etc. While many aspects of Binding Theory remain to be addressed for a system obeying IC, principled explanations of core cases in terms of C-I principles appear to be within reach (Chomsky 2008, Reuland 2011).

What about the other interface, which relates the core computational system to articulatory and perceptual systems involved in EXT? As noted above, EXT is necessarily much more complex than the mapping to SEM, in that hierarchical objects must be translated into an altogether distinct, sequential format. This is not the only complication: EXT violates just about every natural computational principle and carries out extensive modifications (e.g. by introducing

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13 An important remaining question is how to handle apparent idiosyncrasies in selection. Some of these may well turn out upon closer scrutiny to be less idiosyncratic than standardly assumed, as argued recently by Melchin (2017) for eat/devour-type contrasts. Idiosyncratically selected functional prepositions plausibly fall under a general theory of morphological case realized as part of externalization.

boundary tones, prosodic contours and stress placement, etc., all in violation of IC), in ways that are furthermore highly variable across languages. While linear order plausibly plays no role in the syntactic and semantic processes yielding expressions and their interpretations, it is plainly required for vocal or gestural articulation. The mapping must be sufficiently general to accommodate the contingencies of all possible modalities. For instance, speech requires strict temporal ordering, while gestural articulation permits a degree of simultaneity between manual and non-manual signs as well as within manual signs (Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006, Vermeerbergen et al. 2007). The morphophonological properties superimposed as part of EXT also seem to be the locus of much, perhaps all variation between languages (in accord with Chomsky’s 2001 Uniformity Principle).

Psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic inquiries have the potential to shed light on the status of EXT. One example is Smith & Tsimpi’s (1995) work on a subject they call Chris, whose cognitive capacities are extremely limited but who has extraordinary linguistic capacities that allow him to pick up languages very quickly (at least superficially, without significant understanding). Smith and Tsimpi investigated Chris’s reactions to invented languages of two types, one that conformed to UG principles and another that used principles that are not available to UG, such as linearity-based operations. It turned out that Chris was completely unable to deal with the language using simple computational procedures using linear order, but would master easily an invented language that conformed to UG principles in employing structure-dependent rules. Subsequent studies by Smith and Tsimpi (corroborated by Musso et al.’s 2003 findings mentioned above) suggest that normals can likewise relatively easily deal with languages conforming to UG principles, but can handle the non-UG-conforming systems relying on linear order only if they were expressly presented as a puzzle rather than a language. While preliminary, these findings strike us as suggestive.

These observations support the speculation that those properties of language that pertain exclusively to perception and articulation are ancillary, perhaps altogether external to I-language, whereas the core computational system may be close to uniform (Berwick & Chomsky 2016; but see Irurtzun this volume). EXT relates very different systems, a computational system

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15 For related discussion and developments in the study of parametric variation, see Biberauer et al. 2014; Eguren et al. 2016; Kayne 2013; Picallo 2014.
16 We say “close” because even a computationally minimal core syntax might permit a degree of variation when multiple derivational options are consistent with efficiency of computation. See Richards 2008 and Obata et al. 2015 for proposals of this sort.
constructing hierarchical expressions on the one hand and sequential production/perception systems on the other. While the computational system appears to have evolved recently and suddenly, the SM systems had at that point been in place for hundreds of thousands of years. Given that the linkage between these two systems is an inherently “messy” affair, EXT is a plausible source of linguistic variation—perhaps the only one, as noted above.\footnote{\label{footnote:17}See Huybregts 2017 for relevant recent discussion, including speculations concerning the evolutionary relevance of aerially isolated click phonemes.}

Where does all of this leave us with regard to the question of evolvability? MERGE and the inventory of lexical atoms it operates over must be part of UG and as such represent evolutionary innovations specific to the human linguistic mind. What about AGREE and TRANSFER? We believe that while no firm conclusions can be drawn at this point, there are proposals that link these operations to considerations of efficient computation. Chomsky (2013, 2015) suggests that AGREE instantiates \emph{minimal search} within the syntactic object, in which case its core properties (structure-dependence, minimality) might reflect general properties of computation. With regard to TRANSFER and the interface mappings, the mapping to PHON is necessarily complex, while the mapping to SEM may be near-trivial. A plausible speculation is that EXT and its variable properties reflect not UG specifications but rather a lack thereof, if the linkage established between the computational system proper and externalization systems was a problem that had to be solved subsequently to the evolution of I-language.

5. Open Questions and Future Directions

In this section, we turn to a number of theoretical issues and outstanding questions that have emerged in recent work. While we will outline what seem to us to be plausible steps towards resolving these questions, our primary intention here is to highlight their relevance to future research in GG.

We begin by returning to the operation MERGE, which, despite its apparent simplicity, raises many questions. A narrow conception of MERGE permits only two logical options: binary EM and IM. Various further options have been proposed in the literature, such as Parallel Merge/Sideward Movement, a species of “multidominance” structures (Nunes 2004, Citko 2005), and countercyclic Late Merge (Lebeaux 1988, Fox 2002), which replaces a displaced object with a larger one. Are these options corollaries of the availability of Simplest MERGE, as has
sometimes been claimed, or do they require additional mechanisms, raising new evolvability problems? We believe that there are reasons for skepticism towards these extensions beyond a narrow conception of MERGE, which warrant further scrutiny in future research.

All syntactic objects in the lexicon and in the workspace WS are accessible to MERGE; there is no need for a SELECT operation (as in, e.g., Chomsky 1995). WS represents the stage of the derivation at any given point. The basic property of recursive generation requires that any object already generated be accessible to further operations. WS can contain multiple objects at a given stage, so as to permit formation of \{XP,YP\} structures (subject-predicate constructions) by EM. A derivation may (but need not) terminate whenever WS contains a single object; if it terminates in any other situation, no coherent interpretation can be assigned.

Beyond these fundamentals, many questions arise. For instance, does MERGE(X,Y) add \{X,Y\} to \(WS = [X,Y]\) (where X, Y are LIs or complex elements), yielding \(WS' = [X,Y,\{X,Y\}]\)? Or does it rather replace X and Y in WS with \{X,Y\}, yielding \(WS' = [{X,Y}]\) (as assumed in Chomsky 1995:243)? The latter view is more restrictive, and arguably more in line with basic desiderata for optimal generation: the generative procedure constructs a single object to be mapped onto PHON and SEM, not a multiplicity of objects; and considerations of computational efficiency suggest that WS should be kept minimal throughout a derivation.18 The same conclusion is suggested by the fact that a workspace \(WS' = [X,Y,\{X,Y\}]\) derived by MERGE(X,Y) would not ensure that subsequent rules can apply in a determinate fashion: any rule referencing X or Y would ambiguously refer to the individual objects X, Y or to the terms of K = \{X,Y\}. Indeterminacy of rules in this sense is formally unproblematic and in fact a familiar property of phrase-structure grammars—but a sensible question to ask is whether it should be permitted in an optimal I-language at all, given that it raises various technical complications (for instance with regard to the distinction between copies and repetitions, to which we return below). If the answer is negative, we are led to a view of Simplest MERGE as mapping \(WS = [X,Y]\) onto \(WS' = [{X,Y}]\), reducing its complexity and avoiding indeterminate rule application.

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18 A strong hypothesis about the generative procedure would be that operations never extend WS (i.e. increase the cardinality of elements contained in it). Except for the case where two elements taken from the lexicon are combined, EM and IM keep WS constant or reduce it. For related considerations (but very different conclusions), see De Vries 2009.
This restrictive view of MERGE as a strictly binary operation that seeks to curtail the complexity of WS in effect rules out operations such as Parallel Merge (which establishes a ternary relation between the shared element X, its MERGE-mate Y, and the object Z containing Y) and Late Merge (which requires substitution of X by some more complex object; see Epstein et al. 2012). This leaves EM and IM as the only instantiations of Simplest MERGE. We believe that future work should address the various questions raised by these considerations, in order to establish a restrictive “null theory” of the generative procedure that adheres to plausible desiderata of computational efficiency.

Regardless of which implementation of recursive generation we adopt, a further central question is how a MERGE-based system can distinguish copies (created by IM) from repetitions of identical elements (created by EM), so that we correctly distinguish the two instances of the noun phrase the man in The man saw the man from those in the unaccusative construction The man arrived the man. Suppose MERGE(K,W), where W is a term of K, creates Z. Z now contains two (or more) copies of W. But upon accessing Z, how do the external interpretive systems know whether multiple instances of W are copies of a single object or independent objects (repetitions of W)? Different answers to this question have been pursued, e.g. in terms of multidominance structures (Gärtner 2002) or an operation COPY that duplicates W prior to IM (Chomsky 1993, Nunes 2004). But complex graph-theoretic objects are not defined by Simplest MERGE, and no COPY operation is necessary given that IM automatically yields copies (on standard set-theoretic assumptions). Another possibility is that the system keeps track of how often the relevant object was assembled (or accessed in the lexicon) and communicates this information to the interfaces as part of TRANSFER (see Kobele 2006 and Hunter 2011 for related proposals). Along these lines, Chomsky (2007, 2012b) proposes that the distinction is established by the phasal nature of syntactic computation. At TRANSFER, phase-level memory suffices to determine whether a given pair of identical terms Y, Y′ was formed by IM. If it was, then Y and Y′ are copies; if it was not (i.e., it was formed by EM), Y and Y′ are independent repetitions. This captures the basic

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19 See Sportiche 2015 for an alternative treatment of the facts motivating Late Merge analyses in terms of “neglect” at the interface.

20 Identity must take features into account, so that, for instance, in a double-object construction with two identical objects (The king sold a slave a slave), an object NP raised to the phase edge can be correctly associated with its lower copy. The distinction is trivial if the NPs are distinguished by structural vs. inherent case-marking.
intuition that if some syntactic object is introduced into the derivation “from the outside,” it is a distinct object; if it is added “from within,” it is a copy. Phases would then play the crucial role of limiting memory to the current cyclic domain (the principal desideratum of phase theory), preventing unbounded search and thus rendering the detection of repetitions vs. copies computationally feasible.21

A further important question is whether objects constructed by MERGE are necessarily endocentric and identified by a determinate label, as in earlier phrase-structural models incorporating X-bar Theory. The assumption of universal endocentricity carried over to the Bare Phrase Structure model of Chomsky 1995, where MERGE(X,Y) is taken to yield a labeled object \{L,\{X,Y\}\}, L \in \{X,Y\}. But this is a departure from Simplest MERGE, rooted in the intuitive appeal and pedagogical convenience of tree notation. In its simplest form, MERGE has no “built-in” projection mechanism, hence does not yield labeled objects (Chomsky 2013, 2015, Collins to appear). Unlike displacement and linear order, projection is not an empirically detectable property of linguistic expressions but a theory-internal concept. Encoding a label as part of the object constructed by MERGE raises various non-trivial questions (Seely 2006); for instance, why can the label not undergo head movement on its own, or be pronounced? These problems vanish if labels qua syntactic objects do not exist, but the question of endocentricity remains in a different form: is it relevant to the syntactic derivation and/or to the interfacing systems?

Chomsky (2013) argues that the answer to this question is positive, and that an algorithm LABEL is required to supplement MERGE. For some syntactic object K, LABEL(K) locates within K the first element where search “bottoms out:” the structurally most prominent lexical item. LABEL is thus not an entirely new operation, but, like AGREE, an instantiation of minimal search. For K = \{H,XP\}, where H is an LI and XP a complex object, H will be chosen as the label. The first step in a derivation necessarily relates two atomic objects, yielding K = \{H,R\}. What is the label of K in this case? If R is a feature-less root, as assumed by many contemporary approaches, it is plausibly ignored by LABEL, and H will be correctly chosen as the label of K. On this conception, LABEL locates a feature of H, which renders the traditional notion of “head” irrelevant for labeling purposes. This approach to labeling raises intricate questions about the

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21 Earlier theories avoided the problem by assuming a rewriting of lower copies as distinct symbols (traces), linking these to their antecedent via coindexing, but in radical violation of IC.
nature of lexical items (and the distribution of their properties across components, as assumed by models such as Distributed Morphology), which we set aside here.

X-bar-theoretic universal endocentricity has conceptually and empirically questionable consequences. To begin with, it is trivially falsified by every case of IM, which yields an unlabelable \{XP,YP\} configuration (putting aside head movement). Another case in point is the DP hypothesis, a corollary of X-bar Theory. Bruening (2009) shows that while selection by a higher verb clearly targets C (the head of the clause), there is no selection for D (only for properties of N, e.g. number); and unlike C, D is not universal. The challenge, then, is to accommodate D-type elements while retaining the nominal character of the overall phrase. One possibility suggested in Chomsky 2007 and developed by Oishi (2015) is that nominals are headed by a nominalizer n, analogous to v as the head of the verb phrase, with D, where present, occupying some lower position. Another is that determiners are in fact complex elements, as suggested by their morphology in many languages; see, e.g., Leu 2015.

If \( K = \{X,Y\} \) and neither \( X \) nor \( Y \) is a lexical item (e.g., when \( X \) is a “specifier,” in earlier terminology), no head is detected by LABEL. Building on Moro 2000, Chomsky (2013) argues that this situation can motivate displacement of \( X \): if \( X \) merges (internally) to some object \( W \) containing \( K \), \( K \) will no longer contain \( X \) (\( X \) being the set of its occurrences), and consequently \( Y \) will act as the label of \( K \). Chomsky suggests that \( W \) and \( X \) must share a feature if the resulting configuration is to be “stable,” an idea that Chomsky (2015) extends to EPP and ECP effects. Such feature sharing is involved in subject/object raising, for instance, where the raising XP enters into an AGREE relation with the head it raises to (T and \( v^* \), respectively; see Gallego in press for an alternative, and Epstein et al. 2016b for further discussion).

Again building on Moro’s work, Ott (2012), Chomsky (2013, 2015), and Blümel (2017) argue that the need to “break” \{XP,YP\} configurations (motivated by LABEL) can drive displacement of XP, yielding phenomena such as successive-cyclic movement, raising to object, and others. Such proposals assume that MERGE applies freely; but derivations in which relevant applications fail to apply will not yield the required outcome. Plausibly, efficiency of computation precludes “superfluous” applications of MERGE that have no effect on the eventual output (such as string-vacuous IM with no effect on interpretation, which would entail massive structural ambiguity of any given sentence). For proposals along these lines and relevant evidence, see e.g. Fox 2000; Chomsky 2001, 2008a; Reinhart 2006; Struckmeier 2016.
It is quite possible that a constructed object K can, in at least some cases, remain unlabeled (exocentric), e.g. when K is a root clause or created by operations that are not head-oriented in any plausible sense, e.g. syntactic scrambling. Further illumination of these issues will require a theory that answers the question of where detectable endocentricity is required: in the syntactic derivation (say, for purposes of interpreting local selectional relations), at the interfaces (say, for the computation of prosody), both, or not at all (Collins to appear)? These questions remain open for now and are in need of clarification.

A further important research question is whether structure-building mechanisms beyond Simplest MERGE are necessary, such as Chomsky’s (2004) PAIR-MERGE for adjuncts and De Vries’s (2012) PAR-MERGE for parenthetical expressions. Adjuncts and parentheticals have distinct properties, among them strong opacity for extraction. Thus, while (22) is ambiguous between a complementation and an adjunction structure, (23) is unambiguous, since only the former permits IM of the wh-phrase. And while an NP such as a book about NP readily permits wh-extraction of NP (24), an analogous extraction from a corresponding parenthetical appositive NP yields no coherent interpretation (25).

(22) John decided on the boat.
(23) What did John decide on _?
(24) What did John read a book about _?
(25) *What did John read something, a book about _?

Chomsky (2004) proposes that adjunction is the result of a separate operation PAIR-MERGE, which yields asymmetric (ordered) pairs rather than symmetric (unordered) sets, permitting the identification of an adjunct in a phrase-modifier configuration. PAIR-MERGE may also be required for unstructured coordination (as in John is tall, happy, hungry, bored with TV, etc.), a problem that goes back to early work of the 1960s. Even unrestricted rewriting systems cannot
generate these structures, nor can transformations (see Lasnik & Uriagereka 2012 for a critical review of some proposals in Chomsky & Miller 1963).\footnote{A possible analysis of unstructured coordination that avoids these problems could take each AP in the above example to be an elliptical ‘afterthought’ expression in the sense of Ott & De Vries 2016, Ott 2016. This would capture the central properties of the construction: infinite iterability and individual predication of each AP of the subject. For reasons of space, we cannot explore this idea further here.}

PAIR-MERGE is a formally distinct operation from Simplest MERGE, hence raises problems of evolvability. Ideally, it could be shown to be dispensable. We do not take up the challenge here; for some suggestive work on adjunction that does not invoke special operations (but at the cost of introducing other stipulations), see Hunter 2015. As for parenthesis, it seems to us that the only principled approach consistent with evolvability considerations relegates the phenomenon entirely to discourse pragmatics, obviating the need to enrich UG with special operations. That is, parenthetical expressions, which are frequently elliptical, are generated independently and interpolated or juxtaposed only in production (see Ott & Onea 2015, Ott 2016a,b).

Traditionally, adjunction is also assumed to be involved in head movement (HM),\footnote{See Epstein et al. 2016a on PAIR-MERGE as a mechanism for affixation.} but such an approach has several unwelcome consequences (Chomsky 2015:12ff.; also Carstens et al. 2016). HM violates principles of minimal computation and cannot be implemented by Simplest MERGE, given its countercyclic character. It also typically lacks semantic effects, at least for the core cases of verb raising. This vacuity and the fact that the configurations standardly described in terms of HM are highly variable across languages suggest that at least some instances of HM might fall within the mapping to PHON (as suggested in Chomsky 2001 and supported by specific arguments in Zwart to appear and elsewhere), although there are interesting arguments to the contrary (Roberts 2010).\footnote{For a different, syntactic approach to HM, see Chomsky 2015. Core-syntactic HM is presupposed by many approaches to diverse phenomena, such as Donati’s (2006) analysis of free relatives, where the wh-element is analyzed as a D head that determines the label of the embedded clause after IM. See Ott 2011 for an alternative that is consistent with a non-syntactic conception of HM.}

Other cases might reduce to core-syntactic IM, in line with proposals in Toyoshima 2000 and Matushansky 2006. We believe that a fresh take on the relevant phenomena is needed, based on the recognition that traditional implementations of HM are in fact problems restated in technical terms rather than solutions.

An interesting challenge for the idea that HM could be relegated to EXT is provided by Spanish VOS constructions, which reveal that verb movement can solve a minimality conflict (see
discussion around (17) above). In this respect, consider (26) below, where the internal argument cada coche ‘each car’ has moved to a position at the vP edge from which it c-commands the vP-internal external argument su propietario ‘its owner’, permitting a bound-variable interpretation of the subject-internal pronoun.

(26) Recogió [vP cada coche [vP su propietario v [ recogió cada coche ]]]  (Spanish)
picked-up each car its owner
‘Its owner picked up each car.’

What is surprising is that this configuration does not block AGREE between C-T and the external argument (as it should under a conception of minimalness without the notion of equidistance: Chomsky 1993, 2000). The facts are discussed by Gallego (2010, 2013b), who argues that nominative Case assignment to the in situ subject is parasitic on verb movement. This claim is backed up by the pair in (27), which shows that whenever the verb remains in a vP-internal position (assuming that the auxiliary estaba ‘was’ is in T), object shift is ruled out—a situation remarkably reminiscent of Holmberg’s Generalization.

(27) a. [TP Ayer estaba [vP Juan leyendo un libro ]]  (Spanish)
yesterday was Juan reading a book
b. *[TP Ayer estaba [vP un libro [vP Juan leyendo un libro ]]]
yesterday was a book Juan reading
‘Juan was reading a book yesterday.’

What is important here is not only that verb movement enables object shift, but that this operation also licenses the in situ subject. This conclusion is supported by (28), from Gallego (2013:434):

(28) *[TP Estaba [vP los libros [vP pro leyendo los libros ]]], cuando, de pronto, llegó María.
was the books reading when of soon arrived María
‘I was reading the books when, all of a sudden, Maria showed up
The rhetorical flavor of the example notwithstanding, the asymmetry between (28) and (27b) can be taken to indicate that the problem with (27b) is not due to object shift alone, but due to failure of the *in-situ* subject *Juan* in (27b) to receive nominative Case (in (28), *pro* is licensed either because it has raised or else because it does not need Case). These data pose an interesting challenge: if HM were merely a phonological operation, its apparent role in licensing Probe-Goal dependencies would be unexpected.

We noted above that Simplest MERGE applies freely, and that features which are not introduced into the derivation by LIs, such as those pertaining to informational functions of XPs, violate IC. “Cartographic” analyses, where such features take center stage as the driving force behind displacements to the peripheries, are essentially construction-based approaches, with the notion “construction” recast in terms of features and phrase-structure rules generating cascades of projections. But informational notions such as “topic” or “focus,” like grammatical functions or thematific roles, are properties of configurations and their syntactic/discursive context, not of individual syntactic objects (Chomsky 1965; Hale & Keyser 1993); consequently, they should neither be represented in the lexicon, nor in the narrow syntactic derivation (cf. Uriagereka 2003; Fortuny 2008; López 2009; Gallego 2013a, 2016).

The Cartographic Program pursued by Cinque, Rizzi and many others has revealed remarkable facts and generalizations, such as Cinque’s (1999) hierarchy of adverbial positions and Rizzi’s (1997) structure for the left periphery. But the postulated structures raise serious problems, as acknowledged by Cinque & Rizzi (2010:63). As we observed above, any linguistic theory is going to have to meet two conditions: the conditions of acquirability and evolvability. UG must permit acquisition of I-language, and it must have evolved in the human lineage—and if current best guesses are correct, it must have evolved recently. The cascades of projections postulated for various areas of clause structure cannot possibly be learned: there is no conceivable evidence that a child could rely on to learn these hierarchical sequences from experience. But attributing complex functional hierarchies to UG raises an evolutionary puzzle: it seems virtually unimaginable that the complex cartographic templates could have evolved as irreducible properties of UG. The conclusion is that cartographic cascades of functional projections are problems, not solutions. As aptly discussed by Rizzi (2013b), the challenge is to derive the descriptive generalizations from more elementary principles that are motivated independently.
There is some promising work in this direction, such as Ernst’s (2002) non-templatic analysis of adjunct ordering that derives Cinque’s universal template from interpretive properties of adverbial expressions, rendering a “hard-coded” functional sequence obsolete. Developing alternatives to templatic approaches to the clausal peripheries will require, we believe, a re-evaluation to what extent the superficial complexity of “sentences” in fact reflects syntactic composition, rather than amalgamation of independent expressions in discourse. In contrast to early work on “topic constructions” (e.g., Cinque 1983), the cartographic tradition assumes that virtually all sorts of peripheral elements, including left- and right-dislocated constituents, are part of core clause structure. As a result, the puzzling properties of dislocated elements that distinguish them from displaced constituents such as wh-phrases are merely restated, not explained, including their universal extra-peripheral ordering. An alternative, developed in Ott 2014, 2016b, 2017, denies the reality of structurally complex peripheries by analyzing dislocated elements, unlike fronted or extraposed XPs, as structurally independent elliptical expressions that are interpretively related to their host clauses by principles of discourse organization and anaphora. Once again, the result obviates the need for peripheral functional sequences.

We adumbrated above the idea that the core computation yields hierarchically-structured, language-invariant expressions (entering into “thought” processes of various kinds at the interface with C-I systems) whereas the mapping that feeds externalization-related SM systems is necessarily more involved and indirect. This asymmetry between the two interfaces leads Chomsky (2014) to adopt the following hypothesis:

(29) I-language is optimized relative to the C-I interface alone, with EXT ancillary.

The adjective “optimized” here refers to the kinds of considerations introduced above: relying only on Simplest MERGE and no more complex operations. As we pointed out, this strong thesis is consistent with the general fact that operations of I-language operate over structures, not strings (with concomitant beneficial implications for language acquisition), and that structured objects provide the input to compositional interpretation. At the same time, challenges for (29) emerge from recent work suggesting a rather direct involvement of morphophonological factors in the syntactic computation. Richards (2016) develops an elaborate theoretical framework according to which the articulation systems impose universal constraints that, in conjunction with independent
language-specific differences, can account for central aspects of cross-linguistic variation (see also Mathieu 2016 for a related proposal). In this model, metrical requirements of affixes and other conditions imposed by PHON can effect the application of MERGE and other operations.\footnote{Richards explicitly discusses instances of derivational opacity, where phonological factors trigger movements whose effects are later undone by subsequent operations. This entails that the morphophonology in his model cannot simply act as an output filter, but must be directly involved in the narrow-syntactic derivation. For further discussion, see Ott to appear.} Given the impressive results achieved by Richards’ system, his work poses an interesting challenge to the hypothesis that EXT is an ancillary process. The same is true for recent work arguing for the relevance of linear order to various syntactic and semantic processes (Kayne 2011; Bruening 2014), contrary to our suggestions above. If and how these challenges can be reconciled with (28) is an important topic for future research.

As noted above, a related open question pertaining to the overall organization of the system is whether the narrow-syntactic computation includes an operation AGREE in addition to MERGE, or whether featural interactions are restricted to EXT. The former view is based on the assumption that AGREE mediates assignment of structural Case and serves to eliminate semantically redundant φ-features from the syntactic object, as required by a particularly strong version of the Full Interpretation principle (Chomsky 2000 \textit{et seq.}, building on observations of Vergnaud 1977[2006] and George & Kornfilt 1981). Another possibility is that case is a purely morphological phenomenon (Marantz 1991; McFadden 2004), and that uninterpretable features are simply neglected at the C-I interface (in the spirit of Sportiche 2015). The latter scenario is consistent with relegating AGREE to EXT, where it would then serve the sole purpose of determining the morphological form of initially underspecified inflectional elements (cf. Bobaljik 2008, and Preminger 2014 for an opposing view). Also in view of the cross-linguistically highly variable expression of inflection, AGREE seems to fit rather naturally with other operations pertaining to EXT. We believe that there are interesting arguments in either direction and leave the matter here as an important topic for future research.

These and many other issues concerning the overall architecture of the computational system(s) underlying human linguistic capacity remain to be adequately addressed and explored. The mere fact that they can be coherently stated testifies to the progress GG has made over the years, providing ample fertile ground for further stimulating research.
6. Conclusions

Even within the expressly narrow focus of GG on linguistic competence, virtually every aspect of (I-)language remains a problem. Nevertheless, significant progress has been made since the 1950s, and in recent years the establishment of a minimal formal toolkit meeting basic desiderata of explanatory and evolutionary adequacy has become a feasible goal. As always, it remains to be seen to what extent such a toolkit can be reconciled with the empirical challenges and puzzles that inevitably arise wherever we look. As documented above, the formal toolkit centered around the operation MERGE raises new problems on its own, both empirical and conceptual. In fact, in many cases it remains to be determined where to even look for solutions, e.g. when we ask whether heavy-NP shift falls within the MERGE-based system of core computation or is part of externalization, and in many other cases. In our view, this conclusion makes the challenges ahead no less exciting, but should rather fuel our appreciation of the fascinating research questions that present themselves once we approach human language as an object of the natural world.

References


