No name: The Allosemy View

Andrés Saab (al_saab75@yahoo.com.ar)
UBA – CONICET
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Abstract: According to some version of the predicate theory of names, names denote metalinguistic predicates of a certain type, in a way such that the name Perón as it occurs in the sentence Perón died in 1974 denotes a predicate more less paraphrasable as “being called Perón” (Burge 1973, Elbourne 2005, Matushansky 2008 and Fara 2011, among others). The metalinguistic theory of names is claimed as being superior in non-trivial ways to direct reference theories, according to which names contribute an individual without the mediation of descriptions (Kripke 1980). The alleged triumph of predicativism is that by assuming the “being called N” property as basic, both referential and non-referential uses of names can be given a uniform semantic analysis. The referentialist needs instead to resort to homonymy or semantic ambiguity. The goal of this paper is to show that the uniformity argument does not hold and that the adduced linguistic evidence cannot lead to any meta-semantic consideration. Polysemy in the realm of names is exactly what is expected under the assumption that grammatical categories and the associated meanings that they are supposed to encode are not grammatical primitives, but epiphenomena that result from the particular way in which syntax combines functional material and lexical Roots. Before syntax, lexical Roots have no detectable meanings; they only point to a Polysemy Space that it is distinguished by means of syntax. So, under this account, which I call the allosemy view (Marantz 2013), there are no names before syntax, as there are no nouns, verbs or adjectives. Names are thus seen as the result of a particular syntactic configuration whose semantic realization is that of contributing an individual. Metalinguistic uses of names, and other derived uses, are involved in a different syntactic scheme, one that makes a name Root a predicate of a certain type. As I will show, the predicativist predicament is based on a misconception of how lexical Roots are identified in linguistic theory. The uniformity argument vanishes under the umbrella of the allosemy theory. Under closer inspection, the linguistic evidence point, instead, in favor of referentialism, as already argued by Longobardi (1994). Following his and others insights, I will provide new empirical arguments coming from the
syntax of Spanish names in favor of the hypothesis that derived uses of names require some sort of syntactic transformation (Chomsky 1965). The semantic effects of derived uses of names would follow from the meaningless character of name Roots and certain particular processes of deferred interpretation (Nunberg 1004, Jeshion 2015).

Key words: predicativism, referentialism; allosemal, Distributed Morphology; functional morphemes; Roots; polysemy

1. Introduction

According to a prevailing view in philosophy of language proper names like Perón have the job of contributing an individual to the proposition in which they occur, in a way such that a sentence like Perón died in 1974 expresses a singular proposition. Call this view referentialism, where the notion of reference implicated in the term at hand is left in a (consciously) vague way. Recent work has challenged the prevailing view on the basis of putative linguistic evidence by adducing that proper names are predicates of a certain type, namely, metalinguistic predicates. On this account, the proper name Perón denotes a predicate more or less paraphrasable as (simplifying again) “being called Perón”. Thus, for being used as arguments, proper names require additional linguistic material surrounding them. According to predicativism, such additional material comes in the form of a phonologically null determiner.

(1) \([\text{DP } \text{DET } [\text{NP Perón}]]\) (DET = /ø/)

Arguments for the syntactic and semantic presence of this null D come from attested uses of proper names in predicate position, as in

(2) a. There are two Peters in the party.

b. The Peter I know told me…

Uniformity considerations connecting possible syntactic and semantic analyses for (1) and (2) then lead to the conclusion that predicativism is superior in nontrivial ways to referentialism. A quick glance to a flurry of recent works on the syntax and semantics of proper names both in
linguistics and in philosophy of language has been centered on the validity of the uniformity argument (Burge 1973, Geurts 1997, Matushansky 2006, 2008, 2015, Elbourne 2005, Fara 2011, 2015, among others). The referentialist, so the predicativist’s argument goes, is condemned to posit lexical-semantic ambiguity. In turn, Leckie (2013), Jeshion (2015), Predelli (2015) and Schoubye (forthcoming) have challenged the uniformity argument on the basis of different sorts of argumentative strategies, some of which I will follow here. Concretely, I would like to add some linguistic considerations against the validity of the uniformity assumption. The point I will make is that polysemy (in a way to be made precise) is expected for any lexical and functional item in our (mental) dictionary. The referentialist would run into problems only if she were forced to posit homonymy (of the bank type), as it seems clear that there is some sort of non-homophonic identity connection between Juan came in and There is a Juan in the party, when it comes to the lexical nature of the name Juan. But the referentialist would be absolved even if forced to assume ambiguity in the form of (some sort of) polysemy. As I will argue, name polysemy has no special status in the theory.

I will assume that certain aspects of what can be called “polysemy” in a broad sense boil down to the phenomenon of contextually determined allosemy. This is the phenomenon by virtue of which a given morpheme receives different interpretations depending on the local syntactic context in which it occurs. The allosemy view claims that identity of functional or lexical morphemes must not be confused with their (different) potential meanings. To take an example from Marantz (2013) the fact that the verb to house is in no relevant way related to the meaning of the noun house does not lead us to posit homonymy. Allosemy dictates the different meanings (i.e., semantic realizations) of the shared part (i.e., the root house) on the basis of the particular syntactic contexts in which this element occurs. The a-categorial root house is then predicted to provide different readings whenever it occurs in a “verbal” or “nominal” environment.

On this account, there is nothing like a verb or a noun, but complex phrasal structures that determine formal and semantics aspects of what could be called a verb or a noun. The implications of this view for the topic of this paper should be obvious: There are no names, as there are no nouns or verbs. Before syntax, what we have is just a root, say, √PERÓN. Depending on the properties of the nominal or verbal syntax in which this root occurs different
(sometimes predictable) meanings arise. We then predict different meanings in particular nominal and verbal environments because of the presence or absence of designated functional structure:

(3) a. Juan icardeó. (from the verb icardear = act like Icardi).
    b. Icardi will play in Milán.
    c. There are two Icardis on tv, Ivana and Mauro.

Therefore, there is nothing special when it comes to possible analyses for proper names as they occur in (1)-(3) and, what is more, no meta-semantic considerations should follow from this sort of linguistic facts (see Predelli 2015 for related conclusions from a different point of view), at least not without careful inspection. Of course, inquiry into the linguistic nature of names could inform us about how part of its meaning is achieved by language users. Curiously, the current debate reverses the burden of the proof. Predicativists claim that linguistic evidence goes in favor of predicate analyses of proper names, whereas referentialists try to minimize the putative noxious effects of facts like (2). As far as I can tell, this is a strange state of affairs, as a first glance the fact to explain is the unique linguistic behavior of names that, like in (3b), must occur without overt determiners in purely referential uses, a prohibited option for any other type of noun in some languages, like Spanish or English. This remarkable fact regarding the syntactic behavior of names correlates with other remarkable semantic facts, crucially, with their rigid behavior (i.e., names designate the same individual across every possible world; Kripke 1980)\(^1\) and direct reference. Therefore, one is tempted to conclude that all these remarkable facts are strongly linked (see Longobardi 1994). I would follow this temptation here: both rigidity and direct reference correlates with the particular syntax of names in referential uses.

As said, the sketched project requires inquiry into the syntax of the nominal domain (i.e., the DP domain under some well-known assumptions). As we will see, several linguistic facts point to

\(^{1}\) Most predicativists, Geurts (1997) being an important exception, assume rigidity and try to derive it by different means. Although implementations differ, both Matushansky (2008, 2015) and Elbourne (2005) rigidify names by introducing covert free variables. See Schoubye (forthcoming\(_b\)) for an important criticism and section 5 for an empirical argument against Matushansky’s particular implementation.
the conclusion that the syntax of referential and non-referential uses of names should be distinguished. Under the allosemy view, we expect this will indeed correlate with a different semantics for Roots and functional morphemes, without the need of homonymy. In the next section, I introduce the basic concepts of constructivism, the approach to grammar where the notion of allosemy originates. I adopt a concrete implementation, Distributed Morphology, but other constructivist models would lead to the same point. In section 3.1, I show that under the Allosemy View the putative uniformity argument simply does not hold. I argue that the uniformity argument is based on a misconception regarding the identification of lexical Roots. If Roots are not identified by their meaning, as I argue following previous works in constructivism (in particular, Harley 2014), then there is no room for the predicativist argument. What is more, I show that under closer inspection the predicativist is in the need of some sort of homonymy (section 3.2). More detailed syntactic analyses for both referential and derived uses of names are provided in section 4. Some revealing morpho-phonological patterns regarding Spanish names in metalinguistic uses show that such uses require the postulation of more functional structure. Concretely, I claim that most derived uses of proper names (so-called predicate uses) are derived from an underlying null noun construction in Panagiotidis’ (2002) terms. The analysis could be extended to proper names modified by the so-called expletive determiner (e.g., Vino la María Lit. ‘Came the María’). If correct, derived uses of names require some sort of syntactic “transformation”, as already claimed in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax by Chomsky (Chomsky 1965). As for the semantic side, I will try to show that even in these derived uses there is no room for a metalinguistic predicate of the general form “being called N”; instead, metalinguistic and derived meanings in general arise as sorts of deferred interpretations (Nunberg 2004, Jeshion 2015). Finally, in section 5, I present some empirical arguments against Matushansky’s (2006, 2008, 2015) particular implementation of predicativism, according to which the “being called N” property is syntactically present in the form of a covert free variable. If my critique is on track, then her particular uniformity argument in favor of predicativism (one of the strongest ones) should be rejected on particular empirical considerations.

2. Some architectural assumptions: Allosemy in Distributed Morphology
I assume constructivism as the correct architecture of grammar. For expository reasons, concrete implementations are done in a particular version of constructivism, Distributed Morphology
(DM) (Halle & Marantz 1993 and much subsequent work), although my point would follow under other related views (Borer’s 2005 exo-skeleton model, being a prominent one). According to DM, “words” are entirely derived from the same principles of structure-building operations that generate phrases (i.e., syntax). There is no independent mechanism of word formation and, consequently, there are no “words” as the output of some putative Lexicon. Conventional lexical items, say the word *cat*, are epiphenomena resulting from the interaction between structure-building operations (Merge, for instance) and three independent lists of primitive objects that are accessed at different stages of a given derivation. The scheme in (4) resumes the basic architecture as presented in Harley (2014: 228):

![Diagram](image)

\[(4) \quad \{\text{Numeration (Subset of List 1)}\]  

- Syntactic Operations  
- Spell out  
- Morphological operations  
- Vocabulary Insertion (from List 2)  
- Encyclopedic Contribution to Interpretation (from list 3)

We also follow Harley (2014: 228) in how to conceive of each of the lists in (4):

**List 1:** *Feature bundles:* Syntactic primitives, both interpretable and uninterpretable, functional and contentful.

**List 2:** *Vocabulary Items:* Instructions for pronouncing terminal nodes in context.

**List 3:** *Encyclopedia:* Instructions for interpreting terminal nodes in context.
Thus, List 1 contains the basic primitives out of which Syntax com poses syntactic objects. It contains abstract morphemes and Roots, √. Abstract morphemes are taken from a Universal Inventory of Features (UIF) such as [1 person], [past], [female] and so on. The status of Roots is far from being resolved in the current literature. While syncretism phenomena across languages provide empirical support for the view of abstract morphemes as lacking any phonological representation in the Syntax, there is no conclusive evidence for an “early” or a “late” insertion approach for Roots with regard to their phonological exponence. In view of this, we have some alternatives for representing Roots syntactically: (a) it could be that Roots are represented by a label (e.g., √19) which is supplied with a phonological exponent only at the morphological level (Chomsky 1995, Embick 2000, Acquaviva 2008, Saab 2008, 2010, and Harley 2014, among many others); (b) Roots could be sequences of complexes of phonological features plus some diacritic features—as, for instance, class membership— and an index for distinguishing homophones (e.g., √/bánko/21 vs. √/bánko/339; see, in particular, Embick 2010, 2015); (c) Roots are syntactic place-holders whose exponence is freely determined at PF (Marantz 1995, and De Belder & Van Craenenbroeck 2015 for a related view). For the reasons discussed in Acquaviva 2008 and Harley 2014, I will adopt the idea in (a), according to which Roots are just syntactic indexes (although see below). At any rate, notice that, as far as the semantics of Roots is concerned, identification criteria for Roots cannot be done on the basis of meaning identity, a crucial consequence for the ongoing discussion. The three aforementioned theories of Root representation are compatible with this idea.

We also adopt the Categorization Assumption:

(5) *Categorization assumption (CA)*

Roots cannot appear (cannot be pronounced or interpreted) without being *categorized*; they are categorized by merging syntactically with category-defining functional heads.

[Embick & Marantz 2008: 6]

Under the CA, the same Root (index) may combine with different little xs to give rise to what we can informally call *grammatical categories*:

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2 Although see Harley (2014) for an argument in favor Root late insertion based on suppletion.
It follows that Roots do not have detectable meanings “before” Syntax. The CA also implies differences for semantic typing in model-theoretic terms. On some accounts, the three structures in (6) would correspond at least to three different semantic objects, namely predicates of entities, predicates of properties or predicates of events, respectively (see Marantz 2013 and Harley 2014). It is not clear to me whether these interpretations are strictly compositional in the sense that, say, (6a) is a predicate of entities because of some semantic rule combining the Root and the category-defining head *n* or if such an interpretation is globally computed from the entire [*n n + 5√*] complex. At the PF side, things seem to be clearer, as PF interpretation is taken as being “strictly compositional” in the default case (i.e., without any morphological operation intervening before Vocabulary Insertion). Thus, for each terminal node in (6) a phonological exponent is added according to the information available in List 2 and some universal principles of Vocabulary Insertion that regulate which exponent is inserted in a given node. Take √5 as the Root that occurs in *gata* ‘female cat’ (6a), *gatuna* ‘relative to cat’ (6b) and *gatear* ‘to crawl’ (6c). Then, the exponent /gát-/ is inserted in the Root node in a deterministic way in each case, whereas /-a/, /-un/ and /-e/ will be inserted on the nominal, adjectival and verbal position, respectively, according to the aforementioned principles.

The general form of a Vocabulary Item for an abstract morpheme with various exponents is as in (8a) and as in (8b) for an indexed Root:
The list in (8a) is ordered following a hierarchy of specificity in such a way that when more than one vocabulary item competes for the same node the more specified item that match the features of the abstract node wins (Subset Principle, Halle 1997). Crucially, exponents with radically different phonological shapes can compete with each other. So, in Spanish, /-b(a)/ and /i(a)/ compete for insertion in the T\textsubscript{[imperfect]} node. Phonological identity then is not a conclusive criterion for identifying abstract nodes. The relevant criterion here is syntactic identity. The same can be said when it comes to evaluate “semantic realizations” of the same node. We call this semantic counter-part of formal allomorphy *allosemry*. In effect, as recently shown in Wood & Marantz (to appear) and Marantz (2013), abstract morphemes may have different semantic realizations depending on the syntactic context in which they occur. Thus, the same functional head for introducing arguments will be interpreted as an applicative, agentive or P head depending the level of syntactic attachment. For Marantz (2013) and Harley (2014) allosemy generalizes to Roots. This is especially clear in the pair *gata* – *gatear* used as illustration so far, where there is no meaning connection in the Root position (\(\sqrt{5} = \text{‘female cat’ in the [Root + n\text{fem}] domain and } \sqrt{5} = \text{‘to crawl’ in the [Root + v] domain.} \) Importantly, there is no homonymy here, as the same indexed Root underlies both configurations. As in the case of functional heads, meaning then is not the relevant identity criterion. Semantic realizations take place at the point in which List 3 is accessed at the LF interface, where the syntactic derivation connects with the conceptual-intentional systems. So far, the following picture emerges:

(9) A. Roots are not interpretable objects at the interfaces “before” syntax.

As for the LF interface,

B. Categorization of Roots is needed in order to obtain a model-theoretic object that can semantically compose with additional material.
C. Particular meanings arise as a by-product of allosemic processes, i.e., semantic realizations of the same syntactic node (a Root or an abstract morpheme) contextually conditioned.

Some clarifications are in order before continuing. Claiming that Roots have no detectable meanings “before” syntax does not lead to the assumption that Roots have no meaning at all “before” syntax. Root meaning is still a poorly understood topic but I will assume some working hypotheses putting forward in Embick (2016), for whom Roots are meaningful objects in the sense that they determine a Polysemy Space, Π. By assumption, Π connects with different conceptual dimensions. The crucial idea is that Roots are pointers of the Polysemy Space, Π; i.e., Roots point to sets of related Π meanings, π₁ … πₙ. The role of syntax in this respect is precisely activating particular π meanings by virtue of locally combining Roots with designated morphemes. Thus, the semantic space related to the Spanish Root √MANZAN- would have a particular instantiation in specific syntactic configurations (e.g., in Spanish, manzano_masc ‘apple tree’ vs. manzana_fem ‘apple’). As Embick observes, the same Root can also point to unrelated meanings (e.g., garra ‘paw’, agarrar ‘to take’). Distinguishing this last case from true homonymy of the bank type is part of an ongoing research. Finally, it seems that some Roots have no basic meanings and require some “morphological” support to become meaningful elements. Bound roots are a well-studied case (see Aronoff 1976):

(10)  a. -ceive
  deceive, receive, conceive, perceive
  b. -here
  adhere, inhere
  c. -port
  comport, deport, report, import, support
  d. -pose
  suppose, depose, compose, repose, propose
  . . . etc  

[Harley 2014: 241]
Here, the π\textsubscript{i} set of say √-CEIVE requires combination with special prefixes in order to activate some Polysemy Space. So far, we may distinguish at least four different possibilities for connecting Roots to Polysemy Spaces:\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{enumerate}[\text{(11)}]
\item A. many Roots each pointing to different Π spaces (i.e., Homonymy). E.g., √BANK\textsubscript{2}, √BANK\textsubscript{234}, etc.
\item B. One Root pointing to different sets of related Π meanings, π\textsubscript{1} … π\textsubscript{n}, by virtue of the syntactic environment in which such a Root occurs. E.g., [√MANZAN+\text{fem}] vs. [√MANZAN+\text{masc}].
\item C. One Root pointing to different sets of unrelated Π meanings, π\textsubscript{1} … π\textsubscript{n}, by virtue of the syntactic environment in which such a Root occurs. E.g., [√GARR+\text{n}] vs. [√GARR+v].
\item D. Empty Roots, that is, Roots which do not define any Π space and that require the support of additional morpho-syntactic material in order to activate some Π space. E.g., -√CEIVE as it occurs in deceive, receive, conceive, perceive.
\end{enumerate}

In section 4, I suggest that Roots for names are meaningless objects that do not point to any Polysemy Space as in (11D) and, consequently, do not define any π\textsubscript{i} set. Yet, before entering into the details of my proposal, I will deconstruct the predicativist argument on the basis of the framework introduced here. The consequences of this general sketch for the debate around names are more or less evident. In principle, I think that taking for granted the architectural implications of constructivism and their empirical consequences, the predicativism proponents incur in a sort of misconception, according to which different Root meanings lead to homonymy. An allosemism account for predicate and referential uses of names is perfectly conceivable along the lines of (11B). I will develop such an analysis in the next section in order to make clear this predicativist misconception.

\textsuperscript{3} In what follows, I replace Root indexes by capitalized words.
3. Predicativism and referentialism under the Allosemy View

3.1. The Predicativist Misconception

Let’s start reproducing the uniformity argument following Jeshion’s (2015) exposition. The predicativist reasoning goes this way: (i) focus in apparent referential uses of names as in (12) and compare with apparent predicate uses of names as they occur in (13):

(12) a. Alfred studies in Princeton.
    b. Stella is inside the museum.

(13) a. Some Alfedrs are crazy; some are sane.
    b. Two Stellas are inside the museum.

Next, (ii) write the semantics for (12) and (13) along the following lines (cf. Fara 2011 and Jeshion 2015 for discussion):

(14) Being Called Condition (BCC): A proper name ‘N’ is a predicate true of a thing if and only if it is called N.

Finally, (iii) assume that (14) is the basic semantics of proper names; put differently, proper names in (12) and (13) are the only cases where they are used literally. Given that this semantics accounts for (i.e., provide the correct truth conditions) proper names in referential and predicate uses as they occur in (12) and (13), predicativism has a better theory to offer when compared with referentialism, which is in turn forced to posit some sort of lexical ambiguity. But notice that there is no explicit claim regarding what lexical ambiguity means here. On the basis of the previous discussion, we have at least three alternatives:

(15) A. The referentialist is forced to posit lexical homonymy of the bank type (cf. 11A).
    B. The referentialist is forced to posit some sort of regular polysemy coming from the same Root (cf. 11B).
    C. The referentialist is forced to posit some sort of irregular polysemy coming from the same Root (cf. 11C).
The first alternative can be immediately rejected, as there is no need for the referentialist to postulate different Roots in (12) and (13). This is so, even in the case that we concede part of the predicativist argument regarding possible syntactic and semantic analyses of proper names. So, suppose that referential uses occur in a syntactic environment that includes part of the syntax of predicate uses, which is the way in which we should paraphrase the matter on a constructivist approach.

(16) a. The syntax of predicate uses: b. The syntax of referential uses:

The D and Num categories are part of the extended projection of a nominal. The DP head encodes features related to discourse properties (definiteness, deixis, etc) and other inflectional, purely grammatical ones (person, for instance), whereas NumP is connected to the syntax of [a count] nouns. As argued by Borer (2005), Estomba (2016), and Acquaviva (2016) among many others, this category must be split in different projections of the same domain, in order to account for the syntax, semantic and morphology of the mass – count division. I subscribe the Num-split hypothesis, but I will not expand this category here, as it is orthogonal to the arguments to be developed in what follows. What is crucial is that the different analyses in (16) may be the trigger for allelomony at the NP level. Leaving aside details of implementations, LF will realize the complex NP as a \(<e, t>\) object in (16a), but as an entity denoting object, \(<e>\), in (16b). Preliminary, let me suggest the following semantic realizations at the NP level for (16a) and (16b):

LF instructions: semantic realizations of \([n + \sqrt{ALFRED}]\):

(17) a. \([n + \sqrt{ALFRED}] \leftrightarrow [[Alfred]] = \text{the predicate “being called } Alfred\text{”/ Num }\_

b. \([n + \sqrt{ALFRED}] \leftrightarrow [[Alfred]] = Alfred \{\text{called “Alfred”}\} / D \_

The curly brackets in (17b) are just an indication that the “being called N” condition is a semantic presupposition in referential uses of names. Such a presupposition would account for well-known patterns of inference like those (18) (see Leckie 2013 and Schoubye forthcoming, for recent proposal along these lines), which is one of the main arguments in favor of predicativism:

(18)  

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. \; Alfred came.} & \quad & \text{b. \; No Alfred came.} \\
\text{There is at least one Alfred.} & & \text{Alfred did not come.}
\end{align*}
\]

The fact that speakers productively relate referential and predicate uses of names and the fact there is intra- and cross-linguistic uniformity connecting the syntax of such uses is also unproblematic under this account. I will not elaborate on these arguments any further, as the point is well taken in Leckie (2013), Jeshion (2015), and Schoubye (forthcoming). Let me instead focus on what I think is the weakest argument for predicativism, namely, the uniformity argument.

The semantic realizations in (17) can (and must) be revised and I will do it in the next section. But as stand, they shed light on the nature of the predicativist’s fallacy. Recall that for the predicativist argument to hold it is crucial that the function denoted in (17a) be basic. I have related both meanings on the basis of (17a) in one of the many conceivable ways. The rule in (17b) simply says that a proper name is just an individual related in some way to a particular name. As mentioned, this comes in the form of a presupposition, as in Schoubye, but there are other ways of obtaining the same (as a Bias, in Predelli’s 2013 terms). Notice now that this is a concrete implementation of the alternative in (15B), i.e., we have the same Root pointing to related \( \pi_i \) meanings of the same \( \Pi \). As argued by Schoubye and others, this strategy would be enough to avoid the predicativist’s objection.

The vague use of the expression \textit{related in some way} is not arbitrary. Lexical relatedness between identical Roots is a well-known explored domain in modern morphological and lexical theory. In DM, these semantic (dis)connections between identical Roots are syntactically encoded and subject to different conditions. As we have seen, we can conceive of more radical
semantic disconnections for the same Root, i.e., a given Root can point to unrelated \( \pi \) meanings of the same \( \Pi \). Thus, the fact that the verb *agarrar* ‘to take’ in Spanish is not connected to the semantics of the Root in its nominal use, i.e., *garra* ‘paw’, is a direct consequence of allosemy contextually conditioned by two different category domains:

\[ \text{Garra – agarrar allosemy:} \]

(19)  
- a. \([n \ n + \sqrt{GARR-}] \leftrightarrow \text{“paw”}\)  
- b. \([v \ v + \sqrt{GARR-}] \leftrightarrow \text{“to take”}\)  

Of course, semantic transparency is also attested, in cases where category heads combine in certain ways (see Marantz 2013). By assumption, this would lead to instances of (15B). Thus, *hospilatización* ‘hospitalization_{fem}’ means “event of causing someone to be in a hospital”.

(20)

Here, the suffix \(-ción\) is semantically related to the verbal head and inner nominal\(^4\), by virtue of combining \( v \) with the \([\text{Root} + n]\) complex. The differences between (19) and (20) could be then the result of combing the same Root with different category-defining heads (irregular polysemy) or the result of a process of a category-defining head/abstract morpheme functional embedding (regular polysemy). The analyses in (16), where the same nominal complex is embedded under different abstract morphemes, are then predicted to trigger regular polysemy as (20) does. This is one way in which constructivist and realizational approaches to word formation can provide the basis for understanding how syntax produces the inputs for morpho-phonological and semantic

\(^4\) Although notice that in model-theoretic terms the semantic type seems to be determined only at the point in which the outer nominal is evaluated for semantic computation. Notice also that PF interpretation proceeds in the same way, as gender is read off from the outer \( n \) \((hospital_{masc} + hospitalización_{fem}).\)
realizations at the interfaces of the language faculty. It also abstracts away semantic information and formal exponence from the set of identity criteria for diagnosing sameness of Roots and abstract morphemes. The important corollary for the arguments to be developed is that semantic identity does not identify Roots in the syntax (see Harley 2014 for extensive discussion). Two radically different semantic “exponents” may correspond to the same syntactic Root as a by-product of allosemy. Thus, the Root meaning of garra and agarrar are traced back to the same Root, as the /-b(a)/ and /-i(a)/ exponents are traced back to the same abstract morpheme (i.e., the [imperfective] node). To believe that semantic opacity leads to homonymy is a misconception. And I think that this is the misconception in which the descriptivist incurs, when adducing the uniformity argument:

(21) Semantic opacity between identical exponents leads to homonymy.

As argued above, there is no need for the referentialist to posit semantic opacity for referential and predicate uses of names as some degree of semantic relatedness is stipulated in the semantic realizations in (17), but - and this is the point to be stressed- even if semantic opacity were the case (as it could be, indeed; more on this later) the Alfreds in (12) and (13) would still be semantic realizations of the same syntactic Root. What the referentialist needs to show is just that referential and predicate uses of names correspond to different underlying syntactic structures. And this is an empirical matter that has not received all the attention it deserves. At first glance, and against predicativist assumptions, referential and predicate uses of names support the hypothesis that their syntax must be distinguished (Longobardi 1994, Borer 2005 and below). This is a crucial step as the predicativist’s predicament is based on the assumption that bare referential names (e.g., Alfred came) have the same syntax as definite descriptions in general. If this were the case, and √ALFRED were inserted in the same syntactic scheme in the so-called literal uses, then we would have to conclude that meaning ambiguities in referential and predicate uses of names would not be the result of contextually-conditioned allosemy, but just some sort of free allosemy. I think that, in other terms, this is the sort of anti-referentialist argument we can find in works by Matushansky (2008, 2015). For Matushansky, all literal uses of names are modeled from the metalinguistic uses, which are then taken as basic. Against these
two arguments about the syntax and semantics of names is that the following sections are devoted.

3.2. The referentialist counter-attack: Who’s in need of homonymy?

Lot of names in Spanish and other languages, however, are phonetically identical to different sort of nouns. Just to take one relevant example, consider:

(22)  a. Libertad está cansada.       (Lit. Fredoom is tired\textsubscript{fem})
    b. la famosa Libertad Lamarque  (Lit. the famous Freedom Lamarque)
    c. La libertad es una aspiración. (Lit. The freedom\textsubscript{fem} is an aspiration)

The sentence in (22a) is a referential use of the proper name\textit{ Libertad}. In (22b) we have the same proper name in a predicate use. Finally,\textit{ libertad} in (22c) occurs as the abstract noun\textit{ freedom}. As noticed by Borer (2005), in fact, any noun (or other categories) will be a “proper name” provided the right syntactic conditions. So, the common nouns in

(23)  Pez/Tigre/Mesa/Silla está acá. (Fish / Tiger / Table / Chair is here)

would all be forced to be read as proper names by virtue of the syntactic environment in which they occur. In some cases, they can be easily recognized as\textit{ Mesa}, for instance, is a common Hispanic surname (cf. also\textit{ Iglesia(s)} Lit. ‘church(es)’).

(24)\begin{equation*}
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{D} \\
\text{nP} \\
\text{n} \\
\text{\{√PEZ, √LIBERTAD, …\}}
\end{array}
\end{equation*}

Importantly, at first glance, there is no need of postulating any homonymy here, as identical Roots and their meanings are syntactically distinguished. Yet, the predicativist, for whom there are basic or literal meanings of names, is forced to postulate lexical ambiguity in those cases in which names as\textit{ Libertad} are socially recognized (and attested in dictionaries, in some cases).
This is unproblematic. Now, when it comes to possible analyses for (23), the predicativist is forced either to create a new lexical entry for, say, Pez with the meaning “being called Pez” or to conclude that this is a noun used as name. Whatever this last option means, it leads to an undesirable result, as now every noun (and other categories) can be “used” as a name with exactly the same semantic results of bona fide names. What proper names mean is then what every noun can mean provided the right syntactic environment. This makes the semantics of names very particular, to say the least. Of course, the referentialist could also be led to posit lexical ambiguity depending on her assumptions on word formation. Yet, she is in a better position as she does not need to generalize a predicate of entities (the Being Called Condition) to each occurrence of a common noun in a name position; such a noun just ends up referring directly to an individual by virtue of the fact that the Root position in (24) is descriptively inert. In the reverse case, i.e., “conversion” from name to noun, as in (13), a metalinguistic predicate emerges, as a direct result of the lack of any descriptive content of true proper names. Put differently, by virtue of not having any descriptive properties names can only be converted into predicates whose main denotation is the property of having them as names. This exactly the point raised by Longobardi in his influential article on the syntax and semantics of proper names, in which he concludes that the different syntactic distribution of proper names both in predicate and referential uses favor a direct reference approach (contra Burge 1973). Consider the following passage:

More generally, it seems that proper names differ from pronouns in that they may, under a relatively marked interpretation, provide a range satisfying essentially all kinds of overt or empty determiners that end up quantifying over different individuals (or stages of the same individual as in (56)).

(57) a. I met a (certain) Mary.
    b. I visited the (two) Marys yesterday.
    c. every Mary I met in my life
    d. Marys are usually nice girls, according to my experience. (generic reading)
    e. During my visit to the U.S. I met Marys everywhere. (existential reading)
It is easy to check that replacing *Mary* by *she* in (57) yields ungrammaticality in all cases [...] The rough cross-linguistic generalization appears to be the following: Common nouns must always be used to refer to a kind and thus may provide a range to a (lexical or overt) determiner understood as an operator, pronouns can never be interpreted this way, and proper names can, at least in marked cases, but need not. When proper names do acquire the interpretation in question, they obviously resort to their (impoverished) descriptive content, namely, they define as a range for the variable the kind of all possible individuals named that way (or the kind of all possible stages of the relevant individual named that way).

[Longobardi 1994: 636-637, my emphasis]

Lacking any descriptive content, proper names are condemned to some sort of metalinguistic meaning, at least in the relevant contexts (predicate uses). In the next section, I will propose a particular implementation of this idea. For the time being, let’s focus on the details of how referentialists and predicativists would explain (24) in a radical constructivist model. Assume that the syntactic analysis is the same under both accounts. Thus, PEZ as a Root would be inserted in the same way as ALFRED in (16):

(26) a. 
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{D} \\
\text{NumP} \\
\text{Num} \\
\text{nP} \\
\text{n} \\
\sqrt{\text{PEZ}}
\end{array}
\]

b. 
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{D} \\
\text{nP} \\
\text{n} \\
\sqrt{\text{PEZ}}
\end{array}
\]

As mentioned, for a referentialist, (26b) just contributes an individual without the mediation of descriptions. As before, we can assume (but we do not need to) that the “being called N” property is, in reality, a semantic presupposition (27b). Given that the semantic typing of \([n + \sqrt{\_}]\) in this environment gives a semantic object denoting in any reference to the concept of pez is missing. In turn, in its regular predicate position the same Root or the complex \([n + \sqrt{\_}]\) denotes in \(<e,t>\) as result of being selected by Num (see Acquaviva 2016 and the next section). The Root here plays a crucial role as must provide the basic meaningful features that enable this predicate to denote a particular set of entities (in extensional terms). This is condensed in the word *pez* in
the double quotations in (27a). It is a matter of the Encyclopedia list to realize this particular meaning for the Root √PEZ.

**LF instructions: semantic realizations of √PEZ:**

(27) a. \([n + √PEZ] \leftrightarrow “being a pez”/\) Num __
b. \([n + √PEZ] \leftrightarrow \) the individual Pez \(\{\text{called PEZ}\}/\) D __

Now, let’s consider how the predicativist would handle the pattern in (24). The crucial semantic realization is (28b). As mentioned, the result is surprising. As now, every “common” Root inserted in the relevant position would acquire the metalinguistic meaning that descriptivists associate to proper names.

**LF instructions: semantic realizations of √PEZ:**

(28) a. \([n + √PEZ] \leftrightarrow “being a pez”/\) Num __
b. \([n + √PEZ] \leftrightarrow “being called PEZ”/\) D __

In (28b), then, the Root only supplies its exponent (this would require further elaboration in both approaches), so we should ask where the “being called” part come from. Let’s assume that this is one of the semantic realizations of \(n\) as shown in (29).

(29) \([n] \leftrightarrow “being called √”/\) D __ √

The consequences of this analysis for the semantic realization of √PEZ are basically two: (i) The Root must be sensitive to the semantic realization of \(n\) and, as a consequence of this \(n\) meaning, (ii) its semantic realization is zero (“∅” stands for a zero semantic exponent).

(30) √PEZ ↔ “∅” / “being called N” ___

Neither of these two consequences are at odd what we already know about PF interpretation, where zero exponents are largely attested and where there are plenty of cases of phonologically conditioned allomorphy (i.e., Vocabulary Insertion at some given node may be sensitive to the
phonological realization of some adjacent nodes) or just phonological deletions - a maybe more adequate solution for this case. What remains as a mystery is precisely the semantic realization of \( n \) in (29) that generalizes to any \( n \) in the right syntactic configuration. Put differently, this “being called N” property of \( n \) is always available. On this account, what characterizes proper names is that they “lexicalize” in some sense such a property. All this jeopardizes the predicativist predicament, as the putative inherent meaning of proper names -the predicate they denote- is, after all, a predicate of a particular syntactic scheme. The alternative is to resort to some sort of radical homonymy process, according to which all nouns are ambiguous as in (25). This is not a better solution.

In summary, in order to account for (23), the predicativist has only two solutions: (i) either she postulates homonymy for any Root, except true names, in such a way that all nouns will end up denoting a metalinguistic predicate, or (ii) she makes the metalinguistic meaning available on a designated functional head, \( n \). Both solutions are undesirable, as they jeopardize what it seems to be the right empirical generalization, namely that there are no names or nouns, but just syntactic configurations in which something is interpreted as a name or a noun. Of course, there are specialized Roots for names (ALFRED) as there are specialized Root nouns (PEZ), and cases in between (LIBERTAD). But this is a purely encyclopedic issue, regarding the semantic “exponence” of the nodes that syntax constructs. In broad terms, the basic generalization regarding the “semantic exponence” of Roots for “names” and Roots for “nouns” boils down to the absence / presence of descriptive content. So, some particular Roots are just “∅” (i.e., they don’t define any Π space; cf. (11D) and the next section), what explains why in predicate position they are forced to some sort of metalinguistic meaning. This empty semantic exponence is also a matter of syntax, in the sense that absence of Number nullifies any descriptive property which in another syntactic context would be a meaningful Root. Notice that these remarks allow us to make explicit another type of prediction regarding the interpretation of Roots in context. If what we are saying is on the right track, “meaningful” Roots cannot have the metalinguistic meaning “being called N” outside the particular syntax in which such a meaning is enabled. This is borne out. The Root √PEZ cannot have such a metalinguistic meaning in out-of-the-blue contexts as the followings:
The sentences in (31) can only have a metaphorical, “humanized” reading for √PEZ, but not a metalinguistic one related to the “being called” condition, just because √PEZ cannot be realized as “∅” whenever some projection of the Num domain is syntactically active. If we consider the entire patterns under discussion so far, this is exactly the state-of-affairs excepted on the Allosemy View. And this is exactly the kind of pattern we expect if conceive of Roots for names as “∅” exponents at the LF side. At any rate, no particular implementation of the semantics of Roots would change what we have has shown with respect to the uniformity argument: the linguistic facts emerging from paradigms like those in (12) and (13) cannot ensure the predicativist thesis and, more importantly, they do not do predicativism better than referentialism. Strengthening the argument a bit beyond this last consideration, if these linguistic patterns say something about the semantic status of names, then what they have to say points out in favor of the direct reference side, a conclusion already made in Longobardi (1994), as mentioned. In what follows I will take a closer look at the syntax of names in different uses under the allosemy perspective. I argue that the syntax of modified names requires more than the simple presence of Number, a surprising fact, if correct, but one that once again favors the referentialist intuition that predicate uses of names are the result of syntactic transformations, a point explicitly suggested in Chomsky (1965).

4. Making Names from Roots and Nouns from Names

With some notable exceptions (Longobardi 1994, Matushansky 2006, 2008, 2015), the syntax of referential and predicate uses of names has not received the detail it deserves. This is understandable taking into consideration that the debate is centered on some implicit
assumptions on lexical meaning. The fact that there are lots of instances of modified proper names inter and intra-linguistically has been taken as conclusive evidence in favor of predicativism (Longobardi 1994 being an important exception). Referentialists have remained more defensive in face of such linguistic evidence and tried to show that predicate uses of names do not defeat the main assumptions of referentialism (see Predelli 2015, Leckie 2013, Jeshion 2015). The issue becomes pressing under the umbrella of allosemy theory. My contribution in this respect follows the insights in Longobardi (1994), Borer (2005) and Acquaviva (2007, 2016), especially, when it comes to the analysis of referential uses of names. Briefly, I will assume the structure in (16b), repeated like (32b), with a minimal modification, namely, human “proper names” contains a [human/animate] feature on \( n \). Regarding predicate uses I contend that there is evidence that shows that their structure is structurally more complex than in (16a), repeated as (32a):

\[
(32) \quad \text{a. The syntax of predicate uses:} \quad \text{b. The syntax of referential uses:}
\]

\[
\text{DP} \quad \text{DP} \\
\text{D} \quad \text{D} \\
\text{NumP} \quad \text{nP} \\
\text{Num} \quad n \quad \sqrt{\text{ALFRED}} \\
\text{nP} \quad \sqrt{\text{ALFRED}} \\
\text{n} \quad \sqrt{\text{ALFRED}} \\
\]

As a minimum the structures for the relevant predicate uses contain a human null noun to which the name (i.e., the \([n + \text{Root}]\)) restrictively modifies. Here is my proposal for predicate uses of names:\(^5\)

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\(^5\) The structures in (32b) and (33) with minimal changes in feature specification would give us the different syntactic structure for names for days and months in a language like Spanish. While month days behave exactly like human proper names in bare referential uses, day names require a modifying article.

(i)  

a. Juan llegó en (*el) febrero.
   
   J. arrived in (*the.MASC.SG) February
   
   ‘Juan arrived in February’

b. Juan llegó *(el) lunes.
   
   J. arrived *(the.MASC.SG) Monday
   
   ‘John arrived on Monday.’
The syntax of predicate uses:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
DP \\
D \\
\text{NumP} \\
\text{Num} \\
nP \\
n \\
[\text{human}] \\
nP \\
\end{array}
\]

The type of construction that this tree schematizes can be seen as a variety of the so called human null construction (see Panagiotidis 2002, and Saab (to appear) for references):

(34) los de al lado / los tontos / los

\[\text{DET:M:PL of} \quad \text{to:DET[M:SG] side} \quad \text{DET:M:PL fool:M:PL} \quad \text{DET:M:PL}\]

que cantan

that sing[PRS]:3PL

‘the ones living next door / the foolish / the ones who sing’

As discussed in Saab (to appear), null noun constructions should not be confused with nominal ellipsis phenomena, which involves deletion of a phrase, namely the entire \(nP\). Notice that the three expressions in (34) might be ambiguous in the right contexts. Consider, for instance, the following sentences:

(35) a. Los perros inteligentes y los tontos

\[\text{DET:M:PL dog:M:PL smart:PL} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{DET:M:PL fool:M:PL}\]

son indistinguibles.

be[PRS]:3PL undistinguishable:PL

I assume that several cross and intra-linguistic differences in the exponence of the article could be analyzed along these lines, \textit{contra} Matushansky (2006) who reduces most differences in article exponence to purely morphological processes.
NPE reading: ‘Smart dogs and fool dogs are undistinguishable.’
EN reading: ‘Smart dogs and foolish people are undistinguishable.’

b. Los perros de enfrente y los de al lado son ruidosos.

NPE reading: ‘The dogs living in front and the dogs living next door are noisy.’
EN reading: ‘The dogs living in front and the people living next door are noisy.’

These ambiguities are straightforwardly derived under the hypothesis that we are dealing with different types of nominal gaps in each of the DPs in the second conjunct of the sentences in (35). Thus, the human reading arises because of the presence of an empty noun (see Panagiotidis 2002, Schütze 2001 and Corver & Van Koppen 2011 for related analyses) in the second conjunct of both sentences in (32). In turn, the readings under which we are always talking about dogs are derived by NPE. As already mentioned, NPE entails deletion / non-pronunciation of a full-fledged nP:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Empty Noun} & \quad \text{NP-ellipsis} \\
(36) \ a. \quad [\text{DP} \ D [\text{NumP} \ \text{Num} \ [nP \ \text{human}]]] & \quad \text{b.} \quad [\text{DP} \ D [\text{NumP} \ \text{Num} \ [nP \ n \ \text{P} \ \text{P}]]]
\end{align*}
\]

The hypothesis that predicate uses of names are derived from null noun constructions has important consequences for the theory of names. As I will show, the syntactic process underlying metalinguistic uses extend both to (at least some) non-metalinguistic uses of proper names (37) and to referential uses with expletive determiners (38), which are commonly attested in varieties of Spanish and other languages:

(37) a. Vi dos Rembrandt en el museo. Creator / Producer
    saw.1P.SG two R. in the museum
    ‘I saw two Rembrandt at the museum.’

b. Los Messi son muy unidos. Family names
The step from (32a) to (33) is certainly unexpected. What is more, if I am correct in that this is also the case for names with expletive articles, then there is more than simple allosemic in the \([n + \text{Root}]\) domain. In principle, all derivations should be allowed by the formal apparatus, so my hypothesis is certainly not the default. In the next sections, I will try to justify why I consider that (32b) and (33) are the underlying configurations of bare referential names and non-bare / nominalized “names”, respectively.

4.1. The basic ingredients of a bare referential name
In the last section, I have assumed that \([n + \text{Root}]\) complexes in referential uses of names denote \(e\) types, without further elaboration. In reality, the idea is that all \([n + \text{Root}]\) complexes denote \(e\)-
types. For being predicates of the \(<e,t>-type\), names require the syntactic presence of some of the categories in the Num-domain. This conjecture is explicitly developed in Acquaviva (2016):^6

[...] that ‘common nouns’ consist of a syntactic projection line whose semantic content defines what I will simply call an ‘entity type’, which can be interpreted at kind- or at object level. What makes a noun a noun, or rather, formally, what turns a root into a noun, is semantically the property of naming an entity type. [...] It is only through the construction of a syntactic structure that they become predicates.

If this is on track, then it comes as no surprise that names, as numberless DPs, denote \(e\)-types. According to Acquaviva, for being predicates selection by some category of the Num domain is a necessary condition.^7 It is exactly this domain which is absent in names. Finally, also with Acquaviva and others, we conceive of the D domain as the locus of referentiality. Recall that the “semantic exponent” of a \([n + \text{Root}]\) complex only arises by contextual allosemi, specifically, a \([n + \text{Root}]\) complex refers to an individual if selected by D:

\[
\text{DP} \quad \text{D} \quad \text{nP} \\
\text{n} \quad \sqrt{\text{ALFRED}} \\
\text{[human]}
\]

This semantic realization of a name Root is a direct consequence of the proposed syntax. Recall our basic tree:

\[
[\text{n + }\sqrt{\text{ALFRED}}] \leftrightarrow [[\text{Alfred}]] = \text{Alfred \{called “Alfred”\}} / \text{D}
\]

Again, this is precisely the syntax suggested by Acquaviva (and also Borer 2005):

---

^6 Certainly, this is not the standard view on nouns, which are assumed as predicates denoting objects at the more basic level. Yet, I believe that the syntax and semantics of names brings new support for Acquaviva’s hypothesis. At any rate, my arguments here are independent of these competing approaches to nominality.

^7 It is important to make clear that Num does not act as kind-object switch on Acquaviva’s account: the only switch Num performs is the \(<e> / <e,t>\) switch at the low level of DPs.
It is possible that proper names like *Fido* occur in DPs in this minimally reduced guise (which, however, is still syntactically a structure since a root is not the same as a nominalized root); this would depend on whether morphology admits truly numberless nouns in the language.

I contend here that the answer to Acquaviva’s question is positive and that, indeed, the basic ingredients of names are exactly these:

(41) a. Presence of √, *n* and *D* in the specified syntactic derivation, and,
   b. absence of any projection of the Num-domain.

Presence of *n* is justified by gender a concord / agreement, a property of the *n* head (see Saab 2008, Estomba 2016 and others):8

(42) María / Juan es alta / alto.
    M. / J. is tall.fem tall.masc

On top of this, it seems plausible that at least for animate / human nouns *n* is also specified with an animacy feature. As is well known, animate / human direct objects trigger differential object marking in Spanish, i.e., insertion of the pseudo-preposition *a*:

(43) a. Juan *vio* a María.
    J. saw ACC M.
    ‘Juan saw María.’
   b. Juan compró el libro.
    J. bought the bought
    ‘Juan bought the book.’

This means that such an animacy feature must be syntactically active in order of triggering differential object marking. As for the active presence of a D, I refer the reader to Longobardi (1994) for a detailed discussion. I will just add here a piece of evidence from some dialects of

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8 At any rate, presence of *n* is required by the Category Assumption.
Spanish. This involves the phenomenon of accusative clitic doubling, an obligatory phenomenon with pronouns in all dialects:

(44) a. Juan me vio a mí.
    J. CL.ACC.1P.SG saw ACC me
    ‘Juan saw me.’
b. Juan te vio a vos.
    J. CL.ACC.2P.SG saw ACC you
    ‘Juan saw you.’
c. Juan lo vio a él.
    J. CL.ACC.3P.MASC.SG saw ACC him
    ‘Juan saw him.’
d. Juan nos vio a nosotros.
    J. CL.ACC.1P.MASC.PL saw ACC us
    ‘Juan saw us.’
e. Juan los vio a ellos.
    J. CL.ACC.3P.MASC.PL saw ACC them
    ‘Juan saw them.’

There is robust evidence that clitic doubling is doubling of a D head syntactically active in the doubled DP. If this is correct, the fact that in most varieties of Argentinean Spanish bare names and full lexical DPs are optionally doubled indicate the presence of such a head (see Di Tullio et al (to appear) for an explanation of optionality):

(45) Juan (la) vio a María / a la mujer.
    J. (CL.ACC.3P.FEM.SG) saw ACC M. / ACC the.FEM.SG woman
    ‘John saw María / the woman.’

Following Longobardi (1994), I assume that the D node in bare referential names is similar to an expletive. It is expletive nature is also a case of allosemy contextually determined. Concretely, definite D realizes an identity function when directly merged with a $[\_P n_{[human]} + \sqrt{]}$:
This expresses the idea that referential DPs of the appropriate type must encode referentiality. When Number is present, the structure below D denotes a predicate, so referentiality is encoded directly on D. In cases in which Num is absent, the nP domain bears the referentiality information and D is expletivized. This captures in a different way Longobardi’s (1994) original proposal (see also Borer 2005).

Absence of number, in turn, is justified by the absolute impossibility of pluralizing bare referential names, a mysterious fact for predicativism (although see Matushansky 2006 for a morphological analysis).

Once pluralized, proper names behave as “common” nouns as far as their syntactic distribution is concerned. Thus, (47a) is grammatical if the subject occurs in post-verbal position, a fact that parallels the behavior of bare plurals, as also witnessed by their indefinite interpretation:

(47) a. *Juanes llegaron a la fiesta.
   J.PL came.3P.PL to the party
   ‘Juan came to the party.’

b. Juan llegó a la fiesta.
   J. came to the party
   ‘Juan came to the party.’

Once pluralized, proper names behave as “common” nouns as far as their syntactic distribution is concerned. Thus, (47a) is grammatical if the subject occurs in post-verbal position, a fact that parallels the behavior of bare plurals, as also witnessed by their indefinite interpretation:

(48) a. Llegaron Juanes a la fiesta.
   came.3P.PL J.PL to the party
   ‘(Several) Juanes came to the party.’

b. *Invitados llegaron a la fiesta.
   guests came.3P.PL to the party

c. Llegaron invitados a la fiesta.
   came.3P.PL guests to the party
   ‘Guests came to the party.’
The question is then why bare referential nouns can be bare only when singular. As said, it is an important gap that referential bare names do not pluralize. It is a problem for most predicativists, but also for Schoubye (forthcoming) who claims that proper names are just pronouns with a semantic presupposition connected to the metalinguistic fact that the individual picked-up by the pronoun is named in such and such a way. Third person pronouns obviously pluralize (cf. *él ‘he’ vs. *ellos ‘he’)*9. Absence of number projections accounts for this gap in the paradigm. If Acquaviva is on the right track, then we find the perfect correlation between absence of number and absence of predication, a conclusion in consonance with direct reference approaches for names.

4.2. The basic ingredients of modified names
As mentioned, according to Acquaviva, conversion of a noun into a predicate requires the presence of Number. Yet, I have suggested that more than this is necessary at least for some predicate uses of names. In other words, such uses require also the presence of an additional null noun:

(49) The syntax of predicate uses:

$$\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{D} \\
\text{NumP} \\
\text{Num} \\
nP \\
n \quad \sqrt{\text{ALFRED}} \\
\end{array}$$

[human] $n$

The main reason that leads me to posit more nominal structure above the lower $n$ domain is empirical. As is well-known, feminine nouns in Spanish triggers *la-el* alternation in the $D_{[\text{feminine},}$

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9 Do pronouns then contain a minimal predicate in their nominal part as, indeed, suggested in Elbourne (2013)? This will depend on how we analyze the internal structure of pronouns. If they contain a nominal domain, maybe such a domain could be converted into a predicate by the presence of the Number domain, but other alternatives are available (see below).
singular, definite] node when such nouns begins with stressed /á/. So, for a set of feminine nouns the phonological exponent that corresponds to the feminine and singular article is /el/ or /un/ instead of expected /la/ or /ína/. Let me state the rule in allomorphic terms (a maybe controversial point):

\[(50)\]  
\[D_{[\text{feminine, singular, definite}]} \leftrightarrow \begin{cases} /\text{el}/ & / _n \sqrt{\text{á}…/} \\ /\text{la}/, \text{elsewhere} & \end{cases}\]
\[D_{[\text{feminine, singular, indefinite}]} \leftrightarrow \begin{cases} /\text{un}/ & / _n \sqrt{\text{á}…/} \\ /\text{una}/, \text{elsewhere} & \end{cases}\]

(51) a. el {hacha, el águila, el aula, el arma, …}  
the.SG {ax, eagle, classroom, weapon, …} ¹¹
b. un {hacha, águila, aula, arma… }  
a.SG {ax, eagle, classroom, weapon, … }

There are however some putative “exceptions”. Names for letters and proper names are especially relevant now:

(52) a. la Ana (cf. *el Ana ‘the.SG Ana’).
the.FEM.SG Ana
b. la hache (cf. *el hache), la “á” (cf. *el “a”)
the.FEM.SG hache the.FEM.SG “a”

(53) a. una Ana (cf. *un Ana).
a.FEM.SG Ana
b. una hache (cf. *un hache), una “á” (cf. *un “á”)
a.FEM.SG hache a.FEM.SG “a”

¹⁰ Reference to the nominal category is unavoidable, as adjectives do not trigger the rule, e.g., la ancha avenida (“the.FEM.SG broad.FEM.SG avenue”).

¹¹ I translate the article el (or un) that modifies these feminine nouns just a singular, and not as masculine singular (like the true masculine article, el). Diachronically, the feminine el derived from Latin illa, not ille, unlike the masculine article.
According to the *Nueva Gramática de la Real Academia Española (NGRE)*, the exception in (52a)/(53a) could be attributed to the fact that speakers avoid gender confusion with human referents. But this cannot be on the right track, as other human nouns with female reference do trigger the rule, as acknowledged by the *NGRE*:

(54) a. el ama de llaves (cf. %la ama de llaves), un ama de llaves  
    the.SG housekeeper.FEM a.SG housekeeper.FEM  
    (cf. %una ama de llaves)  
    
    b. el hada madrina (cf. %la hada madrina), un hada madrina  
    the.SG Fairy Godmother.FEM a.SG Fairy Godmother.FEM  
    (cf. %una hada madrina)

Notice that the judgments are more unstable here (more on this below). At any rate, there is no variability in grammaticality judgments (52) and (53); these “names” strongly reject the use of the regular feminine article. Crucially, this is so both in clear metalinguistic uses of the names at hand as in the case of referential uses with the expletive article (for those speakers that have the construction):

(55) a. *El/la Ana que conozco…  
    the.FEM.SG A. that know.1P.SG  
    ‘The Ana I know…’  
    
    b. Voy a la casa de *el/la Ana.  
    go.1P.SG to the house of the.FEM.SG A.  
    ‘I went to Ana’s house.’

This is a strong piece of evidence that modified names (referential or predicative) are not just simple count nouns. As suggested in fact by the same *NGRE*, some of the exceptions to the *la-el* rule correlate with the presence of a null noun, regardless of how we analyze this phenomenon. This is especially clear in the case of name for letters, where the paraphrase *la letra hache* ‘the letter hache’ comes to mind immediately. If certain morpho-phonological processes require
locality conditions related to the presence of cyclic heads (little xs, on some accounts; see Embick 2010 for an explicit theory), then we can tell a story according to which the presence of a null noun (a type of cyclic head) interrupts the locality between the D head and the lower n in cases like (55). This of course requires further elaboration, but the intuition is clear enough. Just for the sake of the exposition, let me assume la-el alternation is indeed allomorphy, which is triggered only under adjacency between the target and the trigger (Embick 2010, 2015):

$$(56) \quad D_{[\text{feminine, singular, definite}]} \leftrightarrow /el/ \rightarrow D^\land[n/\acute{a}./.] \quad (\land = \text{adjacency})$$

Blocking of the rule is predicted by the structure in (49), given that the null noun is concatenated with D and this triggers insertion of the “elsewhere” exponent /la/.'

---

12 As noticed by Dave Embick (pers. comm.), it would important to see how “regular” nominalizations behave in this respect, as it could be a good way to set alternative analyses apart. A relevant case would involve eventive nominalizations of the [n [v √ ]] type (e.g., destrucción ‘destruction’). The kind of example that would satisfy all the required syntactico-semantic and morpho-phonological properties is almost impossible to find. Yet, Ariel Carpio (pers. comm.) suggests the following example of deverbal nominal: alza (increasing fem.sg) that occurs with eventive meanings in cases like el alza de los precios de marzo fue mayor de lo esperado. (‘The increasing of prices in March was more than expected.’). The relevant structure could be like in (i):

(i) $[v, alz + \emptyset] + a$

Taking v and n as cyclic heads we could expect the blocking of the la-el rule. Yet, the rule applies (there are some dialectal variation, but this is the general case). It seems that it is the presence of an empty noun, as distinct of a real nominalization process, what blocks the rule. More evidence in consonance with this conclusion comes from adjectives in null noun constructions. Recall first that adjectives do not trigger the rule (see footnote 8). As extensively discussed in Panagiotidis (2002) and many others, adjectives can instead occur as modifiers of empty nouns (e.g., the rich, the poor, etc). In Spanish, when an adjective begins with stressed /á/, the la-el rule is blocked, as expected (thanks to Antonio Fábregas for the example):

(ii) a. la/el ágrafa (the.FEM.SG /*the.SG agraphic.FEM.SG)

b. el ágrofo (the.FEM.SG /*the.MASC.SG agraphic.MASC.SG)
What distinguishes predicate uses of names from non-bare referential uses would be the level of attachment of the lower nominal domain, given place to a restrictive vs. non-restrictive appositive structure, respectively. On the semantic side, neither structure license the “being called N” predicate as a possible semantic realization of the lower nominal domain. Yet, let’s focus only on predicate uses and leave a proper analysis of non-bare referential uses of names for future research.

The semantic realization of the whole nP level corresponds to some sort of predicate (i.e. <e,t>) vaguely translated as the property of being a N-human, where N is a shorthand for a given name in metalinguistic uses. Maybe, the resulting predicate can be obtained conjoining two properties by Predicate Modification (Heim & Kratzer 1998), where the empty noun provides indeed some minimal predicate realized as “being a human” (i.e., [n human] ↔ λx. x is human / Num __) and the name is realized as a property of the form λx. x is N. So, we end up with [λx. x is human & λx. x is N]. But what kind of property is the “being N” property? I think that in isolation this is just a vacuous property in the sense it cannot determine any class of entities. Put differently, whenever a name becomes a predicate it requires some descriptive support, given that name for Roots are meaningless objects like, for instance, bound roots are (cf. 11D). I contend that descriptive support comes in the form of a minimal predicate (the null noun, in this case), which composes with the name in order to output the predicate of “being N-person”. It is this complex predicate which is finally interpreted as “being called N” by a kind of pragmatic inference. In other words, the “being called in such and such way” is not a predicate encoded in the grammar but a sort of deferred meaning that arises by pragmatic means (see also Jeshion 2015). Thus, the grammar only provides the following meaning at the high nP level:

Interestingly, the strong deviance of (ii) is the same as the one observed for names above. This fact could be taken as evidence in favor of the empty noun analysis I am pursuing for modified names. However, this would be still a hurried conclusion in face of the nature of the data and their possible analyses.
(58) The syntax of predicate uses:

\[ \lambda x. x \text{ is a ALFRED-human} / \text{Num} \]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{D} \\
\text{NumP} \\
\text{Num} \\
\text{nP} \\
\lambda x. \text{is a ALFRED-human} / \text{Num}\n\\n\text{n} \\
\text{[human]} \\
\text{n} \quad \sqrt{\text{ALFRED}}
\end{array}
\]

The N-human property is then predicted to have other meanings beyond this metalinguistic, deferred, interpretation. We predict, for instance, that the N-human property may be read as some particular individual in cases in which cultural knowledge allows for such a new deferred meaning. Consider a case like:

(59) Un Messi brillante ganó el partido.

a M. brilliant won the match

Here, as mentioned, socio-cultural knowledge makes available a deferred reading according to which a MESSI-human extensionally defines a singleton set composed by the individual Messi, in such a way that (59) can be substituted by a sentence containing a referential bare name more or less along the following lines:

(60) Messi ganó el partido (jugando brillantemente).

M. won the match playing brilliantly

A Messi-human can also define a set of individuals with the stereotypical properties associated with the individual Messi (such as being extremely talented for soccer) in cases like You are a Messi and related ones. At any rate, I would like to insist in the idea that the fact that ALFRED is interpreted as the property of being a name-type in (58) is not part of the semantic realization of the Root itself, but it is an inference arising from the vague semantic connection between the null human noun and the \([n + \text{ALFRED}]\) structure at hand. In line with Jeshion (2015), then,
metalinguistic uses and other derived uses of names form a natural class of phenomena. Take for instance the *producer* example in (37a), minimally modified as in (61):

(61) \[\text{Vi un Rembrandt en el museo.} \quad \text{Creator / Producer}\]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{saw.1P.SG a R. in the museum} \\
\text{‘I saw a Rembrandt at the museum.’}
\end{array}
\]

A plausible analysis would be introducing a non-human noun with some general feature, say, \[\text{[thing]}\] and an associated masculine feature:

(62) The syntax of predicate uses:
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{D NumP} \\
\text{Num nP} \\
\text{n} \quad \text{nP} \\
\quad \text{[thing, masculine]} \\
\quad \text{n} \quad \sqrt{\text{REMBRANDT}}
\end{array}
\]

Evidence for the null noun analysis is not so straightforward here as the null noun is masculine. But the instability of number agreement favors this analysis again, at least for the case in which the creator name does not agree in number within the DP:

(63) \[\text{Vi dos Picasso / Picassos en el museo.} \quad \text{Creator / Producer}\]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{saw.1P.SG two P.SG / P.PL in the museum} \\
\text{‘I saw two Picasso(s) at the museum.’}
\end{array}
\]

As far as the semantic realization at the \(nP\) layers is concerned, we might have the following:

(64) \[\text{high } nP \leftrightarrow \“\lambda x. x \text{ is a Rembrandt-thing}” / \text{Num}\]
As argued in Nunberg (2004) and Jeshion (2015), our general cultural contact with the name Rembrandt gives us the deferred interpretation “a painting by Rembrandt”. Yet, contra Jeshion now, I claim that the basic lexical semantics of producer examples does not remit to a human individual as the meaning of √REMBRANDT, which is the case when the syntax generates at least two DPs, as in:

(65) un cuadro de Rembrandt…
    a painting of R.

A similar analysis extends to brand names:

(66) Me compré una/un Fender. Brand
    CL.ACC.1P.SG bought a.FEM / a.MASC Fender
    ‘I bought a Fender (guitar) / a Fender (bass/amp).’

Here, the only difference is gender specification, which would be crucial when it comes to infer that we are talking of guitars (guitarra is feminine in Spanish) or basses or amps (bajo and amplificador are both masculine in Spanish). Again, the semantic realization is straightforward:

(68) high nP ↔ “∀x. x is a Fender-thing” / Num
Contextual and cultural information would complete the relevant meaning by a process of deferred interpretation. In the case of the feminine null noun, evidence for the analysis comes from the *la-el* alternation. Take the guitar brand Ávila as illustration:

(69) Me compré una Ávila nueva.

‘I bought a new Ávila.’

As before, the use of the feminine *una* is mandatory indicating the active presence of a null noun. Curiously, Ávila Burger is also a hamburger brand (*hamburguesa* is feminine). Here is an internet example:

(70) Admítelo, después de comer una Ávila Burger no tomas nada.

‘Say it! After eating an Ávila Burger you don’t drink anything.’

The syntax for (70) is essentially the same as (67) (although minor manipulation of the feature structure could be required) and, consequently, we also obtain the basic meaning in (68) with the required modifications. I see no difference with metalinguistic predicate uses of names in the sense that the set of properties “being a guitar/bass/hamburger related to the brand X”, “being a painting by Rembrandt” and, crucially, “being called N” are not provided by the syntax of the relevant DPs, but by a process of interpretation involving a sort of restrictive appositive structure. Thus, we eliminate the odd “being called N” predicate as a semantic primitive, *contra* Matushansky and other predicativists. Given the reasons adduced in the previous section, I take this as an empirical welcome result. Notice that the conjectures made in this section regarding the structure of derived names can be easily tested by relevant syntactic criteria that languages provide on the basis of particular phenomena. Thus, in Spanish the *producer / metalinguistic* readings are disambiguated by different means. Adding the differential object mark in the object

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13 Notice that data like this show that it makes no sense to claim that the rule is blocked to avoid gender confusion; here the referent is a guitar.
in (71) immediately blocks the *producer* reading and triggers the *metalinguistic* one, even when the context obviously favor the *producer* meaning (see Zdrojewski 2015).

(71) Vi a un Rembrandt en el museo.
    saw.1P.SG ACC a R. in the museum

‘I saw a Rembrandt at the museum.’

This is so, just because in most dialects of Spanish differential object marking is banned with non-human/animate objects.

In summary, referential and predicate uses of names correlate with different syntactic configurations. The syntactic and semantic analysis I have defended constitute independent evidence for Acquaviva’s hypothesis that the *nP*-level is not a basic predicate but an entity denoting object that becomes a predicate through the adding of functional structure of the Num-domain. At any rate, metalinguistic uses of names cannot be taken as basic neither under syntactic or semantic grounds (*contra* Matushansky 2008, 2015). They are deferred meanings, the by-result of the absolute incapacity of name Roots for defining a Polysemy Space in Embick’s terms.

5. A last note on the “being called N” property
I have claimed that referential bare names are not predicates because of the syntax in which they occur. I have gone one step further asserting that they are not metalinguistic predicates when modified by an overt article, either. The “being called N” meaning then arises as a by-product of the semantic realization of the *nP* layer and some complex inferences that connect discourse conditions to certain cultural knowledge. This confronts with predicativism in a broad sense, but in particular with the specific implementation in Matushansky (2006, 2008, 2015) according to whom the naming convention between certain individual and a name is a semantic primitive that comes in the form of a free covert variable, R. This variable saturates an argument slot required by the complex semantics of names, which are seen now as a type of relation nouns. As it should be obvious, this is a kind of radical claim, as far as the syntax and semantics of names are concerned, as it supposes the introduction of a relation variable that takes the value of some
naming convention salient in the discourse. In other words, Matushansky claims that names introduce a free variable ranging over naming conventions present in the object language. On this account, the lexical entry for a proper name is as follows:

\[
[[\text{Alice}]] = \lambda x \in D_e . \lambda R_{<e, <e,t>>} . R(x) (/ælɪs/)
\]  

where \( n \) is a sort of the type \( e \) (a phonological string)  

[Matushansky 2008: 596]

When names are used in argument DPs, modified or not, both arguments required by this lexical entry are saturated by covert syntactic objects. Let me illustrate the idea with a bare referential name. Here is the DP syntax for the name \( \text{Alice} \) when occurring in sentences like \( \text{Alice came} \):  

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{DP} & \sim <e,t,t> \\
\text{D}^0 & \sim <e,t> \\
\text{the} & \sim <e,t> \\
\text{PRO} & \sim <e,t,e,t> \\
\lambda x & \in D_e <t> \\
R_0 & \sim <e, <e,t>, t>, t> \\
x & \sim NP <e, <e, <e,t>, t>, t> \\
\text{Alice} & \sim \\
\end{align*}
\]  

[Matushansky 2008: 597]

Matushansky (2008, 2015) devotes an important effort to show the syntactic activity of the free variable \( R \). I find her arguments far from conclusive and problematic from several points of views (see Schouybe forthcoming\textsubscript{a,b} for a detailed criticism). At most, what Matushansky demonstrates is that her analysis is compatible with a range of data, once some additional stipulations are made. Here, I will comment on what I consider some general problems for this view and, at the end of this section, I consider a new empirical argument against the existence of \( R \) as semantic primitive.

\footnote{Movement of PRO is required in order to get the right semantic composition when D enters the picture.}
Recall first that in principle any common noun can be read as a proper name in the relevant syntactic configuration.

(74) Pez/Tigre/Mesa/Silla está acá. (Fish / Tiger / Table / Chair is here)

Given the reasons discussed in section 3, Matushansky is forced to postulate massive ambiguity missing the generalization that a name is such just in virtue of the syntactic context in which they occur. In her defense, she could object to the oddness of the examples in (74). What is more, she could claim that such oddness is accounted for precisely because of the difficulty of making R discursively salient. Once the relevant background is added, R would emerge in the discourse universe.

(75) A. Llamé a mi gato Gato.
   called.1p.sg acc my cat Cat.
   ‘I call my cat Cat.’

B. Y cómo es Gato?
   and how is Cat
   ‘And how is Cat?’

I conjecture that this would be a reasonable way to account for the facts. Yet, this is not exempt from important shortcomings. First, it leads to the conclusion that the rule that makes the relevant semantic type shifting from \(<e,t>\) to \(<e,<<e,<e,t>>,t>>\) is sensitive to discursive factors connected to social knowledge. The problem here is not R itself but the semantic change that would be required for the noun at hand. Otherwise, homonymy would be required. Whatever strategy, it misses the generalization that being a name is a matter of syntax.

Second, it is worth mentioning that one of the main motivations for Matushansky’s analysis is that it would account in a unified way for occurrences of names in referential and predicate positions (i.e., the uniformity argument). Her specific empirical claim involves connecting the syntax and semantics of naming constructions to those of referential names.
(76) They called her Alice.

As discussed at length by Matushansky, there is enough evidence for claiming that naming constructions are minimal clauses with the proper name functioning as a predicate. Notice indeed that in a sense the two implicit arguments that saturate the argument slots of a name, the entity and the naming convention, are explicitly realized in naming constructions by the direct object and the naming verb.

(77) They called [SC her Alice].

The analysis of proper names in naming constructions seems to be straightforward under my account here. Without entering into the details of what the best approach to small clauses should be like, we minimally require that the proper name has the same structure as the predicate uses of names explored in the previous section, that is, proper names are minimal \([n_P \sqrt{+} n]\) complexes with a null defining head, \(n\). Put differently, names in pure predicate position cannot be referential as they lack the D projection. Notice that they cannot be predicates in strict sense (i.e., \(<e,t>\)) as they lack also any number projection, as witnessed by the ban of number agreement between the direct object and the predicate:

(78) a. Llamaron a los niños Pedro / *Pedros.
    called.3P.PL ACC the children Pedro / *Pedros
    ‘They called the children Pedro.’

b. Las dos niñas se llaman Ana / *Anas.
   the two girls SE call.3P.PL Ana / *Anas
   ‘The two girls are called Ana.’

More evidence in favor of the lack of referentiality of names in naming constructions comes from island effects. As is well known (Rizzi 1990 and others), extraction of non-referential NPs out of an island gives ungrammatical results:
(79) a. Cuánto dijiste que pesa?
   how-much said.2P.PL that weighs
   ‘What did you say that he weighs?’

b. *Cuánto me preguntaste si pesa?
   How-much CL.ACC.1P.SG wondered.2P.PL whether weighs
   *’What did you wonder me whether he weigh?’

The same applies with predicates of ECM verbs and other minimal clauses:

(80) a. Cómo dijiste que lo considerás?
   how said.2P.SG that CL.ACC.3P.MASC.SG consider.2P.SG
   ‘What did you say that you consider him?’

b. *Cómo me preguntaste si lo considero?
   how CL.ACC.1P.SG wondered.2P.SG if CL.ACC.3P.MASC.SG consider.1P.SG
   *’What did you wonder me if I consider him?’

As expected, naming constructions present equal results:

(81) a. Cómo dijiste que se llama?
   how said.2P.SG that SE call.3P.SG
   ‘How did you say that he is called?’

b. *Cómo me preguntaste si se llama?
   how CL.ACC.1P.SG wondered.2P.SG if SE call.3P.SG
   *’How did you wonder me that he is called?’

(82) a. Cómo dijiste que los llamaron?
   how said.2P.SG that CL.ACC.3P.MASC.PL call.3P.SG
   ‘How did you say that they call them?’

b. *Cómo me preguntaste si los
how CL.ACC.1P.SG wondered.2P.SG if CL.ACC.3P.MASC.PL llamaron?
call.3P.SG

*‘How did you wonder me if they call them?’

So, we conclude that names are non-referential nPs that modify the object DP inside the small clause.

(83) They called [SC [DP her] [nP Alice]].

As already explained, absence of number indicates absence of <e,t> typing for the nominal component. We have assumed Acquaviva’s hypothesis that bare nP denotes entity types; in the case at hand they denote the name itself. Again, no homonymy is needed on this account blocking the predicativist main criticism. Now, we must assume that Matushansky would agree with the idea that a proper name in naming constructions does not project more functional structure than this. If this is correct, the argument slot for R must be saturated at the nP level both in argument and in predicate uses of names, an assumption indeed made by Matushansky.

This is a critical point, I think. In addition to saturating the relation argument of a given name, R has the important role of rigidifying names in argument position. In this respect, Matushansky proposes that R -as a variable for a naming convention in force between the discourse participants- is an indexical whose value is established by the context. In her own words,

[...] we hypothesize that in argument positions the naming convention argument slot is saturated by a free variable—that of the naming convention in force between the speaker and the hearer, or more strictly speaking, the naming convention of the speaker that is presupposed to be shared by the hearer. This convention (I will indicate it as $R_0$) is indexical in the sense of being fully extensional: it contains no argument slot for a possible world. As a result, proper names in argument positions will be rigid.

[Matushansky 2008: 599]

15 This follows from her analyses, although she annotates the NPs in the small clauses as $xNP$ suggesting that more functional structure could be active. The number agreement facts however run against such possibility.
Thus, Matushansky explicitly assimilates R to other cases of covert variables proposed in the literature to account for the context-sensitivity of some predicates (see Stanley 2000 for a detailed elaboration of the covert variable strategy):

\[(84)\]  
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a. Lucy went to a local bar.} & \quad = \text{local to Lucy, or local to HERE} \\
\text{b. She is a good friend.} & \quad = \text{my friend}
\end{align*}\]  
[Matushansky 2008: 599]

Briefly, there are two important claims with respect to the nature of R as it occurs in argument names: (i) they are indexical, the ultimate cause of rigidity, and (ii) they must be located at the NP level.

\[(85)\]  
\[\begin{array}{c}
\text{NP} \\
R_0 \\
x \\
\text{NP} \\
\text{Alice}
\end{array}\]  
[Matushansky 2008: 597]

Taking for granted these two assumptions, we can conduct concrete experiments in order to see whether the syntactic life of R can really be detected. A test that comes to mind is ellipsis, a classical way for diagnosing the behavior of indexicals. There is robust evidence in favor of the idea that identity in ellipsis makes reference to content and not character (borrowing Kaplan’s 1989 terms). This is stated by Saab (2015) and Barros & Saab (2016) as follows:

\[(86)\]  
\text{Recoverability conditions in ellipsis make reference to content not character.}

When it comes to the interpretation of indexicals under ellipsis, the observation in (81) seems to be clearly correct:

\[(87)\]  
\text{A: Can you help me?} \quad \text{[requesting help]}
B: Yes, I can [help you].

Bound pronouns of course are immune to index identity. As is well-known, they trigger sloppy identity effects:

(88) John loves his mother and Peter does too [loves his mother].

Strict reading: Peter loves John’s mother.
Sloppy reading: Peter loves his own mother.

Naturally, if *his* in the antecedent is a real indexical (e.g, $g(3) \rightarrow Peter$), then the elliptical pronoun must respect strict identity; otherwise, well-known parallelism conditions on ellipsis would be violated. The covert variable hypothesis for “incomplete propositions” in (84) that Matushansky extends to her analysis of names seems to receive important support from ellipsis, as noticed by Stanley (2000). So, consider the sentence in (89) from Stanley (2000):

(89) John is too old. Jill is too.

In Stanley’s words:

It is clear that there is a strict reading of [89]. However, there is also a sloppy reading. Suppose that John, a 42-year-old professional swimmer and Jill, a 23-year-old professional gymnast, have decided to wed. Shocked at their age difference, I ask Bill how John and Jill can relate to one another, to which he replies by uttering [89]. Relative to this context, [89] can express the proposition that John is too old for his sport, and Jill is too old for hers. Thus, in all of the examples we have discussed, we see behavior that is best explained by the postulation of a covert pronominal element.

[Stanley 2000/2007: 61]

This is a clear illustration of the prediction we should test in the case of names. An important difference is that R in argument DPs is fully extensional. Thus, Matushansky’s predicts absence of sloppy readings in ellipsis contexts. The relevant type of ellipsis here is nominal ellipsis which, as we have mentioned in section 3, targets only *nP*s. As noticed in Saab (2015) proper names can be subject to nominal ellipsis when modified:
(90) el Perón del ‘45 y el [sub-Perón] del ‘73…
the.MASC.SG P. of.the ‘45 and the.MASC.SG P. of.the ‘73…
‘The Perón from ‘45 and the one from ‘73…’

In this example we get the predicted strict reading as the value of R takes the same naming
convention that determine the same individual (Perón). However, “sloppy” readings are also
perfectly conceivable:

(91) El [sub-R1 Juan] de al lado es más amable
the.MASC.SG J. of to.the side is more nice
que el [sub-R6 Juan] que vive arriba.
that the.MASC.SG J. that lives upstairs
‘The Juan that lives next door is nicer than the one that lives upstairs.’

Here, as the sub-indexes show, the antecedent name and the elided one pick-up different naming
conventions and, ultimately, different individuals. But this violates identity in ellipsis and, more
importantly, put R in a special place in the world of indexicals. An obvious solution is locating
the index outside the ellipsis site, say, in D or Num. This is indeed Elbourne’s (2005) analysis,
although for him R does not pick up naming conventions, but (simplifying some of his technical
details) individuals; the “being called N” property is supplied by the NP component as in most
predicativist analysis:

(92) [[THE i] NP]

Under this approach, a case like (92) is straightforwardly derived as a case of perfect identity
given that λx.x is called John = λx.x is called John. By the reasons already adduced, this is not an
available strategy for Matushansky, not at least without breaking the alleged uniformity between
referential and predicate names.
6. Conclusion

It is almost impossible not to see the connections between what has been argued in this article and the famous discussion in *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* regarding the role of “syntactic” features and subcategorization rules. Recall first the nominal system proposed by Chomsky at that time (Chomsky 1965: 83):

![Feature Structure Diagram]

The [- common] branch in the right branch gives us the minimal feature structure conceivable in the nominal domain (which, needless to say, does not mean “no structure at all”). In the left branch, we see the possible realizations of common nouns. The main feature dividing both branches is precisely the [count] property. This feature structure perfectly correlates with Acquaviva’s hypothesis, adopted in this article, that nouns cannot be predicates if not dominated by some category of the Num-domain. Yet, notice that the [common] feature is at odd with the system of syntactic features proposed in *Aspects*. Chomsky acknowledged the problem and concluded that, in reality, the mother node could be derived from principles of syntax, eliminating thus any motivations for a lexical common / proper distinction. He said:

Suppose that the rule that introduces Nouns into the grammar is, essentially, the following:

(49) \[ NP \rightarrow (Det) N (S') \]

In this case, we should expect strict Subcategorization of Nouns into the categories [Det __ S’], [Det ___], and [ __ ] (continued with the notational conventions for features introduced earlier). The category [Det __ S’] is the category of Nouns with sentential complements (such as “The idea that he might succeed” …). The Category [Det ___] is simply the category of Common Nouns. The Category [ __ ] is the category of proper nouns, that is, Nouns with no
Determiner… If this is correct, then Proper/Common distinction is strict subcategorial, and does not fall together with the other features introduced in [90].

[Chomsky 1965: 100, my emphasis]

In other words, there are no nouns and names in Chomsky’s view, but just a certain syntactic configuration which gives us what we conceive of as a noun or a name. Derived uses of proper names would be possible if some transformations apply (Chomsky 1965: 167, footnote 26). Chomsky did not make any semantic claim with respect the nature of proper names, but his position regarding how a proper name becomes a noun is in consonance with the idea that modified uses of names cannot be taken as basic. The modest contribution of this paper was reviving Chomsky’s analysis in order to show that under this type of approach, there is no room for the predicativist argument. So, if I am correct in that there is no news regarding the syntax of names, then there is good news for referentialism.

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