Cognitax Tool Grammar: Re-factoring the Generative Program
A pervasive action dimension for linguistic description, theory and models

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This is a preliminary and frequently changing dynamic document responsive to reader critique and is likely not the latest version available by contacting the author. (Note the title has changed.) The later version always supersedes the earlier and typically may include major revisions. Comments and challenges are welcome for future versions. The extended version under development is freely available on request from the author.

1 We are indebted for the incisive comments of readers who suggested constructive improvements even as the ideas presented here were sometimes at considerable variance with their own current working frameworks. We owe special thanks to the following for comments on either parts or the whole of this work: John Hewson, Paul Postal, Vit Bubenik, Pieter Seurens and Willem de Reuse.
2 We had considered an alternative title for this paper since it seeks to explain malformation: “A Review of Verbal Misbehavior”
3 From version 12.9 ‘Cognitax’ replaces ‘Pragmatax’ to clarify that Tool Grammar is distinct from pragmatics, as well as separate work that may refer to grammatical tools. Both were absent from the title in an earlier version.
Operative Motivating Hypotheses of Tool Grammar

1. There exists an empirically evident necessity for representation of linguistic structural action intent which has been generally overlooked in the theory of language, including centralized configurational syntax in the generative program.

2. Linguistic structural action intent extends the basic Chomskyan focus on linguistic creativity (unbounded generation from finite means) to a new level of representation useful for explaining and constraining the inventive means by which the species-specific features of human language are effected. Theoretical gains are sought by extending the Chomskyan idea to generation of structure from intent.

3. The inclusion of intention in linguistic rules both enables solutions of resistant and intractable problems, and otherwise enables a wider set of more generalized and more natural solutions while probing explanations for the profoundly important syntactic observational effects uncovered by generativist methodology (e.g. locality, crossover, C-command, control).

4. The exclusion of linguistic intention and action from generative rules introduces artefactual complexity and precludes the strongest possible natural constraints on characterizations of the human faculty of language.

5. Theorizing based on linguistic action intent leads to thinner, simplified, more directly empirical argumentation compared to the indirections necessitated by complex syntactic analysis based on central configurational syntax.

6. The inclusion of linguistic action intent in generative rules enables a deepening understanding of the role of generative constructs such as C-Command and Merge in the computational facility which underlies human language, revealing a new level of significance for Minimalism’s most basic claims.

7. Functional explanations based on linguistic intent for a wide range of unacceptable sentences contribute to an understanding how human languages are readily learned largely in the absence of exposure to negative data.

8. Careful examination of linguistic intent as a methodology can greatly reduce the entropy of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic theory by independently explaining a plethora of ill formed sentences in a straightforward way, leaving a more tractable set of separate theoretical problems for these disciplines.

9. Scientific validity is enhanced by revising the architecture of generative linguistics from a bi-directional sound-meaning connection to a functional connection between linguistic action intention and external linguistic representation.
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1 Introduction and Summary

Are there alternate paths to explanatory theories based on extensions or revisions of Chomsky’s programmatic axioms and architecture of linguistic competence? Specifically, might scientific validity be enhanced by re-factoring the architecture of generative linguistics from a directly mathematical sound-meaning connection to a functional connection between linguistic intention and linguistic expression? Can the operational presence of structural intention in generative grammar illuminate further the fundamental significance of C-Command and Merge operations of the Minimalist Program? Might linguistic structural intent extend the basic Chomskyan focus on linguistic creativity (unbounded generation from finite means) to a new level of representation useful for explaining and constraining the inventive means by which the species-specific features of human language are effected? Can theoretical gains be achieved by extending the Chomskyan idea to generation of structure from linguistic intent oriented more to the creative generative process of sentence creation than interpretation by the listener? Is Chomsky’s profound attention to the creativity of human language enhanced by extension to the domain of linguistic structural intent?

The main thesis of the present work is that there exists an empirically evident necessity for the representation of linguistic structural intent which has been generally overlooked in the theory of language, including notably centralized configurational syntax in the generative program. We propose and motivate Tool Grammar\(^4\), in which a sentence is an action, a performance wherein intention is central rather than syntax. A sentence intention is a formative set of decisions for external representation of thought by means of highly constrained, conventional, interlocking structures and processes, which we call ‘tools’. Each tool is an intentional device for specific effect in the process of utterance generation, distinguished from the traditional concept of a linguistic ‘rule’ by the explicit specification of intent added to the standard structural input and output conditions. The data essential for motivating linguistic descriptions is thus enhanced by explicit field transcriptions of evident user action and intent using a controlled scientific vocabulary. Tool Grammar (TG) postulates that sentence generation exhibits linguistic cognitive actions most fundamentally and syntax processes more procedurally, parallel to but distinguished from the Chomskyan hypothesis that humans are fundamentally “syntactical animals”. (Searle, June 29, 1972) The crux of resolution for this contrast is whether TG better can enable stronger constraints on the definition of human language than more rigidly syntax-centered accounts. A revision of the architecture of competence shifting away from the strict centrality of syntax can increase the potential for explanatory power in the generative program.

\(^4\) We recognize that Shakespeare’s admonition will apply as much to what might be said here as it is to what has gone before: “There are more things in heaven and earth, (…), Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” Hamlet (1.5.167-8)

\(^5\) The term “tool grammar” (TG) is intended as a handier nickname for “Instrumental Grammar”. Importantly, the term ‘tool’ is not used in any anthropological, archeological, anti-generativist, or reductionist sense, but only to signify that in the formation of a sentence a speaker has access to an array of devices, lexical and structural, for the purpose of externalizing an intended representation of meaning. Since TG does not derive from the toolkit approach of (Culicover & Jackendoff, 2005) or other proposed systems presented as tool sets we sometimes identify it as Cognitax Tool Grammar.
Several specific conceptions of language characterize the TG approach to linguistic analysis.

- While the Generative Program has not always built on a clear definition of the basic units of language, TG defines a sentence as that externalized communication structure which carries the selective representation of meaning resulting from the targeted set of speaker decisions made for the purpose of effecting linguistic intent. This definition orients the sentence to speaker action rather than interpretation thereby distinguishing linguistic intent from the wider phenomena of interpretation and implication that characterize receptive activities. A language therefore is conceived not so much as a set of sentences that need to be accounted for, but a set of structures considered in the context of active decisions about structure and representation on the part of the speaker. 6

- While the Generative Program has classically taken as its basic problem to develop a theory of the non-directional syntactic connection between meaning (logical form) and output (e.g. phonological form), (Chomsky, Sophia Lectures, 2014) TG re-factors the architecture of language competence rather to connect linguistic intentions to output as a directional generative process. This at once adds an intention generator as a new module in the competence framework and also defines a new relationship to truth functional interpretation semantics and the study of implication. For TG, the meanings hearers take from an utterance, which are evidently various and diverse, involve a different set of processes from the speaker’s intentional engagement to represent particular meaning structures. This means that the various interpretations that might or might not be taken from a particular utterance warrant a separate analysis from that of the representation the speaker intended to make. Another consequence of this re-factoring is that the source of creativity and recursion is moved outside the purveyance of syntax to the intention module.

TG holds that language has the external representation of meaning as a purpose and tools as a means of action. Natural constraints on the inter-compatibility of tools render many rules and constraints on configurational syntax unnecessary, since unacceptable sentences often reflect the incompatible misapplication of tools. A broad swath of linguistic ill-formedness can be attributed to structures involving incompatible intents.

As an illustration, the following examples provide a taste of how the intention of the passive tool can conflict with the intentions of other tools: the passive structure, drawing attention away from the agent, is vulnerable to conflict from a tool centering on the agent.

Al visited the sick woman.
The sick woman was visited by Al.
What was surprising about Al was that he visited the sick woman.
*What was surprising about Al was that the sick woman was visited by Al (him).

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6 The development of a formal definition of the word is implicit in the procedures and results of TG but is not elaborated here. Suffice it to characterize a word as a prepackaged structure that is merged into an incrementally expanding hierarchical structure as a speaker makes decisions of representational and structural intent. The means by which words are selected in accordance with pattern matching against internal semantic representation are sufficiently involved and interesting that they deserve separate treatment not undertaken here.
We observe here incompatibility between tools in opposition, at cross purposes, to both add and
take away special attention to the agent. This is one tip-of-the-iceberg example of the myriad
issues, far beyond the simple topic/focus conflict seen here, that can be handled in a
straightforward way if intention is represented in linguistic rules. When this approach is
extended to many other areas of syntax, attractive and simplified solutions become available for
a surprisingly wide range of problems.

The operative hypotheses of this paper surround the question whether linguistic rules are
preferably formulated in terms of linguistic structural intentions, a theoretical position that has
perhaps not heretofore been fully examined to resolution. From a preponderance of diverse cases
involving linguistic problems that resist authoritative solutions, we seek to demonstrate that
linguistic theory is strengthened when it inclines toward incorporation of components of
linguistic action and intention.

The goal is to show that the exclusion of linguistic intention and action from generative rules
introduces artefactual complexity and undesirably precludes the discovery of powerful natural
constraints on characterizations of the human faculty of language. The inclusion of intention in
linguistic rules both enables solutions of otherwise intractable problems and enables simpler,
more natural solutions generally while probing explanations for the profoundly important
syntactic observational effects uncovered by generativist methodology (e.g. locality, crossover,
C-command, control). Theorizing based on linguistic intent leads to thinner, simplified, more
directly empirical argumentation compared to the indirections necessitated by complex syntactic
analysis based on central configurational syntax. TG argumentation, by adding a new dimension
of recordable and verifiable data subject to independent validation, thereby enjoys resistance to
the view that it is merely stipulative or reductionist and facilitates a new way of looking at
generative grammar. By accounting for a wide range of unacceptable sentences in terms of
natural limitations on linguistic intent, TG contributes to an understanding how the complexity of
human languages can be learned largely in the absence of negative data.

2 Re-factoring the Generative Program

To test our theses we select from among difficult and vexing problems in syntactic theory. We
present and defend empirically transparent and radically penetrating mechanisms for these
problems while rigorously constraining the notion of a human language in support of the primary
Chomskyan goals of explaining infinite linguistic creativity from finite resources and rapid child
language learning in the context of poverty of stimulus data. We conclude that syntactic theory
requires specification of structural intent in order properly to solve a set of the most difficult
theoretical challenges.

When syntactic phenomena are understood to be conditioned by linguistic action/intent
descriptors, difficult problems yield to straightforward solutions: conflicting intents yield ill-
formed sentences. When generalizations are sought at an incorrect and incapable level of
representation, unnatural and unnecessarily contrived solutions unavoidably result. By
incorporating intention action directives into linguistic structure building, syntactic problems
generally acquire a facilitative utilitarian resolution: much of syntax is transformed into
functional processes of cognitive mechanics. Important fundamentals of syntax are reducible to a particular form of structural cognitive manipulation and syntax is no longer so autonomous a component of linguistic competence. Much of the Chomskyan Weltanschauung and the resulting theories can be retained and revalidated, but much also is to be gained by re-factoring the organizational structure of linguistic science.

TG represents a sub-paradigmatic shift in syntactic theory to the extent it can be integrated to the minimalist program. Some tenets are revised but important elements are retained. The concepts of poverty of stimulus, universals, ill-formedness, recursiveness from Merge, interpretation, generative capacity, filtering, and so forth are reapplied in an alternative architecture of linguistic competence.

We present a range of arguments from linguistic and poetic data that action intents are at the generative core in a set of syntactic processes. When the intentions underlying structural decisions are examined, separate from the internals of syntax, semantics and pragmatics, all three may be subject to simplification, potentially increasing the scope of constraints on the operations of human language.

The entire enterprise of investigating linguistic intent is seen finally to highlight the thesis that constructs such as C-Command and a lexical merge operation may be deeply fundamental to a linguistic ability wherein tools are used to produce sentential products. TG brings out the essential theoretical importance of a Merge operation since it is logically inescapable that lexical choices in any realistic process of sentence generation become assembled into hierarchical structures, and the latter are among the best motivated of linguistic theoretical constructs. Merge is a tool for assembling other tools.

To the extent that the generative program can provide explanations in terms of universal grammar, it becomes less perplexing and paradoxical how children can learn highly complex natural languages so expeditiously, while at the same time developing intuitions about classes of sentences that they deem unacceptable despite never having been exposed to those them. Since TG provides an architecture and modularization oriented to linguistic intent and affords simple and natural explanations for many types of ill-formedness, it has the potential to contribute to an understanding how languages are learned in the absence of this negative data.

It may bear emphasizing that the Cognitax Tool Grammar approach to human language builds on, rather than undermines, the generative program of the Chomskyan School of linguistics. The main impetus is to use as a database the vast collection of linguistic effects to be found in work on generative syntax. These would not be available and could not have been conceived were it not for the Chomskyan insistence on theoretical rigor as a required framework for targeted data collection of a kind that is necessary for scientific progress. Far from aligning with positions that are antithetical to the Generative Program such as (Tomasello & Ibbotson, 2016) or (Everett, 2012), TG carries the direction of research to a new sphere in the same domain. Chomsky identified early that rule recursion can be associated with one dimension of linguistic creativity, the generation of an unbounded set of structures from finite processes but it is a misrepresentation to identify linguistic creativity merely with recursivity. Chomsky later provided a further profoundly insightful formulation whereby the merging of pairs of subunits
into larger structures also satisfies the need for structural unboundedness. By providing that pairs of units can be combined into a larger structure, whether lexical items or phrasal substructures, the Merge process of the Minimalist Program affords even greater formal explanation for the unique capability of human linguistic capability.

Rather than seeking to undermine or displace the generative program, the proposed revision in the present work would amplify its importance even further to any extent that additional explanatory power is made available. Chomsky’s massively influential foundings of generative grammar builds from profound observations on the creativity of human language. To the extent that a revised architecture can uncover a new level of linguistic creativity it validates the Chomskyan proposal by judiciously extending its initial programmatic formulation. The inclusion of linguistic structural intent in linguistic analysis opens further the possibilities for discovering new dimensions of linguistic creativity.

3 Background: Cognitax is Linguistic Action

Architectural work on large symbolic systems frequently leads to the observation that undue complexity arises when there is an attempt to capture and express regularities at the wrong level of generalization, i.e. where natural conditioning properties are inexplicit or unexpressed. A primary thesis of TG is that there has been excessive idiosyncratically contrived complexity and resulting instability in Chomskyan theories of syntactic competence when generalizations have been sought apart from the factors that condition them. This implies that superior solutions might be achieved at a different level of representation. The vast syntactic literature seeking explanations for which sentences of a language may or may not be acceptable can be reviewed for potential reanalysis if the fundamental reasons for linguistic structure formation are examined in detail. Syntax might be significantly reduced in a utilitarian context to cognitive mechanics of a utilitarian kind. TG explores the world of syntax with the mindset of cognitive functional mechanics.

The origin of the present works goes back to discussions with an anthropologist finely attuned to the linguistic actions of a native language. As she gathered material and made progress on the phonology, morphology, lexicography, etc. of the language she was so carefully archiving, it seemed a gaping insufficiency that linguistics could not offer elicitation field tools for the vocabulary of social life actions that interested her. Linguistics offered methodologies for phonetic transcription, phonemic discovery and transcription, morphological analysis, syntactic description, and promising scientific frameworks for theory, but there was little tradition for recording or analyzing the semantics of the actions that are so obviously carried out in the process of speaking. This stood in stark contrast with the myriad expressions available in every language to characterize what a speaker is doing with words. Elicitation of semantic detail can be difficult, yet every field linguist asking what something means has likely known the experience of hearing rather what the speaker is doing when words are used. This suggests a dimension of semantics which is closer to the surface origination and easier to elicit and describe than the intricacies derived after difficult thought about receptive interpretation in a truth functional model theoretic semantics framework. TG assumes the validity of a particular methodology: when a linguist elicits or records data s/he could well write down an answer to the question what a speaker is doing when a certain form is used. What is the action?
Chomsky’s massively influential generative program has fundamental attributes which are unassailable, but nevertheless extensible. Language is cut up into competence and performance to put scientific focus on cognitive ability, adding a divide and conquer strategy necessary in the midst of the overwhelming complexity of human language. It brings to center stage rapid language learning in childhood and the startling recursive creative potential of language, while also imposing empirical constraints on putative theories and mechanisms. Generative mapping, with its emphasis on formalization, testing, and minimal contrasts of sentence acceptability, provides discipline to guide hypotheses toward the counterexamples necessary for progress. There has been an extraordinary collection of distinctive facts and patterning effects for a large number of diverse language phenomena. Its methodology has been highly effective as a stimulant to scientific advancement, but can also entail forward interests involving new perspectives. For all the fecundity of the unfolding Chomskyan vision, theories have retained syntax, and neither semantics, pragmatics nor higher cognition, as the core focal center of language generation.\(^7\) While the range of data has widened broadly, the area of focus, syntax, has remained narrow relative to the full range of operational linguistic phenomena. The fundamental unit of study, the sentence, has arguably remained without a satisfying definition.

In TG we explore whether a shift in perspective can be advantageous, wherein language is viewed not so much as centering around syntax as the structural action semantics of intentional\(^8\) purpose.

Among many dimensions of scientific challenge, the generative program has focused on the speed and ease of child language learning but has not so much set a paramount goal to explain why in the worlds’ languages there should be such variability, or instability or ambiguity.

TG adopts the idea that elements of language are to be understood as having an intentional functional purpose. Elements of this idea have existed in linguistics for some time, generally involving the analysis of a relatively limited set of abstract functional concepts such as focus, theme, {fore|back}ground etc. TG is distinguished by placing an elaborated system of functional intention at the controlling generative core of language and elaborating a rich set of functional concepts/categories used to explain linguistic phenomena. We advert to tangential prior work by a wide range of researchers, including Halliday’s systemic functional approach (Halliday, 2004), lexical functional grammar (Bresnan, 2001), the psychomechanics and psychosystematics of Gustave Guillaume, Walter Hirtle and John Hewson (Hirtle) (Hewson), cognitive linguistics of e.g. Wallace Chafe, , George Lakoff, and Leonard Talmy (Lakoff) (Talmy), construction grammar of e.g. Charles Fillmore George Lakoff, Goldberg, and Ronald Langacker (LANGACKER, 1986) (Langacker, 1999), Andre Martinet’s Functional Syntax: (Langue et Fonction, Paris : Denoël, 1969, ©1962, Studies in Functional Syntax, München, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1975, Syntaxe générale, 1985, Fonction et dynamique des langues, Paris, Armand Colin, 1989.), the Prague School, and so forth,. A goal of TG is to bring diverse elements of various theories into a unified, inter-compatible linguistic framework, while discarding orphaned beliefs disconfirmed by ongoing empirical work.

TG is compatible with, and benefits from, restricted elements of each of these traditions but

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\(^7\) Paradigmatic and other systematic aspects of morphology have on occasion also been overlooked.

\(^8\) Since much of this work is about linguistic ‘intention’ it should be clarified that what is meant is the plainer meaning related to planning and not the philosophical sense of ‘intentionality’ relating the representations to the content they refer to. The latter topic, which is not considered here, is clarified, for example in (Georges Rey, 2015).
distinguishes itself by extending the role of specifying linguistic intention to a much greater degree and in much greater resolution than has previously been proposed. It also seeks to integrate with Chomsky’s generative program re-combining characteristics of various approaches at the same time.

Special mention should be made of Pieter Seuren’s work on Semantic Syntax and his pioneering formulations of the computerized means by which semantic initiatives can result in syntactic results. His work showing how lexically driven patterns result in syntactically formed configurations in a computationally transparent style are helpful in conceiving the manner by which linguistic intentions might resolve into patterns of acceptable and unacceptable sentences. While our theoretical framework is different, we take from Seuren’s endeavors the belief that linguistic theory is enhanced, not just by the notion of formalization emphasized by Chomsky, but by actual formal implementation as a generative computer program, which is arguably an optimum goal for formalization in linguistic theory.

Whereas various authors have shown overlap between the syntactic and pragmatic components of linguistic competence, e.g. (Chierchia, 2004) (Horn, 2000), etc., our aim is to explore a reorganized view of linguistic generation based on the central concept of linguistic tools which are used to realize a generative component of linguistic intent. Rather than examine only the structural and configurational generalizations, i.e. syntax-generative rules, and what their projection onto truth functional semantics might involve, we propose to investigate more narrowly what the speaker intends to do and how s/he does it structurally. A sentence intention is a formative set of decisions for external representation of thought by means of highly constrained, conventional, interlocking structures and processes, which we call ‘tools’. We refer below to this general area of investigation as ‘cognitax’ tool grammar. Cognitax concerns the decisions speakers make in formulating the structure of sentences. Without proposing that the full-blown inferentially derivable meaning of a sentence underlies and explains syntactic structure, it presents a view in which syntax is not so autonomous as it is often conceived. Cognitax as a discipline is separate from truth semantics and pragmatics insofar as the intentions underlying utterances can be demonstrated to have psychological reality separate from the processes of truth semantics, interpretation and inference. By demonstrating its independent necessity in explaining the phenomena of language we aim to demonstrate its psychological reality as domain of representation in linguistic processing. Cognitax is neither inferential semantics nor pragmatics but a set of separate representations marking linguistic structural intent.9

The present work on TG is limited to core phenomena roughly associated with syntax and its semantic correlates. It bypasses for the most part important broad areas of linguistic science such as truth functional semantic interpretation, discourse, background encyclopedic awareness, and so forth. In this way the work may seem initially less ambitious than works such as (Seuren) and (Halliday), but since many of these wider fields of research involve pre-linguistic cognitive processing in one way or another, TG may be found by adjustment to be compatible and to interact with these and other theoretical frameworks as part of a larger program of re-factoring linguistic analysis. We see advantages to encouraging more of a theoretical lingua franca for

9. Investigations of the evident interactions among cognitax, semantics and pragmatics best awaits preliminary exploration of the former.
linguistic science,

4 Variations on Chomsky’s Galilean Challenge

Among Chomsky’s major scientific contributions was to turn linguistic science toward the questions: what do speakers know that enables them to speak their language, what inherent capabilities enabled the language to be learned, and what does our knowledge of the structure of language tell us about how it might have arisen during the evolutionary process? The formidable force and impetus from this paradigm-changing perspective cannot of course be denied, but it also directs us toward future enquiries regarding: What is next in extending the reach of deepening understanding? It takes only a step to one side to observe that through generative linguistic studies large domains of linguistic science can not only be explored, but, as Chomsky recognizes, opened to new inquiry. What will be the direction and magnitude of the scientific momentum created by Chomsky’s general contribution to linguistic science?

The impetus of our comments here is to propose that there are available means to increase and redirect the momentum of generative grammar by reconsidering and re-adjusting very basic assumptions. We first identify, factor out, and catalogue a number of Chomsky’s most recent central directives about the human language capacity with a view to contrasting their specifics with modestly different but important and consequential alternative working assumptions. Secondly, we seek to challenge this set of particular tenets that have been central to the generative program on the grounds that a comparison with the alternatives can be based on empirical investigation rather than methodological philosophical grounding. Significant additional progress can be enabled by the possibility of new assumptions underlying generative grammar:

By way of preview, our perspective and prejudice is to ask what ever dictates, as has been traditional, that generative grammar must be defined to connect linguistic expression to full semantic interpretation, the latter assumed to be unified, speaker with hearer, undifferentiated and resistant as such is to definition and unification in its various aspects. Given the pervasive, almost definitional, possibilities of misunderstanding and mis-construal of meaning on the part of any receiver, we ask if the generative paradigm can benefit from a reconfiguration rather to connect only linguistic intention on the part of the speaker to the form of expression which is emitted.

To organize our survey we itemize and summarize Chomsky’s points from a recent overview article: “The Galilean Challenge” (Chomsky, The Galilean Challenge, 2017). We propose in particular to circumscribe the manners of creativity that Chomsky is addressing in his recent work, that is, we ask: What is the “Chomskyan Notion of Creativity”, and how does it differ from other possible conceptions such as the particular notion of “Instrumentation Theory”10 that we propose?

To understand the relationship of Chomsky’s notions to Instrumental Creativity, it will be useful to keep in mind the simple definition of Instrumentation Theory (or IT) that we propose, namely

10 By “Instrumentation Theory” we refer to what we call elsewhere “Tool Grammar”.

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the set of investigations that follow from the working hypothesis that linguistic theory must have reference to linguistic intention on the part of the speaker: linguistic rules are configured to involve specification of linguistic intent. The speaker is viewed fundamentally as trying to do things in form and content, and using language as a tool independent of any necessary congruence or exact isomorphic mapping with interpretation on the part of the receiver. We sometimes refer to Instrumentation Theory as “Tool Grammar”.

Chomsky has been writing clearly and elegantly and it is not hard to interpret his recent ideas, so we will use direct quotes extensively to minimize misrepresentation and distortion of context, etc. Quoted material in the following is taken from the aforementioned article unless otherwise noted. We examine the larger philosophical issues in order to lead contrastively to those of Instrumentation Theory. Here is Chomsky’s primary organizing principle.

*The Basic Property takes language to be a computational system, which we therefore expect to respect general conditions on computational efficiency. A computational system consists of a set of atomic elements, and rules to construct more complex structures from them*

This has been historically helpful as in initial working methodology, but can be viewed as insufficient, describing a system to connect meaning to sound lacking the concept of intentional function which is empirically evident wherever language is found. Every sentence is self-evidently beyond just mathematical connection, it enacts intentions of representation and more. A language is not only a computational connection but a projection of intent in the form of a representation of externalized characterizations, typically in the form of assertions. Given this evident reality, the question arises: how ever would it be established that the proper level of generalization for the discovery of linguistic science must be limited within intention-less structure? It is evidently better inclusively to posit structures for linguistic intent itself in order to see in which of the alternative domains the better understanding of human language’s complexities falls out.

To frame his perspective, Chomsky quotes Galileo on the challenge of *Full Creativity*:

…what sublimity of mind was his who dreamed of finding means to communicate his deepest thoughts to any other person, though distant by mighty intervals of place and time! Of talking with those who are in India; of speaking to those who are not yet born and will not be born for a thousand or ten thousand years; and with what facility, by the different arrangements of twenty characters upon a page!

We note that Galileo clearly refers to the full creativity of human communication from the issuance of thought formulation all the way through to externalized speech, and including understanding by the listener. For this reason we propose to call Galileo’s idea “*Full Creativity*” or “*End-to-End Creativity*” in contradistinction to the more limited conception that Chomsky’s approach illustrates.

Chomsky correlates his scientific inspiration with that of Arnauld and Lancelot per a quote from their *Grammaire générale*:
…one of the great spiritual advantages of human beings compared to other animals, and which is one of the most significant proofs of reason: that is, the method by which we are able to express our thoughts, the marvelous invention by which using twenty five or thirty sounds we can create the infinite variety of words, which … permit us to express all our secrets, and which allow us to understand what is not present to consciousness, in effect, everything that we can conceive ….

Consider also Chomsky’s own inclusivity as regards his conception of the ‘language of thought’:

…the atomic elements are word-like, though not exactly words; … its lexicon. Lexical items are commonly regarded as cultural products…. … Closer examination of even the simplest words reveals a very different picture, one that poses many mysteries.

This characterization factors in the creation of lexical vocabulary, and it is useful to separate this out as “Lexical Creativity”, which, we shall see, Chomsky leaves as a challenge for future investigation. Chomskyan Creativity is adjustable to cover Lexical Creativity, but inclusion is postponed in the current state of science. This corresponds to the advent and creation of a most important collection of human linguistic tools so looms important in the context of linguistic anthropology.

He also quotes Descartes who proposed a deeply creative principle to account for the “human capacity for the unbounded and appropriate use of language”:

“our ability to do or not do something … when the intellect puts something forward for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, … we do not feel we are determined by any external force.

Chomsky takes from this that the creativity of language not only distinguishes human beings from non-human animals, but also human beings from his ability to foresee the potential of machines. Chomsky notes

A machine may be impelled to act in a certain way, but it cannot be inclined; with human beings, it is often the reverse. Explaining why this is so, is the Galilean challenge.

Chomsky thereby implies a separate concept of “Unmechanized Creativity” per current conceptions. While those familiar with modern computation, including its default actions, fuzzy logic, Markov models, Bayesian algorithms, and so forth, may balk at the breadth of this delineation, Chomsky is hesitant to include what is left after all that, and does not foresee undertaking this most daunting of challenges.

Chomsky also credits von Humboldt for attention to the general mathematically defined theme:

…language must provide for the possibility of producing an undefinable set of phenomena, defined by the conditions imposed upon it by thought. … It must, therefore, make infinite use of finite means…
Here, he circumscribes the separate concept wherein many objects may be generated from a finite system in a purely computational but not inherently functional context. This concept, which is putatively separable from other dimensions of creativity, is formal and mathematical in nature allowing a conception where it can be envisaged in a machine implementation. We can refer to this concept as “Mathematical Nonfunctional Creativity”.

In contrast with mathematical nonfunctional creativity, the foregoing separable unmechanized dimension of linguistic creativity, which is a form of free will instigation in expressive choice, is separated conceptually by its relatively free nature in functionally relevant content and form selection. It is the interface from which linguistic structural representation emanates, potentially understood as a separate module or domain of knowledge. This is inherently coupled to sentence formulation so deserves recognition as “Free Choice Conceptive Creativity”.

As we see from this breakdown, Chomsky firmly couches the goals for his linguistic program within the Galilean Challenge but there are multiple dimensions of selectivity in varieties of the general idea. Among the various notions of creativity, Chomsky’s phrasing is often general without differentiating all the various facets. This can be a limitation on the opportunity to articulate alternative theories that factor linguistic competence differently. Here is an example indicating an orientation to quite a general idea:

“The capacity for language is species specific, something shared by humans and unique to them. “

He does not initially narrow the scope leaving exclusions to the course of discussion. How the domain of linguistics is implicitly circumscribed is important for the range of investigations that are encouraged.

Chomsky refers to what he calls the “Basic Property” of human language:

“the means to construct a digitally infinite array of structured expressions; each is semantically interpreted as expressing a thought, and each can be externalized by some sensory modality, such as speech”

Significantly, the Basic Property includes neither decisions from thought formation about the manner or content of expression, nor the production of a physical output. For this reason it is useful to refer to this Basic Property as a more limited “Basic Property of Structural Connection”. This connection of meaning to output quietly assumes that the meaning to the receiver is not differentiated from the intended meaning of the speaker.

Fundamentally, this formulation lacks the component of selection which is essential to structural embedding and recursion that is pervasive in linguistic data and at the center of more general notions of creativity. The selection of thoughts to be expressed from the fuller range of
contextual and motivational thoughts the speaker entertains is comprehended. Nor are the selections or options regarding the construction and form of expression countenanced. Similarly, Chomsky leaves to one side evident differences between what the speaker intends to convey and the varied possibilities for interpretation by a listener, deferring also important questions whether the ‘meaning’ of the utterance is even able to be well defined in his formulation. Chomsky’s notion is exclusively one of structural connection, intermediating between the formal structured objects of expression and the putative formal structures of input and output. This does not advert to the functional and intentional nature of linguistic utterances so reduces it to rather more mathematical apparatus than might be taken from the everyday understanding of what creativity in language entails.

Chomsky’s tacit assumption that “semantically interpreted objects” involve a well-defined concept of transmitted meaning contrasts with the alternate view that the speaker projects intended meaning leaving interpretation as a separate but derivative action on the part of the receiver. By way of illustration, consider a speaker who utters “Hey you!” We see immediately from even this trivial case that the meaning to a hearer must be derivatively different since s/he neither understands it as “Hey you!”, as if uttered one’s self, which would refer to another, nor as “Hey me!”, which is infelicitous in any case. Just this shows there must be a separate interpretive action. One might suppose that there is merely a simple semantic transliteration of sorts here shifting the points of reference, but this cannot be. Consider the case where the utterance is in the vicinity of a single person on one side of the street and a group on the other. “Hey you” can refer to the single individual or an individual in the group but is not likely to refer to the whole group (especially if a dialect allowing “Hey yous!” is involved). There is no shared meaning but only the presence of an intention which must be clarified by looking, or asking “Who, me?” A simplified view that there is a simple, generalized meaning only to get attention would result in a conclusion that “Hey, you!” is an idiom with meaning not derivable from its parts, which it clearly is not. Even this simplistic example demonstrates that there is not a well-defined concept of utterance meaning shared by speaker and receiver, but only intention in the flow of linguistic action. Meaning is often transactional, i.e. derivable from a process of interaction, that is, communication.

Chomsky is well aware of the larger communicative context. He understands the

“infinite set of semantically interpreted objects” to be a language of thought capable of linguistic expression, and that enters into reflection, inference, planning, and other mental processes [which …] when externalized, can be used for social interactions.”

An essential aspect here is the establishment of a modular boundary between linguistic intention and structural formation. Chomsky modularizes out not only communicative and social factors, but, quite radically, any and all aspects of linguistic puposefulness. This is a fundamental assumption underlying both Chomsky’s work and the generative program which has surrounded it. The question has not been asked whether the structural properties of Chomsky’s syntactic structural component might better be explained by inclusion of the intentions of the speaker, both structural and conceptual as formal inputs to syntactic formation. How much of the complexity of language might reduce to regular principles were it examined in the context of what the
speaker is trying to do? Sentences are actions which have motivations, and these may be essential to an understanding of the structures which result. This possibility is best considered as an empirical matter requiring scientific examination rather than any indelible assumption inherent to the field of linguistic syntax.

Here we make a further fundamental observation, namely that the characterizations of structured linguistic objects as essentially a language of thought capable of use in communications excludes a priori the more inclusive possibility that they are part a language of communicable cognition adapted both to thought and communication. Chomsky’s restrictive contention, which is a formidable scientific hypothesis, requires proof and validation so it is useful to mark it for reference as the “Communicative Cognition Segregation Hypothesis”. Structural analysis to the exclusion of communicative function is a hallmark of what might be termed the “Chomskyan Exclusion”. It has been proposed but not operationally proven in empirical investigations. A methodological simplification, successful for the purpose of gaining momentum in a new scientific field, can limit progress later if it lacks a basis in underlying realities. Considering the possibility of domains of thought dedicated to the instrumental manner of communication, the proposed distinction between thought and communication may be confounded or convoluted in the absence of further investigation. What is to say that decisions about linguistic structure are not thoughts?

Chomsky envisages a system of structural formation which neither includes, nor interacts intrinsically with whatever part of cognition is used to plan sentences and develop intentions for their formation. We term the separability of intention computation as “Linguistic Intent Exclusion” and refer to structure generation without such as the “Intent Orthogonality Hypothesis”. These can become subject to empirical investigation within the generative program.

Chomsky’s proposals do, at the same time, explicitly involve particular adjustments to the original Galilean Challenge.

…traditional formulations were in terms of the production of expressions. In these terms, the challenge overlooked some basic issues. Like perception, production accesses an internal language, but cannot be identified with it. We must distinguish the internalized system of knowledge from the processes that access it.

We follow tradition by referring to this as the “Linguistic Competence Separation Hypothesis”. It is justified by association with processes of computation:

The theory of computability enables us to establish the distinction, which is an important one, familiar in other domains.
Reference to covert cross discipline assent opens the possibilities of interdisciplinary resonance. In computation one process may of course have reference to a self-contained module, database, or schema effected externally to it, but questions then arise about interaction effects among modules as well as the content and structure of system architecture. These fundamental questions perhaps undermine the argument by pointing to unresolved wider issues of modularization, such as whether linguistic intentions are inside or outside the generative module being proposed.

Chomsky notes that science was limited in the theory of computation prior to the 20th century

“…tools were not available for formulating the problem in a way clear enough to be seriously addressed” … [until] “the general theory of computability” … [which] …“demonstrated how a finite object like the brain could generate an infinite variety of expressions.”

He continues to establish strict modularity for the structural component of language, comparing it to arithmetic

…we distinguish the internal system of knowledge from the actions that access it. … we depend on many factors beyond our intrinsic knowledge of arithmetic. Constraints of memory are the obvious example. The same is true of language. Production and perception access the internal language, but involve other factors as well, including short-term memory.

This again explicitly excludes the possibility of discovering coupling effects on structure from linguistic action intents. The “Linguistic Competence Separation Hypothesis” is justified as a probe for advances by attempting operationally helpful simplifications of the problem space. Such has been fundamental to the generative program’s dramatic role as a catalyst of scientific advancement. But is it unconfirmed as theory, under-motivated by available data and vulnerable to revision over time? The answer lies in contrasting work based on different assumptions.

Chomsky himself adverts to mysteries surrounding the fullness of creativity in human language and visits the boundary between intention and syntax, but glancingly excludes the latter by fiat:

There has been considerable progress in understanding the nature of the internal language, but its free creative use remains a mystery.

Citing the complexity involved even in the simple action of raising an arm, and quoting neuroscientists, he speculates how much more involved human language might be while not at the same time addressing the reverse possibility of increased simplicity in case language is not analogous:

we have some idea as to the intricate design of the puppet and the puppet strings, but we lack insight into the mind of the puppeteer.

We refer to this distinction as the “Action Control Exclusion Hypothesis”.
Chomsky separates physical action including necessary intermediations from structures of internal thought, but leaves unaddressed the possibility of internal thoughts which trigger the intention and conception of linguistic structural expression. Of particular interest for syntax are the intentions or decisions to express a particular configuration of thought and related intentions and decisions how to configure its expression in particular structures. At the considerable depth where Chomsky leaves the analysis of the formulation of the Galilean Challenge, the role of internal mental intentional decisions has importantly not been taken up.

Chomsky leaves for the future the question of mental actions which are decisions to say so and so in such and such a manner. We term this mental intermediation between the well of thought and the drawing of expression as the “Intention Inclusion Hypothesis”. Instrumentation Theory is formulated on the view that this as a potentially important empirical juncture. The specification of linguistic intention as part of the generative capacity either does or does not advance the possibilities of simplicity, understanding, and explanation in linguistic science.

Given the degrees of freedom of linguistic creativity, how many dimensions must be encompassed to enable a basic and understanding of the human faculty of language? Instrumental creativity involves a set of speaker decision choices that has not been investigated as a controlling factor. Instrumental creativity, involving selection of stylistic and syntactic forms, bears a prima facie relationship to the resulting syntactic structures so it might be argued that the onus falls to those who would impose a separation. We illustrate this point below using Chomsky’s examples, but first consider the role of simplicity in Linguistic Theory, which has been a long-standing theme for Generative Program.

Couching the Basic Property in the framework of computational systems Chomsky postulates

a set of atomic elements, and rules to construct more complex structures from them.

and enlists simplicity and efficiency for an explanatory role:

we therefore expect to respect general conditions on computational efficiency.

Also:

…we are bound to seek the simplest computational procedure consistent with the data of language. Simplicity is implicit in the basic goals of scientific inquiry.

Chomsky interestingly speculates:

Linguistics seeks the simplest theory for an additional reason: it must face the problem of evolvability. …. The few facts that are well established, and others that have recently been coming to light conform to the conclusion that the language faculty is very simple…
We summarize Chomsky’s position as dominantly favoring mathematically simple and efficient theoretical postulations and refer to it as the “Dominance of Mathematical Simplicity Hypothesis”.

This extends the contrast between the Chomskyan Exclusion and alternative views: Chomsky relies more heavily on syntax-internal mathematical efficiency and simplicity than any broadened notion including functional or operational processes. The notion of simple is affected by the range of data that is considered. The various intentions of speakers are themselves an observable and verifiable form of data which add an empirical dimension of purpose. 11

The discussion presented so far can be illustrated by considering Chomsky’s linguistic examples.

Universal properties of the language faculty came to light as soon as serious efforts were undertaken to construct generative grammars.

Among the accumulation of important discoveries Chomsky is recently emphasizing the rather more simple matter of structure dependence.

These included simple properties that had never before been noticed…. One such property is structure-dependence.

Chomsky refers roughly to dependence on hierarchical embedding, which is related to the concept of constituency, that has long been central to linguistic analysis. This involves parts that can have parts in contrast to a linearly ordered concatenation of a string of elements without embedding properties

“ignoring properties of the externalized signal, even such simple properties as linear order.”

Here are basic illustrative examples of the “Structure Dependence Hypothesis” that he cites:

_The boy and the girl are here._ … no one is tempted to say _is here_, even though the closest local relation is “girl + copula.” … …we rely on structure not linearity, taking the phrase and not the local noun to determine agreement.

_He saw the man with the telescope_, which is ambiguous, depending on what we take to be the phrases, although the pronunciation and linear order do not change …_Birds that fly instinctively swim_. The adverb “instinctively” can be associated with the preceding verb (_fly instinctively_), or the following one (_instinctively swim_).

_Instinctively, birds that fly swim._ … extract the adverb from the sentence …The ambiguity is now resolved. The adverb is interpreted only with the linearly more remote but structurally closer verb _swim_, not the linearly closer but structurally more remote verb _fly_.

11 It is fair to allow that Chomsky could envisage a step-wise progression of science whereby new observational data is acquired and incorporated in stages over time allowing simplicity to function as an efficient metric at any particular stage.
… ignoring the simple computation of linear distance, and keeping to the far more complex computation of structural distance.

He believes there is no current understanding why such should be so:

The property of structure-dependence holds for all constructions in all languages, and it is, indeed, puzzling.

Nor does he find that approaches based on patterns of language use adequately meet or address the fundamental problem:

Structure-dependence is one of the few non-trivial properties of language that usage-based approaches to language have sought to accommodate. … All fail. … Why does this property hold for all languages, and all constructions?

Chomsky orient his theoretical direction to formal simplicity, rather functional explanation, which he sees as beneficial in both biological and methodological contexts:

The computational operations of language are the simplest possible. This is the outcome that we hope to reach on methodological grounds, and that is to be expected in the light of evidence about the evolution of language.

Consider Chomsky’s primary example.

Instinctively, birds that fly swim

He notes that instinctively associates with swim, which is structurally closer than fly.

At the crux of our thesis that intention is at play in syntactic results, there are evident observable aspects of this sentence that are not addressed by an analysis relying solely on structure-dependence. By not addressing these, important dimensions of analysis are bypassed. Note that the instinctively is moved to the front of the sentence, raising the important question why a speaker might or might not do that; the speaker must have had some intention. The word is emphasized. Structure transparently reflects function here. Effects are evident from basic empirical observation that can be added to the analysis. In this case, the adverb is given emphasis.

Moreover, one might continue and ask why the speaker constructed the phrase “birds that fly” in the first place, rather than simply “birds”. The added predication was necessarily an intentional decision for a reason, which is fairly transparent. It is a restrictive action limiting the class of birds being represented. This additional data enables additional hypotheses of explanation. The restricted class birds that fly can be further restricted if fly is itself restricted as in fly instinctively but that interpretation as in Birds (that fly instinctively), swim, is not available in Chomsky’s example. Given such a stacking of predications, it is natural to hypothesize that the reason for structural dependence is a general constraint that if an element is to be restricted it should be restricted locally rather than the functional alternative, to disperse sub-predications distantly and disconnectedly throughout a structure. This line of thinking thus achieves an explanation for
Chomsky’s partial explanation. It is not simply that *instinctively* has direct attraction to the structurally close element, but that it cannot associate with the distant sub-restriction *fly* packaged and sealed in the that-clause.

We see here constraints against the creation of uncertainty by disconnecting the predication from its target, leading to a tendency toward structural locality which Chomsky highlights. An alternative analysis covering more dimensions of data is that ‘birds that fly’ shows encapsulation, the packaging of elements for further higher level processing being concomitant with a natural constraint that once elements are packaged they can’t be further predicated from outside at a distance.

The core of Chomsky’s observation about adherence to structure is indicative, since the adverb that is not predicationally far appears structurally local, but the utility seen in the data of intent is also evident. It is a natural linguistic inclination that to emphasize or focus content (‘instinctively’) it can be moved to the front, and this imposes locality conditions on predication. To the extent there is validity here there is a beginning to an answer to the very question that otherwise might be considered mysterious: Why is structure dependence a constant in human language? If predications were moved away from their targets it would create inordinate uncertainties about the intention of the speaker: connecting or moving elements at a structural distance creates obscurity, ambiguity and uncertainty since all the intervening elements require exclusion for the predicative relationship that is intended. This contract between speaker and receiver achieves an explanation for Chomsky’s observed regularity.

The optional positioning of *instinctively* also highlights another question, namely whether the stylistic positioning of the adverb at the front in itself reflects a thought. Without some evidently superfluous intricacies of mechanism, the view that structure reflects the language of thought would seem to indicate that differences in structure would also reflect differences in thought. This simple logic leads to the conclusion that the functional or stylistic movement of the adverb reflects a difference in mental intention and an action in thought. Under these assumptions we observe a necessary conclusion, akin to a proof, that intention is part and parcel of structural formation. We see a possibility of inclusion of linguistic intent within the realm of theorizing from the logic of Chomsky’s own investigations.

We have observed that the movement of the adverb is evidently for reasons of communicative emphasis. If such were not true we would have to wonder why a single thought might take two different formations. This is an illustration that structure formation is adapted not only to reflect the core institional thought but also to configure the output for effect on the listener. This affords the possibility that language structure may involve dimensions of communicative purpose, wherein language serves a dual purpose for the structure of thought as well as the exigencies of efficient communication. If structure reflects thought, we see the possibility of a logical inference that it must be connected to communicative function even within the assumptions of the generative program.

Returning to the theoretical question of the provenance of structure-dependence and mathematical creativity, Chomsky posits that structure-dependence and simplicity come together as co-benefits in the elementary Merge operation he proposes to account for human language structure.
… consider the simplest recursive operation, embedded in one or another way in all others. This operation takes two objects already constructed, say X and Y, and forms a new object Z, ..... Z can be taken to be just the set {X, Y}. ..... the operation is called Merge. ..... the objects constructed, however complex, will be hierarchically structured, but unordered; operations on them will necessarily keep to structural distance, ignoring linear distance. The linguistic operations yielding the language of thought must be structure-dependent, as indeed is the case.

The simplicity of Merge is seen as explanatory for the ubiquitous structure-dependence in language.

An appeal to simplicity appears to answer the question why all human languages must exhibit structure-dependence.

We refer to this as the “Mathematical Merge Orientation” in linguistic theory. We call it mathematical because there is no emergent functional context.

Chomsky amplifies the scientific justification for merge by positing an extension of its applicability to syntactic displacement:

Displacement is a ubiquitous and puzzling property of language. Phrases are heard in one position but interpreted in two, both in their original position and in some other position that is silent, but grammatically possible. The sentence, “Which book will you read?” means roughly, “For which book x, you will read the book x,” with the nominal phrase book heard in one position but interpreted in two.

Chomsky again adds a reference to computational systems in support of his proposal:

Displacement is never built into artificial symbolic systems for metamathematics, programming, or other purposes.

This claim might be reviewed in the context of pointers to functions which return NULL under contingency, highlighting the need for a broadened comparison of the generative grammar conception of a computational system with the panoply of possibilities in computational contexts.

Chomsky’s approach benefits from casting displacement phenomena simply as an internal merge involving two copies in different places. He does not, however, here reflect in detail on factors triggering the copy, nor the implications should copies be massively generated in need of filtered reduction at transformational or interpretive stage.

Merge automatically yields displacement with copies—in this case, two copies of which book. The correct semantic interpretation follows directly.
The value of simplicity is seen as reinforced by the proposal that displacement conflates with Merge:

… displacement with copies is a predicted property of the simplest system. Displacement is, in some respects, even simpler than Merge, since it calls on far more limited computational resources.

There is an unaddressed systemic question here regarding what triggers internal Merge, begging questions of functional context and linguistic intent. Simplicity can only be convincingly evaluated by a larger program of comparison of Chomskyan mathematical connections against a functionally more inclusive system.

Chomsky’s hypotheses imply considerable required work which will impact the ultimate validity of his principal claims. Specifically, one looks forward to discovering whether the extreme degree of fundamental simplicity might or might not have an inverse effect by creating unwarranted complexity when others try to solve myriad linguistic problems using the core principles. Chomsky is methodologically correct in aiming for simplicity on a variety of dimensions, but it remains to be determined whether an increased simplicity at the level of mathematical connection will be pervasive in larger solutions encompassing a wider range of available data or counterproductive. We term this matter the “Monotonic Complexity Hypothesis.”

Chomsky reinforces his argument for pervasive reference to structure by extending it to other phenomena including “such properties as referential dependence and quantifier-variable interaction”.

…“The boys expect to see each other,”

“each other” refers to the boys, …

“Which girls do the boys expect to see each other?”

…“each other” does not refer back to the closest antecedent, “the boys,” … it refers back to the more remote antecedent, “which girls.” … That is what reaches the mind under Merge-based computation with automatic copies….

Again, this analysis is clearly correct, leading to questions why it might be, and interest in possible answers in a functional context. The occurrence of “which girls” at the front of the sentence indicates a primary intention to seek information about an unknown and also signals that it is connected to some verb according to its requirements for constituents of support. It is well accepted that it got there by a location process that is traceable. The verb ‘expect’ requires a complement either of the form ‘expect to V…’ with assumed identical subjects as in “The boys expect to see each other”, or ‘expect someone/thing to V…’ with assumed different subjects, as in “The boys expect the girls to see each other, but not both. These are mutually exclusive. Therefore the reading with different subjects is not compatible with the phrase “which boys” which can have no origin. We see here clearly why ‘each other’ refers to the structurally closer element. It is simply because the other possibility reflects an incompatible conflict in intentions in
which the primary carrier of linguistic intention to resolve an unknown, “which boys” would be left with no role whatsoever. ‘Expect’ requires an intention to have either different or same subjects, but not both. The explanation for Chomsky’s observation is a constraint against implementation of linguistic intentions that are at odds with one another. The question becomes not so much how to rule out a particular formation or interpretation but an examination of the processes of intent such that inopportune formations reflecting contradictory intents would never be generated in the first place.

Chomsky further argues that deletions in displacements are inefficient from the point of view of the listener, raising the question why there are deletion phenomena at all.

Deletion of the copy in externalization … [is] among the major problems of automatic parsing and perception. …

“Who do you think ____ left the show early?”

the gap marks the place from which the interrogative has been moved, creating a long-distance dependency between the interrogative and the finite verb. If the interrogative copy were not deleted, the problem would be much reduced.

Chomsky associates his analysis with “principles of efficient computation” to explain which copy is retained:

one copy must appear …[as]… evidence that displacement took place …. In … languages like English, that copy must be structurally the most prominent one.

But no functional explanation is provided for why there should be deletion given that interpretation by the hearer becomes complicated:

The result is to leave gaps that must be filled by the hearer. This is a matter that can become quite intricate.

Chomsky sees evidence here that language is not so much a tool of communication as one of thought, putting to one side the evident possibility that deletion itself might be for communication efficiency:

Language design appears to maximize computational efficiency, but disregards communicative efficiency…counter to the common belief, often virtual dogma, that communication is the basic function of language.

Significantly, with dramatic, but perhaps necessary discontinuity in the logic, Chomsky characterizes the basic properties of language as unexplained, saying they “remain quite puzzling”. We forego the details surrounding this particular example, since it they are similar to the previous, but note the salient observation that communication efficiency is somewhat enhanced by not
having to repeat a co-referential element as long as undo uncertainty is introduced. Chomsky’s conclusion that communication factors recede behind structural ones becomes very much an unresolved open question when it is considered that a third approach based on functional intent is viable and plausible. Once intention is considered as a possible controlling factor for syntactic processes new understandings become possible where both structure and communication play a role.

The broad alternative perspective is that linguistic phenomena might become less puzzling as functional and intentional factors are considered. The core basis of linguistic recombination Chomsky refers to as the “Merge” operation might also be viewed as historiographically implicit in the traditions of Dependency Grammar (modulo/excepting specifics such as being unordered) dating all the way back to Aristotle, and even genetically cognate with the very idea of constituency present in many theoretical approaches. Since Dependency Grammar views the notion of predication as formative and fundamental, we can easily evoke a necessary implication of its recursive power as roughly suggested in phrase structure rules, or other formulations:

\[
\text{Predication} \Rightarrow \{\text{Predicator}, (\text{Support, ...})\}
\]

\[
\text{Support} \Rightarrow \{\NP, (\text{Predication})\}
\]

(This is intended to be indicative only and not a formal statement)

This modestly different perspective, that hierarchy comes from actions of predication, has the attribute that it provides an extra-mathematical functional explanation for the existence of Merge as a consequence of the act of predication, namely that verbal expression requires the application of attributes to things. Otherwise there is no information. This interconnects linguistic theory with information theory as well as mathematical simplicity as a desirable attribute of linguistic explanation.

On the notion of complexity generally, it is well known that when symbolic systems are compiled and realized for real world application it can be advantageous or necessary to abandon simplicity in favor of redundancy for the purpose of speed and efficiency. Similarly, one observes tradeoffs among interacting systems in which reduced complexity in one results in increased complexity in another. These comparisons are suggestive comparisons rather than empirical arguments, but they might well be considered together with references to the theory of computation that Chomsky includes in his analysis. Generative solutions that have been proposed not infrequently involve a subjective level complexity that makes them seem inherently counter-intuitive. The question of simplicity must be considered quite globally in any complex set of hypotheses about that nature of human language.

The psychological reality of linguistic structure, well supported by constituency, dependency, hierarchy and merge, will evidently be an incomplete construct without a complementary understanding of why and how it arises.

If linguistic structure, understood as a product of a Merge hierarchy-building operation, is a defining characteristic of human language the resemblance to predication operations begs for inves-
tigation as a likely explanation for the existence of merge hierarchy and a functional explanation of its operational role. Does predication predict merged structure?

Chomsky carefully adjusts the Galilean challenge putatively to include only an integral computational system of internal knowledge for mathematically interconnecting a general cognitively idealized and indistinct level of meaning to its externalized representation, and to exclude sentence production and speech, i.e. linearization and pronunciation.

He has distinguished

… language from speech, and […] production from internal knowledge.

And posited

a language of thought, a system that might be remarkably simple

while attributing the complexity and variety of language to externalization:

Secondary processes map the structures of language to … externalization. These processes appear to be the locus of the complexity and variety of linguistic behavior, and its mutability over time.

Chomsky defers an analysis of the lexical items from which sentences are built:

The origins of computational atoms remain a complete mystery.

He recognizes that the notion of creativity which he seeks to capture in his proposals excludes the primary conception of the scholars who inspired him:

… the Cartesian question of how language can be used in its normal creative way, in a manner appropriate to situations, but not caused by them, incited and inclined, but not compelled. The mystery holds ….

There is an obviously valid claim as to the enormous progress that has been made in beginning to understand human language since the advent of the generative program:

A great deal has been learned about language since the Biolinguistic Program was initiated…more has been learned about the nature of language, and about a very wide variety of typologically different languages, than in the entire two-thousand-five-hundred-year prior history of inquiry into language.

The generative program inspires a new generation of linguists much in the way it has inspired two or three previously:

The more we learn, the more we discover what we do not know.
And the more puzzling it often seems.

We can now summarize. A sentence is a constructive action to project a representation of thoughts and as such has characteristics of actions as well as information structures. The action of sentence creation projects and externalizes the speaker’s intentions for linguistic representation, and involves somewhat different processes from the interpretation by those who receive the sentence, frequently with different from that intended by the speaker. Meaning as applied to speaker intention is different from meaning as derived by external interpretation, so that any system that connects output to meaning in an overly unified way confronts an ill-defined and systematically ambiguous concept.

Abstract mathematical concepts of syntax lacking functional notions fail to capture the basic observation that sentence construction involves actions of predication and modification resulting in hierarchical structure. By assuming that syntax is a system to connect idealized meaning to output sentences and implementing a theory to embody that characterization, modern syntax can effectively bypass scientific definitions for the important observable objects of language, namely the sentence and the word. Once a sentence is understood as an action for representational purposes, functional definitions of these natural world objects become feasible since there is a locus for the whys and wherefores.

Finally, we can precis the scope of contrasts between the Chomskyan Challenge and the alternative approach that subsumes linguistic intention. Chomsky is generally flexible, modest, and forward looking with regard to avenues of inquiry that seem mysterious at the present time. He excludes Lexical Knowledge and fundamental explanations for the Basic Principle and Structure-Dependence. He orients formal scientific investigation of the core linguistic capacity away from the instigation of linguistic communicative processes, as well as the physical actions of expression, and restricts linguistic science according to the discipline of simplicity. The Instrumentation Theory approach is similar in many respects but views the intermediary mental intentions to select and structure information for expression as amenable to empirical investigation. In addition, Instrumentation Theory seeks explanations beyond (and perhaps even explanatory of) mathematical simplicity in the functional processes that can be observed underlying the actions of human language. Chomsky highlights the human capacity as being quite different from that of a machine and chooses to consolidate knowledge of linguistic structure in a separable domain using methodologies and analogies that refer significantly to the properties of machines. This perhaps begs for the re-imagining or elimination of the concept of a computational machine in the human language module. Instrumentation Theory in contrast incorporates immediately and directly a set of properties of human behavior that are sufficiently limited in scope that they can be incorporated in machines we know or can today easily imagine: specifications of intent can trigger structural formations. By incorporating specifications of intention in linguistic analysis Instrumentation Theory seeks to advance more fully the understanding of human abilities that have motivated Chomsky and those that inspired him.

The challenge now, later in the Chomskyan era of linguistics, is to increase the momentum that his work has generated. What is next? How to explain what he has explained? In view of the outward complexity of language it might be tempting for some to frame Chomsky’s counter-intuitive claim for the extreme simplicity of underlying language systems to Voltaire’s *Candide,*
but we disagree strongly viewing Chomsky’s discoveries as profound contributions which stimulate further questions.

5 Ill-Formedness and a Working Methodology

If language engages the application of a set of tools, ill-formedness, in all its variation, can result from picking the wrong tool for the intended task, or combining incompatible tools, or not having the prerequisites for some tool. In general, unacceptable sentences don’t occur in normal usage and it is natural to seek the most direct explanation. Syntactic theory has never come close to explaining all the sorts of ill-formedness documented in the literature. (Ross J. R., Haj Ross’s papers on syntax, poetics, and selected short subjects, 2014) We present the hypothesis that there are so many manners of ill-formedness because there are many tools in a language that have natural restrictions on their use. Examples of ungrammatical sentences might be likened to trying to paddle an elevator or forcing square pegs into round holes, or where there is no hole at all. A goal of this paper is to demonstrate new resources for the explanation of patterns of unacceptability.

Since we claim that structural action semantics can be transcribed, and is at the core of the language faculty, an operative question arises whether problems which have been considered unresolved, controversial, or even intractable might succumb more easily when the fundamental actions of language are factored in.

The methodology for exploring our hypotheses will be to survey and comment on selected problems and key data from the following sources, with some emphasis on central or difficult problems:

- Standard textbooks in generative grammar
- Well documented unresolved problems and issues
- Specific works documenting areas where generative grammar is incapable
- Problems of metaphor, stylistics, and poetics which in their finesse can be regarded as quality control on syntactic theory

We pursue this program of investigation below, undertaking preliminary analyses to explore a theoretical goal of discovering strong constraints on the limits of human language.

6 Specific Objectives and Scope

A full exploration of the relationship between linguistic intention and expressed linguistic realizations is a vast project so we must begin by limiting the scope of initial work. From one perspective, our purpose here is initially somewhat negative insofar as we aim to show that there can be alternative explanations to be explored for many unacceptable sentences which have been attributed only to configurational aspects of linguistic generation. So our first goal is to look again at why sentences may not be grammatical or acceptable, from another angle, based on the premise that for transparent and coherent reasons many recombinant structures, which may look possible when viewed from the limited perspective of independent variation, may not, instead, ever be of a nature ever to be preconceived due to cognitive constraints. In the context of these
original questions, we begin to explore the nature of a system that uses linguistic intention to preclude instances of what would not be said for utilitarian cognitive reasons. A number of scholars have pursued a more functional view of linguistic structure and have conceived certain linguistic rules as functional elements using a limited range of operational concepts such as theme, focus, background, and so forth. Our goal, in contrast, is to envisage a larger framework where the role of functional intent is massively expanded to provide operational workings that support and pervade the manifestations of syntax in a more encompassing way that also can enable more powerful constraints on universal grammar in the sense fundamental to the generative tradition. Our use of the term ‘tool grammar’ reflects an interest in analyzing as many syntactic phenomena as possible for underlying functional explanations.

Tool grammar presents a minimal hypothesis that careful examination of linguistic intent can greatly reduce the entropy of syntactic and semantic theory by independently explaining a plethora of ill formed sentences in a straightforward way leaving a more tractable set of separate remaining theoretical problems.

Whereas Chomsky’s minimalist program proposes a generative account of the syntax-centric connections between sound and meaning to include the creative, recursive component within those connections, we advert to the challenge of integrating such a system with cognitive creative linguistic intention and explore the implications of reconfiguring the program of research to incorporate such a level of creative linguistic cognitive action into the generative enterprise. We contemplate steps beyond a minimal revision such as adding a linguistic action interface to the syntactic component in addition to the phonological and semantic ones, and put it rather at the center of sentence generation. It is beyond the scope of initial work to proceed the full distance into this research program so we limit our goals to demonstrating the feasibility and advantages of such an approach while programatically outlining some directions that seem promising for future progress, and also observing in passing evident opportunities for imposing strong general constraints on form of possible language structures.

Formalization of linguistic theories is important to afford testability and to guide data collection toward an understanding of important structural effects. Linguistic science has progressed to the point where theories have begun to be formalized as actual implementations in computer code. Implementations as computational prototypes, even strictly within the domain of linguistic theory, may be especially revelatory for generative systems since they can not only validate the empirical claims but can bring new theoretical questions to light. Although we are not aware of a data base of regression tests for the acceptable and unacceptable sentences of any language we are preparing to implement our own proposals as a working prototype. This aspect of TG studies is beyond the scope of the present work but should be understood as an important longer term goal for scientific validation. While focusing on theoretical linguistics, we also envisage work toward a model of linguistic competence which lends itself to incorporation in engineered solutions for natural language problems. While we adhere to the importance of linguistic analysis and modeling, we also anticipate a possibility of machine learning algorithms attempting
automatically to mediate between specifications of linguistic intent and surface syntactic structures. Hidden Markov models and other statistical techniques may produce valuable linguistic engineering systems without hand crafted linguistic rules, and may bear useful similarity to neural models of brain functioning. While there may eventually be computer implementations, cognitax TG is initially formulated in the tradition of linguistic theory rather than computer science and as such neither inherits nor exhibits meaningful similarities to semantic grammars in the discipline of artificial intelligence.

We intend this work to be empirical but programmatic and incremental. We present arguments that a set of syntactic phenomena are attractively explained if the analysis includes a specification of linguistic intent for structures observed in data, but the objective is programmatic and exploratory with limited goals. The sole objective is to show that structural decision actions can contribute to an explanation of linguistic patterning. Discussion is limited to classic, challenging or resistant problems which motivate use of structural action conditioning factors that impose general constraints on generation by eliminating incompatible co-occurrences.

Since we can practically address a only subset of linguistic problems we leave open the possibility that some well-studied phenomena with settled solutions might or might not have purely configurational solutions as presented in mainstream work in autonomous syntax without a component of linguistic intent. We motivate the need for a linguistic action dimension in a set of cases and outline a preliminary alternative architecture of competence, but it is beyond the intended scope to examine the full range of syntactic processes which might thereby be impinged, nor to present a complete alternative system. To the extent our arguments are successful, theoretical syntax can benefit from incorporating a new dimension, but it would be premature to try to anticipate the full range of implications. There remain a wide range of deeply studied syntactic phenomena to be examined from the perspective of linguistic action intents. We do not here exclude autonomous syntactic solutions. For this reason, and since many questions are left open, any definitive conclusions about the degree of difference between alternative systems and architectures of competence would be premature and speculative. This caveat allows for the possibility that previous solutions presented in the literature may be not impinged by specifications of structural intent.

In summary, the objective, therefore, is only to argue that linguistic intent can condition syntactic patterning while outlining an alternative architecture of linguistic competence without articulating a full technical proposal in detail. Our process of analysis is an exploratory pilot to consider whether evident constraints on structure tend toward strong generalizations to help define the notion of what a human language is and can be.

We do not address issues of semantic analysis or semantic theory beyond the narrow and functionally restricted domain implicit in the tool grammar concept. The specification of linguistic structural intent has a qualified semantic nature but is limited to actions affecting structural choices and excludes issues of interpretation, compositionality, implication, inference, possible worlds, as well as the wider spectrum of linguistic truth-functional semantics as a general discipline. Notably, we do not propose that the full specification of the meaning of a sentence underlies the generation of syntactic structure as in the earlier tradition of generative
semantics. Our position is that one very limited tranche of semantic information is associated with linguistic choice, leaving issues of interpretation apart for separate study. Where work on generative semantics was challenged for not providing sufficient constraints on universal grammar, our hypothesis is that the theoretical use of one dimension of semantics in syntactic analysis, structural intention, opens the possibility not only of providing a stronger level of universal constraints, but one that covers data more completely. Generative semantics derives syntax from meaning; TG derives structure from intentions that result in selections of lexical items and constructions. In TG, syntax is not completely autonomous from a semantic realm, but neither is it fully enmeshed with the elaborations of interpretive semantic theory.

Our proposals include preliminary statements of compatibility constraints on the combination of structural elements. To the extent that these provide simpler explanations for complex phenomena, or preclude unresolved exceptions and resolve residual puzzles they become subject to comparison with systems of purely configurational constraints in generative. We argue that constraints on generation using representations of linguistic intent hold promise generally to simplify the statement of linguistic universals, thereby advancing the Chomskyan goals for a specification of competence. The ideal result would be a simpler system of constraints that stabilizes and grows as new discoveries are made, while providing better coverage for a wider range of data with fewer exceptions. It is interesting when analyses we develop in the TG framework seem to validate and replicate a set of Chomskyan conclusions that were not based on linguistic intent.

Finally, it is noted that many syntactic phenomena can be analyzed either as alternative related structures introduced into an utterance as a formational process, or as a basic pre-compiled lexical structure which is optionally transformed to an alternate form by a transformational rule. We do not in the present work undertake a comparison of the differences between lexical and derivational patterning, that is, between alternative formative constructions and options in the dynamic process of construction. For this reason we refer to the constructions involved in such alternations using the non-committal term ‘(trans)formation’.

7 Illustrating Linguistic Action: Passive is Not Active

In this section we do not analyze passive structures in detail but only demonstrate that the passive construction involves a cognitactic action and is not simply a mechanical or configurational manipulation. We call a structural linguistic action (or a combined set of linguistic actions) an ‘actioneme’ and symbolize its transcription using a dollar sign (‘$’). An actioneme is analogous to but different from the ‘sememe’ of traditional linguistics. It is understood as a basic psychological component of linguistic structural intent.

Actionemes are introduced as pseudocode (see below) in the spirit of computer system design where it is useful to summarize actions as part of the preliminary process of examining system architecture and coding strategies prior to later formalization in machine executable form. We discuss this aspect of actioneme representation below. The actionemes presented are useful to facilitate discussion for a system eventually to be formalized in executable computer language,
but they are also primarily useful for analysis of linguistic theory.

The actioneme is a basic recording of what users are doing, the originating linguistic action, when a linguistic element or structure is selected, but it does not include any full semantic specification of utterance meaning. The term actioneme is introduced to signal an emphasis on what forms are used to do, while larger traditional questions of what they mean are not directly engaged. Semantics generally involves discovering what a speaker is saying. In cognitax the focus is on what the speaker is doing in structuring an utterance. It is the difference between the content of a message and the strategies used to present the content. What is said, versus what is done, and how.\footnote{We differentiate our work from the earlier contentious tradition of generative semantics since we do not advocate that syntax should be directly derived from an underlying semantic representation in logical or other form, but that it is useful to posit an intermediary action phase involving cognitactic decisions that determines aspects of how structures will be built. Tool grammar involves this indirection and in any case does not address the historical arguments for or against generative semantics.}

The sememe is an element of meaning while an actioneme is an element of cognitax, or structural linguistic action. We take the meaning of an utterance to be the thoughts which the speaker undertakes to represent, while the cognitax is the set of decision actions the speaker takes in formulating how the meaning should be represented in external form. An actioneme is not an element of meaning in a normal broad sense. In the way that it can be considered semantic, it is reduced in a very restricted sense, oriented to linguistic action that results in particulars of sentence formation as a result of linguistic decisions for particular intent.\footnote{Traditional linguists might object to the introduction of a new linguistic term since ’sememe’ is available to refer to any basic unit of meaning formation, but we prefer to introduce a new term here to signal the contention that if fieldwork centers on eliciting the intended action of sentences, and linguistic theory incorporates intention in a theory of tools, that a new understanding of linguistic processes will result.} Since actionemes involve structural decisions, it might be asked why they should ever be characterized as ‘semantic’. The answer is that linguistic structural actions originate in the speaker’s thought processes, which is the domain of semantics as we intend it.

We propose that every linguistic (trans)formation\footnote{Or construction as the reader prefers. Throughout this paper transformations may be cast as alternate constructions depending on considerations which we do not presently take up.} has cognitactic content and introduce one example here to illustrate.\footnote{In case a theory denies the existence of a particular transformation and construes syntactic alternations to have been produced directly our arguments still apply because at some point in sentence production a choice of structure is made and must be reconciled with other choices.} The passive form of a sentence evidently is not functionally equivalent to the active form:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Al visited the sick woman.
\item The sick woman was visited by Al.
\item What was surprising about Al was that he visited the sick woman.
\item *What was surprising about Al was that the sick woman was visited by Al (him).
\end{enumerate}
This indicates that an actioneme is operative in the passive example: $\text{bringPatientIntoAgencyEventFocus}$. The active form can be explained as an unremarkable default or, possibly, since one can posit two possible functional intentions, as reflecting $\text{exhibitExplicitEventAgency}$. When a phrase highlighting special characteristics of the agent (such as “What was surprising about” or “Of all the foolish acts given her allergies”) is added, the tool drawing focus away from the agent becomes incompatible.

(5) Of all the foolish acts given her allergies, Al visited the sick woman in his wool sweater.
(6) *??Of all the foolish acts given her allergies, the sick woman was visited by Al in his wool sweater.

These examples show a cognitactic conflict\(^\text{16}\) between tools in opposition, trying in a single sentence, at cross purposes, to both add and take away special attention to the agent. We discuss a Cross Purpose Constraint further below.

As actionemes are proposed as operative in syntactic processing they should not be viewed as unredeemable subjective intuitions without rigorous scientific basis or theoretical foundation. We maintain that actionemes can be regularized and codified in ongoing investigations, and their validity as data can be established and replicated in a scientific process. Actioneme elements can be validated by properly interviewing linguistic consultants, by social science research practices, and by psycholinguistic experimentation. A properly motivated set of actionemes would have status beyond initial intuitions as formally validated linguistic constructs.

TG suggests possible explanations for the many dimensions of variability of structured expressions. A grammar might be understood as a repertoire of mental tools used in building actions based on conceptualizations rather than a fixed mechanistic generative competence. What are sentences built with? We propose TG or sentence action grammar as a utilitarian construction and delivery system; it makes use of linguistic structural action semantics defined in a broad but intuitive sense: What is the speaker doing with the utterance?

We aim to demonstrate the explanatory value of transcribing evident features, such, for example, as “assert completed” where such an action is manifestly present in the use of perfective structures. We call these features, when transcribed and presented actionemes. We envisage constraints on tools for the realization of linguistic actions, implemented in downstream syntactic processes, and call the holistic system cognitax. Sentence action meaning, unlike the predicate calculus of truth functional meaning, is viewed as procedural knowledge, i.e. methods for accomplishing things, rather than declarative knowledge, the static summarization of dynamic possibilities.

\(^{16}\) A cognitactic incompatibility is a situation where the use of one tool does not make sense in the context where another tool has been used. A representation involving both puts them in conflict. These may either be viewed as constraints on construction as we do here for purposes of demonstration, or might possibly be built into the individual tool structures so they are not candidates for insertion in the same structure. In either case we maintain that the filtering of incompatible structures follows from the common sense utility of the structures rather than abstract configurational structures.
8 Actionemes as Pseudo-Code

Actionemes are clusters of properties that represent linguistic action intent. We present hypotheses about linguistic actions using dollar sign actioneme symbols such as ‘$insertReflexive’. Actioneme symbols (represented with ‘$’ symbols) represent preliminary hypotheses aiming toward a standard vocabulary of linguistic action intents. They are utilized as a form of pseudo-code for methodological convenience with an understanding that the process of formalizing TG should call eventually for a range of mathematically explicit, more rigorous elements and forms. The purpose of pseudo-code is to engage higher level questions of structure, process and organization without falling into detailed questions at a lower level of generalization. Actionemes are shorthand in discursive presentations for a feature and function formalism which is conceptualized for a machine implementation as a generative system. A useful and conciliatory default assumption is that actioneme features inhabit and extend the feature space often referenced in syntactic and semantic theory but are given a revised and radically more enlarged role than has been countenanced previously. Pseudo-code representations abstracting away from the higher resolution of the most detailed analysis can be borrowed from computer architecture where it is exceedingly useful for preliminary analysis of procedural processes and is essential for discussions of alternative approaches prior to formalization into machine executable form.

The current work primarily considers issues of theoretical linguistics but can also be part of a design process for a computerized system that aims to properly formalize TG theory as an operational generative system subject to regression testing against a database of sentence forms. Actionemes often require phrases and reflect an internal complexity. This suggests the possibility either of a form of feature representation (e.g. $inquireJudgment [+inquire, +judgment]) or of embeddable function representation. (e.g. inquire(judgment()) ), and might possible involve mixed representations. The use of embedded functions implies a tree representation, begging the question, which we leave open, whether representation of action intentions fits naturally into the merged tree structures that result from lexical selection and assembly into increasingly larger units. Whatever the form of improved theoretical statements our hypothesis is that constraints on cognitive compatibility among linguistic tools can be formulated as patterns of actioneme feature or function complexes, and that, furthermore these can be integrated into the larger matrix of a linguistic theory. The general thesis is that linguistic tool intents are involved in a restrictive cognitive utilitarian mechanics, which can explain many linguistic phenomena, and is compatible with a variety of linguistic theories. Our current purpose is to advocate for the general approach so issues of formalization are not here addressed.
9 Motivation for a New Orientation

It is possible to look at the tradition of generative mechanical syntax and intuitively feel incompleteness with regard to an understanding of the essence of human language. Meaning is treated in generative grammar, but it doesn't have the central role that can seem from the outside as indispensable to any well-ordered discipline of linguistics. The present work attempts to address a void by bringing the particular semantics of linguistic action, what a user is doing when a particular structure is chosen, back into central focus, albeit in a controlled and limited way.

There is an essential tradition of transcription in linguistics. As a profession, linguists record data to systematically reflect structure in phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, etc. But what of the particular purposes of the uses of language structures? Syntacticians don’t generally systematically encode the elements of sentence intent as a commonly accepted practice, as they do the basic elements in other domains. Yet, structural action semantics is the glue that connects semantic intention to form.

All of language, considered as a phenomenon, is oriented around intended meaning, and syntax in particular is in service to it. Syntax can be understood as a meaning representation and delivery system, so one would expect, a priori, the severest of epistemological problems to arise should it be abstracted sufficiently away from the glaring reality of its essential purpose. Semantics has not found the centrality of its role in linguistic syntax perhaps because in its various manifestations it is not so directly observable or accessible and brings inherent difficulties as a result. Even the narrower spectrum of linguistic intention cannot be recorded except indirectly. It must be inferred to an extent beyond other dimensions of more direct representation. Yet, just as physical particles are discovered without any means of direct observation, contemporary linguistics has recognized the necessity to investigate central phenomenon with inferential work. While there are many scholars engaged productively in the broad generative enterprise of meaning theory, we propose here to focus directly on one particular and highly constrained dimension associated with meaning, the connective processes of utilitarian intent, as integral to the analysis of syntactic phenomena.

Syntactic work has historically inclined toward semantic analysis insofar as it has regularly imported quasi semantic elements (tense, modality, aspect, case, subcategorization, selectional restrictions, etc.) to accomplish its work. In TG similarly, we propose to extend the reach of syntax into the domain of structural intention so as to identify underlying factors and investigate their role in explaining linguistic patterns.

We propose an incremental ground-up approach to developing conventions for sentence action transcription. Our exclusive interest is in the inventory of linguistic actions rather than truth functional intensional systems, or other variants based on formal logic. We bring a narrow selection of semantico-intentional elements forward for their relevance in syntactic construction and patterning. Tool grammar distinguishes itself from traditional semantics, among other ways, by refraining from an insistence that all meaning representations be compositional in order to leave open the possibility that generative systems may be compiled for speed and function in ways that do not reflect the expectations of truth functional semantics.

17 There is a well known principle of psychology whereby one’s beliefs and attitudes are formed much by exigencies of circumstance, possibility, and realistic ability.
It is crucially indicative that human languages already have built-in vocabulary for expressing what one speaker posits another is doing in the course of language use. These expressions are a valuable basis of preliminary action transcription because they emanate from inside the system we would like to study. Users interpret linguistic intentions and report them using vocabulary already in the language.

We begin by extracting from everyday language terms that describe what some speaker is doing, or intending, or trying to do, by using a particular linguistic construction. We propose to draw upon this innate natural vocabulary as a stimulus to widen the scope of the study of grammar. We limit ourselves in semantics only to descriptions of conventionally recognized linguistic actions and the intentions that underlie them.

The TG approach does not in wholesale manner begin by rejecting the general thesis of configurational explanations for syntactic patternings, but only presents the advantages in particular but theoretically important cases of an amplified analysis, controlled in the domain of structural intent, which, after all, is prima facie quite natural to a functional view of generative processes. Arguing prior to full formalization, we use pseudo-code actionemes to explore the fundamental issue of the controlling factors for the occurrence of many patterns from reflexive anaphors to poetic structure. We refer to the TG regularities conditioned by linguistic action intent, and thereby having characteristics different from purely syntactical rules, as components of the cognitax of a language. The structures and processes of cognitax constitute a tool grammar for a language so may be thought of as synonymous terms for our purposes. The former is intended to convey the inseparability of cognitive sentence planning decisions from the understanding of syntactic structure, while the latter denotes the utilitarian aspect.

As noted, Tool Grammar is inspired by the observation that natural languages include numerous terms to describe linguistic actions (assert, deny, ask, tell, etc.), so there is reason to believe that external observations about action intents can be refined to a form of scientifically valuable data for theorizing about the processes underlying language behavior. Language itself thus provides some metadata about language which can afford a basis for developing a closed, controlled scientific vocabulary for systematically transcribing the linguistic intents associated with linguistic structures. The TG framework includes the hypothesis that those competent in a language are thereby able to ascertain intents underlying linguistic utterances, albeit in a naïve, unformalized form, that, for linguistic analysis, ultimately will require ongoing development in a standard scientific process of empirical rectification.

Beyond conscious awareness and the formulation of a controlled vocabulary of actioneme primitives, a central goal of a theory of action intents is integration with processes of structure formation in an overall theory of structural linguistic action. TG furthermore has the
potential to reveal that constraints on well-formedness correspond often to high level cognitive disciplines and strategies for managing complexity, uncertainty, integrity, consistency, information density and other cybernetic principles of information representation. TG can be summarized as a fully formalizable theory of cognitive utilitarian meta-linguistic structural action intents. An important goal is to achieve over time as work product a scientific controlled vocabulary for the range of linguistic intents available in human communication.

10 Evidence from Meta Reference

John Ross in one of his squibs raises a point of direct interest to the hypothesis that cognitax tools underlie human language use. (Ross J., 50 Years of Linguistics at MIT, 2013)

One mystery squib of mine was a question: what is the source of that in this sentence: “The rules of Clouting and Dragoff apply in that order.”?

The sentence implies a decision regarding which of conjoined terms to order leftmost/first. This evidently reflects a tool $specifyConjunctOrder, and it would seem ‘that’ must refer to this ordering, i.e. to the cognitax actioneme. This shows linguistic structure is self-aware and can refer to itself at the level of actionemes. The referent of ‘that’ is direct evidence that actionemes exist per the decision to place one item before another.

The example suggests that syntactic structures are connected to a process of construction which is improvisational and on occasion even self-conscious and self-referential. It is evidently prima facie evidence that syntax offers tools in a manipulation matrix, such as perhaps a whiteboard pointer in computational representations, rather than a contained generative automaton.

We take Ross’s questions as primary direct evidence for the existence of cognitax tools and their usage in sentence formation.

11 Some Historical Antecedents to Cognitax

In and from (Austin, 1975) there has been extensive work on the pragmatic and related aspects of language via linguistic use groupings such as locutions, illocutions, perlocutions, performative verbs, illocutionary acts 18, and so forth. 19 Classical work into the pragmatic effects on syntax includes (Searle J., 1979), which gives a taxonomy of pragmatic types, examples and analysis of

18 (Sadock, 2004) summarizes Austin's rough-out of illocutionary types
1. VERDICTIVES: acts that consist of delivering a finding, e.g., acquit, hold (as a matter of law), read something as, etc.
2. EXERCITIVES: acts of giving a decision for or against a course of action, e.g., appoint, dismiss, order, sentence, etc.
3. COMMISSIVES: acts whose point is to commit the speaker to a course of action, e.g., contract, give one’s word, declare one’s intention, etc.
4. BEHABITIVES: expressions of attitudes toward the conduct, fortunes or attitudes of others, e.g., apologize, thank, congratulate, welcome, etc.
5. EXPOSITIVES: acts of expounding of views, conducting of arguments, and clarifying, e.g., deny, inform, concede, refer, etc.

19 See (Sadock, 2004) for an overview.
verbal classes, and specific discussion of effects on syntax. In early generative studies there was interest in pursuing concrete derivational relationships between verbs of linguistic action and other aspects of syntactic study. John Ross pursued a performative verb hypothesis (Ross J., On declarative sentences, 1970) that would have a verb like 'say' underlying indicative sentences. The mainstream of the generative enterprise veered quickly away from generative semantics (involving syntactic decomposition of lexical items and other abstract devices).

Later traditions of generative work constructing purely syntactic solutions have indirectly provided evidence for what we present as actionemes. An example of this, among many, is Landau's postulation of underlying locative elements for experiential verbs (Landau, 2010), which in our terms outlined below would be recast as an action intent (actioneme e.g. $assertLocative). This is example illustrates a body of work pointing in the direction of cognitax analysis but stopping short of any proposal to orient linguistic syntax itself to structural action semantics.

This initial scaffolding is seminal, but does not portray the large universe of diverse language actions that are evidently at work in the full spectrum of language constructions, nor does it provide a systematic means for construction solutions using them.\(^{20}\)

The European functionalists proposed that pragmatics and semantics underlie syntax. (Dik, 1981) Although there are sufficient differences to make a full contrast with his theories of secondary interest, the role of intention as the initiator of linguistic events appears in Dik’s work. (Dik, 1981) (p.8). Dik does not identify a level of linguistic action or elaborate a level of linguistic intention so distinctly or with such a functional load for the generation of syntax as we propose here. Nor does he explicitly relegate the generation of linguistic intention, the anticipation of addressee interpretation, or addressee interpretation definitively to a higher cognitive domain. He views them more as intertwined in general with syntactic processes than as separate higher cognitive function. In contrast, for TG we propose linguistic action as an explicit level of generalization justified by its facility for explaining syntactic and other phenomena.

### 12 Basic Constraints on Focus Constructions

Cleft and Pseudo-Cleft constructions are documented in many treatments of English syntax, illustrated, for example, by (McCawley, 1998) p. 66.

\begin{align*}
(1) & \text{I gave a watch to my brother.} \\
(2) & \text{*It was a watch to my brother that I gave.} \\
(3) & \text{*What I gave was a watch to my brother.}
\end{align*}

These contrast with acceptable clefting (our examples):

\begin{align*}
(4) & \text{It was a watch I gave to my brother.} \\
(5) & \text{It was to my brother I gave a watch.}
\end{align*}

\(^{20}\)A useful and far-ranging treatment that maintains the formal separation of pragmatics from syntax also includes analysis of reflexives and other phenomena used to show interaction effects and some operational intermingling. (Ariel, 2008)
What I gave to my brother was a watch.
To whom I gave a watch was my brother.

It is evident that these (trans)formations exist to move material to a fronted focus position, but rules of syntax have not included a dimension to capture their functional purpose. We posit an actioneme for constructions such as these: $\text{giveFocusToSalientElement}$. If such an actioneme is associated with the syntactic (trans)formations the unacceptable sentences above would seem to be ruled out by a common sense constraint.

Single Focus Constraint

Given that the purpose of a focus construction is to bring an element to the fore, it is counterproductive to focus transform more than one element since focus on two elements is contradictory and detracts from the purpose. The focusing of two elements interferes with the proper focusing of either.

The focus item ‘only’ provides independent support for a variant of this constraint as illustrated by data from (McCawley, 1998) p 68. Contrastive stress is indicated by underlining.

(8) John only put flowers in the vase.
(9) *John put only flowers in the vase.

Here we see both ‘only’ ($\text{assertNoOther}$) and contrastive stress ($\text{assertThisOverThat}$) insinuating focus in the same sentence. When ‘only’ adds focus to the entire verb phrase, it can co-occur with contrastive stress on the locative phrase. But when ‘only’ focuses the direct object and contrastive stress focuses the locative phrase, they are not compatible. In this case we see that a corollary of the Single Focus Constraint operates within the verb phrase.

Overlapping Exclusion Constraint

Don’t use multiple focus devices that exclude possibilities when one exclusion is inclusive of a narrower one.

This example serves to illustrate the simplicity, directness, and empirical basis of cognitactic analysis, for which evidence can be marshaled in a wide range of syntactic environments.

13 Tools versus Rules

A tool is not equivalent to a rule. It encompasses more and serves a different purpose. A rule is a productive regularity observed by a linguist. It can be a generalization or a requirement or a tendency but it cannot in our view purposefully be used by a speaker to build a communication structure. A rule is for the theorist describing an observable pattern, a tool is for someone with an intention trying to accomplish something. A linguistic tool is useful in building a communication structure, which is an assembly of intentions represented by their particular forms. A set of sentences can be described statically or be abstractly generated by rules, but these auto-generated sentences do not serve a utilitarian purpose. Tools, in contrast, can be wielded to specific effect. As the product of tools, sentences are inherently useful, whereas a
purposeless generation of a syntactic structure is not.

We posit two fundamental types of linguistic tools: lexical and (trans)formational. We refer to linguistic tools that reflect the intention to configure or modify the communication in a particular manner for particular effect. They take syntactic structures in configurational syntactic complexes as input and generate modified configurational syntactic complexes as output, but always with some stylistic or other informational intent.

Formally, a rule can be characterized as a well-known schema with two basic parts: structural requirements and structural effects

RULE

Structural input requirements
Structural output effects including optional introduction of new material
(Extraneous parameters)

The structural requirements specify under what conditions of structure the rule is applicable. The structural effects specify the effects on the input structure when the rule applies. A third part records extraneous parameters of applicability as required by a particular theory. A rule may thus be characterized as ‘optional’, or can be selected as ‘active’ among a collection of universally available rules and conditioning effects which may or may not be activated in a particular language. Any number of ancillary parameters can be considered.

A tool, in contrast, can be specified with these same parts, but including, crucially, an additional part to specify utilitarian intent.

TOOL

Utilitarian intent
Structural input requirements
Structural output effects including optional introduction of new material
(Extraneous parameters)

To illustrate the difference, consider one simplified case of adding a lexical item and effecting a (trans)formation. A user chooses to insert a perfective morpheme to communicate that an event is completed. There is an input requirement that there be an event of continuance instantiated in a verb. New material is specified. The effect of the tool is to merge the new material, the perfective marker, into the input structure.

21 An alternative view of grammar would create the respective constructions independently without the intervention of transformation mechanisms. We do not consider this possibility here.
Perfective Tool:

Intent: $assertCompleted
Input requirement: verb of continuance: “He eats”
New material: ‘have + en’
Output effect: merge perfective marker: “He has eaten”

Now, consider the operation of a classic stylistic (trans)formation.

Passive Tool:

Intent: $bringPatientIntoAgencyEventFocusFrontToSalientPosition
Input requirement: verb plus object: “He eats the cake”
New material: ‘be + en’ (‘by_’) 
Output effect: The cake is eaten by him.
  Move object to front, subject to by-phrase, Merge passive marker: “The cake is eaten by him”
  Note: This structure might alternatively be analyzed as a lexical choice involving no transformational restructuring.

A main difference from standard generative grammar is that TG would incline to natural utilitarian solutions as part of the human endowment for problem solving with tools. The linguistic mind is projected as not so abstractly foreign to the conscious utilitarian human mind. All grammatical devices have been intantiated, given the constraints of universal limitation, by humans. Rationales for tools may be recognizable and understandable as intuitive inventions. Every linguistic rule may have been some inventor’s novel idea at some point prior to adoption by a community, and must be understandable with regard to motivation and intended effect. Empirical investigation will determine whether we risk a disservice to the tradition of a human linguistic lineage if we assume all intricate language capacity results from no other processes than a simplified setting of parameters. (Chomsky, The minimalist program, 1995) A language may, alternatively as here, be understood as an inventory of tools, selected from a universally available tool construction set (limited and extensible under meta constraints), together with a selection of parameters to determine how tools are individually configured and interact with one another. This possibility for innovation and invention beyond n-ary parameter choices can be advantageous in the case it is verified, as we suspect, that the variety of language constructions cannot be insightfully understood as a simple setting of parameters.

The crucial analytical difference between a rule and a tool is that the latter specifies intent using vocabulary of linguistic action descriptors. We anticipate these can be conventionalized over time from linguistic fieldwork in order to develop a putative universally available set, even while the structures realized from them can be differentiated and diverse. We hypothesize is that the listing of intents in a sentence involves a necessary operational characterization of meaning which will be more useful in the understanding of syntax than those associated with semantic interpretation and deriving from formal logic, which are less tractable and more removed from the psychological mechanics of utterance generation. For the purposes of TG, meaning is circumscribed as a series of functional and intentional steps taken to enact a plan for desired

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22 Operations are not formalized where we intend only to illustrate high level concepts.
effects. These are able to be observed and captured by the field linguist undertaking the analysis of language.

14 Distinguishing Grammar from Meaning

Since TG endeavors to motivate syntactic rules using action directives of intent, expressed in a controlled and circumscribed semantic vocabulary, the question naturally arises as to the fundamental distinction between grammar and meaning, and how it might be characterized in linguistic theory. Chomsky’s original contrast usefully distinguishes types of ill-formedness that intuitively seem either structural or semantic: (Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, 1957) p. 15

(1) *Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.
(2) *Furiously sleep ideas green colorless.

Whereas the first of these is viewed as grammatically correct but semantically amiss, the second lacks even grammatical well-formedness in the common view. Since TG views linguistic tools as devices for building structures to represent ideas externally, we are led to a natural expression of the grammar vs. semantics distinction based on the proposal that lexical items and syntactic structures are complementary tools for representing configurations of thoughts:

Semantic ill-formedness results from the combination of incompatible ideas in the formation of an utterance.
Grammatical ill-formedness results from the use of functionally incompatible tools, lexical or (trans)formational, in building structures for external linguistic representation.

In the first example above, green is a color, ideas cannot sleep at all, let alone furiously, which factors put the ideas at odds. In the second, less than optimal, example, assuming no expressive license, commas, or the like, which are other matters, the tools have requirements which are not met:

‘sleep’ has a slot designed for following/predicating a noun
‘furiously’ is a tool designed to fill a slot modifying a verb
‘ideas’ is a tool designed to fill a slot/predication calling for a noun
‘green’, ‘colorless’ are tools designed to fill slots preceding/modifying a noun

This original pair of examples was used to make a particular point by Chomsky, which is not quite the same as our concern here, so the contrast is not so targeted for our purposes. It combines elements of semantic and grammatical conflict and is also subject to various expressive and stylistic interpretations rendering them more acceptable. A better example for our purposes illustrates the point more directly:

(3) *In sleeps the.
We propose that the inclusion of a dimension of structural action semantics in the formulation of rules as tools still enables a clear distinction between meaning, which concerns ideas, and grammar, which concerns representational structures.

In general there are two types of linguistic tools: lexical and structural. Lexical tools are selected to map configurations of ideas to a conventionalized word structure. They bring with them constraints on the selection of other words that can co-occur with them. Structural, or (trans)formational tools build structure and determine the form of presentation of the source ideas as they are represented in the external medium. Because there are two types of tools there are three main types of grammatical ill-formedness depending on whether a tool conflict is

- lexical-lexical (e.g. subcategorization) e.g. *In sleeps the.
- structural-structural (formational conflict) e.g. *It was a watch to my brother that I gave.
- lexical-structural (e.g. government). e.g. *I wonder you are meeting?

In later sections of this paper we undertake to illustrate various types of tool conflict in reference to standard and difficult problems in linguistic analysis.

While on the subject of the grammar/meaning distinction it is useful to lay out what a linguistic utterance is in TG terms, and to clarify the relationship to semantics. TG holds that there is a higher context of cognitive ideation from which an utterance emanates, but it is not an intended part of the output linguistic utterance. A linguistic utterance is conceived as action directives selected in a higher pre-linguistic cognitive component. There are two types of action directives from which an utterance is formed:

- A selection of lexical items, which are pre-packaged objects of expression with semantic affinities at the level of the higher cognitive domain, deemed sufficient (pattern) matches for the ideas to be represented. The intent of lexical tools is always the same, to represent in conventional form configurations of ideas to be represented. Lexical tools include constraints specifying restrictions on other lexical items that co-occur in their presence. Lexical items do not include full semantic specifications, which must be constructed for the utterance by the addressee by reverse engineering based on the conventional packaging of words.
- A selection of formational tools, which are directives determining various aspects of how the utterance will be structured. Each formational tool is associated with an action intent such that some tool intents may not be compatible where the objectives in the tool use are in conflict. Passives, clefts, focus constructions, and so forth, including the full range of syntactic constructions discussed in the syntactic literature, are products of formational tools.

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23 There are more to the extent that one considers the exigencies and incompatibilities that arise when lexical items are merged into larger structures. These questions are elaborated in a later section.
With these two inputs, procedures of tool application suffice to generate the utterance. A sequence of merge operations renders the complex of lexical items into a single hierarchical structure while the formational tools render the structure per their input and output specifications into a derived form of representation. The generated structure is linearized as output in the expressive medium, e.g. sound, signing, etc.

Here it is worth re-emphasizing that for TG the utterance generation does not envisage the full range of possible semantic interpretation. There can be, and often are, misunderstandings. The understanding of what is meant or intended or implied or anticipated for an utterance is in the province of the higher and more general cognitive realm. It can of course be modeled by the speaker prior to the generation of the output representation, and is characteristically interpreted by the addressee on receipt. Nevertheless, interpretation is a separate process from intention so a restricted set of specific action intents must at some level be specified for the formational structure tools. A thesis of TG is that unacceptable conflicts can best be identified and understood in the domain of intention. This involves a restricted aspect of linguistic action semantics which must be associated with the process of syntax formation. In this way semantics is partially but not fully separated from syntax for TG in the way that Chomsky once prescribed:

[T]he study of meaning and reference and of the use of language should be excluded from the field of linguistics…[G]iven a linguistic theory, the concepts of grammar are constructed (so it seems) on the basis of primitive notions that are not semantic …, but that the linguistic theory itself must be chosen so as to provide the best possible explanation of semantic phenomena, as well as others. (Chomsky, Essays on Form and Interpretation, 1977) p. 139

In a larger sense, the fields of full semantics and syntax are modularized apart in TG because the full meaning of an utterance is associated with independent cognition before and after the generation of its output representation. TG includes a limited range of semantic actions in syntactic specifications.

This partial similarity to the Chomskyan approach, in separating full semantics from syntactic generation, belies, nevertheless, a major difference. While the generative enterprise characteristically has syntax at the center of linguistic competence, embodying the essential language properties of creativity, productivity, recursion and infinite range, TG places all of these in the cognitive sphere which generates directives to a less empowered and more compact syntactic component. Cognition is central to the TG view of generative linguistics with the syntactic component in a service role and one dimension of structural action semantics active at the interface. For this reason TG syntax can appropriately be labeled "cognitax". The organization of the TG system and its utterance derivation processes are discussed further in a later section.

To illustrate briefly, consider a substantial case, among many, where these limited semantic factors play a role in generative syntax is the selection of complements for verbs. A small subset of these admits of indirect question complementation. (Johnson, 2004) p. 51
(1) a. Martha denied that John has left.
(2) b. Martha said that John has left.
(3) c. * Martha wonders that John has left.
(4) a. * Martha denied whether John has left.
(5) b. Martha said whether John has left.
(6) c. Martha wonders whether John has left.

Here we see that 'say' and 'wonder' allow an indirect question. We propose that they can implement the action $countenanceAlternative. In contrast, 'deny' doesn't. Furthermore 'wonder' doesn't allow 'that' clauses for the meaning under consideration.

(7) *Al wonders that Sue will leave.

This illustrates a role we propose for cognitax actions. The indirect question complementizer 'whether' is a tool used by the speaker to $raiseAlternativesAsQuestion, while 'deny' has the action $ruleOutAlternative. The complementizer 'that' effects $assertSpecificFact. This allows unacceptable sentences to be ruled out by a constraint based on actionemes more direct than configurational syntactic mechanisms.

Cross-Purposes Constraint
Don't introduce structures that work against each other in basic utilitarian intent such as raising and excluding the possibility of alternatives in the same construction.

In this case we see some verbs explicitly raise the consideration of alternatives and are compatible with complementizers that envisage the same. There is no practical point in raising alternatives while also denying them. A verb like 'deny' that works to narrow the possibilities to a single specific action requires a complement that is consonant with that intent, and is restricted to a specific action. These evident characterizations tend only to be available by direct representation of intention in syntactic theory and are obfuscated by indirection in approaches which do not retain action/intention at the core of linguistic generation.

15 Linguistic Fieldwork and Actioneme Transcription
TG views meaning as being projected by action, so the corresponding approach to data collection may be quite different from the direct asking of what forms mean. For cognitax what one does with a sentence and its parts is more useful for development of a tractable linguistic theory than questions such as what a sentence or other item might imply or “mean” in a truth functional setting. The operative question is what the user seeks to achieve by using a form. We advocate that elicitation frames generally take the form: What is the speaker doing with a word, morpheme, phrase sentence, etc.? This includes minimal contrasts against expressions lacking the form in question. For those doing anthropological or other field work it is daunting to specify all the implications of a meaning of a linguistic element. The TG view of meaning is operational. An element may conceal a readily accessible meaning in any declarative sense but have operational effect to be understood by contrasting examples with and without the form in question. What, for illustration, is the declarative meaning of ‘even’. There may be no answer
prior to asking what speakers are observed to be doing when using this item in specific circumstances. Even as lay speakers, subjects are aware of a plethora of linguistic acts at all levels of structure, and are able to express and refer to these routinely, albeit in crude and raw form, with a general or dedicated native vocabulary. A single sentence or any of its units may, and characteristically does, involve a multiplicity of actions and subjects are not in general at a loss for vocabulary to describe them.

TG can rely on elicitation techniques such as the following, which are well-known to field linguists in any case:

1) What was the speaker doing when s/he used that element?
2) Why is that element there?
3) What’s missing if you take that element out?
4) Can you say something to show me how you would use that element in a different context?
5) If you took that element out what could you put in there that would do about the same thing? What are the differences?

To illustrate this general idea of transcribing linguistic acts, it is instructive to look, first informally, at everyday words that describe the kinds of actions speakers have in mind even independent of any theoretical linguistic interest. In English, for example, the vocabulary describing language actions is very large. It is premature to pursue a fixed conventionalized list of descriptors but it is useful to explore the domain by means of a sparse sampling of illustrative examples.

Some are common and general:

Speak, Talk, Verbalize, Say, (promise, swear)

Many describe the structure of argumentation:

Argue, Contend, Deny, Refute, Contradict, Prove/Disprove, Counter, Give a reason, Reason, Imply, Presuppose, (Dis)Claim, Associate, Deduce, Generalize, Correct, Reinforce, Assert, Hypothesize, Support, Evade, Suggest, Ignore

Some are essentially social beyond the basic interpersonal component inherent in other examples:

Deliberate, Discuss, Consult, Set expectations, Confer

Others have to do with rhetoric:

Introduce, Expand on, Summarize, Emphasize, Hedge, Indicate, Highlight, Insist, Gloss over, Be ironic

A good many are judgmental

Flatter, Insult, Denigrate, Praise, Bemoan, tattle, blab, babble

Many pertain to specific contexts:

Joke, Sermonize, Read, Lecture, Pray, Preach, Rhyme, Wax poetic, Sing, Order (at retail)

They can be idiomatic:

spill the beans, let the cat out of the bag,
Some terms describe language use but do not reflect a speaker intent:

- Be boring
- Make no sense
- Is confusing
- Stumble over words
- Be unclear

Of particular note, some such terms are of such general linguistic utility that they might be segregated out for the frequency of their utility.

- Negate
- Question
- Declare
- Declare Unknown
- Command
- Indicate
- Express doubt
- Express certainty
- Leave unspecified
- Emphasize
- Downplay
- Focus on

Others are so basic and general that they can be inferred from and associated somewhat reliably what has been held to be a grammatical construction.

- Quantify (‘the dogs’)
- Locate (locative case)
- Attribute (bike’s color)
- Modify (‘run quickly’)

This is but a small sampling of what is a large inventory of such terms. It is a major, albeit ultimately valuable, undertaking beyond the present scope to map out and analyze the full descriptive taxonomy. While some terms can be used to describe non-linguistic acts, they also have major or central uses where they do reflect language behavior. Many terms have such a dual role.

As natural language terms, linguistic action descriptors often overlap and cross-classify one another. Just as the phoneme is an abstraction\(^\text{24}\) often composed of multiple parts (/p/ bilabial, voiceless, /au/ [a] [w]) so these can be thought of as popular emic elements, which we refer to as linguistic ‘actionemes’ made up of analytical distinctive features that can combine in a variety of ways.

Usage of natural language descriptors in the field have the benefit of reflecting the interpretation of actual participants. While they can be used profitably in transcription of linguistic passages, scientific refinement and regularization can provide a formal, principled, canonical set over time. While further work is required to fully inventory, categorize, interpret and codify such expressions, we illustrate transcription of intention in an informal and exploratory way in this paper. Even with some informality, such transcriptions are empirically verifiable. Since they are manifest in popular usage, inquiry and experiments can determine and validate when and whether particular transcriptions have been accurately imposed on data.

There has been a recent focus on field methods for semantic and pragmatic research and regular coverage in conferences, including Semantics of Under-Represented Languages in the Americas (SULA). (Matthewson, 2004) (Gibson, 2010) (Sprouse, 2012) These areas of methodological interest are important for recording linguistic actions in syntactic and general studies as well.

In summary, speakers are typically doing many things at once when they utter a sentence, and it is valuable for the linguist explicitly to record individual actions implicit in the use of each sentence. There would be two primary questions to investigate in field explorations:

- **Generalizations:** Generally, what is the speaker doing when s/he uses a particular form or

\(^{24}\) The term ‘abstraction’ here is used in a non-technical sense when referring to phonemes, etc. in this paper without wanting to raise questions of exact theoretical or psychological status.
structure X?

Scenarios: Given an element X, what would typically be going on when a speaker uses X and what would a speaker be doing by the use of X in that context.

Directing field work toward the discussion of scenarios and situations, as advocated, in recent studies, enables more specific descriptions of what is being done with each tool. This is an important dimension beyond the bare judgments of acceptability and the glossed translations that have historically been the focus of syntactic studies. For TG the most fundamental records would be the actions in a sentence without involving a full exploration of inferences, truth conditions etc., which speak more to theories of anticipation, interpretation, inference, and so forth. We see linguistic action and intention explicitly mentioned when speakers talk about language. This provides an important empirical basis for linguistic theory.

16 Labrador Inuttut Inverted Number Marking

[NB: This updated section is available on request in the extended document.]

17 Inverse Number Marking Phenomena Elsewhere

We now turn to a set of apparent examples of inverse number marking apart from second person inflection. These occur in Dagaare, a language of the Niger-Congo group, and have been discussed extensively, including summary of previous work, in (Grimm, 2009) (Grimm, 2013). Grimm presents data suggesting that there is in Dagaare a single synchronic suffix, /ri/, which marks singular in one class of nouns, but plural in another (data from Grimm):

“same stem, yet -ri codes the plural interpretation for ‘child’ and the singular interpretation for ‘seed’”:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Plural</th>
<th>Stem</th>
<th>Gloss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b’i’e</td>
<td>b’i’r’i</td>
<td>bi-</td>
<td>‘child’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b’i’r’i</td>
<td>b’i’e</td>
<td>bi-</td>
<td>‘seed’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

He gives further examples illustrating the plural interpretation for lexemes glossed ‘child, tree, forehead, basket, pig, scorpion’, and singular interpretation for ‘seed, hoe (metal instrument), prop/pillar, root, dry spot, horn’. Grimm notes this sort of inverted number marking may be rare in the world’s languages but is nevertheless attested in Kiowa and Pacific New Ireland languages.

This data raises a number of questions and Grimm advances the discussion by analyzing and documenting the semantic source of the two classes in terms of individuation. He points out
difficulties in the theory of markedness for this data since singular/plural are generally regarded as unmarked/marked respectively, while their patterning is contrary to this in the Dagaare classes. Grimm does not address the thesis of (Smith L. R., 1979) wherein it is considered whether morphemes may function as markers of markedness, i.e. that singular and plural may be unmarked for two different classes, allowing a single morpheme to refer to the marked case in each. We deprecate this alternative position in the interest of pursuing a tool grammar solution as a deeper and potentially better motivated probe into the inverted number phenomena.

What is unmistakable in data presented is that all of Dagaare lexemes illustrating the singular interpretation clearly illustrate nouns referring to a collective system, and, furthermore, the ones with plural interpretation do not. 25

This data points clearly in the direction of an actioneme which reflects semantic dimensions of individuation per Grimm, and also count classification. Namely we posit that the morpheme seems cognitively unified around an actioneme $ASSERTCOUNTABLE$. The logic of this is that for a collective system countability arises and only makes sense where the individual element underlying the collection is conceptualized, while for the individuated noun, the possibility of counting arises just when the individuals are collected into a plural grouping.

This solution is related to a theory of individuation but offers an explanation why a single morphological form might be used to represent opposing valences: they are unified in the higher conceptualization of imposing countability. This solution illustrates an advantage of a tool grammar approach. If we analyze in terms of what the speaker is doing new possibilities arise, and in this case we open a window into a process that is natural and inherent as speaker action moves in the direction of counting. An analysis based on markers of markedness might unify the sense of the opposing forms, but, unlike tool grammar, it cannot provide an explanation why they should be unified in the first place, or at all. There is an apparent requirement here for the representation of linguistic intent in generative rules.

18 Crossover Phenomena

(THIS SECTION IS THE ROUGHEST OF PRELIMINARY DRAFTS SUBJECT TO UPCOMING REVISIONS. IT IS PROVIDED IN THE PRESENT FORM ONLY FOR THOSE WHO CARE TO JOIN THE TOOL GRAMMAR WORKING GROUP AND PROVIDE PRELIMINARY COMMENTS.)

Consider crossover phenomena in the following sentences where subscripts mark coindexation (coreference). (Wikipedia) Words with subscripts refer to the same person.

25 It is possible here to observe how a marker of markedness might present as an appearance in morphological patterning.
(8)  
a. \textit{Who}_1 \text{ said he}_1 \text{ was hungry?} – Crossover absent, intentional coreferential reading available  
b. *\textit{Who}_1 \text{ did he}_1 \text{ say } \_\text{ was hungry.} – Crossover present (strong), intentional coreferential reading unavailable  

(9)  
a. \textit{Who} \text{ told } \textit{Jill}_1 \text{ that Fred would call her}_1 \text{?} – Crossover absent, intentional coreferential reading available  
b. *\textit{Who} \text{ did } \textit{Jill}_1 \text{ say that Fred should call } \_\text{?} – Crossover present (strong), intentional coreferential reading unavailable  

(10)  
a. \textit{Who} \text{ will call his}_1 \text{ mother?} – Crossover absent, coreferential reading available  
b. ?\textit{Who} \text{ will his}_1 \text{ mother call } \_\text{?} – Crossover present (weak), coreferential reading unlikely  

(11)  
a. \textit{Which student}_1 \text{ called her}_1 \text{ instructor?} – Crossover absent, coreferential reading available  
b. ?\textit{Which student}_1 \text{ did her}_1 \text{ instructor call } \_\text{?} – Crossover present (weak), coreferential reading unlikely  

The reading of the a-sentences is acceptable. For only the b-sentences, the wh-word seemingly has moved, crossing the pronoun to the sentence beginning.

From an actionemic perspective this insightful configurational patterning succumbs to a more functional and naturalistic solution. It is evident that the pronouns assert a known reference back to an antecedent element $assertKnownReferenceToElement$, while wh-words posit an unknown variable: $declareUnknown$. It is therefore evidently counterproductive at an actionemic level to declare unknown a known reference. In the a-sentences, there is a known reference to an unknown, which does not involve an inherent contradiction because the known reference is directed toward an unknown target whatever it may refer to.

19 English Reflexives  
A solution is proposed in this section for the acceptability patterns and effects for reflexive anaphors, as a competitive alternative to a purely configurational syntactic approach. By associating a specification of linguistic action intent with each formational process, which distinguishes the Tool Grammar approach, a simple, functionally motivated analysis is achieved which probes beyond the undergirding configurational elements of C-Command control and the Extended Projection Principle. The alternative TG approach here opens a window and poses questions and alternatives for the architecture of competence.\textsuperscript{26}  

We present a TG analysis of reflexive, holding, simply, that for each rule or element of

\textsuperscript{26} Note that we use dollar sign pseudocode for architectural investigations into a system which is amenable to proper formalization and machine implementation.
structure in a sentence there must be specified, an element of linguistic structural intent, and
that the intents of tools are relevant and determinative with regard to where they may be
applied, thereby explaining patterns of acceptability/unacceptability. This approach does not
reject the general thesis of a configurational explanation for reflexive patternings, but only
presents the feasibility of a narrowed analysis, controlled in the domain of structural intent,
which is prima facie quite natural to a functional generative process. Arguing prior to full
formalization, we address the fundamental issue of the controlling factors for the occurrence
of reflexive anaphors. The TG regularities conditioned by linguistic action intent, and
thereby having characteristics different from purely syntactical rules, are characteristic of a
cognitactic view of language wherein syntax is not so separate from cognitive functional
purpose. By the association of purpose and intent with linguistic structural processes, we
orient our analysis of reflexive structures around the practicalities of its usefulness in an
endeavor to capture the essence from the perspective of utilitarian competence of language.

**Background Data, Configurational Approaches, Overview**

In the Minimalist Approach reflexives historically depend on the concept C-Command, which is the
configurational relation wherein the co-referential item must be the sister or be within the sister of the
referee. Here is representative motivating data:**Invalid source specified.** 118-20

1. I shaved myself.
2. *Myself shaved me.

In expanded treatments, three factors are useful in configurational treatments of the reflexive.
They are as follows: (Haegeman, 1994) p.207 ff.

- **CM Clause-Mate:** Reflexive is conditioned by co-reference inside the minimal clause.
- **CC C-Command:** Reflexive is conditioned by a co-referent in a C-command position
- **SA Subject Argument:** Reflexive is conditioned by the nature of the abstract local subject
argument

Our treatment will diverge from this strictly configurational analysis but dovetails well with
these previous generative analyses. In particular we find evidence that C-Command arises in
generalizations for an underlying functional reason Further, we argue that orientation to subject
role in syntax, associated with the probing insights of the Extended Projection Principle,
affirming that sentences must have a subject, derives its explanatory capacity from a necessary
philosophical view: sentences are fundamentally representations, implying that there would of
necessity be subject matter. These principles of generative grammar coalesce with concepts of
purpose and intent as the functioning of linguistic constructs as tools is considered.

Below we present an array of standard data and effects associated with discussions of the
reflexive in English, adapted from (Haegeman, 1994), Adger (Adger, 2002), (Carnie, Syntax A
Generative Introduction, 2007), and others. This data illustrates three contextual controlling
factors: a locality clause-mate constraint (CM), a hierarchical C-command constraint (CC), and a subject argument constraint (SA). The presentation is intended for those already familiar with the generative treatments of reflexive phenomena, which are well-rehearsed in the literature.

Following is the data set of acceptable and unacceptable sentence types which are the empirical basis of analysis. We recite relevant observations for each example:

(5) I shaved myself. Al invited himself.
(6) *Myself shaved me. *Himself invited Al (He himself left. *Himself he left.)
   a. Order or structure is relevant
   b. No anaphor in subject position
   c. Not c-commanded by referent so precedence not necessary in configurational treatment
(7) *Al invited herself.
   a. Co-reference required with feature agreement.
(8) *The man I saw shaved myself.
   a. Co-reference is lateral or down in embedding, not up..
(9) *My mother hated myself.
   a. Embedded modifiers of heads are out of co-reference scope.
(10) Al believes Sue to like herself.
    a. Reflexive occurs when co-referents associated inside same simple clause.
(11) *Al believes Sue to like himself.
    a. Higher subject co-reference is blocked across object control
    b. Reflexive doesn’t occur when co-referent in higher clause across object control.
(12) Al’s mother invited herself.
    a. Reflexive can refer to larger subject NP
    b. Covered by CC
(13) *Al’s mother invited himself.
    a. Not just CM but CC required since reflexive can’t refer to NP inside subject NP
(14) *Al said that himself left.
    a. Shows CC not sufficient, need CM too
(15) Al said that he left.
    a. Shows CC not sufficient, need CM too
(16) Al thinks that Sue hurt herself.
    a. CC insufficient
    b. Need locality constraint CM
(17) *Al thinks that Sue hurt himself
    a. CC insufficient
    b. Need locality constraint CM
(18) *I expect himself to invite Al.
    a. Locality (e.g. CM) insufficient
    b. CC required but phrase structure tree is debatable
(19) I expect Al to invite himself.
    a. Locality (e.g. CM) insufficient.
(20) Al believes himself to be the best.
    a. CC but not CM, so predicts ill-formed wrongly, but depends on phrase structure analysis
(21) *Al believes that himself is the best.
    a. CC but not CM so predicts ill-formed correctly
b. Also presents hypothesis that tensed S is controlling

(22)  * Al believes Sue's description of himself.
  a. CC but CM so predicts well-formed wrongly, showing the need for an additional
     constraint.

(23)  Al believes any description of himself.
  a. CC CM predict this but shows can’t just limit previous case inside NP

(24)  Sue believes AI's description of himself.
  a. Shows potential role of the logical subject.

(25)  The picture of himself upset AI.
  a. Reflexive in matrix subject position shows special nature of picture/description
     constructions.
  b. Shows potential 3rd factor, role of logical subject

(26)  * Al believes that Sue's description of himself is wrong.
  a. Correct prediction CC but not CM

(27)  Al believes that any description of himself is wrong.
  a. Wrong prediction since CC but not CM

(28)  (Sue believes that) AI’s description of himself is wrong.
  a. Correct prediction: CC and CM.

(29)  Al believes that a picture of himself will be on show.
  a. Shows that neither a tensed clause constraint nor a noun phrase constraint will
     suffice.
  b. It’s possible to call on an abstract concept of subject dependent on case marking
     features being present..

(30)  Al expected Tom to invite himself. Tom was expected by AI to invite himself.
  a. Object control is a trigger

(31)  Ed allowed himself to invite AI. Ed allowed AI to invite himself.
  a. Co-reference to and from the higher object

(32)  Al believed Ed to have hurt himself. Al believed himself to have hurt Ed.
  a. Co-reference to and from the higher object
  b. Object control triggers lower reflexive.

(33)  Al has to want to try to begin to save himself
  a. Subject control triggers reflexive through multiple embeddings.

The configurational approach extends to three structural factors to account for reflexive
phenomena. C-command and Clause-mate restrictions account for the majority patterns but
picture/description constructions as in (22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29) require the invocation of
an abstract subject concept, which is indirectly motivated under a number of contingent
assumptions.

Configurational analyses present specific hypotheses that stimulate further and deeper
investigation. They are highly effective for uncovering and probing syntactic and other effects.
They reflect directly on questions of which linguistic structures and processes are compatible
with human linguistic capacity, but do not, however, explore or posit reasons why any particular
linguistic structure may exist or how it functions in a utilitarian context. Configurational
generative analyses do not seek the founding purpose behind the reflexive construction. In our
analysis we juxtapose against this limited structuralist approach a cognitactic approach using
functional explanations of intent which depends on principles of cognitive strategy rather than
hypotheses about specialized architectural configurations.
The General Case

The generalization we arrive at for the above data is that there is a default, baseline (overridable) assumption, for purposes of likelihood and practicality, that the nominals within a single clause will not in most cases co-refer, and are prone to cause more ambiguity confusion when they do. In other words, while they occur as contrastive indicators, reflexive co-occurrences are not the unmarked syntactic norm. From this perspective it appears functionally useful to mark them overtly. Simple predications do not normally involve some attribute in a relation to itself. When a nominal does in fact co-refer, against the more general expectation, it appears as a reflexive form to show that the default unmarked expectation has been over-ridden as a measure to preclude ambiguity in a particular clause. There is for the most part no such co-reference expectation across clause boundaries. Reflexives do not generally occur outside simplex clausal environments, because, when more than one clause is introduced, resulting in more than one predication, the possibilities of co-reference exceed the lower likelihood associated with a reflexive relation of single predication. In this way, reflexives are seen to have a purpose reflecting user intent. Their function is to reduce ambiguity by adding lexical material in a context where the differentiation is most useful.

It is the specification of an intent for each form of construction or (trans)formation that distinguishes cognitactic tool grammar from other generative systems. We refer to an element introduced into a linguistic structure for some reason of user intent as an ‘actioneme’, symbolized by a string with an initial dollar sign ‘$’. In TG we propose actioneme hypotheses to specify the function, purpose, and user intent underlying constructions such as the reflexive.

As a first approximation (to be refined) we can account for the occurrence and nonoccurrence of ‘-self forms in most of the above data in a direct way by specifying just the basic behavior associated with the introduction of the –self lexemes. We note that the simplest and broadest generalization from the data is that –self co-refers with clause-mate preceding NPs. This accounts for most of the data leaving narrow special cases to consider. As a first rough approximation, we might propose the following actioneme intent for introduction of –self anaphoric forms:

Reflexive Behavior (actioneme $assertCoreference)

Insert a reflexive –self form for an NP under the following conditions:
  There is a valid referee, co-refering NP in the same clause.
  The referee precedes the NP

Note that a precedence relation appears prima facie to be required since co-reference is one directional.

(34)  *Himself invited Al

Reflexives referring outside the local clause into a separate tensed clause are ruled out because reflexives are restricted to clause mates in the local clause.

(35)  *Al thinks that Sue hurt himself
(36)  *Al believes that himself is the best.
We propose a cognitactic procedure to filter the unwanted sentences.

Cognitactic Filtering Procedure

1. Register specified domains for which co-reference is less expected and more prone to ambiguity.
2. Register cases where NP co-reference occurs in these domains against this expectation.
3. Replace a co-referring NP in these domains with an agreeing reflexive –self form where it follows its referee.

As noted above, for purposes of higher level analysis we summarize the general features of linguistic structure actions using a form of notation we call an actioneme. In this case, to express the state of affairs for reflexives, we propose for step one above an automatic default, unmarked actioneme within each simplex clause predication: $\text{registerCorefAmbiguityRiskForClauseDomain}$. This is a cybernetic default as discussed above reflecting the most likely and frequently expected situation. It captures a background condition, that for simple clauses, it is deemed less likely that nominals will be co-referential.

We posit a second actioneme for step 2 $\text{registerCoRefOverride}$ activated when a nominal co-referes inside a clause against the expectation of step 1, i.e. $\text{registerCorefAmbiguityRiskForClauseDomain}$. Finally $\text{insertReflexive}$, corresponding to step 3., inserts a reflexive –self form agreeing with the context. It indicates some NP that co-refers with some other preceding NP in its domain of expectation that is not in a separately embedded sentence.

These actionemes represent structural intentions which are best understood as a part of linguistic competence.

The variety of surface forms is covered as illustrated in several examples:

(37) I showed Ann herself
(38) *I showed herself Ann
(39) The book was given by Ed to himself.
(40) The book was given to Ed by himself

It is interesting to inquire why such processes might be formed. Beyond simple clauses, when an embedded clauses is present, there arises not only an additional predication, but invariably as a result, the possibility of one or more additional nominal elements. In particular the embedded clause must admit at least of its own subject. This proliferation of nominal candidates increases the likelihood that elements may co-refer. In fact we posit that the global possibility of nominals, particularly animate ones, beyond those involved in the main simplex predication is fundamental in controlling the occurrence of the reflexive form.

Special Cases

Case 1
The simple actionemes posited above do not yet account for cases where reflexive bridges simple clause boundaries. Consider the following cases of subject control.

(41) Al attempted to work the radio
(42) Al tried turning the radio on.
(43) Al painted the wall suspended from a rope.

To handle subject control and cases such as these we propose an actioneme $\text{registerSameSubject}$ that declares identity between the higher and embedded subjects.

Similarly, we posit $\text{registerSubjectSameAsObject}$ for object control verbs:

(44) Sue asked him to enroll himself/*herself. Subject to object control
(45) Al believes Sue to like herself/*himself

To account for these cases we propose that as an automatic consequence of actionemes asserting same subject or object for control verbs, that the domain of unexpected co-reference is automatically extended to include the higher NP. We capture this as the actioneme: $\text{expandCorefUnexpectedDomainToControllingNP}$

This expansion can be recursive. When there is a chain of subject control the reflexive domain expands accordingly.

(46) Al has to want to try to begin to save himself

Significantly also, in this example, himself can occur before any of the verbs.

(47) Al (himself) has to (himself) want to (himself) try to (himself) begin to (himself) save himself

Note the following particular case showing that the functional role (subject, object) of NPs is operative rather than merely NP presence, and also that the expansion of the domain does not include intervening material:

(48) Sue promised Al to promote herself/*himself a note. (subject to subject control)

The following shows that the reflexive processes depend on a general notion of precede, rather than specific immediate precedence.

(49) Al showed Sue (himself/herself) in the mirror

Case 2

The unified actioneme approach outlined above generally accounts for the data but further analysis is still required for exceptional cases involving representation lexemes. Consider following examples repeated from above:

(50) Al believes any description of himself.
(51) Sue believes Al's description of himself.
The picture of himself upset Al.

Note that these exceptional cases all involve a set of similar lexical items: picture, description, account, photo, likeness, depiction, reflection, book, and so forth. It is the class of nouns denoting representations. These are anomalous cases in the TG approach, and are also equally exceptional for configurational C-Command and clause mate explanations where they motivate special configurational apparatus. They bring out important questions and illustrate insights in the generative treatments that led to an explanation using a structurally articulated concept of an abstract subject (Chomsky). If such a form of abstract subject is articulated, it can explain these reflexives that otherwise appear not to be C-commanded by the referee as per the configurational solution. Both in accord and in contrast, where previous accounts posit an abstract structural subject, in the following we follow the intuition further to ask in what that special subject relationship consists.

In cognitax, sentences are representations, and representations are of necessity about something. The conceptual matter that a sentence representation is about is both a structural primitive and definitional (recapitulating the Extended Projection Principle (Chomsky)). It aligns with the idea of ‘subject’ in grammatical descriptions. We posit that each sentence is a representational action about something, involving a fundamental linguistic action declaring what the subject of representation is. Each sentence therefore involves the linguistic action:

$\text{assertSubjectOfRepresentation}$, or more briefly, $\text{chooseSubject}$

Similarly, each sentence representation projects a characterization of the subject.

$\text{assertPredicateCharacterizationOfSubject}$, or $\text{choosePredicate}$

It follows from this that a representation that has as its subject itself a representation would be a uniquely special case. The embedded representation must have a subject, and for picture/description examples it is clear that some subject object is being pictured/described. We conclude from this that the subject of ‘picture of himself’ is the thing being pictured, or in the case above (50) it is ‘Al’. Under this analysis the above examples are neither exceptional, nor require reliance on a configurational concept such as C-Command, since the reflexive simply co-refers to the subject of the predication (representation). Nor is there a problem where the reflexive occurs in a subject clause preceding the overt occurrence of Al since ‘himself’ co-refers locally with the subject within the local clause rather than as it superficially might appear with the object position at a distance.

In the following example, on the other hand, ‘himself’ cannot co-refers to the subject of the description, since, while the description is about Al, the phrase ‘Sue’s description, at a superordinate level, has Sue as the grammatical subject displacing the logical default subject, Al, which otherwise would emerge as a trigger for reflexivization. The higher predication is that Sue is responsible for a description, and it is the description by Sue that is about Al. Since Sue appears in the vacuum created by the need for a subject, Al is suppressed as a subject of description

(53)  * Al believes Sue's description of himself.

While this analysis differs from configurational analyses, it can also be seen as building on them and penetrating further in a constructive direction. Generative analyses have found great utility in the Extended Projection Principle, which asserts that sentences must have subjects. Our analysis here depends on such a principle and seeks to probe further by asking why sentences necessarily have subjects:

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27 Thanks are due to John Hewson for private correspondence emphasizing the need for this perspective.
in TG it follows from the understanding that sentences are representations. Furthermore it appears sentences can have only one subject, since, when a grammatical subject appears as in the previous case, it displaces the logical representation subject for purposes of reflexivization.

Other examples involving reflexives that appear to precede their referee can be analyzed similarly using these notions of recessive representation subjects for the picture/description lexical class.

(54) Which book about himself did Anson write?
(55) Which book about herself did Jenny say that Anson had written.
(56) The picture of himself upset ed.
(57) ?I gave some pictures of himself to bill

The cognitactic rules as presented work for a variety of different verbs and structures

(58) I gave Ed some pictures of himself
(59) Destruction by the city of itself
(60) Destruction of the city by itself
(61) Destruction of itself by the city

Case 3

It should be noted that where numerous more complex examples can be constructed based on (trans)formations such as passive, dative inversion, or question formation, a variety of unacceptable sentences can be explained as the misapplication of incompatible tools. This topic is beyond the scope of the discussion of the organic reflexive process. Here are some examples:

(62) *To whom did you recommend himself.
(63) ??Destruction by itself of the city
(64) ??*The book was given to himself by Al
(65) ??*The book was given by himself to Al
(66) *I recommended himself to Al.

Case 4

A further special case arises in (Adger, 2002) regarding a situation in which a gladiator is being awarded his own life:

(67) The consul’s gift of the gladiator to himself.
(68) *The consul’s gift of himself to the gladiator.
(69) The consul’s gift to the gladiator of himself.
(70) The consul’s gift to himself of the gladiator.

In these cases the recipient and patient are the same. It is a kind of a metaphor, being given one’s self, since one cannot literally be given one’s self. For a gladiator to receive himself is literally a convoluted thought. One cannot give the recipient to the recipient. The expectation is that the patient and recipient are different.
This reveals an analogical parallel to the less probable identity of reference in simple clauses where NPs are expected not to co-refer. Here it is the patient and recipient related in an impossibility, obviating the risk of ambiguity. This observation indicates that these cases can be subsumed under a single analysis. The actioneme analysis proposed earlier for clause domains can be used here by generalizing it as a function. Where we previously had a simple declaration, $\text{registerCorefAmbiguityRiskForClauseDomain}$, we can now revise this as an actioneme function: $\text{assertCorefUnexpectedForDomain(DomainSpecification)}$. Now the domain specification can be either “NPsInClause” or, for a verb such as gift, “PatientAndRecipient”. In this way a single process can account for both cases.

Case 5

Also interesting is the case of comparatives in which –self forms can co-refer outside the local clause with some considerable degree of acceptability to some speakers:

(71) Al knew Sue was taller than himself.
(72) Sue said to Al Ed was taller than herself.
(73) Sue heard from Al Tom said to Bob Ed was taller than herself.

These are particularly interesting because of the impossibility a thing exceeding itself:

(74) *Sue is taller than herself.

Since a thing cannot exceed itself the risk of ambiguity in the local use of a pronoun is reduced, making the –self form without function. In these cases we see the scope of co-reference may be expanded to where the functional purpose of the reflexive becomes useful. We capture these circumstances by positing that the scope widening actioneme $\text{assertCorefUnexpectedForDomain}$ can be applied to include the containing clause, e.g. $\text{assertCorefUnexpectedForDomain(ContainingClause)}$. To the extent that the corresponding examples such as above are acceptable, this actioneme may even be applied repeatedly, while also decrementing the felicity of the result as the longer distance potential for co-reference increases. It is beyond the scope of the present work to propose specific technical mechanisms to account for varying degrees of unacceptability, but this case is suggestive of various interesting possibilities to be considered.

**Higher Level Constraints**

Based on the foregoing, if we ask in general why the various ill-formed sentences discussed above are unacceptable in view of our imaginative ability to construct them, the answer comes down to the misapplication of tools. When a tool is applied where it is not called for, or when incompatible tools are used in an utterance, the result is an improper structure. These consequences can be made more explicit by reference to common sense constraints such as the following:

**Required Purpose Constraint**:
Do not override an expectation where there is none, or, in general, do not utilize a tool
where its purpose will not be fulfilled

Vacuous Action Constraints

Do not undertake a targeted action when there is no target to act on.

Such constraints vanish behind common sense insofar as natural language exists for a set of purposes and disregards for those purposes would naturally lead to dysfunctional generations.

Conclusions

In summary a concise simplified cognitax solution handles the data involving four aspects of descriptive patterning: precedence, clause mate locality, C-command, and abstract subject relationship.

While our approach has been specifically to avoid the abstractness of a purely configurational approach where a preferred alternative actioneme tool analysis is attractive and well supported, we do not see the configurational approach to be wrong or misguided so much as an invaluable step in the deepening progress of understanding. We inquire further why C-Command should have the explanatory power that has been attributed to it and conclude that a true generalization has been indirectly represented, since the sisterhood referred to in C-Command is, a from another perspective, a relation to a clause predication, that is a saying of something about something. The configurational branching reflects the application of predicative tools. We propose that C-Command holds to the extent it does because it corresponds to discrete actions of clause predication.

While there is this overlay and congruence, we maintain the actioneme approach is an advance, because it explains why C-Command should hold, namely, that there are tools, such as reflexive constructions, that are constrained to act principally in direct predications. We posit that reflexives outwardly/explicitly revise a probability expectation of difference of reference. The scope of that expectation is within a clause predication. As such, we believe cognitax provides an explanation why the C-Command configuration, fencing off the next higher predicate as it does, should be relevant. In this way TG can be viewed as a marginally more ambitious generalization to cover the data.

Furthermore, we believe the particular cases of picture/description reflexivization illustrate how the Extended Projection Principle points to a profound generalization over diverse phenomena in many languages. This being true, the extra measure involved in positing an actual process to choose the subject of each sentence would seem to advert quite directly to a linguistic reality.

Even the special exceptional cases of comparative and donor-recipient identity reflect back and lend support for the cognitactic analysis.

To the extent that our arguments are successful in establishing the need for cognitactic processes, TG illuminates questions about the architecture of competence. Whereas generative studies have traditionally separated syntax from motivational cognitive inputs, TG would delineate a severely restricted controlled vocabulary of linguistic intents and present these as interconnected with a set of syntactic processes. The empirical basis of actionemes supports the hypothesis that there is an additional component in the architecture of linguistic competence which is the source of certain of the structures that have traditionally been the subject matter of syntax.

20 Poetics as an Argument for Psychological Reality

Consider Blake’s poem “Tyger” which John Ross (Ross J. R., 2000) has examined carefully for poetic structure. A hallmark of the work is the discovery of what Ross calls the ‘corridor’, a sort

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28This might conceivibly be collapsed with the Required Purpose Constraint, but our view is that many hundreds of analyses must be undertaken before the universal generality of actionemes might be well motivated.
of column which is a repetition of structure in successive lines, so that a vertical pattern of recurrence sets in relief stacked corresponding items and offsetting horizontal patterns. We observe the column of alliterations in the poem per Ross's insightful and deeply considered work, but also stacked actionememes, as illustrated below. The actioneme effectors are reflected on the surface only as wh-words but the cold configurations of labeled hierarchies cannot do major duty to bring out the structure of inexorably mounting uncertainty, which is the heart of the poem. If one considers Blake's poem as a reflection of superficial wh-word alliteration alone the result is surface structural analysis unconnected to a core meaning whose emotional potential stands as an essence of the poem. By circumventing what the poet seeks to do to the reader, one misses a core linguistic element. If language is hypothesized to involve a set of active tools, it is a good test of the proposal to see if it can partially explain the manner or enablement of art. We think a poem cannot easily be made just from phonology and configurational syntax. A poem is typically a series of impactful actions.

If we posit a linguistic action, an intention effectuator (‘actioneme’) underlying each wh structure, the actioneme alliteration can be seen in harmony and counterpoint with phonological alliteration. We have annotated the poem itself.

The Tyger

Tyger Tyger, burning bright,
In the forests of the night:
[What] immortal hand or eye,
Could frame thy fearful symmetry?

In [what] distant deeps or skies,
Burnt the fire of thine eyes?
On [what] wings dare he aspire?
[What] the hand, dare seize the fire?

And [what] shoulder, & [what] art,
Could twist the sinews of thy heart?
And [when] thy heart began to beat,

[What] the hammer? [what] the chain?
In [what] furnace was thy brain?
[What] the anvil? [what] dread grasp,
Dare its deadly terrors clasp!

[When] the stars threw down their spears
And water'd heaven with their tears:
[Did he] smile his work to see?
[Did he] [who] made the Lamb make thee

Tyger Tyger burning bright,
In the forests of the night:

[What] immortal hand or eye,

Dare frame thy fearful symmetry?

There is an actioneme underlying the insertion of the wh words which corresponds to the action of asserting that something is unknown. The $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve) actioneme represents a Russian corridor that most exactly overlays the wh word syntactic column. It’s perhaps anathema to think of a poem as constructed by a process devoid of artistic meaning intent. The repetition of the action of affirming the presence of the unknown is near the heart of this poetic creation.

There is a resonant rhetorical effect here from the presence of repeated questions around an integrated theme. $accumulateRelatedQuestions is a second order self-referential actioneme which builds the literary tension. Note that Blake’s use of wh-words reflects exactly such a column/corridor, and that the syntactic pattern interplays with the phonological. To attribute the poem’s power only to the colder insertion of wh items, however, is to abstract it in a way that for poetry lacks the essential emotional dimension.

For present purposes there is an overarching point to be made, as subtle as it is potentially powerful, namely, that there is an experience in reading the poem, verifiable simply by surveying good readers of poetry, that not only is not reflected but cannot be reflected by syntactic wh insertion or by any theory of syntax that lacks something like the actioneme. Is there evidence for the reality of this $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve) actioneme? Certainly, the answer is yes because any sentient able reader of the poem must recognize that the essence of the artistic experience is the repetitive and accumulative pounding of the mysterious unknowns. If we are sensitive we cannot escape Blake’s intent. This is not a matter of theories of linguistics or poetics but simply a fact of the data which can be independently verified. It is perhaps unprecedented to cite an artistic experience as evidence for a syntactic approach but, still, it is offered here as focused and verifiable evidence.

Without the actioneme there can be no truly comprehensive analysis of the rhetorical method or the poetic process. The subtle action-based re-framing of the wh-word occurrences enables us to represent the fact that Blake sends artistically crafted thunderbolts from the utilitarian cognitive instruments.

To summarize, as a provocation to emphasize the nature of the material we are dealing with, our analysis holds that the actioneme $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve) can be observed at work in some circumstances completely apart from everyday utilitarian syntactic considerations. It is evident in art. Once a linguistic action dimension is recognized in linguistics, its power, to the extent it is real, might be expected to become pervasively evident. To deny it would be as to tell a viewer using a new high power telescope that they are not in fact seeing what they see since the viewed objects do not appear in existing maps of the skies.

Our premise is perhaps confirmed by one of the world’s pre-eminent poem who has affirmed that s/he has always thought of the units of poems as actions.29

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29 Personal communication.
21 The Role of Intention in Verbal Control

Introduction and Summary

The scientific goals of the Minimalist Generative Program (MGP) (Chomsky, 1993) have been advanced via a traditional architectural assumption that a grammar connects meaning to sound (sign, etc). The most general purpose of the present work is to ask and evaluate the question whether scientific goals can be better supported rather by an alternative architecture wherein grammar is viewed as connecting linguistic structural intention to sound (sign, etc.), oriented more to speaker generation than listener interpretation. In this view, linguistic structure is connected to intentional sentence formation by means of speaker-oriented actions to effect desired structural representations as a process separate from semantic interpretation. The generative process of the sentence producer is separated from the interpretational or anticipatory process of implicit semantic rendition.

One of the most far reaching architectural revisions in the generative program since its inception has been the re-orientation, as part of the minimalist formulations, from top-down generation, building syntactic structures (outward from an initial S symbol toward elaborated hierarchical configurational structures), inversely, to the reverse bottom-up process whereby complex hierarchical syntactic trees are built as elements are injected and merged as constituent elements. This shift to expansive grafting engenders new possibilities and advantages for the architecture of competence insofar as elements are adjoined by means of the (putatively) maximally simple rule of Merge as proposed by Chomsky. The analysis we present explores the hypothesis that sentence generation is further best modeled as a process wherein lexical items are selected and merged into structures, along with directives for particular forms of structural realization, and both of these decision types are controlled by a formative specification of structural intent. This is linguistic intentional action on the part of the speaker. We thus argue for a revised architecture wherein linguistic rules, be they lexical insertions or structural formations, are conditioned by factors of linguistic structural intention. For convenience we refer to this approach as Tool Grammar (TG) as explained below.

Rather than seeking to undermine or displace the minimalist program the proposed revision would amplify its importance to the extent that additional explanatory power becomes available. Chomsky’s massively influential foundings of generative grammar originates from profound observations on the creativity of human language. To the extent that a revised architecture can uncover for exploration a new level of linguistic creativity it validates the Chomskyan proposal by judiciously extending its initial programmatic formulation. Further, any modifications which increase the simplicity of linguistic theory enhance the viability of the Minimalist approach.

One of the attributes of the Generative Program has been to motivate the discovery of a large number of syntactic patternings associated with structural attributes. These constitute a database of scientific effects which provide an opportunity for ongoing research. Presently we will focus on a pervasively fundamental and central syntactic effect to provide a laboratory for
the study of linguistic action intent. To develop supporting arguments and have them carry significant weight the approach that follows will be to consider the phenomenon of verbal control, one of the most difficult, long-studied and least resolved of problems in generative syntax. In his formidable comprehensive analytical summary (Landau, 2013) both lays out the considerable complexities of this problem and concludes that it has not been resolved: (Landau, 2013, p. 258)

Difficult questions remain open; some of them are as old as the earliest studies of control. Perhaps more than in other areas of linguistic research, problems in control are challenging in that they bear no obvious mark as to which part of the grammar they belong to; lexicon, syntax, semantics or pragmatics – the proper analysis is always up for grabs. If history is any clue, the future of control holds many more surprises.

The subject of verbal syntactic control represents a watershed challenging area of research in the history of generative syntax and is particularly ripe for analysis based on Landau’s comprehensive and penetrating research summary of the phenomena observed and recorded over several decades. Furthermore, his follow-on analysis (Landau, A Two-Tiered Theory of Control, 2015), advancing toward a comprehensive theoretical treatment, highlights key issues and presents new opportunities for understanding. The difficulty of the problem presents an opportunity as a gateway challenge for new theories of syntax. To the extent that competitive explanations become available in the domain of verbal control, enabling theories engage the theory of syntax in a non-superficial way.

The numerous linguistic effects observed in the MGP are essential scientific waypoints, but also further afford a means of stimulating and testing new theoretical hypotheses. To the extent that the specification of linguistic intent can strengthen the constraints on linguistic form and therefore the range of possible human languages, it also addresses Chomsky’s over-riding concern with understanding how children learn language so expeditiously in the face of its complexity and their exposure to limited data, known widely as the poverty of stimulus problem. A potential advantage of linguistic rules which are intention-aware is an opportunity to provide unified solutions to difficult problems where previously difficult syntactic challenges have partitioned out to semantics, pragmatics, discourse analysis, and so forth, in a dispersed and often less than fully integrated way. If TG can simplify the generative apparatus and constraint ecology it has the potential to advance the primary goals of the generative program. A principle aim of Minimalist theory is simplicity so TG is supportive of its general tenets to the extent that the conception of Universal Grammar can be rendered less complex.

The general purpose here, then, is to examine control data (partially) outside the historical context of syntactic configurational analysis, placing it rather within a revisionist framework referred to as Tool Grammar (TG). TG is circumscribed by the claim that syntactic theories can be improved if linguistic rules are enhanced by the addition of formal specifications of linguistic structural intent as part of their input conditions. By requiring a formal statement of user structural intent for each linguistic rule or process, a significantly different kind of analysis oriented to structural and functional purpose is enabled.
The methodology of our analysis will be to work through key data and syntactic effects that Landau has collected, endeavoring to present for consideration the advantages of a TG perspective. Since TG diverges significantly from previous approaches it is fairly discontinuous from the argumentation of configurational syntax so the analysis proceeds without investigating previous analyses point by point, as Landau has done so thoroughly in any case.

Throughout we will bring Landau’s data forward to provide commentary and analysis from the perspective of structural intent. For convenience of reference, examples will be numbered sequentially but the page reference and a brief topic tag will be given when examples are drawn from (Landau, 2013). In view of the seminal nature, comprehensiveness, and clear explication of Landau’s work we will assume the reader is familiar with it.

The MGP creates new frontiers in the science of language, which themselves beg inquiry into where further explorations might lead. The examination of verbal control based on Landau’s compendium of observations is an important frontier area central to the theory of syntax.

Overview of Verbal Control as a Test Environment

In the history of the MGP, Idan Landau’s work on verbal control stands out for its assiduity, scientific comprehensiveness and relentless theoretical advancement on a single cluster of related syntactic phenomena. The choice of verbal control for long term persistent scientific analysis is particularly penetrating because it is at the very center of complex sentence formation, involves manifold resistant complexities, and, beyond its own mysteries, interlaces with both semantic and pragmatic processes.

To recap, Landau has both rigorously surveyed the large field of verbal control studies and also insightfully penetrated the accumulated data effects to propose ever more comprehensive theoretical solutions, making it possible to leverage this work in a particular strategic way. We use (Landau, Control in Generative Grammar, 2013) as a summary of observational effects which must be accounted for, and reference (Landau, A Two-Tiered Theory of Control, 2015) as the most advanced theoretical milestone for any ongoing research.

We investigate where these facts might lead as we seek to apply the principles of TG to verbal control. Here are the specific empirical and theoretical questions that arise from Landau’s consolidation:

Questions Implied by Verbal Control for Linguistic Theory:

A. Why, precisely, do certain groups of verbs cluster together in the observational effects that emerge from examining verbal control as a phenomenon?
B. What are the implications of accepting classes of verbal control verbs as basic observational data to be accounted for in theory?
C. Why does verbal control exist in natural languages?
D. How can entropy in the theory of control be reduced and simplicity increased?
E. Verbal control, viewed as a type of interlocking between verbs as they are merged into syntactic structures, raises empirical and theoretical questions about generative sentence building. What are the theoretical advantages of coordinated lexical selection by speaker intention in sentence building versus noisy random disjoint selection and over-generation subject to massive semantic filtering? Which model best approximates human competence?

These are questions we will return to after the following sections which undertake to strategically leverage the results of Landau’s work.

**A Fundamental Starting Point**

It is essential to our purpose that we begin by looking at classes of predicates that emerge from syntactic patterning as primary data. In the literature of configurational syntax, classes of verbs that surface from the observation of shared syntactic behaviors are often considered derivatively incidental rather than fundamental to theoretical motivation.

Here are a set of crucially important classic raising/control distinctions presented by (Landau, 2013, p. 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Raising to Subject</th>
<th>Raising to Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) seem, appear, turn out, happen, begin, continue, stop, likely, certain, sure.</td>
<td>believe, consider, prove, show, take, expect, allow, prevent, depend on.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject control</th>
<th>Object control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2) try, condescend, promise, decide, plan, agree, hope, prefer, wonder, refrain.</td>
<td>persuade, encourage, recommend, appeal, force, plead, order, urge, dissuade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering these classes as primary data raises important questions. Why do such classes exist? At what level are these classes defined? What are their definitions? Can one predict whether there could be verbs falling into more than one definition? What do these classes tell us about human language capability and its organization? What are the implications for human language ability with and without such classes. The emergence of these data prompt many such questions.

By merely examining the usages implied by these classes in a spirit of wishing to provide descriptive linguistic transcriptions, it is possible to infer a working approximation of structural action intention underlying these classes. We simply inquire what the speaker is doing: What is the action? Following is a reasonable approximation (in what might be a line of successive

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30 Landau: “Both raising and control predicates come in two versions. In one version, the matrix dependent is a subject (as in (22)), and in the other one it is an object. We provide below a sample from each category (drawn from the English vocabulary).”
approximations as TG evolves). As noted below, we express these sets of intention features informally as actionemes marked with initial dollar signs, complex collections abbreviated for purposes of architectural discussion in a form of pseudocode, as is common in developing an architecture for symbolic systems. In a more formalized representation they would appear as sets of binary features and/or functional specifications.

A. Raising to Subject
   \$addVerbXSpeakersExternalObservationDirectedToSubjectOfV

B. Raising to Object
   \$addVerbXExternalMentalConditionDirectedToSubjectOfV

C. Subject control
   \$addVerbCommitmentToAgencyEnactmentDirectedToActionOfV

D. Object control
   \$addVerbAdvocacyForAgencyEnactmentDirectedToSubjectOfV

E. Raising, Generally: \$addVerbConditionExternalToAgencyEnactment vs.

F. Control, Generally: \$addVerbConditionInternalToAgencyEnactment

In these last two we encounter one example of a fundamental hypothesis in the domain of cognitive syntax, namely that human language appears characteristically to be concerned in an operational way with the causality of events and situations. We frame this context as $AgencyEnactment and further hypothesize here that there is a potential to differentiate those conditions internal to a causality chain, i.e. those controlling the eventual occurrence or non-occurrence of an event, from external ones involving conditions less impactful on direct causality, describing, rather, factors of the surrounding and framing context. Syntactic constructions routinely involve additive predications on more central verbal assertions, and these can be of these internal and external types impacting the processes of syntactic formation. We therefore operate on the working hypothesis that internal/external distinctions on $AgencyEnactment are transcribable and psychologically real. This claim is summarized in the following:

The Bounded Causality Hypothesis

The cognitive distinctions observable in linguistic patterning distinguish predications internal and external to the causality chain of events and situations ($AgencyEnactment).

We present hypotheses about linguistic actions using dollar sign symbols and refer to them as ‘actionemes’. Actionemes are clusters of properties that represent linguistic action intent. They represent preliminary hypotheses aiming toward a standard controlled vocabulary of linguistic action intents. They are utilized as a form of pseudo-code for methodological convenience with an understanding that the process of formalizing TG should call eventually for a range of mathematically explicit, rigorously defined elements and forms. The purpose
of pseudo-code is to engage higher level questions of structure, process and organization without falling into distracting questions at a lower level of more detailed specification. Actionemes are shorthand in discursive presentations for a feature and function formalism which is conceptualized for a machine implementation as a generative system. A useful and conciliatory default assumption is that actioneme features inhabit and extend the feature space often referenced in syntactic and semantic theory, but are given a revised and radically more enlarged role than has been countenanced previously.

Even as initial renderings, subject to revision, these characterizations enable a new perspective on the processes of verbal control. We have here, for example, as one feature (Single actionemes are mnemonics for multiple features and functions.), a signifier of “direction to”, according with the occurrence of ‘to’ as the external sign of complementation. This offers an explanation why ‘to’ is selected to mark control and not some other lexeme. The claim is that the speaker is directing one predication to another for a purpose of modification, so it is no accident that directional ‘to’ has been chosen for this purpose in English. Structural directionality is part of what is intended.

Variant specifications of the linguistic intention are possible in the short term, highlighting a longer term need to evolve and conventionalize a control vocabulary for actioneme formation. The variants below, for example, reflect alternative approaches refined at a different level of abstraction to characterize putative concurrent underlying factors, which in more formal terms would be represented as complexes of binary features or function relationships.

G. A,B, i.e. raising classes together reflect
   $addVerbExternalMentalReactionReSituation$ or
H. C,D. i.e. control classes together reflect:
   $addVerbInternalAgencyEnactmentRoleInSituation$

These actionemes as summary transcriptions of linguistic actions are postulated to provide a basic empirical platform for further theoretical formulations. To the extent they correspond to a psychological reality they afford some explanation for why the verb classes occur. Such transcriptions, short for complexes of particular features, represent underlying data for syntactic analysis but also serve as directives for syntactic formation of the sentence. They are also subject to validation by psycholinguists using experimental techniques.

The mental constructs implied by these pseudo-code transcriptions provide necessary but not sufficient conditions for the explanations we pursue as to why control verbs and the verbs they control should co-occur as they do. The higher control verb provides characterization of the lower, controlled proposition. In this way it is necessarily the case that the controlled verb is selected first since it is natural first to conceive a predication then subsequently consider what framing it should take in sentence construction, while the inverse, to choose a framing then ask what to frame, is not operationally plausible. We observe from this that linguistic framings are imposed on propositional material which precedes it as conceptual background. Given an accessed proposition, one decides how to frame it in formulating an expression, not infrequently based on reference to mental processes, as we see in the case of control structures.
We observe from these structures a necessary refinement on the functioning of any linguistic merge operation which in the process of sentence generation builds syntactic structures bottom-up as e.g. lexical items are selected by the speaker to implement intentions for expression. Specifically, it is not logical in a computational system that linguistic intentions would be selected randomly for after-the-fact reduction by any means, while compatibility of intents among selected elements is most natural to the production of a structure conformant to what is intended.

A propos of the present classes, we observe, from an intentional perspective, that controller and controllee verbs in verbal control constructions exhibit an interlocking relationship: they are selected as a coordinated sub-unit and in reference to each other. This evidently would not be the result of random coincidence or filtering from random juxtapositions since this contravenes the integrated function which is evident in their purpose. For this reason we posit the necessity of a species of merge wherein a characterization verb is selected in connection with a particular proposition, effecting certain interlocking connections This substructure, first constructed independently, becomes available for merge into a the larger syntactic structure. This contrasts with the over-generation and filtering philosophy of the Minimalist Program. The interlocking features include co-reference of subjects, insertion e.g. of ‘to’ and other possible elements such as tense and aspect.

This process, as we have just described it, introduces the concept of packaging, which reappears often when looking at syntactic problems from the perspective of intention. There is a plausible view even, that pervasive features of syntax such as complementation and syntactic embedding/hierarchy itself are resultant from the mechanisms of intentional packaging. This topic is too broad to consider here but should be kept in mind as a potential benefit of intention analysis.

Note: Sections here are omitted in this version. The remainder of the body of this section is currently being refined.

[NB: This updated section is available on request in the extended document.]

**Wager Class Verbs as a Proof of Concept Challenge**

We proceed next to some directly persuasive confirmatory evidence for the reality of TG processes. In the context of heretofore perplexing observations about the patterns associated with so-called wager class verbs we pursue the potential to develop a quasi mathematical proof that a specification of linguistic intention is necessary for the proper scientific account of syntactic phenomena.

The structure of the argument is to observe a classic problematic syntactic pattern which has been inherently and persistently resistant to configurational analysis or resolution, but which is directly and simply explained by simple reference to transparent actionemic features which are independently required. By recording evident action in its verbal usage, the previously confounding pattern yields easily to a simple, straightforward, and transparent solution. Thus, to
the extent that a competitive configurational analysis with at least comparable explanatory features is not forthcoming a convincing tool grammar treatment of these phenomena emerges as a strong theoretical test of its theoretical necessity.

To frame the argument, recall that previously we adduced evidence for a structural intention involved in the formation of object raising verbs:

\[ \text{$\text{declareMentalProcess}$} \]

With this in mind we adduce one important class of verbs that persists as a major unsolved problem in the generative program commonly referred to as the so-called Wager Class of Verbs. These are discussed extensively in (Pesetsky 1992) and are documented there as due to Paul Postal. They are ECM agentive verbs referring to cognition:

**Wager Class Verbs**

*Examples: wager, assure, say, insist, allege*

These are significant by virtue of the behavior by which they do not normally allow a raised or ECM subject as in

(5) *They say Sue to be enjoying the summer.*

while, significantly and surprisingly, permitting such when used in apposition:

(6) Sue, who they say to be enjoying the summer, has left.

With this in mind, we turn to a primary question of what is intended in the structure of the apposition. We observe immediately that the function or purpose or intent of an apposition construction is to help identify the nominal which it supports, or to identify the feature of the nominal that makes it currently relevant. This is a linguistic intention that can be transcribed directly: \[ \text{$\text{specifyIdentity}$} \]. Significantly, identification, the specification of identity, beyond the generality of cognition, is itself a mental process. Once we recognize this, we can see that in the apposition actioneme, \[ \text{$\text{specifyIdentity}$} \], we have a clear instance where the intent is per the general, previously motivated actioneme for object raising verbs:

\[ \text{$\text{declareMentalProcess}$} \]

This is explanatory: apposition emerges as a raising context by consistent, regular means in a tool grammar actionemic context.\(^31\)

\(^31\) From the TG perspective, merely characterizing the class of verbs that exhibit raising only generally, as ones of cognition, does not draw an empirically fine distinction of linguistic intent, leaving observable information untranscribed. In fact the broad ‘cognition’ feature, as in alternate analyses, does not suggest an explanation for the apposition use. It is factual and useful to embed any characterization in a functional perspective and specify more specifically that they
This not only explains the acceptability alternation but then also provides us with strong independent evidence that the analysis of linguistic structural intent has verifiable validity. The presence of mental process was established a priori by observing a class of verbs, then subsequently in the present case found to be syntactically functional in a context which has been resistant to a configurational analysis lacking specification of linguistic intent. The case of wager class verbs is appropriately specific because it depends on apposition which is a syntactic configuration with particular and evident functional purpose, bringing linguistic intent more to the surface than it is in many constructions. It is significant that the apposition cases do not involve added lexical material, but only a syntactic formation.

Further, we see the actionemic role confirmed when a wager class verb is used in question formation, also a mental process of identification involving syntactic formation:

(7) *We wagered some guy to have won.
(8) Which guy did we wager to have won?

In summary, the wager class verb phenomenon is susceptible to a straightforward explanation based on transcription of linguistic action intent. It provides direct supporting evidence both for the explanatory usefulness and psychological reality of actionemic features in syntactic analysis. To any degree that configurational analyses remain unable to provide a convincing explanation for wager verb phenomena, the tool grammar approach receives direct support which may be difficult to circumvent, thus providing a proof of concept challenge.

**Implications and Conclusions**

In summary, we have proposed that actionemic transcriptions of linguistic intent explain the generalizations associated with the verb classes that are operative in control/raising verbs, exhaustive/partial control distinctions, lexical tense licensing, and wager verb phenomena.

This analysis also provides an explanation for the selection of the infinitivizer ‘to’ from among other possibilities. ‘To’ is a reflection, as a directional particle, of the additional predication ‘to’ an element in the actioneme complex. This exploits the generality within uses of ‘to’ as a preposition and so forth, e.g. ‘add to’, ‘attach to’, etc..

Based on the foregoing analysis we can consider progress toward analytical goals for a TG treatment of verbal control.

A. Why precisely do certain groups of verbs cluster together in the observational effects that emerge from examining verbal control as a phenomenon?

We have observed that two prominent classes of verbs emerge from examination of tense declare a mental process.
and partial control patterning in the phenomena of verbal control. Each of these classes consists itself in five distinct, diverse and empirically separate but consistent classes of verbs. Important questions arise from Landau’s landmark primary work in this area. Why these classes should cohere? Why do they exist? How are they to be treated linguistically so that they emerge as natural objects? For TG, by introduction of linguistic structural intention into the theoretical framework, we have seen that each is characterized by a clear and separate intent.

B. What are the implications of accepting classes of verbal control verbs as basic observational data to be accounted for in theory?

The fact of providing a solution to the problem of explaining the coherence of these verb classes is itself an argument in favor of the TG perspective. These classes are direct evidence that structural intent is operative in natural language sentence generation. By allowing linguistic rules to be conditioned by linguistic intent we enable a simpler, more highly constrained, and more easily learned conception of human language.

We also gain from this approach insight into the nature of a set of hidden internal cognitive categories. We have seen, for example, evidence that linguistic processing is structured to preserve internal agency integrity.

C. Why does verbal control exist in natural languages?

Once we advert to the intentional provenance of verbal control, the regularities uncovered by Landau, namely the inflexibility of tense shifting and the requirement of exhaustive control emerge as strong explanatory factors for why verbal control should exist in languages. By intentionally restricting feature shifting between the matrix and embedded clauses it becomes possible to reduce a situational structure with very high functional load and statistical frequency to a reduced, non-repetitive, very efficient and somewhat flattened structure. By precluding any process from allowing inter-clausal shifting, and allowing a redundant subject not to be expressed, the mechanics and efficiency of expression are facilitated for very common verbal relationships. Furthermore, as we have seen, verbal control packages elements of causality and agency so as to make them impervious to confounding interference, thereby enabling linguistic expressions better to assert logical relationships and causality without causing undue complexities of semantic interpretation.

D. How can entropy in the theory of control be reduced and simplicity increased?

From many examples of systems of symbolic computation it is well-known that attempts to express a process with a view to generating the desired outputs can lead to extraordinary complexity if the process is expressed at an infelicitous level of generalization. Processes in the Generative Program are generally expressed either at the level of syntactic structure formation or semantic/pragmatic interpretation and filtering. There is a very fundamental question whether the reformulation of some rules at the level of linguistic structural intent can simplify a model of linguistic competence, thereby
increasing our understanding how it is that children might learn an extraordinarily complex system from exposure to a relative paucity of data.

In the history of the Generative Program there have been theoretical modifications intended to simplify the operation of core processes, but the complexities outside the core and toward the periphery have become highly specified of configurational detail in ways that can seem suited to particular problems rather than general function. Alternatives to what can appear to be over-specification can help to determine whether current theories have burdensome uncertainties in the global computational construct relative to available confirmatory data.

We have seen in the case of verbal control that by introducing a properly motivated level of linguistic structural intent, complex configurational solutions that appear unrelated to important generalizations can be replaced by simple factors with natural justifications. We have contrasted previous work where verbal control should be conditioned by Tense, Agreement and Attitude semantics with TG solutions that employ elements that appear to emerge naturally from the expressive function of the classes of verbs.

We therefore propose for consideration and re-validation in the generative paradigm that a theory modification whereby linguistic rules can be conditioned by linguistic structural intent can lead to a simpler, more empowered theory of linguistic structure, reducing the uncertainty associated with particular solutions and improving the entropy of a generative model as a whole.

E. Verbal control, viewed as a type of interlocking between verbs as they are merged into syntactic structures, raises an empirical and theoretical question about generative sentence building. What are the theoretical advantages of coordinated lexical selection by speaker intention in sentence building versus noisy random disjoint selection, subject to massive semantic and pragmatic filtering? Which model best approximates human competence?

When the Minimalist Generative Program inverted the original logic of generative grammar by introducing a Merge operation to build sentences lexically from bottom up rather than compositionally by expanding on an initial #S# symbol, a framework resulted which is highly amenable to a putative cognitive reality of how humans themselves must generate sentences. The idea that words are somehow assembled into larger structures, while automatically developing a hierarchical structure in the process, is one that is compatible not only with a variety of traditions in linguistics but one that also models linguistic generation in a manner less abstracted from actual utterance performance. Syntactic Merge, in one form or another, is a likely watershed convergence point for linguistic theories going forward. It’s importance is buttressed and supported by the Tool Grammar view of linguistic generation.

It is evident that a control verb and the one it controls need not be viewed as either statistically or cognitively independent events. Nor is it necessary to export the considerable puzzles of linguistic structure to semantic and pragmatic interpretation in
cases where they might be addressed at the point of intentional lexical selection. Lexical merge is readily adaptable to mechanisms that would provide for the interlocked selection of lexical items and structures. This seems a theoretical necessity from the co-occurrent patterns of interlocking that are present in the data of verbal control.

In previous analyses of verbal control it has been left to semantic interpretation and pragmatic filtering to remove incompatible formations. In TG, where there is a formative specification of structural intent, it is natural to provide for the generation of compatible forms at the point where they are introduced and where it is expected to be simplest and most efficient. With intent in mind, a speaker would naturally choose items compatible with a set of communicative strategies. In this way we arrive at the conclusion that TG has the potential to model and approximate human competence more effectively than a syntax-centric configurational approach relying on a plethora of syntactic structures that must always be filtered only by semantic and pragmatic components.

While the formal notion of a sentence has been central to the formalist characterization of what a human language is in the generative program, there has perhaps never been a satisfactory definition of what a sentence is. From the inception of rules of linguistic intention we conceive within the TG perspective the beginnings of an outline of a satisfactory definition, namely as a unit of structure based on a set of individual but coordinated decisions to project the representation of a coherent set of linguistic intentions into an external medium so that they may be interpreted by others. This manner of definition has not been available as long as linguistic intention has been excluded from linguistic description.

Finally, we observe that while other studies have found verbal control not to be a unified linguistic process, the method of TG brings forward a level of linguistic representation where more can be unified than might otherwise have been expected. Verbal control is not so diverse as it might initially seem.

Having here analyzed the high level issues of verbal control, we envisage companion research which undertakes to seek explanations for many detailed observations that Landau has summarized. These would seem to promise to be readily forthcoming in the TG framework. Landau’s penetrating landmark work has enabled a new generation of linguistic insights.

### 22 Certainty Verb Subcategorization

Next we consider a challenging case of complement subcategorization for verbs. We illustrate that both verbs and complements can activate their own possible actions and these must be compatible if the selected tools are to be used in tandem.

Verbs are subcategorized for propositions, exclamatives and questions, but licensing a complement versus noun phrase is separate. (Johnson, 2004)

1. John asked me what the time is/the time (Question)
2. I'll assume that he’s intelligent/his intelligence (Proposition)
3. Bill couldn’t believe how hot it is/the heat (Question)
Thus it might be supposed that categorial selection could not be derived in a straightforward
manner from semantic selection classes.

In our framework verbs are tools designed for purposes, so it is elemental that they could be for
asking, asserting, doubting, questioning, exclaiming and so forth. These classes follow from the
basic data of observation of use. The licensing of simple noun phrases falls out from the action
analysis. While 'ask', 'assume', and 'believe' involve elements with certainty assumed to be
resolved, 'wonder', 'pretend', and 'complain' report inherent continued uncertainty. We propose
that where the latter set is used a linguistic actioneme $certaintyNotResolved is observed. We
similarly observe the opposite actioneme $certaintyResolved for the nominals: “the time”, “his
intelligence”, and “the heat”. It is perhaps not surprising in view of the fact that a noun is a
lexical packaging strategy that there would be a tendency to allow situations of resolvable
certainty to be packaged and summarily presented in nominal form, while uncertainty benefits
from the increased flexibility of the fuller descriptions in a clause. We posit the cognitax actions:
$implyResolvedCertainty for the nominals and $leaveCertaintyUnresolved for the clauses, and
propose that these condition the constructions under consideration.

This is further illustrated by the following data (p.88-9). In the first set below we observe verbs
of certainty.

(7) Mary promised me that she would sing.
(8) Mary promised me the ring
(9) Jerry told me that he can’t stand Mary’s singing.
(10) Jerry told me the story.
(11) Sheila showed me that she cares.
(12) Sheila showed me her concern.

Contrast those with the following verb of unresolved certainty:

(13) a. Mary persuaded Bill that he should go.
(14) b. * Mary persuaded Bill the fact

The proposed patterning is that a tool of unresolved certainty (verb) does not pair naturally with
a tool of resolved certainty (nominal): operational classes are not co-selected when they work in
opposite directions, as in this case where a certainty conflict constraint is observed. We observe
that any attempt to account for such data by means only of syntactic configuration must
necessarily bury and hide transparent intentional processes.
Another problem that presents a challenge to configurational analysis is a documented set of placement alternations.

The phrase “at noon” seems often to follow the verb object. (data from (Johnson, 2004) p. 46)

(1) a. Jill ate it at noon.
   (2) b. * Jill ate at noon it.
   (3) a. Jill ate spätzle at noon.
   (4) b. * Jill ate at noon spätzle.

But there are multiple conditions affecting acceptability that need to be considered:

(5) a. Jill ate the rotting kumquats.
(6) b. Jill ate at noon the rotting kumquats.
(7) Jill ate the rotting kumquats at noon
(8) *Jill ate at noon the soup.
(9) Jill ate at noon a bowl of rancid wonton soup

These illustrate well known heavy NP structures whereby “at noon” can be located closer to the verb in the aftermath of the creation of a heavy object, i.e. one that we might characterize, also in the spirit of heaviness, as $describeUnusualObjectWithLongDescription. Once this cognitaxed action is selected, with its sizeable resource allocation and implied processing, it could be considered a natural consequence that sentence planning might trigger a compensatory (trans)formation tool in a strategy to keep the attributes of the verbal modification unit contiguous and easily associable. We might refer to this as $reassociateVerbalModifier, a (trans)formation which moves the verbal modifier back close to the verb where it is most naturally associated. The unacceptability of [*Jill ate at noon the soup.] is due in this analysis to the useless application of $reassociateVerbalModifier when there is no triggering circumstance of intervening complexity.

In summary, we posit here the movement of the time phrase to allow easier association with the verb. These cases are analyzed in a way not significantly different in mechanics from the traditional rule of syntax-configurational Heavy NP Shift, with the difference that we see it as a tool to extricate a complex characterization away from the verb so that the association between the time phrase and the verb is not weakened, obfuscated or rendered ambiguous.

Note the similarity of this process to the alternations of dative shift:

(10) She gave the book to the man.
(11) She gave the man the book.
(12) ?She gave to the man the book.
(13) ?She gave the old-fashioned book I brought back from France that didn't have the pages cut to the man.
(14) She gave the man the old-fashioned book I brought back from France that didn't have the pages cut which earlier in the year had been mailed.

(15) *She gave the old-fashioned book I brought back from France that didn't have the pages cut which earlier in the year had been mailed to the man.

(16) She gave the man the old-fashioned book I brought back from France that didn't have the pages cut which earlier in the year had been mailed.

Dative shift is similar in its information restructuring capability but differs because it is optional when the utility of restructuring is not present, i.e. when the object NP is not heavy. This seems to be evidence that the $reassociateVerbalModifier family of similar operations can serve multiple functions. In the case of dative shift the trigger can be not only a reorganization to avoid a difficult to interpret dispersal of verbal information, but, alternatively, to implement a possible re-ranking of affiliations of direct and indirect objects with the verb. In this case the hypothesis is that the speaker action is $createPrimaryAssociation that effectively bonds or blocks bonding of constituents as a measure for speaker intent.

Note also a similar phenomenon cited by (McCawley, 1998) p. 66 as a “constraint against subordinate clauses in the middle of a surface constituent”

(17) Bill told that lie to Alice
(18) *Bill told that Fred had quit school to Alice.
(19) Bill told Alice that Fred had quit school.

The actioneme approach would seem to resolve difficulties with this and other analyses. Here is the characterization from (Johnson, 2004) p. 83 that summarizes the theoretical importance of the data: “the conditions governing these preferences come from something other than syntax proper.”

Obligatory Heavy NP Shift: finite CPs:

(20) *Max [said that pigs fly] yesterday.
(21) Max said yesterday that pigs fly.

Optional Heavy NP Shift: “full” NPs:

(22) Max visited the students yesterday.
(23) ? Max visited yesterday the students.

PPs:

(24) Max talked to the students yesterday.
(25) Max talked yesterday to the students

Blocked Heavy NP Shift:

Pronouns:
We quote Johnson on the value of a solution: “This is a deeply mysterious affair. Why should movement transformations exist? A goal of much current research in syntax is to find an answer to this mystery. “

The answer we provide is that (trans)formations are tools that exist to implement specific effects and various tools are not functionally compatible with other tools. Our approach has been to loosen the syntactic formalism as a necessary step in tightening the constraints on universal grammar and providing an alternative cognitactic approach to simply and directly account for the phenomena.

24 Complement versus Adjunct in Noun Phrases

We next proceed to consider the contrast between complements vs. adjuncts as presented in (Carnie, Syntax: A generative introduction, 2007).

As a preliminary, consider what makes a thing a book. It has to have something like potential reading material on pages; this is essential. Yet there are many variants of books whose differences don't involve the essentials.

(1) The book of poems with a red cover
(2) *The book with a red cover of poems.

The complement ‘of poems' modifies an essential part of the definition, i.e. a book contains reading/viewing material by definition.

(3) It's the same book with a different color cover.
(4) *It's the same book by a different author with different content on a different subject.

A book contains reading/viewing material such as poems as an essential but color is not so involved.

The actioneme $\text{InstantiateAnEssential} (‘\text{of X}') is proposed to only be applied to an essential or its part, not an expanded derivative such as “book with a red cover”. A book can still be a book without a (red) cover. So if we attempt to instantiate or elaborate a definition on a decorated base that no longer has just definitional material ($\text{addDescriptionBeyondEssential}$) the result is artificial. The constraint is:

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32 Situations where this might be acceptable, such as in a court of law where a book with a red cover is in evidence effectively bolster the analysis, especially since special intonation is required.
Constraint on Elaboration Beyond Essential

Do not to apply a tool elaborating a definition after the definition has been elaborated with non-definitional material.

The practical nature of the constraint is perhaps evoked in a crude metaphor: one might not apply a primer coat after the application of a finish coat of house paint. This illustrates how direct solutions via cognitax can become available where difficulties about in a framework with centralized configurational syntax.

25 Auxiliary Movement and WH in Questions

A representative syntactic analysis per (Carnie, Syntax: A generative introduction, 2007) (chapters 7, 11) accounts for subject verb inversion in questions

(1) Al can go.
(2) Can Al go?

by positing a null unpronounced complementizer in the superordinate structure. In place of this syntactic element we propose an actioneme $askAboutPredication\textsuperscript{33} in the tool structure of interrogative sentences. Rather than specify abstract configurational rules we propose functional explanations for many aspects of word and phrase order. This (trans)formation tool\textsuperscript{34} puts the predication in focus by fronting its superordinate verbal element as a way of signaling an interrogative rather than declarative intention. We similarly posit the lexical tool $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve) for WH questions associated with inserting the WH word and triggering movement to focus position at the front of the sentence. In both cases fronting is correlated with doubt.

(3) Al can see WH.
(4) What can Al see?

It would seem not to be accidental that an element for which information is unknown and requested should be fronted to focus position. Both of these tools serve to cue the listener by excluding declarative garden path interpretations involving structures that would otherwise begin as non-question constructions, only to spring question status on the listener late in processing.

Here are some actioneme analyses of common interrogative types involving $askAboutPredication (the intent of questioning) and $declareUnknown (holds the place of a nominal about which information is requested).

\textsuperscript{33} This is an umbrella representation summarizing more than one $unknown type:($declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve),$askForWhomAssertionTrue}) etc.

\textsuperscript{34} Many structures alternations can be analyzed either as transformations or choices of related constructions. We leave these questions open but advert to both possibilities.
(5) Are you meeting?  $askAboutPredication triggers auxiliary fronting
(6) Who(m) are you meeting?  $declareUnknown, $askAboutPredication triggers aux fronting
(7) Who will meet you?  $declareUnknown plus $askAboutPredication where both are already in front focus position.
(8) *Whom you are meeting?  $declareUnknown plus $askAboutPredication requires fronting of both.
(9) You are meeting who(m)?  $declareUnknown on an element in the context of previously established (echo) basic predication does not ask about predication so does not trigger subject auxiliary inversion.

Focus movement can involve fronting somewhat generally. The composite cognitactic act involving both actionemes pairs inquiry about which individual or class might be involved ($declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve)), with inquiry about the truth of the resulting implied assertion ($askAboutPredication). A generalization might be roughly formulated:

Interrogative Focus Fronting Transformation

Front question items

$askAboutPredication associates with the superordinate predicate element, which it fronts locally over the subject
$declareUnknown adheres to a specific focus of interrogation and moves it to the front of the sentence.

Given this framework consider

(10) Who do you think Al will invite?
(11) *Who do you think that Al will invite?

By positing $declareUnknown for ‘who’ fronting it follows that it should not be compatible with ‘that’ complements since the latter involve a packaging strategy per the ‘factive’ actioneme $assertSpecificFact. Declaring an unknown for specific established circumstances is using tools at cross purposes.

Consider indirect question verbs such as 'wonder':

(12) I wonder are you meeting?
(13) *I wonder you are meeting?
(14) I wonder whether you are meeting
(15) *I wonder whether are you meeting?
(16) I wonder who will meet you.

35 Generally, wh questions front the interrogative in which some nominal constituent is associated with uncertainty: $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve). Both elements, the wh object and the auxiliary, are fronted: they are both targets of questioning. $askAboutPredication is involved in auxiliary movement, and wh-movement is a reflection of $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve) on the nominal.
I wonder what he has done. (Tends not to presuppose something was done.)
$\text{declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve)}$

I wonder what has he done. (Tends to presuppose something was done.)
$\text{declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve), $askAboutPredication}$

These inherently reflect asking and can involve either an $\text{SaskAboutPredication (trans)formation}$
or, alternatively, a ‘whether’ lexical actioneme $\text{presentBinaryOption}$ in lieu of subject auxiliary inversion. These do not co-occur because asking generally about a predication and asking about a specific binary option are different and mutually exclusive linguistic acts.

The actioneme analyses offer simple and direct transparent solutions that enable less of a requirement for complexity and contrivance in a syntax-central system.

26 Islands and Embedded Wh Constructions

Wh words are used in relative clause constructions in addition to questions. What these contexts share is a role for holding a place where information is to be filled in. In this section we consider a set of classical syntactic constraints on Wh structures with a view to examining whether they can be aided, illuminated, or replaced by actioneme analysis.

Carnie's discussion (Carnie, Syntax: A generative introduction, 2007) (p 334) of Ross's classic movement-constrained islands includes complex phrases containing relative clauses:

(1) What did he claim that he read t in the syntax book?
    (movement out of simple C)
(2) *What did Bill make the claim that he read t in the syntax book?
    (Out of C to head N)
(3) *Which cake did you see the man who baked t?
    (out of Adjunct to head N)

A purely syntactic approach holds that there can't be movement out of a clause if it's in a configuration dominated by a Determiner Phrase, as in a complement or adjunct to a head noun. The configurational solution is incomplete from the cognitax perspective insofar as an operational intent is not specified.

We note a parallel between

(4) the claim that he read in the syntax book
(5) the man who baked the cake

In both cases the embedded sentence serves to clarify information about the head, using ‘that’ and ‘who’ respectively. We propose that both structures involve $\text{declareUnknown(alias $positVariableToResolve)}$ (which claim; which man). Corresponding to ‘that’ and ‘who’ the sentence embedding tool functions to fill out the restricting or unknown information for the head nouns. We express the Wh actioneme with an alias to elaborate the functional role: $\text{declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve)}$. The function of the embedded sentence can
be characterized as $\text{embedSentenceToSpecifyObject}$.

There is no such head noun or associated structure in

$$ 6 \quad \text{He claimed that he read something in the syntax book} $$

Evidently a reason is needed to explain why movement of the wh-word $\text{declareUnknown}$ (alias $\text{positVariableToResolve}$) can't break out of a nominal construct such as 'make a claim that' or 'see the man who', as in the unacceptable sentences above. The $\text{declareUnknown}$ (alias $\text{positVariableToResolve}$) of the wh words declares incomplete, unknown knowledge so it is natural to expect that one wouldn't ask for information via $\text{askAboutPredication}$ and $\text{declareUnknown}$ (alias $\text{positVariableToResolve}$) about an element that is simultaneously being used to specify an element used to lay out the very question.

The interrogation tools are not compatible with packaging a construction designed to identify or clarify the same information. The function of the that-clause and relative clause is $\text{embedSentenceToSpecifyObject}$, for both 'the claim', and 'the man'. In this TG interpretation it is clear that the actions $\text{embedSentenceToSpecifyObject}$ and $\text{askAboutPredication}$ or $\text{declareUnknown}$ (alias $\text{positVariableToResolve}$) are incompatible.

These data suggest a preliminary constraint on clause specification constructs:

Unknown Specification Constraint (Corollary of Cross Purpose Constraint)

In the context of $\text{embedSentenceToSpecifyObject}$, use of a $\text{declareUnknown}$ element is inappropriate in an embedded S functionally specifying a head, because the introduction of an unknown is at cross-purposes with the process of specification.

Finally, to illustrate further, consider the sentence below. The clause 'who baked ___ cake' specifies which man is spoken of. There is an inherent contradiction in using an element such as the object of 'bake' both in a process to specify a head noun and to declare an unknown in an interrogative context.

$$ 7 \quad \text{*Did you see the man who baked which cake?} $$

Even though there is no overt embedded sentence, a similar form of analysis can elucidate the unacceptability of

$$ 8 \quad \text{*Whose did she buy book?} $$

since the possessor both specifies the book and also has that role undermined by a structure which declares it unknown.

We leave detailed analysis for future work, but note there are even minimal pairs that contrast the act of specification with addition of ancillary detail. These involve ‘about’, which has a built-in
looseness of specification:

(9) He read a/the book about computer science.
(10) He dropped a/the book about computer science.
(11) What did he read a book about?
(12) *What did he read the book about?
(13) *What did he drop a/the book about?

Carnie also considers wh-islands involving more than one wh item in a sentence. He presents relevant data:

(14) I wonder what John bought t with the money.
(15) How do you think John bought the sweater t?
(16) *How do you wonder what John bought t1 t2?

And we add a question with two wh words:

(17) *What do you wonder who bought?

Some other examples:

(18) You wonder what Al photographed.
(19) You wonder who photographed the ape.
(20) *?Who do you wonder photographed the ape?
(21) *Who do you wonder what photographed?

And also:

(22) You wonder who photographed what? (Echo context only)
(23) ?Who do you wonder photographed what?
(24) *You wonder what who photographed.
(25) Who saw what?
(26) *Who what saw?

There are infelicities in these sentences when there are two wh-phrases, especially when both of them are fronted. The wh-island constraint has often been presented as a pure syntax configurational solution, e.g. Don't move a wh phrase skipping over another wh phrase that has been moved.

Actionemes let us approach the question by examining the compatibility of multiple unknowns.\(^{36}\)

\(^{36}\)The following may be echo questions, and reflect different phenomena:

?How do you think Al bought what?
?I wonder what Al bought how.

Insofar as these latter two are considered good sentences they could be reduced from compounds with equal constituent reduction but without two movements, but it seems closer to a natural consequence if use of multiple

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We propose $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve) for positions where wh-words occur. In case the wh-word is fronted to produce a question form (embedded or matrix) we propose the interrogative actioneme $askAboutPredication. The $declareUnknown element may involve manner, agent role, patient role, etc.

We propose that multiple $declareUnknown actionemes are incompatible in a single scope involving $askAboutPredication, since introduction of a second unknown confounds and thwarts the processing and resolution of the first unknown in the context of interrogation. There occur two $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve) elements in each of the unacceptable sentences above. Use of one unknown variable requires the other elements in the local scope to be known in order to establish the possibility of reasonable questioning. The exception is an echo context where the question reflects a just previous utterance which anchors some items in the verbal exchange.

This suggests a constraint:

**Unknown Interrogation Constraint (Corollary of Cross Purpose Constraint) V. 1**

In the context of $askAboutPredication, use of multiple $declareUnknown elements is inappropriate, because the introduction of a gratuitous unknown is at cross-purposes with the process of questioning another one. Doubt confounds resolution of doubt.

The questionable acceptability of

(27)  ?Who do you wonder kissed the ape?

seems also to argue that the presence of two unknowns, even if one is embedded in an indirect question lacking a wh-word, can be the source of a difficulty.

In a similar way, a reprise of the traditional Subject Condition is possible:

(28)  That the police would arrest several rioters was a certainty/doubtful.
(29)  *Who was that the police would arrest a certainty/doubtful?

'That the police would arrest several rioters' is in a subject role. Frequently in syntactic analysis it is construed that wh elements can't be moved out of subjects.

Here we observe that 'was a certainty/doubtful' is used to $assesssLikelihood, while the unacceptable sentence at the same time includes $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve), which is the endpoint of uncertainty. A prerequisite of establishing likelihood would seem to be having firm premises rather than introducing one that is itself uncertain. We propose a tentative constraint subject to ongoing refinement.

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wh-words depends on the compatibility of the elements being questioned.

37 This constraint may well be generalized with the foregoing one.
Likelihood Uncertainty Constraint

In the context of assessing Likelihood, use of a $declareUnknown element is inappropriate in a determining role for the proposition under assessment, because the introduction of an unknown is at cross-purposes with the process of establishing a foundation for determining likelihood. Likelihood assessment cannot be based on definitional uncertainty. Definitional uncertainty is $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve) associated with an argument implied within the definition of a verb.

Finally, consider the traditional Coordinate Structure Constraint

(30) I like Mary and John.
(31) *Who did you like Mary and t?
(32) *Who did you like t and John.
(33) I ate some popcorn and drank some soda.
(34) *What did you eat t and drink some soda?
(35) *What did you eat some popcorn and drink?

Looking at the higher intent of these coordinate sentences, each reflects an actioneme $expressSimilarityOrParallelismByConjoiningAssertions.

Now the act of $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve) is incompatible with the explicit establishment of similarity or parallelism among assertions..

Conjunction Constraint on Unknowns in Assertions

Assertions Conjoined for Similarity or Parallelism should not include an unknown since its lack of clarity works directly against effective comparison.

In summary, the actioneme approach recurrently presents itself as an alternative to purely syntactic traditions such as those of the structural technical solution proposed in the Minimal Link Condition (all movement is local i.e. to the closest non-filled landing position across complexes of structural tree derivations). The attractiveness and viability of actioneme analysis here shows its promise to favorably rework numerous well-studied syntactic phenomena whose solutions have notseemed always to readily stabilize over successive generations of research. The observations of this section suggest the need for further work in wide reaches of observed syntactic complexity. If they are correct it would be expected that new principles at the level of cognitax would emerge and be validated.

27 More on Island Constraints

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38 We forego consideration of echo questions.
In this section, we further examine various configurational syntax constraints that have been proposed to consider whether they might be enhanced or replaced by cognitactic constraints. We consider data that emerged from consideration of the A-over-A principle (a rule applying to category A must apply to the higher A) (Chomsky, Current issues in linguistic theory, 1964), the Empty Category Principle (Chomsky, Lectures on Government and Binding, 1981), and later generalizations as they were further strengthened.

Consider the following:

(1) I treasured my trip to Africa.
(2) *Africa, I treasured my trip to.
(3) My trip to Africa, I treasured.

‘my trip to Africa’ involves the actioneme $describeExperience’; ‘to Africa’ is an action $clarifyTrip as part of describing experience, while ‘Africa’ is $assertPlace as part of clarifying the trip. Fronting implements $bringToFocus so the problem with the sentence above can be characterized as focus being put on a disproportionately minor embedded detail. This suggests a constraint:

Subordinate Focus Constraint

Don’t bring subordinate embedded details into focus without strong contrastive stress to mark awareness of the special emphasis on a minor subordinate predication.

This phenomenon doesn’t have only to do with depth of predication as the following show, but degree of details, associated with categories such as manner, place, and other predications less central to the event.

(4) What-i did he say that he was reading i?
(5) What-i does she believe that he said that he was reading i?
(6) What-i are they claiming that she believes that he said that he was reading i?
(7) What do you think that they are claiming that she believes that he said that he was reading i?
(8) *How-i have they forgotten which problem they should solve i?

(Santorini, 2007) p. 12

In the following we observe that wh fronting applies to the verb object when manner is declared unknown, but not vice versa. This shows a hierarchy of detail preventing a wh action on an interconnected detail (‘how’ is intimately related to the notion of a solution) when a more basic element is to be resolved is $declareUnknown. Similarly, the data shows that for the verb subject to be declared unknown and fronted confuses the purpose when the essence of the unknown, i.e. selection of a particular one (‘which’), is intimately connected with the manner of solution (‘how’).

(9) ?Which problem have they forgotten how they should solve?
In the following examples associated with the Empty Category Principle we see similar processes at work:

(12) *How did John ask whether Bill fixed the car?

The indirect question associated with ‘whether’ is inappropriate to frame an assertion in which manner is unknown. Similarly, ‘that’, which points to a fact ($assertSpecificFact) is not compatible with a predication in which the subject is unknown:

(13) *Who does John believe that will fix the car?
(14) Who does John believe will fix the car?

(Santorini, 2007) p. 12

Nor is it functional to interrogate an adjoined predication for which a major argument is unknown:

(15) *Which bike did you ride before Al fixed?
(16) *How i do you wonder when Al baked the cake i?

(Chomsky, Barriers, 1986)

These too show the general theme of not interrogating embedded refinement details. This points to the validity of constraints at the level of linguistic structural intention.

The above observations accumulate to a general conclusion that many constraints on configurational syntactic processes can be simplified, improved, replaced, and/or be made more general by use of cognitactic analysis.

28 Stevens Poetry
A well-known poem by Wallace Stevens’ shows artistic use of actionemes. We illustrate this as a process already evident in the first verse:

Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird by Wallace Stevens
(first poem/stanza of 13)

(1) Among twenty snowy mountains,
(2) The only moving thing
(3) Was the eye of the blackbird.
The larger poem, not considered here, as it moves from and beyond the beginning, has in the course of the poem to do with many levels of structure, e.g. on one level, for example, with numbers (thirteen, one, three, twenty). Putting the various levels of complexity aside and excerpting this one small piece we can observe there are dyadic pairs of dramatic semantic contrasts at the core of the reader experience. This is evident from mapping the principal actionemes in the first stanza.

Among twenty snowy mountains, $\text{widenHorizonToVastPerspective}$
The only moving thing $\text{isolateFocus}$
Was the eye of the blackbird. $\text{narrowFocusToMinutePoint}$

Among twenty snowy mountains, $\text{backgroundOfVastStillness}$
The only moving thing $\text{foregroundFocusSingleMovement}$
Was the eye of the blackbird. $\text{foregroundMinuteSingleDot}$

Among twenty snowy mountains, $\text{presentStillWhiteVastExpanse}$
The only moving thing $\text{contrastFocusSingleMovement}$
Was the eye of the blackbird. $\text{presentMinuteBlackDot}$

By isolating and characterizing the actionemes, we see multiple overlaid patterns that constitute structure in the poem. Each pair is an instance of the strategic poetic actioneme: $\text{makeStarkContrast}$. The instances reverberate, one against the other. To the extent these intended actions by a poet are evident from experiencing the poem there can be less doubt about the reality of cognitactic linguistic actions as elements of language competence. How might the stylistic actions of poets ever be properly analyzed if linguistic theory does not advert to a most basic intentional aspect of linguistic generation?

29 Postal Puzzles

Paul Postal has noted the significant challenge of the following profoundly puzzling data on his web page. (Postal, 2014) In citing his data we break the example sentences out by actioneme to seek a solution. We propose two types of intended action for the verb ‘reach’,

$\text{assessAgentActionSuccessOnPatient}$
$\text{assessProcessGoalSuccess}$:

(1) The director never reached Adam.
$\text{assessAgentActionSuccessOnPatient}$
$\text{reportOnAgentActionTowardGoalSuccess}$

(2) That book never reached Adam.
$\text{assessProcessGoalSuccess}$
$\text{reportOnPatientProcessTowardGoalSuccess}$
(Lacks agency)
(3) Adam was never reached by the director.
    Passive=$promoteAgencyParticipantToFocus
(4) *Adam was never reached by that book.
    No agent complement, i.e. patient in a process without agency.

There is a challenge to explain why the last example is not acceptable. The sentences above are annotated with actionemes including the passive (trans)formation tool, which is a tool to promote a participant in an agency action to the fronted focus position.

($bringPatientIntoAgencyEventFocus)

If a structure does not involve causal agency the passive tool cannot apply. If this is not present, as in the last example, there is no role for the application of the (trans)formation.

Agent Front Focus Tool (Passive) ($bringPatientIntoAgencyEventFocus)
Promote the agency participant to front focus. As a mechanism to allow focus on the various participants in a causal agentive event, this tool cannot operate without causal agency.

The data set below allows for a similar explanation. The examples have been annotated with actionemes reflecting how agency and the Agent Participant Raising (trans)formation tool can account for the alternations. Here we observe that goal raising cannot apply if there is no agency.

(5) Adam was difficult for the director to reach.
    AgentParticipantRaising requires an agent
        (director reached Adam: an agent)
(6) *Adam was difficult for that book to reach.
    No AgentParticipantRaising operation if no agent
        (book reached Adam: no agent)
(7) Texas was difficult for him to reach
    Goal raises if there is an agent.
        (he reached Texas: an agent)
(8) *Texas was difficult for the book to reach.
    Goal cannot raise without agency.
        (book reached Texas)

Similarly, the ‘reaching of x by y’ and ‘unreachable by’ constructs require an agency participant.

(9) the reaching of Adam by the director
(10) *the reaching of Adam by that book
Adam was unreachable by the director.

*Adam was unreachable by that book. 39

We can again account for the data by positing that 'reach x by' requires an agency participant.

It is useful to ask why in each of the foregoing cases we observe constructions requiring agency. For all the constructions considered a non-agent element is presented in a focus position while the agent itself retires to a less prominent position. The verb ‘reach’ carries an implied notion of possible success for the result the agent seeks to achieve. These facts suggest that the tools presenting a non-agent in relative focus likely exist as a means to communicate a central role for the non-agent element in the agent’s pursuit of an intention. Under this interpretation, it is plausible to assume there exists a class of tools (constructs and (trans)formations) underlying these examples which puts into focus a non-agent element seen as important to the agentive action: $focusElementImportantToAgentiveIntent. In this way cognitactic analysis can open new avenues of analysis and understanding.

30 Polarity Items

It is a challenge syntactically to exclude the positive form for negative polarity items in analogous constructs. 40 (Carnie, Syntax: A generative introduction, 2007) (p 133)

(1) I didn’t have a red cent.
(2) I hadn’t seen her in a blue moon.

The acceptability of the above calls for an explanation of the unacceptable positive analogs:

(3) *I had a red cent.
(4) *I didn’t have 5 red cents
(5) *I had seen her in a blue moon.
(6) *I hadn’t seen her in 2 blue moons.

Consider some plausible actioneme pseudocode to represent linguistic intention for the negative cases. ‘red cent’ reflects a tool that utilizes a rhetorical symbol for an amount rather than inserting an actual monetary amount:

__________________________

39 This related data is unclear so is not considered.
   a. The director didn’t reach Adam although she did Louisa.
   b. *That book didn’t reach Adam although it did Louisa.
40 Note ‘even’ can be added. Note also: *I didn’t have 5 red cents.
The article 'a' instantiates $assertSingleItem. Combining these we get salient focus on there being only one, a minimal amount. These combine with $denyHaving (‘not have’) to yield the derived pseudocode $denyEvenMinimumViaSymbolForVerySmallestAmount. $denyHaving makes use of the rhetorical device. This is a plausible account of the acceptable negative polarity sentences above. But what about the ill formed ones?

We are brought to the question: Why would one use $addHyperbolicRhetoricalSymbolForVerySmallestAmount and $assertSingleItem without further purpose such as negating it rhetorically? If one wanted to assert the holding of a small amount, its literal value could be evoked, or alternatively a generality such as e.g. ‘almost nothing’. But here there is not an amount but only a rhetorical symbol for a radically small amount. An amount could not even be implied because there is no such value attached to what is rather only a rhetorical device. There is evidence here for a constraint on actionemes: “Don’t add purposeful rhetorical elements and then not use them”.

To elaborate in more detail, ‘a red cent’ is rhetorically useful as a worthless mythical absolute minimal symbolic denomination. For stylistic effect, some tools used together implement a useful construct. There is no role for $addHyperbolicRhetoricalSymbolForVerySmallestAmount (‘red cent’) if it is not put to some use.

Here is similar construction illustrating the same relationships:

(7) He doesn’t have a penny to his name
(8) * He has a penny to his name

This analysis suggests that negative polarity is not a phenomenon of configurational syntax but one of sentence construction actions. A similar analysis applies to ‘blue moon’.

Lawler offers a collected overview of negative polarity with key examples which we consider below. (Lawler)

(9) He didn’t ever see it.
(10) * He ever saw it.
   Also: ‘ever the fool’ means without end, over endless time
   'ever' = $assertOverTimeEndNotReached
   Negation is present $assertNotSee

For stylistic effect, these tools together implement $assertFailToSeeOverTimeEndNotReached. There is no role for $assertOverTimeEndNotReached (‘ever’) if it is not put to some use since the same circumstance is effected by use of $assertFailToSee in its bare form. This is an example of the

Superfluous/Null Construct Constraint
Do not introduce an actioneme if the result would be the same as if it were not introduced.

Now consider:

(11) He hasn’t called in weeks/hours/days/years/eons.
(12) *He called in weeks.

“in weeks” = $assertUnexpectedlyLongTime
Negation is present in $assertFailToCall

For stylistic effect, these tools together implement $assertFailToCallOverLongTime. There is no role for $assertUnexpectedlyLongTime (‘in weeks) if it is not put to some use. Without negation the actions sum to an effect whereby the event happened at any point during a time longer than would be expected, which leaves open the possibility that it happened within the expected time frame. This also is ruled out by the Superfluous/Null Construct Constraint.

Consider also that positive polarity items are unacceptable when negated:

(13) I would rather have pie.
(14) * I wouldn’t rather have pie. (Except as echo.)

‘rather’ = $assertPreferredAlternative

This actioneme is incompatible with a negative insofar as it convoluted to propose an alternative in order not to use it, i.e. it avoids wasted effort to set up a circular disuse of an alternative.

(15) I sorta like cake.
(16) * I don’t sorta like cake.

‘sorta’ = $assertIndefinitePartialDegree

This is ruled out because one must avoid building extra detailed structure for a partial degree of predication, when the predication is vacated by negation. This illustrates a constraint to rule out building gratuitous structure for no purpose. When structure is created it must be utilized.

These positive and negative polarity phenomena indicate a need for a constraint on the combination of actionemes in building sentences:

Wasteful Structure Constraint

Don't build complex actioneme structures then not use them, or contradict them, or circumvent them.

In reality the operative factor in polarity patterning is not negation, as the name negative polarity
might suggest, but useless elaboration. Negation rather can be a valid form of use for rhetorical elaboration.

Now consider examples from (Giannakidou), used to argue that some current explanations of negative polarity, i.e. downward entailment and nonveridical conditioning, can’t explain the full range of data.

Analysis of logical implication in polarity constructs has led to a hypothesis that negative polarity items are sanctioned by downward entailment, but Giannakidou cites counter examples lacking negation that are not downward entailing: (Giannakidou)

(17) He doesn’t have any sense.
(18) * He has any sense

‘any’ = $\text{S anticipate at least something}$
Negation is present in $\text{S assert fail to have}$

For stylistic effect, these tools together implement $\text{S assert fail to have absolute minimum}$. There is no role for $\text{S anticipate at least something}$ (‘any’) if it is not put to some use, since without negation it asserts vacuously that what might occur in bland circumstances is what would in any case be expected. This amounts to insinuating an attitude into the situation that has no purpose since circumstances are such that the attitude is not appropriate.

Consider also:

(19) Most children with any sense steal candy.
(20) Children with any sense steal candy.

Here we have a similar situation, susceptible to the foregoing actioneme analysis, except that negation is not overt but implied by the partitive formation which countenances children of different types. A varied collection can involve individuals of varying degrees sub-selected by having or not having the anticipated sense so there is a useful role for the actionemes.

Now consider an idiom showing actioneme structure similar to ‘any’ above.

(21) He wouldn’t lift a finger.
(22) * He would lift a finger.

‘lift a finger’ = $\text{S posit symbol of negligible effort}$
Negation is present in $\text{S assert fail to}$

For stylistic effect, these tools together implement $\text{S assert fail to make negligible effort}$. There is no role for $\text{S posit symbol of negligible effort}$ (‘lift a finger) if it is not put to some use.

These constructs are in the family of actionemes used for disparagement, referred to as ‘mini-mizers’. Note that there also exist disparagement contexts that do not involve explicit negation,
but do so implicitly by dividing groups of people into classes with and without the property, thereby introducing the implied negation:

(23) Most people who would lift a finger have their own reasons.
(24) People who would lift a finger have their own reasons.

Also from Giannakidou, consider that polarity items can be licensed in interrogative and conditional environments. Here is the context:

(25) Ruth didn’t lift a finger to help.
(26) *Ruth lifted a finger to help.

Anticlimax: This is ruled out as an unused minimizer for dramatic effect.

(27) Ruth doesn’t give a damn what I think.
(28) *Ruth gives a damn what I think.

Anticlimax: This is ruled out as a superfluous, unused minimizer introduced for dramatic effect.

These negative polarity items are sanctioned in questions and conditionals:

(29) Did Ruth lift a finger to help?

In the question, ‘lift a finger’ arises in the context of interrogative possibility that a dramatic minimizer could be appropriate.

(30) If you give a damn, you’ll listen.

Here too the possibility is raised by the question that dramatic minimization could be appropriate since every question raises the possibility of a positive and a negative.

Giannakidou further cites data that are a problem for both the nonveridical and descending entailment conditioning of polarity items. Consider ‘only’ and emotive factive verbal contexts:

(31) I am glad he said a word!
(32) ‘I’m glad we got any tickets.
(33) Mary regrets that she lifted a finger.
(34) Only Mary {gives a damn/said anything}

Both ‘glad’ and ‘regret’ are $assertPossibilityofAlternative so the dramatizing minimizer is licensed by implication of the negative possibility. Similarly, ‘only’ asserts the possibility of others with different properties so can contrastively utilize the dramatizing minimizer.41

In summary, we have observed that cases of negative and positive polarity can be quite generally

41 We do not consider scalarity, which Giannakakos rejects
understood by means of analysis of the linguistic actions involved in utterances, and that a configurational syntax account, which has been uncertain and problematic, is challenged by the empirical potential of the cognitactic perspective.

31 Syntax Emerging from Action Semantics: Lexical Selections & Categorizations

As we posit cognitax rules and their related constraints, we observe that such representations have not emerged historically as a well defined level in the extra-syntactic domain of semantics. This appears to be true because their manifestation can be more directly associated with syntactic than interpretational phenomena. What seems superficially to be syntactic can often be profitably reanalyzed as inferentially rooted in structural action semantics.\(^{42}\)

This question as to what is syntactic and what is cognitactic is illustrated in data such as the following which illustrate $\text{indicateSpecific}$ ‘the’ and $\text{indicatePossessor}$ possessive ‘s’:

(Johnson, 2004)

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad * \text{the Mary’s book} \\
(2) & \quad * \text{the the man’s toy} \\
(3) & \quad * \text{a the man on the moon’s nose}
\end{align*}
\]

Just as a verb cannot receive multiple subjects, indirect objects, etc. so a noun cannot have multiple determiners selected from the set: definite, indefinite, possessive. There is only one slot in the lexical tool’s compatibility matrix. This is generalized as a syntactic phenomenon insofar as the definitional, lexical nature of a noun specifies that it is subcategorized and checked for no more than a single determiner.

These facts have been viewed as particularly syntactic as evidenced e.g. by phrase structure rules and other implementations of theory, but there is a connection to structural action semantics worthy of consideration. The relationship between syntax and semantics is usefully viewed as functionally intimate given user intentions and cognitactic constraints are evident. It seems inefficient and infelicitous, for example, that a noun would be subject to $\text{identifyPossessor}$ and $\text{indicateSpecific}$ since specifying a possessor tends itself to make the possessed element specific. Adding two specifiers is similarly redundant and of no purpose, or cognitactically contradictory if one is definite and the other indefinite. The action evident in adding a determiner may be subject to a constraint proscribing a duplicate or contradictory application of a specifying tool.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, syntactic structure is not immediately and radically diminished by addition of a level of linguistic structural intent. Basic, pared down syntactic information remains necessary to formally define the notion of ‘duplicate’: various elements must be assigned to the specifying class in order to formulate a constraint that repeated elements should not be specified. One could try to move toward formalizing this by positing an actioneme

\(^{42}\) We need not immediately resort, however, to any view that all traditional syntactic processes should be recast as basically semantic, and must leave issues in this area open for future research. We advert to various possibilities that a syntactic component and syntactic processing can be independently required as intermediations.
$ascribeSpecificity to cover definite and indefinite determiners, possessives, numerals, etc. A portmanteau could of course be created in cognitax to implement a syntactic slot category but this would still need to be aligned with some lexical categorization. This approach may be challenged as partially begging the question as to the nature and relations of syntax. If syntactic phenomena are coded in lexical entries there remains a syntactic presence whose extent is indeterminate without extensive investigation of the cognitactic level. Under all theoretical models intimate connections between syntax and cognitax appear to persist and require formal recognition.

Ongoing research is nevertheless required because actions involved in lexical selection may interact with other cognitax actions in ways that suggest that a variety of selection restrictions could often be recast as cognitax action constraints. In the following cases cognitax interactions appear to be at least partially at work.

(4) * Many happy the puppies barked. (Johnson, 2004)
(5) * He ate should apples.

In the first, we observe that ‘many happy’ and ‘the’ both assert manners of specificity, but do so in conflict by juxtaposing a set with a singleton. In the second, obligation modality is applied to a passive object rather than a willful action, violating an actioneme constraint: “Create obligations only for will-enabled actions.”

Co-occurrence constraints and substitution classes are extensively discussed in (Johnson, 2004) leading to the same sorts of questions.

Note, for example, there are adverbs where it is not transparently and immediately evident how a syntactic solution would be displaced by cognitactic constraints.

(6) A very happy child
(7) The extremely large boat

(8) I have deliberately misled.
(9) I have noticeably erred.

(10) A deliberately angry child
(11) The noticeably large boat

(12) * I have very misled.
(13) * I have extremely erred.

(Johnson, 2004)

But note:

(14) I have very much misled.
(15) I have erred to an extreme degree.
To keep some questions open, in cases like these it is nevertheless interesting to consider a cognitax solution. It is possible to analyze ‘very’ and ‘extreme’ as asserting degree on some dimension: $assertExtremeDegreeOnDimension. On this account the unacceptability of verbal modification for these adverbs could be ascribed to the absence of an explicit dimension for the verbs ‘misled’ and ‘erred’ in contrast with ‘happy’ and ‘large’.

It would appear some verbs could be binary with regard to inherent understanding of degree or extent, e.g. $assertInherentDegreeDimension. For others, degree or extent is expressed in an ancillary element of extent, degree or amount. So it would be infelicitous to have $assertExtremeDegree unless degree or extent had been specified via ‘much’ or ‘degree’.

These examples illustrate what may currently appear to be a fungible boundary between syntax and semantics and point to a need for further research. We leave these questions open and believe they raise useful problems, but ones that can only be fully understood if the role of linguistic action is considered.

32 Limitations of Cognitax Constraints to Displace Mechanisms of Syntax

The intent of TG is to argue the advantages of including structural action semantics in linguistic rules as a means to better formulate constraints on language generation processes. As noted, questions of the boundaries circumscribed around syntax per se remain. Whether cognitax mechanisms are limited to enabling a circumscribed set of better syntactic descriptions or go a distance further toward more fully eliminating the burden placed on syntactic mechanisms is left open as a principal research question. In this section we briefly consider a number of cases in order to highlight these questions rather than to resolve them. Some of the data is drawn from (McCawley, 1998)

The word order of auxiliary verbs can be used to illustrate fundamental syntax, as for example in McCawley’s recitation that “passive ‘be’ cannot precede any other verb”: (McCawley, 1998) p.1

(1) John has been arrested.
(2) *John is had arrested.

We leave the most fundamental questions to one side, allowing that syntactic mechanisms can be at work here, but note that a cognitax solution may be possible insofar as the ‘had arrested’ tool complex indicating past action calls for an agent, while the ‘is’ tool to establish some state itself calls for a patientive subject. A possible view of the ill-formedness is that it reflects trying to do two things at once using tools which, even if they were compatible, independently need resources which are not supplied.

In another case, simple stipulative word order specification seems at work and the existence of syntactic functionality cannot reasonably be denied given current insights: (McCawley, 1998) p. 2:

(3) I admire her.
(4) *I her admire.
(5) Je l’admire. ‘I admire her.’ Fr.

Nevertheless, each case of required word order must be analyzed separately to understand if there might be a cognitax intention underlying some observed alternation. Contrast the following data, for which a case can be made that the word order constraints are cognitactic rather than syntactic: (McCawley, 1998) p. 2

(6) I will go to Boston soon/tomorrow.
(7) I will soon/*tomorrow go to Boston.
(8) I *tomorrow/soon will go to Boston.
(9) Tomorrow/soon I will go to Boston.

We hypothesize that rather than a simple predication of syntactic order on ‘soon’ and ‘tomorrow’ cognitactic rules may be involved. For ‘tomorrow’ we countenance the actioneme $assert Specific Time Of Future Event as a specific expectation of time, while ‘soon’ is more an assertion of general expectation $assert General Expectation Of Early Future Event. In this analysis ‘*will tomorrow go to Boston’ is less felicitous because a specific expectation is requires the essential specifics of an entire proposition, including the subject, action and goal. At an interior location it breaks apart the wholeness of the integral material it would seek to modify; the adverb of time is inserted between the time modal and the rest of the predicate, misleadingly, as if the whole were subdivided for a reason. The specificity involves increased certainty requiring the target object to be packaged without countervailing internal complexity.

On the other hand ‘will soon go to Boston’ has the more general time adverb placed in position immediately between phrasal constituents it can modify since a general expectation of time can apply monotonously to an internal constituent, i.e. the modal or ‘go to Boston’.

Similarly, for ‘*tomorrow/soon will go’, ‘soon’ placed here is more acceptable because there is a reason for pre-posing it to modify ‘will’, namely that the special expectation of time ‘soon’ is connected to the intention or expectation of ‘will’. Placing the specific ‘tomorrow’ before ‘will’ displaces it away from a default position modifying a packaged proposition to a placement for exploiting a relationship to the modal verb, where the uncertainty of internal factors goes against the certainty of the time adverb.

We present this analysis as a plausible approach for relegating a superficially syntactic phenomenon to cognitactic processes. The analysis can benefit from further investigation and validation, but is particularly interesting because the constraint it implies is a hypothesis that the faculty of language has special mechanisms for managing uncertainty in the structures it generates. We observe these principles of cognitive organization elsewhere in our reprise of configurational analyses to an extent that indicates the possibility of an important operation in the faculty of language.

Despite the evident intrusion of cognitax hypotheses into traditional syntactic domains it appears clear that a set of processes seem to persist as more purely configurational syntactic mechanisms.
These include well known patterns of syntactic agreement, for example, as well as the necessity that lexical insertions, most conspicuously verbs, bring in subcategorization possibilities and constraints that impose requirements on the syntactic output. The following data illustrate this point: (McCawley, 1998) p. 2, p 17

(10) I put it there.
(11) *I put there.
(12) *John put in the vase.
(13) *John put the flowers.
(14) *I wish Jerry would stop looking at.
(15) *They spent the whole evening thinking about.
(16) *This drug has only been used in the treatment of.

The comments of this section illustrate that while the scope of the present work does not extend to the boundary between cognitax processes and those of a more purely syntactic character, it does raise unanswered and important questions that can only be addressed by careful investigation of linguistic intent and action.

33 Even/Only Phenomena

In this section we consider some aspects of the phenomena surrounding the use of ‘even/only’. Erlewine references a basic principle in reference to ‘only’ that depends on the configurational notion of c-command: (Erlewine, 2011)

The associate of only must be in its scope:
(1) * [Which boy]^ does John only like __ ?

Principle of Lexical Association (PLA) An operator like only must be associated with a lexical constituent in its c-command domain [at S-structure].

As an alternative analysis, we posit that 'only' reflects an actioneme $specificMeasureLessThanPreconceived, implying a preconceived amount or degree, so it is infelicitous also to attach $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve), as in wh phrases,

\[\]

43 At the same time it is attractive but speculative to consider that any lexical piece might have an actioneme functional specification that could explain syntactic patterns. To illustrate with one example among an exceedingly large number of candidates, if ‘see’ involves $assertVisualPerception, it would be natural to expect the perception to be encoded without an overt targeting preposition. Similarly, if ‘look’ implies $assertVisualTarget the occurrence of the target preposition ‘at’ might also be anticipated.

(1) I saw (*at) John.
(2) I looked at/*0 John.

44 Some sentences in this set would be acceptable in discourse environments supplying the missing elements. This raises another set of questions and leaves open the question of additional ways that cognitax might explain the patterning of utterances.
with an element that has been specifically determined.

This violates a constraint:

Specific Expectation Compatibility Constraint

Don't declare an unknown on an element when the uncertainty conflicts with a specific expectation.

Next, Erlewine considers quantification with ‘every’:

(2) Someone wants to meet [every boy in the room].
(3) *Someone wants to only meet [every [boy] \( F \) in the room].

Because we associate 'every' with $assertTotality there is an inherent and natural contradiction when $specificMeasureLessThanPreconceived is also present. This can be characterized:

Incompatible Estimation Constraint

In the same structure don’t at once characterize something as less than preconceived and also the total possible.

We can similarly treat the expectation of PLA effects with other operators:

(4) Someone wants to even meet [every [boy] \( F \) in the room].
(5) John \( /p \) wanted to even \( /p \) read [every book that [Mary] \( F \) did \( _\_ \) want to read].

We posit $beyondEventPreConceptionOrExpectation for 'even' and $specificMeasureLessThanPreconceived for 'only' so no parallelism or compatibility would be anticipated between these. In contrast, as in these examples, ‘even’ is compatible with ‘every’ since it is natural that $beyondEventPreConceptionOrExpectation would fit with $assertTotality since a maximum is compatible with exceeding some threshold.

Additionally, Erlewine shows the incompatibility of $declareUnknown (alias $positVariableToResolve) with $specificMeasureLessThanPreconceived on a deictically specific nominal.

(6) *Which boy is such that John only likes [that (contextually specific) boy].

This too manifests as a violation of the Specific Expectation Compatibility Constraint.

These examples show the potential for cognitactic solutions to widen understanding of linguistic phenomena and illuminate the underlying essence of fundamentally configurational solutions involving c-command by pointing to processes at a level of representation beneath the configurational one.
34 Covert Modification in Floated Quantifiers: Iteration and Totality

English quantifiers ‘all’, ‘both’, ‘each’ do not behave like ‘most’, ‘one’, and ‘many’ since they permit ‘floating’ from a subject NP to a position to its right, as illustrated by (McCawley, 1998) p. 98:

(1) All/Most of the Chopin etudes give me great pleasure.
(2) The Chopin etudes all/*most give me great pleasure.
(3) Each/One of the guests made a speech.
(4) The guests each/*one made a speech.
(5) Both of Tom’s hands were filthy.
(6) Tom’s hands were both filthy.

An actioneme account for these data can involve positing $assertTotality for ‘all’, ‘both’, and $assertIterationOverAll for ‘each’. 45 As such, representing the total set, they are logically free to be introduced as modifiers after the presentation of the base noun phrase. In contrast, ‘most’, ‘one’, and ‘many’ restrict the membership of the noun phrase, so if post-posed can result in a misleading construct insofar as they would cause a discordant re-adjustment of meaning from that set up by the prior noun phrase, having as it does, a default interpretation of totality. This is a form of garden path constraint.

Advance Notice Quantification Constraint

Avoid placing a restrictive quantifier later than the noun phrase it modifies if the latter has set up a prior strong default interpretation of totality.

We see a related restriction among McCawley’s further observations concerning quantifiers that occur among and following direct and indirect objects:

(7) Each of/all/both the visitors gave the children a dollar.
(8) The visitors each/all/both gave the children a dollar.
(9) The visitors gave each of/all/both the children a dollar.
(10) The visitors gave the children each/all/both a dollar.
(11) The visitors gave the children a dollar each/*all/*both.

Note the ambiguity of the last sentence, for which ‘each’ applies either to the visitors or the children. 46

The pattern in the last sentence can be explained by observing that ‘each’ refers to an iteration of a predication for an entire set of entities, i.e. visitors, children, or dollars. We propose

45 In this account it is logical to think of the predication involving an iteration over a set of individuals as coextensive with, and equivalent to, the predication on the total set established in the noun phrase, so they are meaning preserving in a basic sense even while they add a dimension of focus on the mental act of iteration.

46 We find unclarity in the acceptability judgments for McCawley’s other sentence: The visitors gave the children each/*all/*??both a dollar.
$assertPredicationIteratingOverTotalSet$ as follows:

(12) The visitors each (for each visitor) gave the children a dollar
(13) The visitors gave the children each (for each child) a dollar

We contrast this with ‘all, both’ which more simply refer to a totality modifying ‘visitors’ or ‘children’ $assertTotality$ as follows:

(14) The visitors all/both (all/both the visitors) gave the children a dollar
(15) The visitors gave the children all/both (all/both the children) a dollar.

It is therefore not surprising that ‘all, both, each’ occur post-posed as clarifications next to constituents they modify, i.e. ‘visitors’ and ‘children’.

In our proposal, ‘each’ differs from ‘all, both’ in that it asserts a repeated predication over a set, and therefore involves, modifying beyond just the set (nominal), but also, in an essential way, the actual predication: the predication is iterated over the items of the set. It has higher adverbial attributes. The speaker is affirming that in running through a set one by one the predication will hold. In a sense ‘each’ modifies the larger predication adverbially conceptually beyond the nominal adjectivally. From this point of view it is understandable, and perhaps elegant, that the quantifier ‘each’ might occur at the end of the predication itself without specifying which noun phrase the iteration applies to, thereby affording a systematic ambiguity. This is a device that leaves the scope of iteration unspecified and ambiguous as we observe it in the above sentence.

(McCawley, 1998) p. 101 also cites quantifiers after objects which are pronouns:

(16) Arrau played them all.
(17) *Arrau played the Beethoven concertos all.
(18) Arrau played them both.
(19) *Arrau played the Brahms concertos both.
(20) I have listened to them all.
(21) *I have listened to the Beethoven sonatas all.
(22)

We see here again the potential for understanding floating quantifiers as governed by actionemes. Since pronouns involve the linguistic action $referToPreviouslyMentionedSet$ they naturally allow a question whether the entire set is being referred to. In light of this ambiguity it is not unnatural that pronouns should accept extent modifiers where full noun phrases involving no indirection of reference do not. They contrast with the situation where a definite noun phrase such as ‘the Beethoven sonatas’ refers by default to the totality of items it encompasses. By this logic it would be a misuse of the linguistic tool $assertTotality$ (‘both, all’) to apply it where it would redundantly have no effect given the default interpretation. There is a constraint against using a tool where it is ineffectual, as noted elsewhere.

This case accumulates with the foregoing to motivate the potential for mechanisms of linguistic
intention in developing explanatory theories.

35 Testability, Verifiability, Formalism

[NB: This updated section is available on request in the extended document.]

36 Theoretical Status, Universals and the Architecture of Competence in the Chomskyan Framework

[NB: This updated section is available on request in the extended document.]

37 Toward a TG Generative Framework

[NB: This updated section is available on request in the extended document.]

38 Extending the Minimalist Rule Framework for Cognitax Tool Grammar

[NB: This updated section is available on request in the extended document.]

39 Relationship of TG Cognitax to Syntax, Semantics and Pragmatics

[NB: This updated section is available on request in the extended document.]

40 Relationship to Speech Act Research

[NB: This updated section is available on request in the extended document.]

41 Dynamic Semantics and Discourse Representation Theory

[NB: This updated section is available on request in the extended document.]
42 Donkey Pronouns

TG posits a set of linguistic actions for use in the formulation of syntactic rules. It affords cognitive utilitarian solutions to syntactic problems without, since they are separable, directly facing the mass of significantly resistant linguistic issues that have been investigated in the disciplines of semantics, pragmatics, and philosophy. Nevertheless, since these can overlap and interact extensively with syntactic analysis, there is reasonable hope that TG solutions might offer new perspectives even in these disciplines. It is worthwhile, therefore, briefly to illustrate that TG analyses may extend beyond syntactic problems to issues in traditional semantics and pragmatics. TG may be especially helpful where confounding issues of acceptability and permissible interpretation of particular utterances arise. In this section we address the classical problem of so-called “donkey pronouns” that is associated with theories of dynamic semantics and discourse representation theory.

First, let us establish the importance of donkey sentences for work in semantics and pragmatics generally. It follows that it is important if TG can provide a substantive explanation because the issues surrounding the donkey sentence problem underlie a significant set of analyses in dynamic semantics. To quote (Geurts, 2011):

“In large part, the motivation for developing dynamic theories of interpretation, beginning with DRT, was the realization that the dichotomy between referential and bound-variable (occurrences of) pronouns is less natural than one might think—less natural in the sense that some pronouns don't fit comfortably in either category.”

We provide and contrast an alternative TG analysis using analysis and examples drawn from this survey article (Geurts, 2011) (GA):

In the following sentence GA takes ‘his’ to refer to ‘Pedro’, illustrating a referential use of the pronoun.

(1) Pedro beats his donkey.

In TG we would postulate linguistic actions such as the following for elements of the above sentence.

\[
\text{assertReferenceToPedro}^{47} ('his') \\
\text{assertPedroHasDonkey} ('his') \\
\text{assertPedroBeatsDonkey} ('beats')
\]

GA holds that, in the following, “no farmer” cannot be referential, so the pronoun ‘his’, which refers to it, cannot be either. With a reference analysis ruled out, the pronoun is viewed as being one of binding that involves quantifiers.

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47 Linguistic actions can be naturally expressed as functions such as \text{assertReference(Pedro)}, \text{assertHas(Pedro,Donkey)}, but we forestall detailed formalizations in this paper which seeks only to show the viability of a TG approach.
No farmer beats his donkey.

TG avoids reliance on abstract theoretical distinctions of reference vs. binding and favors a less cultivated treatment based on direct linguistic actions. In contrast with the previous example, illustrating reference to ‘Pedro’, TG here posits cognitive actions involving reference to concepts or thought constructs. This makes unnecessary an analysis built on a pivotal assumption that there can be no reference to a set that can be empty:

\[
\text{SimagineFarmer (‘farmer’) = concept}
\text{SimagineFarmerHasDonkey (‘his’)}
\text{SimagineFarmerBeatsDonkey (‘beats’)}
\text{SassertNoRealInstantiationsOfImaginedFarmer(‘no’)}
\]

Beyond this, the TG approach also enables us to avoid reliance on configurational constraints to explain patterns of occurrence for particular interpretations. Where a syntactic configurational constraint is called upon in GA, namely that a pronoun must be C-commanded by that to which it refers (i.e. be a sister constituent or contained in one) TG relies on cognitive utilitarian constraints. Thus, in the following sentence the fact that ‘his’ cannot refer to ‘farmer’ would be explained in a syntactic account because ‘his’ is not C-commanded by farmer.

His donkey likes no farmer.

In contrast, the cognitactic TG approach provides an alternative hypothesis based on a natural role for sequencing of cognitive processes referring to mental constructs:

\textbf{Imaginary Construct Sequence Constraint}

\textit{Don’t refer to an imaginary concept until the act of imagination has been stimulated in the utterance.}

Above, our analysis enabled us to obviate the substantiation of the abstract claim that in “Pedro beats his donkey” ‘his’ can function either as a referential term or a bound variable. This distinction was also called on in GA to explain the difference in interpretation of the following sentences:

(4) Pedro beats his donkey, and Juan beats his donkey, too.

(5) Every farmer beats his donkey, and Juan beats his donkey, too.

In the first, but not the second of these sentences the second “his donkey” refers either to Juan's donkey or Pedro’s donkey. In the second sentence ‘his’ must refer to Juan. This is attributed to the proposed distinction by GA that ‘his’ can be construed, abstractly, either as a referential item or bound variable, but there is an alternative explanation in TG. In the first clause of the second sentence a conceptual construct is referenced:

(6) Pedro beats his donkey.
(7) Every farmer beats his donkey.

Given an action analysis, we are able to account for the fact that ‘his’ refers only to Juan in the second sentence by postulating a natural constraint on use of imaginary concepts to avoid semantically confusing situations:

**Imaginary Construct Differentiation Constraint**

Don’t coordinate an imaginary concept inside a construct involving parallel assertions about a parallel non-imaginary referential element.

In the second sentence “Juan beats…” sets up a concrete referential context which is incompatible with the imaginary construct reference in “Every farmer beats…”.

In further consideration, GA illustrate their general point that “the dichotomy between referential and bound-variable (occurrences of) pronouns is less natural than one might think”:

(8) Pedro owns a donkey.
(9) It is grey.

GA dismisses a co-reference account for ‘it’, first because “a donkey” is not seen as itself referential based on the fact that the negation of the first sentence “Pedro doesn’t own a donkey” doesn’t refer to some donkey Pedro doesn’t own, but rather denies there is any such donkey. Further, the negation makes the second sentence unacceptable.

(10) Pedro doesn’t own a donkey.
(11) *It is grey.

This is taken to point toward a conclusion that indefinites such as “a donkey” are quantifiers rather than referential items. But general problems arise here, as GA describes. We quote at length:

“However, if we construe “a donkey” as an existential quantifier, how does it manage to bind the pronoun across a sentence boundary?”

“The problem … is related to the fact that the pronoun and its indefinite antecedent occur in different sentences. The following examples show, however, that similar problems arise
within sentences:

If Pedro owns a donkey, he beats it.
Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.”

“…it is obvious that the pronouns don't refer, so they can't be co-referential with their antecedents, either. Nor are the pronouns bound by their antecedents, for they aren't c-commanded by them. “

“a donkey” is too deeply embedded for it to c-command “it”. […] Hence, the neuter pronouns in these sentences cannot be construed as bound variables.”

“apparently, indefinites are neither quantifiers nor referential terms, and this problem entrains another one, for as long as it unclear what indefinites mean, it will also remain obscure how they can serve as antecedents to pronouns. “

The TG approach shifts the entire problem to an account that would rely instead on a principle of avoiding useless actions. The following actionemes are involved in imaginary cases of indefinites such as “doesn’t own a donkey”

(12) *If Pedro doesn’t own a donkey, he beats it.
(13) *Every farmer who doesn’t own a donkey beats it.”

$ImagineDonkey
$ImagineXownsDonkey
$AssertXdoesn’tOwnDonkey

In a TG treatment a cognitive utilitarian constraint such as the following would account for the data:

**Concept Negation Closure Constraint**

Don’t refer to an imaginary concept invoked for the purpose of establishing its negated existence.

The above overview illustrates some cases where TG brings the possibility of a wider range of solutions to areas of investigation where syntax, semantics and pragmatics intersect. We have shown the relevance of action analysis for some general preliminary questions of pragmatics and discourse representation theory, but have not attempted to examine the extensive detailed analysis of GA or the extensive literature of these fields, presenting only some preliminary contrasts to indicate where further investigation can be fruitful. While our general purpose is to propose an approach to facilitate better understanding of syntactic problems, we have endeavored in this section to illustrate how action-based analysis interacts with some problems of traditional semantics, pragmatics and the philosophy of language to reduce the burdens of explanation or restrict the domain of unexplained data. The linguistic intent of cognitax is
available to contribute to the investigations in the philosophy of language and its border areas.

43 TG and Information Structure

[NB: This updated section is available on request in the extended document.]

44 Wh-islands in degree questions

Introduction

(Abrusan, 2011) proposes in an extensive investigation that degree questions with wh-islands are unacceptable exactly when they are not susceptible in formal semantic analysis to a most informative true answer. This approach follows in the spirit of earlier semantic analysis (Fox, 2007), which argues that other types of weak islands are blocked by Maximization Failure (MF), wherein maximization functions fail for certain operator scale conditions. This vein of work involves important assumptions about the architecture of cognition which contrast with those that we will explore. Our purpose is to propose and support more direct and simpler, less elaborated hypotheses regarding the representation of degree scales as universally dense (Fox, 2007).

We present a simple analysis based on Tool Grammar (TG). TG holds, simply, that for each element of structure in a sentence there must be specified an element of linguistic structural intent, and that the intents of some tools are mutually incompatible, thereby explaining patterns of acceptability/unacceptability. There are various ways in which TG might be formulated, but they have in common the constant of specification of linguistic action intent for each structural element, which is the element of TG theory considered here.

Evidently, the intents of TG to be presented could be conceivably be recast in a custom tailored formalism of e.g. intensional/propositional logic. They do not in themselves logically exclude the general thesis of a semantic analysis for wh-degree terms but do present a narrowed analysis restricted to a more limited domain of structural intent. Using a pseudo code representation, as is standard for architectural design for symbolic systems, we postpone formalization in order to focus on the fundamental issue of what are the controlling factors underlying wh-island patternings.

An important theme of this section is that the TG approach raises the possibility of simplifying solutions not only for theories of syntax, but for the theories of semantics and pragmatics as well. This is made possible by introducing a new level of data representation which is not included in most forms of linguistic analysis, namely that of speaker intent. To the extent that this modularization is natural to the underlying systems for the purposes of explaining linguistic patterns, it is expected that the resulting analyses can involve both simpler argumentation and simpler solutions than those of approaches lacking such a perspective. Since they is based on field observations by native speakers, TG specifications can be inoculated against the view that
they are merely stipulative or reductionist. These are supported to the extent that the addition of a new dimension of recordable and verifiable data is subject to independent validation.

We assume familiarity with (Abrusan, 2011) and (Fox, 2007) without reconstructing their arguments. We proceed by extracting the data from the work in question and proposing for it a TG analysis involving structural intents. These are examined for intention conflicts and principles of incompatibility are proposed.

Both MF and TG raise important questions about the architecture of linguistic competence in a cognitive framework. It is beyond the scope of the present section to attempt fully to investigate these issues here, but we seek to advance the level of understanding by presenting the fundamental tenets of TG to contrast with those underlying MF.

Brief Orientation

The problem we address can be observed in the following data:

(1) a. Which glass of wine do you know whether you should poison t?
(2) b. *How much wine do you know whether you should poison t?

When wh questions are formed from with degree constructions they are acceptable in some cases and unacceptable in others. This is explained in (Abrusan, 2011) by undertaking formal semantic analysis to show that no meaning interpretation is possible for the ill-formed sentences. The problem is cast not as syntactic but one of filtering structures whereby interpretation is blocked. An alternative architecture views sentence generation as a separate process from semantic interpretation and accepts the challenge of excluding the ill-formed sentences as part of structure formation. TG essentially associates a linguistic intent with each structural element and seeks convincing rationales why some combinations of intents may be incompatible. Based on experience with complex symbolic systems, it is commonly found that natural generalizations are only possible if sought at the appropriate level of representation, and undue complexity may otherwise result. The TG hypothesis is that when intents are associated with structures simpler and more natural solutions can result. For TG, semantic analysis remains valid and important but is construed as more centered in the processes of interpretation than generation. This approach can leave an analysis such as (Abrusan, 2011) valid and highly interesting, but less explanatory for the process of generation.

In the above example (Abrusan, 2011) would posit that there is no viable semantic interpretation for 1b. We do not review the arguments which are well explained in the source article. For TG a sentence is a set of linguistic mental actions in which various intentions are exercised to produce a linguistic representation for interpretation by the addressee. TG proposes that there can be a limited, finite controlled vocabulary of linguistic intents which is putatively available and universal to some considerable degree, although those latter possibilities are not explored here.

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48 Data is from the source papers referenced above.
49 The vocabulary of intents may well be largely shared among languages but the structures reflecting intents is evidently much more various and subject to universalities of a different order. Furthermore, the constraints on
For 1b., we might propose that the structure “How much wine” reflects an intent to inquire about a continuous scale judgment, while “do you know whether” represents an intent to inquire about a definite determination. We represent these intents in TG using dollar symbol phrases that we refer to as actionemes:

\[
\begin{align*}
(3) \text{“How much wine”} &= \text{$\text{inquireContinuousScaledJudgment}$ (CSJ)} \\
(4) \text{“do you know whether”} &= \text{$\text{inquireDefiniteDetermination}$ (DD)}^{50}
\end{align*}
\]

The fundamental claim of this section is that intents such as these can be incompatible. A sentence would not be generated to simultaneously inquire about a definite determination when it is predicated on the burden of a second unresolved inquiry about a judgment on a continuous scale. We will discuss this further below, but the general claim is that there is evidence for a constraint in natural language against aggregation of too much uncertainty (duty of inquiry) in cognitive representations. The over-arching generalization is that cognitive processing can impose constraints to manage representations that involve uncertainty. We posit controls on uncertainty overload as a defining cognitive factor in the definition of natural languages.

Source of Actionemes

Tool Grammar is inspired by the observation that natural languages include numerous terms to describe linguistic actions (assert, deny, ask, tell, etc.), so there is reason to believe that transcribed observations about action intents can provide a form of scientifically valuable primary data about the processes underlying language behavior. The contention is that language itself provides some metadata about language and that this can provide a basis for developing a closed, controlled vocabulary for systematically transcribing the linguistic intents associated with linguistic structures. The Tool Grammar framework includes the hypothesis that those competent in a language are thereby competent in ascertaining intents underlying linguistic utterances, albeit in a naïve, unformalized form that, for linguistic analysis, ultimately requires additional extensive refinement in a standard scientific process. Beyond conscious awareness and the formulation of a controlled vocabulary of actioneme primitives, a central goal of a theory of action intents is integration with processes of structure formation in an overall theory of structural linguistic action. TG furthermore has the potential to reveal that constraints on well-formedness correspond often to high level cognitive disciplines and strategies for managing complexity, uncertainty, integrity, consistency, information density and other cybernetic principles of information representation. TG can therefore be summarized as a theory of cognitive utilitarian meta-linguistic structural action intents.

Formalization of Actionemes

Actioneme symbols (represented with initial ‘$’) are utilized for methodological convenience with an understanding that the process of formalizing TG should call eventually for a range of mathematically explicit, more rigorous elements and forms. Actionemes often require phrases and reflect an internal complexity. This suggests the possibility either of a form of feature

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50 The intent is not actually associated with the phrases presented here but is rendered that way here for purposes of discussion.
representation (e.g. \texttt{$\text{inquireJudgment}$ [+inquire, +judgment]}) or of embeddable function representation. (e.g. \texttt{inquire(judgment())}), involving, possibly, mixed representations. The use of embedded functions implies a tree representation, begging the question, which we leave open, whether representation of action intentions fits naturally into the merged tree structures that result from lexical selection and assembly into increasingly larger units. Whatever the form of improved theoretical statements, our hypothesis is that constraints on cognitive compatibility among linguistic tools can be formulated as patterns of actioneme feature or function sets, and that, furthermore, these can be integrated into the larger matrix of a linguistic theory. The general thesis is that linguistic tool intents are involved in a restrictive cognitive utilitarian mechanics, which can explain many linguistic phenomena, and is compatible with a variety of linguistic theories. Our current purpose is to advocate for the usefulness of the general approach so issues of formalization are not here addressed.

A TG Prospectus for wh Agreement

(Abrusan, 2011) proposes in an extensive investigation that a set of degree questions with wh-islands have patterns of acceptability that can be explained by a theory that the ill-formed sentences are excluded because they can receive no semantic interpretation. These arguments proceed along the lines of (Fox, 2007), based on the thesis that any question must have a maximally informative answer, i.e. one that implies all other true answers. Our purpose is not to dispute the semantic analysis presented, which is careful and sophisticated, nor to deny the underlying insights, but to open the question whether there might be some account that could explain why sentences ill-suited to understanding might not be generated in the first place.

The Conflicted Determinacy Thesis

In this section, we present a TG thesis that there are four structural intents that interact to preclude the principle set of unacceptable sentences presented in (Abrusan, 2011). We analyze the verbal data as involving in some cases an inquiry about a process of evaluation and other times one involving an establishment of a definite determination. We distinguish these as distinctly different linguistic actions. For the wh elements, we also distinguish crucially between the act of selection from a limited pre-selected set and a judgment about a continuous scale of measurement. Each of these intents is introduce by means of lexical item tools, with which they are associated.

Here are the associations of intents, with lexical material covered by a basic set of examples in the article. We note that a rigorous test of the semantic filtering hypothesis presented would benefit from examination of a wider range of lexical items and structures, but we restrict ourselves here to the specific patterns presented in the paper since space limitations prevent a full examination of a number of pertinent structural features.\(^{51}\)

\(^{51}\) A full examination of the semantic filtering hypothesis might draw on a wide sample of structural contexts. Here are sample patterns that incline to favor the tool grammar approach: *Is determined*, *can you determine*, *is listed*, *is ascertainable, is to be ascertainable*, *did you find, do you find*, *is specified*, *is recommended*. Note also that the yes/know feature of *know whether* is not...
$\text{inquireEvaluation}$:

“think that you should”
“need to know whether”
“arguing about whether”

$\text{inquireDefiniteDetermination}$

“know whether”

$\text{inquireSelectionFromPre-SelectedSet}$

“which glass”
“how many books” if inquiring about a known count

$\text{inquireContinuousScaleJudgment}$

“how much wine”
“how many books” if inquiring about unknown count
“how many pounds”
“how many points”

We use the following abbreviations to represent the compatibility or conflict of intents

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
\text{E} & \text{inquireEvaluation} \\
\text{DD} & \text{inquireDefiniteDetermination} \\
\text{PS} & \text{inquireSelectionFromPre-SelectedSet} \\
\text{CSJ} & \text{inquireContinuousScaleJudgment} \\
\end{array}
\]

Here is the intent compatibility table:

\[
\begin{array}{c|cc}
\text{E} & \text{DD} \\
\text{PS} & \text{OK} & \text{OK} \\
\text{CSJ} & \text{OK} & * \\
\end{array}
\]

Intent Compatibility Table

This pattern of compatibility is attributed to a principle of cognitax (syntax grounded in higher cognition) which is hypothesized to control the uncertainty or indeterminacy in an inquiry. A compared semantically against the instrumental *know how*, and these too conform to tool grammar expectations.
definite determination has a higher requirement to reduce uncertainty, while an evaluation process evidently would have built-in expectations of uncertainty. Inquiry about a continuous scale judgment is interpreted as having a higher level of inherent uncertainty and indeterminacy than inquiry about a pre-selected set.

Principle: Conflicted Determinacy Constraint

Inquiring about a continuous scale judgment conflicts with the aspiration to high certainty inherent in inquiring simultaneously about definite determination, since prior cognitive processing is a pre-requisite to laying the groundwork for determinacy. Binary absolute judgment can’t be determined based on an uncertain categorization judgment. There is a stricture not to overload inquiry about a definite determination with excessive unresolved uncertainty: preselection is tolerable, discrimination on a continuous scale is excessive.

Note: Continuous scale judgments are more uncertain and cognitively burdened than predetermined selection.

Corollary: It’s ok to embed inquiry about an uncertainty into an inquiry about an evaluation.

Following are the data from (Abrusan, 2011) illustrating the application of this constraint. We interpret sentences marked with ‘?’ as basically acceptable with possible overtones of less determinacy associated with secondary variables which are beyond the scope of the present work.

(5) a. Which glass of wine do you know whether you should poison t?
   $\text{inquireSelectionFromPre-SelectedSet}$
   $\text{inquireDefiniteDetermination}$
   PS/DD

(6) b. *How much wine do you know whether you should poison t?
   $\text{inquireContinuousScaleJudgment}$
   $\text{inquireDefiniteDetermination}$
   *CSJ/DD

(7) a. Which glass of wine do you think t0 that you should poison t?
   $\text{inquireSelectionFromPreSelectedSet}$
   $\text{inquireJudgment}$
   PS/E

(8) b. *How much wine do you know whether you should poison t? (=1b)
   $\text{inquireContinuousScaleJudgment}$
   $\text{inquireDefiniteDetermination}$
   *CSJ/DD

(9) c. How much wine do you think you should poison t? (Our example)
   $\text{inquireContinuousScaleJudgment}$
   $\text{inquireJudgment}$
   CSJ/E
(10) How many books do you know whether you should burn t?

There are two theoretical intents here contrasting $inquireSelectionFromPre-SelectedSet with $inquireContinuousScaleJudgment. Only the former results in an acceptable sentence.

$inquireSelectionFromPre-selectedSet
$inquireDefiniteDetermination
PS/DD
$inquireContinuousScaleJudgment
$inquireDefiniteDetermination
*CSJ/DD

(11) (4) a. *How many pounds does the World Anti-Doping Agency know whether the boxers lost last year?  
$inquireContinuousScaleJudgment
$inquireDefiniteDetermination
*CSJ/DD

(12) b. ?How many pounds does the World Anti-Doping Agency need to know whether the boxers lost last year?  
$inquireContinuousScaleJudgment
$inquireDefiniteDetermination
CSJ/E

(13) (5) How many points are the judges arguing about whether to deduct?  
$inquireContinuousScaleJudgment
$inquireDefiniteDetermination
CSJ/E

Based on the regularity of patterning in the above we propose that a TG solution should be considered as against the semantic filtering solution proposed by Abrusan, particularly since the actioneme transcriptions represent independent primary data, confirmable by consulting with native speakers.

The Vacuous Judgment Thesis

We present next a second TG thesis employing three structural intents that interact to preclude a further set of unacceptable sentences presented in (Abrusan, 2011). We analyze the verbal data to involve inquiry whether or not a set of circumstances is, or is not, the case. We advert to the possibility that this distinction bears a relation to that of a pre-selected set as in the previous section, but treat it as distinct for purposes of initial analysis and explication here. For the wh elements, all examples involve judgment about a continuous scale of measurement, which is the action intent we presented previously. Each of these intents is introduce by means of lexical item
tools, with which they are associated.

Here are the associations of intents with lexical material:

\$\text{inquireIsTheCase}:

- “did drive”
- “does have children”

\$\text{inquireIsNotTheCase}:

- “didn’t drive”
- “doesn’t have children”

\$\text{inquireContinuousScaleJudgment}:

- “how fast”
- “how many”

We use the following abbreviations to represent the compatibility or conflict of intents:

- ITC = \$\text{inquireIsTheCase}
- NTC = \$\text{inquireNotTheCase}
- CSJ = \$\text{inquireContinuousScaleJudgment}
- (PS = \$\text{inquireSelectionFromPreSelectedSet})

Here is the intent compatibility table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ITC</th>
<th>NTC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| CSJ  | OK  |    *

Intent Compatibility Table

An important aspect of this analysis is the observation that selections from pre-selected sets are inherently negatable in the sense that negation of a subset can be interpreted as the complement. In this sense we propose that SelectionFromPreSelectedSet is meaningfully negated by taking the complement, while ContinuousScaleJudgment cannot be.

With this in mind, the pattern of compatibility in data taken from the paper is attributed to a principle of cognitive utilitarian mechanics oriented to avoiding useless constructions reflecting vacuous situations. An inquiry about a judgment on a specific situation that never occurs has no value. This is an instance of a general avoidance of useless constructions, and may be considered axiomatic in a system where each structural element is introduced by specific intent for specific purpose.
Principle: Vacuous Judgment Constraint in Non-negatable Circumstances

Inquiring about a judgment concerning a specific circumstance that never occurs fails to be generated because it serves no purpose to posit a value for a non-entity.

Caveat/Qualification: In the case where alternatives are intended ($\text{inquireSelectionFromPreSelectedSet}$), negation of a circumstance can imply the occurrence of the alternative circumstance which is non-vacuous.

Following are the data from (Abrusan, 2011) that illustrate the application of this constraint.\(^{52}\)

\begin{align*}
\text{(14)} & \quad (6) \ a. \ \text{How fast did John drive?} \\
& \quad \text{\texttt{inquireContinuousScaleJudgment}} \\
& \quad \text{\texttt{inquireIfTheCase}} \\
& \quad \text{CSJ/ITC} \\
\text{(15)} & \quad b. \ *\text{How fast didn’t John drive?} \\
& \quad \text{\texttt{inquireContinuousScaleJudgment}} \\
& \quad \text{\texttt{inquireNotTheCase}} \\
& \quad *\text{CSJ/NTC}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{(16)} & \quad (7) \ a. \ \text{How many children does John have?} \\
& \quad \text{\texttt{inquireContinuousScaleJudgment}} \\
& \quad \text{\texttt{inquireIfTheCase}} \\
& \quad \text{CSJ/ITC} \\
\text{(17)} & \quad b. \ *\text{How many children doesn’t John have?} \\
& \quad \text{\texttt{inquireContinuousScaleJudgment}} \\
& \quad \text{\texttt{inquireNotTheCase}} \\
& \quad *\text{CSJ/NTC}
\end{align*}

But notice the acceptability of both of the following:

\begin{itemize}
  \item The following data support the conclusion that the operative factor is CSJ vs. PS.
  \item How many records didn’t John break? (of a list)
  \item How many types of errors didn’t John make? (known types)
  \item How many time trials didn’t John drive? (in the schedule)
  \item How long didn’t John drive? (if e.g. split between drivers or activities)
  \item How many models didn’t he drive in his Nascar career?
  \item *How many races didn’t John enter? (unless types of races)
  \item *How many miles didn’t John drive (unless e.g. comparing alternate drivers)
  \item How many laps didn’t John drive (in the race)?
  \item *How exhausted wasn’t John?
  \item *How important wasn’t John?
  \item *??How important didn’t John feel?
\end{itemize}
Since the constraint seems a reasonable one for structure generation, is based on transcribable primary data, and covers the data presented, we propose that a TG analysis should be evaluated for its simplicity and explanatory value along side semantic and syntactic accounts.

The Scalable Modifier Thesis

In this section, we present a TG thesis that there are three structural intents that interact to preclude the data presented for responsive and rogative verbs (Karttunen, 1977). We assume familiarity with these categories and their use in the (Abrusan, 2011) paper.

Here are the associations of intents with lexical material:

$assertScalableStateOfResultantKnowing :$
knows/told us/remembered/guessed/forgot

$assertBinaryStateOfUncertainInquiry$
wondered/asked/investigated

$assertAboveAverageDegree$
mostly

We use the following abbreviations to represent the compatibility or conflict of intents

53 Responsive predicates (know-class)
Verbs of retaining knowledge   know, be aware, recall, remember, forget
Verbs of acquiring knowledge   learn, notice, find out
Verbs of communication        tell, show, indicate
Verbs of decision              decide, determine, specify, agree on
Opinion verbs                 be certain about, be convinced about

Rogative predicates (wonder-class)
Inquisitive verbs              wonder, ask, investigate, examine, consider
Verbs of relevance             matter, be relevant, be important, care
Verbs of dependency            depend on, be related to, have an influence on, make a difference to
Here is the intent compatibility table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SSRK</th>
<th>BSUI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAD</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intent Compatibility Table

This pattern of compatibility is attributed to a principle of cognitax which is pro-forma intended to prevent combined modifications (predications) using fundamentally incompatible predicates. (Since multiple categories of such incompatibility are envisaged we anticipate a feature checking mechanism, even though a feature formalism is not extensively developed in this section. Note also that we might propose a specific “Degree Scale Compatibility” constraint to prevent the conflict of strictly binary categorical predicates with inherently opposite scaled degree ones, but choose to generalize the constraint in anticipation of an extended inventory of such conflicts.)

Principle: Compatible Modification (Predication) Constraint

Structures involving incompatible modification (predication) features are precluded, such as those which on the one hand imply degree scales, and those that in their binariness preclude them.

In this case elements which do not match for scalable modification are blocked.

Following are the data from (Abrusan, 2011) illustrating the application of this constraint.\(^\text{54}\)

\(^{54}\) Note that there are various dimensions of useful data which are not presented in Abrusan. We restrict analysis here but note that the following are generally supportive of our thesis.

rarely wondered
* individually wondered which girls (Plural)
*Partially wondered
*Overall wondered
mostly hypothesized
mostly speculated
Mostly wondered which of
John mostly wondered/asked/investigated which of the girls came to the party.
*I partially wonder where she is.
I partially know where she is.
(20) (8) John mostly knows/told us/remembered/guessed/forgot which girls came to the party.
   ‘mostly’ = $assertAboveAverageDegree
   Responsive verbs = $assertScalableStateOfResultantKnowing
   AAD/SSRK

(21) (9) *John mostly wondered/asked/investigated which girls came to the party.
   ‘mostly’ = $assertAboveAverageDegree
   Rogative verbs = $assertBinaryStateOfUncertainInquiry
   * AAD/BSUI

We conclude that a TG solution based on the primary data of linguistic intention offers a simple, direct alternative to semantic filtering.

Additional Conflicted Determinacy Data

In this section we extend earlier analysis and consider a complement of data presented in (Abrusan, 2011). To a considerable extent this section overlaps and reflects the data and processes already covered. We present a TG analysis here for completeness in covering the source paper.

We again present a TG thesis that there are four structural intents that interact to preclude the starred, unacceptable sentences from being generated. Although TG offers solutions for more nuanced irregularities in those sentences marked with ‘?’ we do not consider them here.

Here are the associations of intents with lexical material, overlapping, as we have indicated, with what has been presented previously.

$inquireContinuousScaleJudgment CSJ
   “how many inches, wine, kilograms, pounds”
   “how tall, much”

$inquireSelectionFromPre-SelectedSet PS
   “what hair color”
   “which problem”
   “how fast”
   “how many, X or Y”

$inquireJudgment E
   “are considering whether we can”
   “investigating whether it is useful”
   “wondering whether it is worth losing”

$inquireDefinitiveDetermination DD
   “find out whether”
   “discover whether”
   “forget whether”

120
“know whether”
“know who”
“predict who”
“regret who”

We again use the following abbreviations to represent the compatibility or conflict of intents

\[
\begin{align*}
E & = \text{$inquireEvaluation} \\
DD & = \text{$inquireDefiniteDetermination} \\
PS & = \text{$inquireSelectionFromPre-SelectedSet} \\
CSJ & = \text{$inquireContinuousScaleJudgment}
\end{align*}
\]

Here is the intent compatibility table:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
E & DD \\
PS & OK & OK \\
CSJ & OK & *
\end{array}
\]

Intent Compatibility Table

Again, this pattern of compatibility is attributed to a principle of cognitax which is understood to control the uncertainty or indeterminacy in an inquiry. The data in this section is covered by the Conflicted Determinacy Constraint presented earlier. We reproduce it here for reference in reading the examples below.

**Principle: Conflicted Determinacy Constraint**

Inquiring about a continuous scale judgment conflicts with the aspiration to high certainty inherent in inquiring simultaneously about definite determination, since prior cognitive processing is a pre-requisite to laying the groundwork for determinacy. Binary absolute judgment can’t be determined based on an uncertain categorization judgment. Don’t overload inquiry about a definite determination with excessive unresolved uncertainty: preselection is tolerable, discrimination on a continuous scale is excessive

Note: Continuous scale judgments are more uncertain and cognitively burdened than predetermined selection.

**Corollary:** It’s ok to embed inquiry about an uncertainty into an inquiry about an evaluation

Following are the data from (Abrusan, 2011) illustrating the application of this constraint.

(22) (10) a. ?How many inches of legroom are the airline executives considering whether we can remove from economy class cabins (without people noticing)?
$inquireContinuousScaleJudgment $inquireJudgment CSJ/E

(23) *How many inches of legroom did the airline executives find out whether we can remove from economy class cabins (without people noticing)?

$inquireContinuousScaleJudgment $inquireDefinitiveDetermination *CSJ/DD

(24) (11) a. *How much wine are scientists investigating/examining whether it is useful to drink in order to stay healthy?

$inquireContinuousScaleJudgment $inquireJudgment CSJ/E

(25) b. *How much wine did scientists discover whether it is useful to drink in order to stay healthy?

$inquireContinuousScaleJudgment definitiveDetermination *CSJ/DD

(26) (12) a. *How many kilograms are the boxers wondering whether it is worth losing next year (in order to have a better chance to win)?

$inquireContinuousScaleJudgment $inquireJudgment CSJ/E

(27) b. *How many kilograms did the boxers forget/realize/tell you whether it was worth losing last year?

$inquireContinuousScaleJudgment $inquireDefinitiveDetermination *CSJ/DD

(13) *How tall does Mary know whether she should be? (in order to join the basketball team) *CSJ/DD

But PS is ok: What hair color does Mary know whether she should try? PS/DD

(28) (14) a. *Which problem does Mary know who should solve?
In conclusion we find that this data also conforms to the TG analysis, suggesting it should be considered as a viable explanation for the observed patterning.

Conclusions

The goal in this section has been to widen the discussion of possible explanations of degree term phenomena. We have presented a novel approach using the linguistic action intents of Cognitax Tool Grammar and shown how it efficiently covers a set of previously analyzed data using only common sense constraints.

This approach involves an architecture of competence which is different from that underlying previous syntactic and semantic analyses, so emerges as an important part of an evaluation of...
competing theoretical frameworks.

The TG analysis is neither stipulative nor reductionist because it includes an additional level of data representation compared to other approaches, and this data can be directly elicited and transcribed from native speakers.

The structural intents of TG could be formalized using a custom tailored application of intensional/propositional/possible world logic

The TG approach does not encompass full semantic interpretation, so cannot exclude the general thesis of a semantic analysis for wh-degree terms. It only presents evidence for the viability of a narrowed syntactic analysis restricted to a domain of structural intent. Parallel ongoing research extends the arguments for the TG approach, based on analyses of a wide range of syntactic, pragmatic, and semantic phenomena. To the extent that the TG approach proves viable and scientifically illuminating it can provide a level of structural cognitive compatibility explaining why many ill-formed sentences might not normally be generated. The filtering consequences of incompatible intents undertake, when proven generally well motivated, to reflect an important module in the architecture of competence and serve to simplify theories of natural language sentence generation by removing complex cases to a level where they might be more naturally resolved.

45 Rhetorical Structure Theory

[NB: This updated section is available on request in the extended document.]

46 Stronger Constraints for Modeling the Faculty of Language

Analysis of particular linguistic problems in the TG framework yields a set of putative constraints on linguistic structure formation. We have proposed a preliminary set of constraints at the level of cognitive intentional formation:

- Single Focus Constraint
- Overlapping Exclusion Constraint
- Cross Purpose Constraint
- Required Purpose Constraint
- Vacuous Action Constraint
- Constraint on Elaboration Beyond Essential

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55 Computational approaches generally do not aim so directly toward formulations of psychological theories for the faculties of language. We limit ourselves by not covering other approaches connected with machine computation, such as computational semantics, computational pragmatics, bidirectional optimality theory, spoken dialog systems, and Bayesian methods in general.

56 Computational approaches generally do not aim so directly toward formulations of psychological theories for the faculties of language. We limit ourselves by not covering other approaches connected with machine computation, such as computational semantics, computational pragmatics, bidirectional optimality theory, spoken dialog systems, and Bayesian methods in general.

57 Some of these constraints are discussed only in the expanded version of this paper.
• Unknown Specification Constraint
• Unknown Interrogation Constraint
• Likelihood Uncertainty Constraint
• Subordinate Focus Constraint
• Conjunction Constraint on Unknowns in Assertions
• Superfluous/Null Construct Constraint
• Wasteful Structure Constraint
• Specific Expectation Constraint
• Incompatible Estimation Constraint
• Advanced Notice Quantification Constraint
• Imaginary Construct Sequence Constraint
• Imaginary Construct Differentiation Constraint
• Concept Negation Closure Constraint
• Conflicted Determinacy Constraint
• Vacuous Judgment Constraint in Non-negatable Circumstances
• Compatible Modification Constraint
• Conflicted Determinacy Constraint

These constraints remain individually to be validated in further investigations over time but even in their first proposals they accumulate to attest to a reality in the faculty of language that underlies rapidly learned creative language use based on sparse data. They clearly overlap in ways that suggest that they can be combined to produce a smaller more general set. The constraints combine to impose the possibility of more concentrated and stronger limitations on the notion of possible human language than those resulting from the analysis of syntax-centric configurational rules alone without incorporating factors of linguistic action and intent. It is evident that many of them may be conflatable in a strictly formal analysis to a single meta constraint:

Linguistic Intention Umbrella Constraint

In selecting an element for construction of a sentence to represent meaning do not make a choice which conflicts in intent with another element chosen for this sentence.

This general conclusion places the present work distinctly within the Chomskyan paradigm, even if it proposes a subparadigmatic shift in perspective, because stronger constraints on the characterization of the human faculty of language contribute to an understanding of infinite linguistic creativity from finite resources and how it is that children learn language so quickly when the data experience to them is so limited.

47 Summary and the Architecture of Competence
See also the Introduction and Summary and the section Implications for the Generative Program for a high level summary.
We have presented arguments that humans are not so extensively and fundamentally “syntactical animals” (Searle, June 29, 1972) as is assumed in the pervasive Chomskyan Generative Program. Instead, Tool Grammar (TG) postulates that sentence generation exhibits linguistic cognitive intention actions most fundamentally and syntax processes more procedurally. Evidence has been presented to demonstrate that there exists an empirically evident necessity for representation of linguistic structural intent which has been generally overlooked in the theory of language, including notably centralized configurational syntax in the generative program. The creativity of sentence generation is positioned in the context of speaker intention at a higher cognitive level than syntax formation. This revision of the architecture of competence extends the potential of the generative program beyond current limitations.

Arguments for TG emerge from considering a range of difficult and vexing problems in syntactic theory. We have pursued empirically transparent and radically penetrating solutions for these problems under strong constraints on the bounds of human language. We find support for the hypothesis that syntactic theory requires specification of structural intent in order properly to solve a set of the most difficult theoretical challenges, and, further, that this brings unavoidable implications for the architecture of linguistic competence.

Evidence has been presented that the notion of possible human language may be more narrowly constrained by means of limitations on processing in the sphere of intention and action than by those available by consideration of syntactic processes alone without components of intention and action. This work, therefore, while compatible with aspects of many approaches, is in support of the primary Chomskyan goal of explaining infinite linguistic creativity from finite resources and rapid child language learning in spite of a poverty of stimulus data.

A sentence in TG is a set of actions, a structure building performance where the initiative of intention is central rather than any primary syntactic scaffolding. Each tool is an intentional device for specific effect in the process of utterance generation. It is distinguished from the traditional concept of a linguistic ‘rule’ by the explicit specification of intent added to the standard structural input and output conditions.

Language has communication, via external representations of internal meaning, as a purpose and tools as a means of action. Tools include lexical items, build/merge/move mechanisms and functional manipulations [(trans)formations)] under constraints on usage and context. The initial structure of sentences is implicit in the choice of lexical items to effect intent. They are assembled by merge operations which aggregate elements into larger constituents. (Trans)formations are manipulative tools applied to basic structures to realize the intent, manner and impact of delivery. Tools, lexical and (trans)formational, embody observed regularities traditionally captured as ‘rules’ in linguistic descriptions but they always include as an essential core component the specification of purposeful utility for intentional structural effect. Natural constraints on the cognitive inter-compatibility of tools render many rules and constraints on configurational syntax unnecessary, since unacceptable sentences often result from the incompatible misapplication of tools.

58 John Hewson (personal communication) observes the history of syntax might have been redirected by the postulation of NP + VP => S, rather than S => NP + VP.
Recursive functions of language in TG are formed in cognitive ideation rather than just within operational syntax, and they precede language specific structure formation. Creative, generative and recursive linguistic capabilities emanate not from a source syntactic component but from pre-syntactic linguistic cognitive abilities that result in linguistic action directives. Recursive, anticipative, and creative linguistic productivity is located in a higher level linguistic cognitive facility, cognate with those of semantic extraction, inference, or pragmatic derivation. The latter are interpretive and characteristically more oriented to the perspective of the addressee. Language tools are more operational than interpretive and mediate between cognition and expression by providing the necessary structure.

The data essential for motivating linguistic descriptions can be enhanced by explicit field transcriptions of evident user action and intent using a controlled scientific vocabulary. Linguists traditionally transcribe phonology, lexicology, morphology and syntax, but less consistently the intentional force of utterance components. Transcriptions of structural action semantics are restricted and accessible, as well as observationally prior, compared to truth semantics or intensional logic, which are inferential, indirect, derived, more obscure and proportionately complex. They may or may not necessarily adhere to principles of traditional semantics such as strict compositionality. Full semantic processing involves secondary procedural information often associated with addressee interpretation, rather than declarative knowledge that is basic to sentence origination and generation. Semantic action directives use only the simpler restricted action elements of meaning involved in the intentions of sentence generation, not full-blown interpretive semantics. Semantic interpretation, anticipation, inference, pragmatic construal and model theoretic mappings are deferred to the separate capabilities associated with general cognition and linguistic understanding. The formalization of linguistic intents requires a new technical controlled vocabulary containing a restricted set of general action descriptors centered on a universal central core.\textsuperscript{59} As a methodological aid for linguistic description, adding linguistic intent to linguistic structure building rules ultimately lessens the burden on the separate disciplines of semantics and pragmatics. The transcription of linguistic intent, of which speakers may be conscious, inoculates the approach against the view that its elements are purely stipulative.

TG describes a performative mechanism for generating externalized representations of meaning from which conveyed meaning is derived by means of a separate interpretation by the addressee. Action tools build structures to externalize representations of meaning. Sentence formation is not direct communication but the posting or publication of representations of thoughts left to be interpreted by addressees to extract and construe meaning. Sentence formation is fundamentally different and separate from sentence interpretation. Linguistic utterances satisfy internal intentions by presenting characterizations of thoughts mediated by conventionalized linguistic devices. A word is a fundamental language schema bridge used to map thoughts to external representations.

TG represents a sub-paradigmatic shift in syntactic/semantic theory to the extent it can be

\textsuperscript{59} If there are universal tendencies in the inventory and taxonomy of linguistic actions this clearly does not necessarily extend directly to the range of structures used to represent those actions since languages have highly diverse means of expression.
integrated to the generative program. Although not an essential scientific purpose, in accordance with traditional formalist definitions of a language as a set of acceptable sentences\textsuperscript{60}, tools, properly formalized and operating under natural constraints, together with a component able to generate linguistic intentions, have the recombinant generative capacity to output all and only the well-formed sentences of a language, but crucially involve notations of functional role as a scientifically empowering dimension.\textsuperscript{61} Certain syntactic and cognitive dimensions of language can be conflated by adding an explicit level of structural action semantics subject to cognitive compatibility constraints. Traditional generative theories seeking to account for the speed of child language learning and universal structure would benefit in their aims from a universally available vocabulary of possible sentence intent elements. TG also seeks to address the vast variability in linguistic patterning among natural languages as a natural consequence of the possibilities of new tool invention and recombination under the constraints of functional compatibility. Speed of child language learning can be further understood to the extent that constraints on structure formation can be shown to follow from natural universal cognitive restrictions on tool formation and compatibility. By accounting for a wide range of unacceptable sentences in terms of natural limitations on linguistic intent, TG contributes to an understanding how the complexity of human languages can be learned largely in the absence of negative data, and how intuitions might develop about the unacceptability of sentence types that have never been present in the learning environment.

The difference between semantics and grammar is seen as the difference between ideation and expression. Semantic ill-formedness results from incompatible ideas (‘colorless green’), while grammatical ill-formedness results from the incompatible use of tools (‘colorless sleeps’).

A swath of linguistic ill-formedness can evidently be attributed to the presence of incompatible cognitive intents in the elements of unacceptable sentences. When syntactic phenomena are understood to be conditioned by linguistic action/intent descriptors, various difficult problems evidently yield to straightforward solutions: conflicting intents yield ill-formed sentences. TG seeks to bring much of the subtlety of syntax over into the realm of cognitive utilitarian mechanics, lifting burdens of explanation from syntax and transporting them to a specialized facility for utilitarian cognitive efficiency. This is accomplished while separating the utilitarian mechanics of externalization by the speaker from cognitive issues of semantic interpretation, anticipation, disambiguation, inference, and so forth, leaving the fields of semantics and pragmatics unconfounded, and separated as a domain of higher order cognition. Intentions result in the generation of thought-representational sentences, but neither interpretation nor communication can be fully effected until after a separate process of extraction is carried out by the addressee. Many formerly syntactic problems appear vulnerable to the thesis of incompatible intent, separating and reducing the challenges for theories of syntax, semantics and pragmatics.

When generalizations in symbolic systems are sought at an incorrect and incapable level of representation, unnatural and unnecessarily contrived solutions unavoidably result. Re-

\textsuperscript{60}We reject the definition of a language as a set of sentences, but propose that TG could be configured to generate such a set for those committed to this view.

\textsuperscript{61}The mounting complexity of contemporary solutions to syntactic problems can be symptomatic of what is known in software systems as a ‘kludge’, i.e. an addition of ad hoc complexity that may not be necessary if the system is structurally reorganized on different principles.
modularization of cognitive systems can afford more rational coverage of observed phenomena. By incorporating one dimension of action meaning into linguistic structure building, a large set of syntactic problems acquires a facilitative functional means: much of syntax becomes utilitarian mechanics of a specialized cognitive kind. Fundamentals of syntax are reducible to a particular form of cognitive utilitarian processes. The theory of grammar enjoys benefits when the complex model of linguistic cognition is re-modularized around the separate domains of expression and understanding.

TG seeks to model the psychological mechanisms underlying observable language. A specific language is a set of tools for posting and interpreting representations of thought adapted to a particular culture. Language (competence), in conformance with the generative paradigm, consists of the facility for linguistic tools governed by natural constraints on their formation and inter-compatibility. The set of sentences in a language is an effectuation rather than its embodiment or definition. The end purpose of linguistic descriptions is to create models of the natural human competence to learn and employ the world’s languages.

We have proposed a new level of constraints on generation using representation of linguistic intent and hypothesize that generalizations at this level can simplify the statement of linguistic universals which is essential for generative grammar.

Linguistic rules evidently require linguistic structural intentions, a theoretical position that has not heretofore been thoroughly presented. From a preponderance of diverse cases involving linguistic problems that resist authoritative solutions, we have argued that linguistic theory must incorporate components of linguistic action and intention. A set of problems in linguistic theory has served to demonstrate that the dimension of structural intent must necessarily be considered for adequate solutions to emerge. The absence of this level of representation in syntactic theory can plausibly account for limitations in advancing the theory in linear progress toward additional foundational achievements.

We conclude that there is evidence for the hypothesis that the exclusion of linguistic intention and action from generative rules introduces artefactual complexity and undesirably precludes the strongest possible natural constraints on characterizations of the human faculty of language. The inclusion of intention in linguistic rules evidently both enables solutions of otherwise intractable problems and enables simpler, more natural solutions generally solutions while probing explanations for the profoundly important syntactic observational effects uncovered by generativist methodology (e.g. locality, crossover, C-command, control). Theorizing based on linguistic intent shows potential to provide to thinner, simplified, more directly empirical argumentation compared to the indirections necessitated by complex syntactic analysis based on central configurational syntax. TG argumentation can be not infrequently inoculated against the view that it is merely stipulative or reductionist because the addition of a new dimension of recordable and verifiable data is based on primary field transcription and is subject to independent validation.

Finally, with regard to recent developments in the generative program, we note that our own investigations highlights the thesis that the Merge view of syntactic organization may likely be revalidated in TG as a fundamental discovery in the sphere of linguistic competence, a topic
whose full major implications are beyond the reach of the present work. We conclude that scientific validity can be enhanced by revising the architecture of generative linguistics from a merely mathematical sound-meaning connection to a functional connection between linguistic intention and linguistic expression.

48 Shortcomings and Future Work

We have presented the broad outlines of an alternative approach to (syntactic) utterance generation by motivating the need to include specifications of intent in formulations of linguistic processes. We supported the proposals by presenting an array of solutions to challenging problems. It would be premature to propose a fully elaborated system architecture but we have considered broadly some consequences and implications for linguistic theory and the architecture of competence. The work is limited to schematic analysis in support of a TG framework without attempting detailed formalization, broad coverage of the full range of syntactic processes. Similarly, we withhold analysis and judgment on the large number of syntactic processes which may be presented as derivational transformations, but are also (often equivalently) amenable as elaborated structures inserted directly from the lexicon making structural transformation unnecessary.

Any work such as the present must necessarily have shortcomings due to the newness and comprehensiveness of the general approach, as well as the limitations of early stage analysis. It is expected that further research can improve the particular analyses presented here. There are many particular shortcomings including the absence or insufficient coverage of morphology, diachronic issues, cross-language data, opportunities for experimental validation, and so forth. It is hoped, nevertheless, that the general approach might afford new insights to the many language phenomena which remain today mysterious. The constraints on construct formation in particular might be expected to undergo ongoing revision as future work proceeds. Much depends on the extent to which future work might help articulate and reinforce further constraints on the formation of linguistic structures at the level of intentional action.

A principal secondary hope for this theoretical work has been that a framework might emerge which could eventually lead to the engineering of new systems for language generation and recognition. While pursuing linguistic theory, it is advantageous to advance linguistic science toward modeling linguistic competence in software. If the thesis that linguistic structural action semantics are operationally at the center of human, it is possible that the formulation of linguistic tools could lead to new engineering possibilities for Chomsky’s generative program. Much future work is required and progress may depend on other shifts in perspective by the next generation of linguistic scholars.

Works Cited

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