Focus fronting, unexpectedness, and the evaluative dimension

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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the fronting of a focal constituent to a clause-initial position which, in various languages, is associated with an import of unexpectedness. We provide prosodic and syntactic evidence from Italian showing that this phenomenon has distinctive grammatical properties with respect to other instances of ‘focus fronting’. We argue that the fronted constituent bears narrow focus, and that the unexpectedness import conveys that the asserted proposition is less likely than at least one distinct focus alternative (cf. Grosz 2011). We characterize this import as a conventional implicature, and we argue that likelihood is interpreted with respect to an informative modal base and a stereotypical ordering source which are shared by the conversational community, thus allowing the negotiation of a shared evaluation. In order to incorporate evaluative meanings in the discourse context, we adopt and extend the componential view of the context proposed by Farkas & Bruce (2010).

KEYWORDS: focus fronting, unexpectedness, context, ordering source, evaluation
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1. Introduction

In various languages we observe the fronting of a focal constituent, bearing the main prosodic prominence, to a left-peripheral position. This structure may convey different interpretive effects in specific contexts. One interesting instance of such ‘focus fronting’ conveys that the proffered information is unexpected or surprising (see, a.o., Zimmermann 2007, Hartmann & Zimmermann 2007 on Hausa; Abeillé et al. 2008 on the French construction II; Frey 2010 on German; Cruschina 2012 on Sicilian dialects). Some illustrative examples are reported in (1)-(4).1

(1) Tu sais ce qui est arrivé? Le candidat du patron,
you know what is happened the candidate of-the boss
ils ont refusé! they have.3PL refused
‘You know what happened? They refused the boss’s candidate!’
(French; Abeillé et al. 2008, (19a))

(2) A: Chi successi? B: A machina m’arrubbaru!
what happen.PAST.3SG the car me.CL stole.3PL
‘– What happened? – My car was stolen!’
(Sicilian; Cruschina 2012, 71, (92))

(3) Sai come lo chiamava il suo amico?
know.2SG how him.CL called.IPF.3SG the his friend
“Novellino” lo chiamava.
greenhorn him.CL called.IPF.3SG
‘Do you know how his friend called him? He called him greenhorn.’
(Italian; from S. Veronesi, No man’s land, Milan 2003)

(4) A: Mèeneenee yà fàaru?
what 3SG.REL.PERF happen
B: Dabboobi-n jëjii nee mutàanee su-kà kaamàa.
animals-of bush PRT men 3PL.REL.PERF catch
‘– “What happened?” – The men caught wild animals.’
(Hausa; Hartmann & Zimmermann 2007, (43))

In this paper we provide an empirical characterization of this structure in Italian and a formal analysis elucidating the role of focus. In §2 we show that this structure is characterized by specific prosodic and syntactic

1 Throughout the paper the constituent that bears the main prosodic prominence is marked in italics.
properties, differing from another instance of focus fronting that occurs in corrective replies to an assertion: this implies that the unexpectedness import is grammatically encoded, rather than being one out of many pragmatically possible uses of a general ‘focus fronting’ structure. In §§3-4 we argue that this import qualifies as a conventional implicature (CI) by Potts’s (2007) criteria; building on Frey (2010) and Grosz (2011), we characterize it in terms of the comparative likelihood of alternative propositions: there are one or more focus alternatives which are more likely than the proposition expressed by the clause. We then provide a compositional analysis in Potts’s framework for CIs.

On Potts’s characterization, conventional implicatures are typically anchored to the speaker. In §5 we argue instead that the unexpectedness import in our structure is not exclusively anchored to the speaker, but rather, it is interpreted with respect to a modal base and an ordering source which are shared by the conversational participants, and allow them to negotiate a shared evaluation. In virtue of its intrinsically cooperative nature, evaluative meaning differs from Potts’s expressive meaning, although both are separate from the at-issue meaning.

We then adopt the componential view of the discourse context proposed by Farkas & Bruce (2010), and we extend it to include specific evaluative components that record the individual or joint evaluative commitments of the participants, and that contain the ordering sources on which these evaluative commitments are based.

In §6 we digress in order to compare our notion of evaluation, based on ordering sources, with other ‘evaluative phenomena’ like expressive epithets and predicates of personal taste, and in §7 we relate our analysis to the general issue of ‘mirativity’. In §8 we discuss an apparent paradox concerning the coexistence of narrow focus on the fronted constituent with broad focus required by question-answer congruence in sentences like (1), (2) or (4) above. Finally, §9 provides a synthesis of our proposals and some concluding remarks.

One proviso is in order right at the beginning. Following Cruschina (2012: 117-118), we will dub the structure exemplified in (1)-(4) mirative fronting (MF). This label is inspired by DeLancey’s (1997) definition of the grammatical category of mirativity, whereby the speaker expresses that the information she is asserting has been very recently acquired and is not yet integrated in her system of beliefs. By using the term ‘mirative,’ our aim is to contribute to the empirical call for “further in-depth studies of how languages mark new information and surprise in their grammars” (Aikhenvald 2004: 2015). However, there is no consensus as to whether mirativity must be treated as a separate category (Aikhenvald 2004; Torres Bustamante 2012, 2013, a.o.) or as an overtone or extension of evidential markers (Lazard 1999, 2001; Rett & Murray 2013, a.o.). The issue is particularly difficult to tackle in light of the wealth of different phenomena that manifest an unexpectedness import across languages: most notably exclamative clauses (see a.o. Portner & Zanuttini 2003; Rett 2011; Peterson 2010, 2012; Giurgea 2014), exclamations (Rett 2011), European Portuguese “evaluative fronting” (Ambar 1999), (some uses of) German A’-fronting (Frey 2010), unembedded dass-clauses in German (Grosz
2011), the mirative use of the imperfect in Spanish (Torres Bustamante 2012, 2013), and mirative evidentials (Rett & Murray 2013).

Many questions concerning the semantics of mirativity within a wide crosslinguistic perspective are therefore still open. In the absence of a generally accepted semantic account and of defining formal criteria, we will not deal with the issue of the connection between mirativity and evidentiality, nor will we examine the many potential links between our proposal and other treatments of mirativity in different grammatical systems or strategies. We will only provide a concise comparison with some proposals in the recent literature (see notes 10, 13, 21 and §7). Similarly, we postpone to future research the task of a detailed crosslinguistic comparison: the limited aim of this paper is to analyse Italian focus fronting as a grammatical strategy conveying a mirative meaning, and to provide a detailed characterization of its prosodic, syntactic and interpretive properties. This, we believe, is a necessary starting point for a rigorous comparative work.

2. Empirical characterization of the phenomenon

The first step in our argument is to provide a precise empirical characterization of mirative fronting. We will focus here on Italian.

To begin with, it is important to stress that in Italian focus fronting is not univocally associated with a mirative import of unexpectedness, as exemplified in (1)-(4) above; it can also be associated with a corrective import, as in (5B), whereby speaker B rejects A’s assertion and asserts a distinct proposition (see Bianchi & Bocci 2012):

(5) A: Gianni ha regalato una collana a Maria.  
  John has given a necklace to Mary

B: Un anello le ha regalato.  
  a ring her.Cl. has given

‘A: John gave Mary a necklace. B: No, he gave her a ring.’

The corrective import emerges in a reply immediately following an assertion, which is the target of the correction (here, (5A)). On the other hand, it is unavailable in polar questions: e.g., (6B) cannot be used to correct the propositional content of the question in (6A).

(6) A: La domanda cruciale è: ha davvero insultato il suo collega?  
  the question crucial is: has really insulted the his colleague?

B: # Il direttore ha insultato?  
  the director has insulted?

(Intended:  
A: The crucial question is: did he really insult his colleague?  
B: (No, the crucial question is): Did he insult the director?)

MF has a wider distribution: as we saw in (1)-(4), it can be hosted in answers to questions or in all-new sentences; furthermore, it is also
possible in polar questions like (7).

(7) Ma domani al mare andate?
    but tomorrow to-the seaside go.2.PL
‘Are you going to the seaside tomorrow?’

However, the different distribution across various contexts does not tell us per se whether these two instances of fronting are grammatically distinct phenomena or just two potential uses of the same fronting structure which happen to be felicitous in different contexts. It is therefore necessary to compare their prosodic and syntactic properties.

2.1. Prosodic evidence

We designed a prosodic experiment on Italian with two aims. The first was to make sure that both in corrective and in mirative instances of fronting, the fronted constituent qualifies as a narrow focus from a prosodic point of view, that is, it bears the main prominence while the rest of the clause is uttered as prosodically subordinate to it. The second aim was to ascertain whether the fronted constituent has the same or a distinct prosodic profile in the two types of context: should a systematically different profile be observed, this would indicate that the corrective import and the mirative import are grammatically distinct.

The experimental items were six pairs of sentences in which a fronting structure was presented in two types of context.²

(a) In mirative contexts, the target sentence is an assertion and the surrounding context elicits the mirative import. See (8).

(8) [Anna and Beatrice talk about Lea, Gianni and their recent wedding.]
    A: E io che pensavo che non avessero nemmeno un soldo!
    and I that think.3PL. that not have.SBJV.3PL. even a cent
    Indovina un po’?! Alle Maldive sono andati in viaggio di nozze!
    guess a little to-the Maldives are.3PL. gone in journey of wedding
    ‘I thought they were penniless! Guess what! They went to the Maldives on honeymoon!’

(b) In corrective contexts, the target sentence is a reply where the fronted constituent corrects part of an immediately preceding assertion (contrast across utterances). The target sentence is followed by a negative coda, which explicitly denies the corrected alternative. See (9).

² These experimental items were part of a larger syntactic experiment aimed to test the acceptability of focus fronting in Italian under different conditions, which, in addition to mirative and corrective, also included merely contrastive focus (i.e. an utterance-internal contrast between the focus and an alternative conveyed in a negative tag, but without a corrective import with respect to a previous utterance). The results showed that focus fronting is not admitted in the merely contrastive condition (see Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina 2013).
[Anna and Beatrice talk about Lea, Gianni and their recent wedding.]

A: Se ho capito bene, sono andati alle isole Vergini.
if have.1SG understood well are.3PL gone to-the islands Virgin

B: No, ti sbagli!
no, you.CL be-wrong.2SG to-the Maldives are.3PL gone
in viaggio di nozze! Non alle isole Vergini!
in journey of wedding not to-the islands Virgin

‘A: If I’ve understood correctly, they went to the Virgin Islands.
B: No, you are wrong! They went to the Maldives on honeymoon!
Not to the Virgin Islands!’

Out of the six pairs of sentences, three were minimal pairs (modulo the occurrence of the negative tag in the corrective condition, on which see below): see items (1)-(3) in the Appendix. In the other three pairs the target sentences differed in some relevant respects (properties of the stressed syllable, length of the postfocal material, or length of the focused constituent): see items (4)-(6) in the Appendix. The non-matching pairs were designed to explore preliminarily to what extent phonological factors like the length of the fronted constituent or the length of the rest of the clause could affect the prosodic realization of the sentence in the mirative condition.

We elicited the production of the experimental items by six native speakers of Italian (4 women, 2 men), as read speech. We thus collected a corpus of 288 utterances (6 items x 2 conditions x 4 repetitions x 6 subjects), out of which we randomly picked up 2 repetitions per subject for the analysis (144 utterances). We manually segmented the sentences into phonemes and we ToBI-transcribed them. We extracted several measures from the tagged corpus via Praat scripts: for the first vowel of the fronted constituent, the mean and median f0 values; for the stressed syllable and vowel of the fronted constituent, the minimum and maximum f0 values, the f0 standard deviation, and the alignment of the targets with respect to the syllable/vowel onset and their relative alignment with respect the total syllable/vowel duration. For the statistical analysis of the phonetic parameters, we took only into account the minimal pairs.

It is important to note that the negative tags in the corrective items were invariably realized as independent intonational phrases, separated from the target clause by a strong prosodic boundary (mostly separated by actual silent pauses); this amounts to saying that the occurrence of the negative tag does not affect the relevant prosodic aspects of the target clause. The results show that in both conditions, the fronted constituent associates with a nuclear pitch accent, while the rest of the clause is always realized with a flat and low prosodic contour that is prosodically subordinate to the fronted constituent. This finding confirms that the fronted constituent qualifies as a narrow focus in both contexts. However,

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3 The sentences were recorded in a quiet room with head-mounted microphone (Shure Beta45) at a 48kHz sampling rate (16-bit resolution) and then downsampled at 16 kHz in Praat.
the two conditions crucially contrast with respect to the intonational patterns associated with the focused constituent. Consider the pitch contours in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

![Figure 1](image1.png)

**Figure 1.** Pitch contour of an utterance produced after the stimulus (8) in the mirative condition: *Alle Maldive sono andati in viaggio di nozze!* The stressed syllable associated with the nuclear pitch accent is in bold.

![Figure 2](image2.png)

**Figure 2.** Pitch contour of an utterance produced after the stimulus (9) in the corrective condition: *Alle Maldive sono andati in viaggio di nozze!* The stressed syllable associated with the nuclear pitch accent is in bold.

In the mirative condition, the fronted constituent is typically realized with a high plateau profile that starts from the very beginning of the focused constituent and stays steadily high, or slightly rises, to reach a high target within the last stressed syllable of the constituent. From this high target that defines the end of the plateau, the pitch contour goes down to reach a low target aligned with the last syllable of the focused constituent. The pitch drop occurring at the end of the fronted constituent gives rise to the perceptual impression of a prosodic boundary. We analysed the low target aligned with the final syllable as an L- phrase accent that marks the end of focused constituent.

In the corrective condition, the fronted constituent is not realized with a high plateau, and the pitch contour does not start high at the beginning of the constituent. In this condition, the rightmost word is
typically realized with a rise-fall pitch contour. From a low target aligned
with the onset of the stressed syllable, the pitch steeply rises to reach a
peak aligned with the stressed vowel and then falls towards a second low
target, aligned with the final syllable of the constituent. We analysed this
second low target as an L phrase accent that marks the right-hand
boundary of the fronted constituent.

Thus, in our data the two conditions clearly contrast with respect to
the pitch contour realized at the beginning of the fronted constituent. The
pitch is high on the initial syllable of the constituent in the mirative
condition, while it is low in the corrective condition. This is observed for
all the items. See Figure 3, which reports the mean f0 values of the first
vowel in the two conditions for the subset of the minimal pairs.

The difference between the two conditions is confirmed by statistical
analyses based on multi-level mixed effects regressions performed on the
subset of the minimal pairs. We specified the mean f0 values (in semitones, re=100) of the first vowel as the dependent variable and the
context type (corrective vs. mirative) as a fixed effect. The maximal
random structure justified by the data included random intercepts for
speaker and item, as well as random slope for speaker. The test showed
that the mean f0 values of the initial vowel are significantly lower in the
corrective condition than in the mirative one: \( \text{Estimate: -1.7, Std. Error: 0.42, } p<.001 \). Analogous results are obtained for the vowel’s median f0 values (\( \text{Estimate: -1.7, Std. Error: 0.35, } p<.001 \)) and for the f0 values at the
vowel midpoint (\( \text{Estimate: -1.8, Std. Error: 0.47, } p<.01 \)). We therefore
conclude that in the mirative condition the left-hand boundary of the
fronted constituent is tonally associates with a high boundary tone, i.e.
%H, in contrast to the corrective condition where the boundary is tonally
unspecified or associates with a low boundary tone.

A further difference opposing the corrective and the mirative
condition emerges from our data. This difference concerns the pitch
contour realized on the stressed syllable of the rightmost word in the fronted constituent. In the corrective condition, the stressed syllable is typically realized with a very steep rise that starts from a low target aligned with the syllabic onset and ends in a peak occurring within the rhyme. Cf. Figure 2 and Figure 4 (panel A). From the peak, the contour falls towards the phrase accent L- that marks the end of the constituent. By contrast, in the mirative condition, there is no low target aligned with syllabic onset. The stressed syllable is rather characterized by a high target defining the end of the high plateau, which results from the interpolation with the initial %H or a preceding pitch accent. Depending on the early or late alignment of the high target within the stressed syllable, most part of the stressed syllable is realized either with a fall (when the high target is aligned with the vowel onset) or with a sustained high plateau (when the high target is aligned late in the rhyme). Cf. Figure 1 and Figure 4 (panel B).

Figure 4. Schemes of phonetic forms of the pitch contour observed on the stressed syllable of the rightmost word in the fronted constituent. Panel A: corrective condition; panel B: mirative condition.

In order to corroborate this description, we compared for the minimal pairs the difference between the f0 value of the high target and the f0 value at the onset of the stressed syllable in the two conditions, i.e. the amount of rise. We carried out a linear mixed effects analysis with context type (mirative vs. corrective) as a fixed effect. The maximal random effect structure justified by the data included random intercepts for item and random slopes and intercepts for speaker. The analysis showed that the f0 difference (in semitones, re=100) between the stressed syllable onset’s f0 value and the stressed syllable’s peak is significantly higher in the corrective condition: Estimate: 3.5, Std. Error: 0.75, p<.01. Furthermore, we tested with a similar model the amount of pitch variation, quantified as the standard deviation of the pitch (in semitones) resulted. As expected, the standard deviation of the pitch on the stressed syllable is significantly higher in the corrective condition than in the mirative one: Estimate: 1.1, Std. Error: 0.22, p<.001.

In line with previous studies (see Bocci 2013 and the references therein), we analyse the rise-fall movement characterizing the last stressed syllable of the fronted constituent in the corrective condition as the result of the interpolation between the nuclear pitch accent L+H* associated with the stressed syllable and the phrase accent L- associated with the right-hand boundary of the constituent. The L+H* pitch accent was systematically observed in the corrective condition for all the items: out of the entire corpus, we transcribed the fronted constituent as associated with L+H* in 96% of the utterances. For the residual 4% of the cases, we
failed to identify a clear leading tone aligned with the syllabic onset and we thus transcribed the pitch accent as H*. See Table 1.

As mentioned above, the high plateau that characterizes the fronted constituent in the mirative condition ends in a high target that can be aligned early or late within the stressed syllable. See Figure 4, panel B. In order to mark transparently the alignment of the high target, we decided to transcribe the pitch contour as H* when the high target occurred within the rhyme and most of the syllable was realized with a sustained high pitch, and as H+L* when the high target occurred before the steady part of the vowel and most part of the syllable was realized as a fall. Out of the entire corpus, 61% of the utterances in the mirative condition were transcribed as H* and 19% as H+L*. See Table 1. Although the alternation between H+L* and H* does not seem to be phonologically conditioned in our corpus, at the present stage, we do not exclude that the early alignment of the high target (transcribed as H+L*) is to be reinterpreted as a phonetic variant of H*. Crucially, the cases transcribed as H* and the ones transcribed as H+L* share an important aspect: in both cases, the fronted constituent is systematically realized with the initial high boundary tone %H.

Finally, out of the entire set of mirative items, in 19% of the cases the fronted constituent was realized with the pattern observed for the corrective condition: the %H at the left-hand of the fronted constituent does not occur and the final stressed syllable is realized with a rise-fall contour, i.e. L+H* L-. These findings are observed in both minimal pairs and the non-minimal pairs. We assume that these residual mirative cases in which the fronted constituent was realized with the ‘corrective’ tune L+H* -L are due to a noise effect: the speakers probably failed to correctly identify the intended interpretation.

To ascertain whether the distribution of the nuclear pitch accents associated with the fronted constituent is predicted by the context (mirative vs. corrective), results from the entire corpus were tested by means of a multi-level mixed effects regression with log odds of the occurrence of L+H* against alternative outcomes (i.e. H+L* and H*).
altogether) as the dependent variable, context (mirative vs. corrective) and type of subcorpus (minimal pairs vs. non minimal pairs) as the fixed effects and by-subject random intercepts and slopes. The analysis revealed that the probability of observing L+H* is significantly lower in the mirative condition: Estimate: -3.8, Std. Error: 0.42, p<.001. Notably, the type of subcorpus does affect the pitch accent selection, nor does the interaction between type of context and type of subcorpus, confirming that the observed PA-distribution in the minimal pairs does not differ from the one observed in non-minimal pairs (cf. Table 1).

On the basis of our results, we propose that the tunes associated with the fronted constituent in the mirative condition are %H H* L- and %H H+L* L-. By contrast, the tune associated with the corrective import is L+H* L- (as already found in previous research; cf., a.o., Bocci 2013). Accordingly, the mirative and corrective import contrast intonationally in two distinct respects:

i. the occurrence of a %H boundary tone;
ii. the selection of the nuclear pitch accent (see Figure 3).

In sum, these findings show that the corrective and the mirative import associate with different intonational properties. We therefore conclude that MF is grammatically distinct from focus fronting carrying a corrective import. In the following section we summarize some syntactic evidence, drawn from Cruschina (2012), which also supports this conclusion.

2.2. Further evidence from syntax

Cruschina (2012), in analysing Sicilian and standard Italian, identified two syntactic properties which discriminate fronting in mirative vs. corrective contexts; we will here provide examples from Italian.

First, in the mirative case the fronted constituent cannot be separated from the finite verb by any intervening constituent, as shown in (10b). On the contrary, in corrective contexts adjacency is not required, as shown in (11B).

(10) a. Non ci posso credere! *Due bottiglie ci siamo bevuti!
   Not CL.LOC can believe two bottles CL.PRES.1PL drunk.PL
   ‘I can’t believe it! We drank two bottles!’

b. ??/* Non ci posso credere! Due bottiglie, al pub,
   not CL.LOC can believe two bottles at-the pub
   ci siamo bevuti!
   CL.PRES.1PL drunk.PL

(11) A: Gianni ha venduto la moto.
   Gianni has sold the motorbike
   B: La macchina Gianni ha venduto, non la moto.
   the car Gianni has sold not the motorbike
   ‘A: John sold his motorbike. B: No, he sold his car, not his motorbike.’
   (adapted from Cruschina 2012, 143, (17))
Secondly, fronting with a mirative import cannot occur in embedded clauses, e.g. within the complement of a verb of saying (12). On the contrary, under the corrective interpretation such embedding, although slightly marked, is clearly possible (13).

(12) ??/* Non ci posso credere! Ha raccontato che due bottiglie ci eravamo bevuti! (Cruschina 2012, 119)

(13) A: Gianni ha detto che ha venduto la moto.
    John has.3SG said that has.3SG sold the motorbike
B: No, ha detto che la macchina ha venduto.
    no, has.3SG said that the car has.3SG sold
‘A: John said that he sold his motorbike.
B: No, he said that he sold his car.’

We refer the reader to Cruschina (2012) for a syntactic analysis of these differences; what is relevant for our current purposes is that these syntactic contrasts identify the two types of fronting as grammatically distinct phenomena.

2.3. Summary

To summarize so far, we have provided both prosodic and syntactic evidence to the effect that MF constitutes a grammatical phenomenon on its own, rather than being just one of the pragmatically possible nuances of a general ‘focus fronting’ structure. Hence, from this point on we will concentrate exclusively on MF; the next step will be to provide an explicit characterization of the mirative import.

3. Unexpectedness as comparative likelihood

The prosodic analysis has confirmed that the fronted constituent in MF bears narrow focus. The next question, then, is which role narrow focus plays in giving rise to the unexpectedness import. One interesting answer is provided by Partee’s insight that unexpectedness involves a comparison between two different states of affairs:

Evidence for conceptualization of “other possible worlds” can be seen even at a prelinguistic level in any child or animal that can

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4 On the other hand, Frey (2010) gives a unified analysis for German “A’ fronting”, covering both the mirative and the corrective import. We leave for future research a crosslinguistic comparison between German and Italian fronting.
show surprise, since surprise signals mismatch between a perceived state of affairs and an expected state of affairs. (Partee 1995, 326)

Notice that in MF, the fronted focus constituent occurs in the high periphery of the clause. In alternative semantics terms (Rooth 1992), the focus operator must attach at the clausal level in order to have the focus constituent in its scope, and the focus alternatives are thus exploited at the level of the proposition. The mirative import of this structure can then be taken to convey that the expressed proposition is unexpected when compared with at least one distinct focus alternative: there may be salient alternatives in the context, or else, relevant alternatives may be drawn from general background knowledge. (Note that we are not claiming that mirativity in general necessarily involves the comparison of focus alternatives, but that this is the crucial contribution of focus in the case under exam; see §7 for more discussion.)

In order to formally model this idea, we will adapt a proposal by Grosz (2011), which characterizes unexpectedness in terms of the comparative likelihood of alternative propositions. Grosz's proposal is framed in Kratzer's theory of modality, which is based on two parameters: (a) the modal base $B(w)$, which we can define (simplifying somewhat) as a set of possible worlds accessible from the evaluation world $w$; (b) the ordering source $O(w)$, a set of propositions which induces an ordering on the worlds of the modal base.

The ordering is determined by the relation between possible worlds defined in (14):

(14) For any two worlds $v, u \in B(w)$,

\[ v \leq_{O(w)} u \text{ (v is at least as close as u to the ideal represented by } O(w)) \text{ iff all the propositions of } O(w) \text{ that are true in } u \text{ are true in } v \text{ as well.} \]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[For all worlds } v \text{ and } u \in B(w): v \leq_{O(w)} u \text{ iff}
\{p: p \in O(w) \text{ and } u \square p\} & \subseteq \{p: p \in O(w) \text{ and } v \square p\}\end{align*}
\]

On the basis of (14), it is possible to define the following relations between propositions (definition (15) adapted from Kratzer 2012, 41):

(15) $p$ is at least as good a possibility as $q$ w.r.t. a modal base $B(w)$ and an ordering source $O(w)$ iff there is no world $u$ in which $q$ is true and $p$

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5 Grosz himself credits E. Villalta for the original insight.

6 More precisely, the modal base is yielded by a conversational background, i.e. a function which, for any evaluation world $w$, yields a set of propositions (the modal base is then determined by the intersection of such propositions).

7 The ordering source too is determined by a conversational background taking in input the evaluation world $w$.

8 Here we differ from Grosz (2011, §4.1.2), who adopts a different definition from Kratzer (1991).
is false which is closer to the ideal represented by $O(w)$ than all the worlds $v$ in which $p$ is true and $q$ is false.  

$$[\neg \exists u \ (u \in B(w) \& u \in q \& \forall v \ ((v \in B(w) \& v \in p \& q) \rightarrow u < O(w)(v)))]$$

(16) $p$ is a better possibility than $q$ w.r.t. a modal base $B(w)$ and an ordering source $O(w)$ iff
i. $p$ is at least as good a possibility as $q$ w.r.t. $B(w)$ and $O(w)$;
ii. $q$ is not at least as good a possibility as $p$ w.r.t. $B(w)$ and $O(w)$.

These definitions are completely neutral with respect to the nature of the modal base and of the ordering source: these determine the different flavours of modality that emerge in concrete examples. The modal notion that we need in order to analyse the mirative import is likelihood, and this is defined by a stereotypical ordering source:

(17) A stereotypical ordering source ('in view of the normal course of events') is a conversational background assigning to every world the set of propositions which represent the normal course of events in that world. (Kratzer 1991, 645)

The stereotypical ordering source ranks the worlds in the modal base $B(w)$ according to how close they come to what constitutes the normal course of events in the world of evaluation $w$. Accordingly, if a proposition $p$ is a better possibility than another proposition $q$ w.r.t. a base $B(w)$ and a stereotypical ordering source $SO(w)$, we will say that $p$ is more likely than $q$ (w.r.t. $B(w)$ and $SO(w)$).

With this background, we can now characterize the mirative import that is associated with MF in the following way:

(18) The proposition expressed by the clause is less likely than at least one distinct alternative proposition w.r.t. a contextually relevant modal base and stereotypical ordering source.  

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9 “When comparing two propositions $p$ and $q$, we disregard the worlds $p$ and $q$ have in common and compare $p\& q$ and $q\& p$ by checking whether there is any world in $q\& p$ that is higher ranked than every world in $p\& q$. If not, $p$ is at least as good a possibility as $q$.” (Kratzer 2012, ch.3, §3).

10 An unexpectedness import is also commonly associated with exclamative clauses. Portner & Zanuttini (2003) argue that $wh$-exclamatives (e.g. *What a cool day it was yesterday in New Delhi!*) perform domain widening, adding some potential values for the variable bound by the $wh$-phrase which are not included in the contextually given domain; this widening beyond the ‘usual’ values may give rise, by implicature, to a feeling of surprise. This approach does not invoke the ranking of alternatives. Rett (2011) analyses exclamatives in terms of an illocutionary operator E-Force, which expresses that the propositional content was not expected by the speaker. As for $wh$-exclamatives, Rett shows that they always have a degree interpretation, and argues that they denote a property of degrees; e.g. (i) has the denotation in (ii) (Rett 2011, (40)):

(i) How tall John is!
We will return to the nature of the modal base and of the ordering source in §5. To exemplify, let us consider the following instance of MF:

(19) Gianni è inamorato pazzo di Maria. Pensa un po’... Gianni is in-love mad with Maria. think a little
Un anello di diamanti le ha regalato! a ring of diamonds to her.

Taking the focus operator to be attached on top of the clause (20a), the ordinary semantic value of the clause is the proposition that John gave Mary a diamond ring (20b), and the focus semantic value is a set of propositions of the form $Q(\lambda x. \text{give} (\text{john}, x, \text{mary}))$ (20c). The mirative import conveys that there is at least one member of this set of alternative propositions which is more likely than the proposition that John gave Mary a diamond ring (20e).

The existential force of (18) requires $C$ to provide at least a minimal likelihood scale consisting of the expressed proposition and one distinct focus alternative. This is certainly the weakest possible definition of the mirative import, and it is in fact much weaker than Grosz’s original...
The reason why we opt for this weaker formulation is that in the case of MF, there need not be any immediately salient set of alternatives: a hearer may perfectly interpret (19) even though this is uttered out of the blue – e.g. as a comment on how madly in love with Mary John is – and there has been no previous mention of expensive or inexpensive gifts. The participants need only agree on the fact that there is at least one more likely alternative proposition, but they need not agree on any specific alternative (i.e., they may have different gifts in mind).

Notice also that the fronting structure may come with a flavour other than surprise, e.g. disgust or discontent (cf. also Abeillé et al. 2008 on French):

(21) Accidenti! Marina hanno invitato!
   damn Marina have.3pt.invited
   ‘Damn! (Of all people,) they invited Marina’

This reading is usually accompanied by a ‘deprecation’ marker, as exemplified above. We have not studied in detail the prosodic properties of focus fronting under this interpretation; one of the examples in our prosodic experiment clearly elicited a dislike evaluation, and the fronted focus displayed the same plateau profile which was observed in the other cases. Pending further investigation, we will tentatively assume – following again Grosz (2011) – that these cases are just like our MF, except for the fact that the interpretation involves a bouletic ordering source, rather than a stereotypical one (on ordering sources, see §5.3).

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13 Grosz (2011, § 4.1.2) gives a different definition for the surprise reading in his analysis of unembedded dass-clauses in German, e.g. (i):
   (i) Mein Gott, dass der nicht verschlafen hat! (Grosz 2011, 56, (73))
      my God that he not overslept has
      ‘(I’m shocked) that he didn’t oversleep.’
He assumes a set of contextually relevant alternative propositions which are ordered on a (speaker-related) scale S of inverse likelihood; one proposition in the scale represents the contextually given threshold of likelihood. An operator EX takes as arguments a scale S and a proposition p, and (informally) expresses an emotion that captures the fact that p is higher on the scale S than all contextually relevant alternatives q that are below the contextual threshold. The reasons for assuming a contextual threshold are not immediately relevant to our current purposes; therefore, we adopt a simpler (merely existential) definition of the mirative import. Clause (i) also has an optative reading, which is obtained by replacing the inverse likelihood scale with a bouletic scale (see below the discussion around (21)).

14 See also Cruschina (2012, 148-149).

15 In some contexts, the relevant alternatives are very constrained or even fully explicit (see e.g. the exam examples (33), (39) and (40)), but this is not a necessary condition for the mirative import to be interpretable. This is another difference with respect to corrective focus, where there must be one salient alternative that gets corrected (cf. van Leusen’s 2004 ‘Antecedent Condition’).

16 See the Appendix for the list of the experimental items.
4. The status of the mirative import

The next question to be addressed concerns the interpretive status of the mirative import. Adopting the criteria proposed in Potts (2007b, §3; 2008, §2.1), we argue that it qualifies as a conventional implicature (CI) and that it belongs in a ‘tier’ of meaning separate from the truth-conditional (at-issue) meaning.

A first indication of the CI status is non-deniability: by uttering a sentence with MF the speaker commits herself to the mirative import, and importantly, she cannot cancel it without making the sentence infelicitous:

(22) [Context: Mary is telling news about her friend’s new boyfriend]

\[\text{Un anello di diamanti le ha regalato! # Ma non c’è niente di strano / # ma la cosa non mi sorprende.}^{17}\]

‘He gave her a diamond ring! # But there’s nothing strange about it / # But that doesn’t surprising me!

Note also that, contrary to at-issue entailments, the mirative import is not affected by being in the scope of the polar question operator, as shown by example (7), repeated here as (23):

(23) \[\text{Ma domani al mare andate?} \]

\[\text{but tomorrow to-the seaside go.2.PL} \]

‘Are you going to the seaside tomorrow?’

Sentence (23) does not entail the proposition that the salient group including the addressee(s) \((x+a\_e)\) is going to the seaside tomorrow (at-issue content), but it does convey that there are more likely alternatives of the form ‘\(x+a\_e\) are going to place \(y\) tomorrow’ (see §4.1 for details).

Furthermore, two types of evidence support Potts’s multidimensional analysis, showing that the interpretation of MF yields a pair of an at-issue proposition and a CI proposition. Note first that the propositional content of a sentence containing MF is asserted by the speaker: this is shown by the fact that it can be directly denied by the interlocutor, as in (24B), a reply to a variation of (19).\(^{18}\)

(24) A: Pensa un po’: \[\text{un anello di diamanti le ha regalato!} \]

\[\text{think a little: a diamond ring to-her.CI. has given} \]

\text{The continuation in (22) is felicitous if the speaker makes it clear that she is expressing a dislike evaluation rather than an evaluation of unexpectedness; similarly, the example (21) above would also be compatible with the same kind of continuation. In the spontaneous examples that we have observed, the context usually disambiguates the intended reading (e.g. by concomitant expressions of surprise or deprecation). As already mentioned, we cannot tell at this point whether these two nuances are also distinguished by a different prosodic profile.\(^{17}\)

\(^{17}\) We borrow the denial test from Rett (2012, (5)).
‘Guess what! He gave her a diamond ring!’

B: Niente affatto! (Chi ti ha detto questa assurdità?)
   nothing at-all! who you.Cl has told this absurdity
   ‘You’re wrong! (Who told you this absurd thing?)’

Although speaker B rejects the truth-conditional content of A’s assertion, he is not thereby committed against the mirative import: this shows that the at-issue meaning and the CI-meaning belong to two separate dimensions, that is, they are treated independently in the interpretation process.\(^{19}\)

The reverse dissociation can also be observed: in (25), speaker B accepts the propositional content of A’s assertion, while rejecting its mirative import:

(25) A: Pens\(\text{a tu: un anello di diamanti le ha regalato!}
\text{think you A diamond ring to-her.Cl has given}
   ‘Just think about it! He gave her a diamond ring!’

   B: Non c’è niente di strano.
   Not there’s nothing of strange
   ‘There’s nothing strange about that.’

One additional argument for multidimensionality can be based on ellipsis. To illustrate, consider the following example, featuring an expressive epithet (Potts 2008, (14)):

(26) A: I saw your fucking dog in the park.
   B: No, you didn’t. You couldn’t have. \textit{The poor thing} passed away last week.

Speaker B’s utterance contains two instances of VP-ellipsis, and the content of the elliptical VPs must be parallel to that of the antecedent VP in speaker A’s utterance. Crucially, what is parallel is just the ordinary denotation of that VP (the property of seeing speaker B’s dog in the park), but not the expressive content introduced by the modifier \textit{fucking} contained in the antecedent VP. This shows that the CI content of the expressive modifier is separate from the descriptive content of the containing VP.

A similar separation can be observed in the case of MF. In (27), the elliptical predicate in B’s reply is parallel to the descriptive content of the predicate in A’s assertion, yet B explicitly rejects A’s mirative implicature:

(27) A: Pens\(\text{a te! Un ritratto stile Warhol si è fatto fare!}
   think.Imp you a portrait style Warhol REF\textit{L} is made make

   B: Io pure. Che c’è di strano?

\(^{19}\) In being semantically independent from each other, Potts’s dimensions of meaning differ from a two-dimensional system à la Kaplan (1977), where the meaning in one dimension (character) is a function that returns in output the meaning in the other dimension (content).
me too what there is of strange
‘A: Guess what! He got himself a Warhol-style portrait.
B: Me too. What’s strange about that?’

These properties, taken together, characterize the mirative import as a conventional implicature in the sense of Potts. 20

4.1. Compositional analysis of MF

We have not yet made clear how the mirative implicature is actually introduced. In principle, it could be directly introduced by an illocutionary operator (cf. Grosz 2011, Rett 2011, Rett & Murray 2013 for similar proposals; see also §7 for discussion). Recall, however, that MF can occur both in assertions and in yes-no questions: we would then have to assume that the mirative import can be optionally introduced by two different illocutionary operators.

A closer look at yes-no questions gives us evidence against such a direct association. Consider (28):

(28) Marina hanno invitato?
Marina have.3Pt. invited?
‘Did they invite Marina?’

In a Hamblin-type approach, yes-no questions denote the set consisting of the proposition \( p \) denoted by the sentence radical and its complement: \( \{p, \neg p\} \). But note that the mirative import carried by (28) is interpreted with respect to the focus alternatives of the proposition \( p \), and not of its complement: namely, (28) conveys that there are more likely alternatives of the form ‘they invited x’. Assuming that the polar set is generated by the illocutionary operator, which takes in input the proposition denoted by the sentence radical, we are led to hypothesize that the mirative implicature is introduced at a compositional level below the operator, where the complement proposition \( \neg p \) is not yet available.

On the other hand, the implicature must be introduced at a level not lower than the attachment site of the focus operator, because its interpretation relies on a comparison between the expressed proposition and at least one focus alternative. The focus operator introduces a free variable \( C \), whose value is constrained to be a subset of the focus semantic value of the proposition; this subset \( C \) constitutes the quantificational domain of the existential quantifier of the implicature.

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20 A conceptually distinct possibility would be to analyse the mirative import as a conversational implicature. On this view, all that is grammatically encoded is that the focus alternatives are defined at the propositional level (since the Focus operator is adjoined on top of the clause); then, in each particular context, the hearer identifies either the mirative import or the corrective import as the most plausible way to embed the sentence in the overall discourse structure (cf. Asher 2004). However, the empirical evidence provided in §2, as well as the lack of cancellability, undermine this view.
We therefore define an operator $F_{IMP}$ (for: focus-based implicature), which takes in input the proposition denoted by the immediately lower compositional layer and exploits the $C$ variable introduced by the focus operator, returning (a) the original proposition (of type $st^a$: at-issue content) and (b) a CI-proposition (of type $st^c$). The two components of meaning are here separated by the symbol •, following Potts’s notation (and adopting his rule of CI-application):

\[(29) \ [F_{IMP}] = \lambda p_{\phi_{<\lambda\phi_>}}, p \cdot (\exists p'_{\phi_{<\lambda\phi_>}}, p' \in C) (p' \text{ is a better possibility than } p \text{ w.r.t. a relevant modal base and stereotypical ordering source}).\]

Given the hypothesized compositional layers in (30), the interpretation of the sentence radical of question (28) will be as in (31).

\[(30) \ [\psi \text{ illocutionary operator}] [\chi F_{IMP} \ [\phi \ [XP \ldots t] \sim C \]]\]

\[(31)\]

\[a. [[\phi [Marina]_{\psi} \ [TP \ pro_{\psi} \ hanno \ invitato \ t]] \sim C] \ [0_{\phi}] =
\lambda i. (\text{invite}(a@b, x)) \text{ (where, for the contextually determined assignment } g, g(1) = a@b).\]

\[b. [[\phi [Marina]_{\psi} \ [TP \ pro_{\psi} \ hanno \ invitato \ t]] \sim C] \ [1_{\phi}] = \{\lambda i. (\text{invite}(a@b, x) \mid x \in D_{e}\} \]

\[c. \ C \ [\psi] \subseteq \{\lambda i. (\text{invite}(a@b, x) \mid x \in D_{e}\} \]

\[d. [\chi] \ [\psi] = [[F_{IMP} C] \ [\phi]] \ [\psi] = \lambda i. (\text{invite}(a@b, x)) \cdot (\exists p' \in C) (p' \text{ is a better possibility than } \lambda i. (\text{invite}(a@b, x)) \text{ w.r.t. a relevant modal base and stereotypical ordering source}).\]

It is important to stress that the mirative implicature can be properly interpreted only on the basis of a non-singleton focus semantic value: this is why we have dubbed it focus-based implicature. We return below to the illocutionary layer and to the linguistic implementation of the implicature trigger.

5. The role of the context

In the preceding section we argued that the meaning of MF is multidimensional in Potts’s sense, namely, it consists of a pair of propositions. In the rest of the paper, we will argue for an even stronger

\[\text{This differs from Grosz’s EX operator, which maps a truth-conditional meaning into a one-dimensional expressive meaning (Grosz 2011, § 4.1.6). Here the output is two-dimensional because, as shown above, the at-issue content of a clause hosting MF is asserted or questioned.}\]
view: the mirative implicature belongs in an *evaluative dimension* of meaning which is supported by dedicated components of the discourse context, and not by the common ground, which records informative (truth-conditional) content. By ‘evaluation’ we mean, specifically, a proposition whose interpretation requires an ordering source.

The steps of our argument will be the following:

(i) We will argue that the modal base used to interpret the mirative implicature does not correspond to a set of worlds accessible from an evaluation world, but rather, it must be identified directly with the context set in the sense of Stalnaker (1978): the set of worlds that are compatible with the common ground propositions that all the discourse participants accept as true (§§5.1-5.2).

(ii) The worlds of the context set, serving as the modal base, are then ordered by a stereotypical ordering source.

(iii) It follows that the stereotypical ordering source cannot itself be contained in the common ground, which defines the modal base, but it must be recorded in a separate discourse component (§5.3).

This will lead us to assume a structured view of the discourse context; in particular, we will adopt and extend the proposal by Farkas & Bruce (2010). After incorporating in our analysis the illocutionary layer, we will return to the relationship between the proposed evaluative dimension and the truth-conditional one, and we will compare our notion of evaluation with other ‘evaluative’ phenomena (in a broader sense than ours) like expressive epithets, predicates of personal states, and modals.

### 5.1. *Which modal base?*

In (18) we characterized the mirative import of MF in terms of a modal relation of comparative likelihood. The next question to be addressed is which modal base is used to interpret it. *Prima facie*, it seems natural to assume that the modal base is constituted by the set of worlds that are doxastically accessible to the speaker at the time and world of utterance. This would correspond to the idea that the mirative import is the expression of the speaker’s surprise, as is generally assumed since DeLancey’s first characterization (see also §7).

However, this natural assumption leads to a striking paradox in cases of assertion like (19) above, repeated here as (32):

(32) *Un anello di diamanti* le ha regalato!
   a ring of diamonds to-her.CL has given
   ‘He gave her a diamond ring!’

By (18), the mirative import conveys that the expressed proposition is less likely than some alternative propositions. Note that in order for this to hold, the expressed proposition cannot be true in all the worlds of the modal base: if this were the case, no other proposition could be a better possibility. (Let \( p_0 \) be the expressed proposition and \( p_f \) an arbitrary focus alternative. For \( p_f \) to be a better possibility than \( p_0 \), it must be the case that...
\(\neg (p_0 \text{ is as good a possibility as } p_f)\) (by (16ii) above), i.e., \(\neg \exists u (u \in B(w) \& u \in p_f - p_0 \& \forall v ((v \in B(w) \& v \in p_0 - p_f) \rightarrow u < (v)_w))\); but if every world in \(B(w)\) is a \(p_0\)-world, there can be no world \(u\) such that \(u \in p_f - p_0\); hence, \(p_f\) cannot be a better possibility than \(p_0\).

The paradoxical conclusion is that, for the mirative import to be interpretable, the speaker could not believe the proposition that she is asserting.

As a solution to this paradox, we might assume a weak version of the Gricean quality maxim, such that the speaker’s asserting \(p\) does not require that she believes \(p\), but only that she does not believe \(p\) to be false.\textsuperscript{22} But this solution turns out to be insufficient if we take a conversation-oriented perspective.

In the dynamic approach initiated by Stalnaker (1978), the crucial notion is not individual belief, but rather, \textit{public acceptance}: the conversational community shares a common ground of propositions that are mutually taken to be accepted by every participant.\textsuperscript{23} As stressed by Gunlogson (2003) and Farkas & Bruce (2010), an act of assertion has a double effect. On the one hand, a speaker who makes an assertion immediately commits herself to the truth of the asserted proposition: this becomes part of her public discourse commitments. On the other hand, the speaker proposes that the asserted proposition is entered in the common ground: if the other participants accept her assertion, the proposition becomes a joint commitment of the conversational community from that point on.

If we then shift from individual beliefs to public commitments, the relevant modal base would be the set of worlds that are compatible with the speaker’s discourse commitments at the moment of utterance.\textsuperscript{24} Recall now from (24) above that a declarative sentence hosting MF is asserted. By asserting it, the speaker becomes publicly committed to the expressed proposition: it follows that the asserted proposition is true in all the worlds of this modal base and, once again, no alternative proposition can be a better possibility.

One possible way out could be to assume a ‘two-stage’ interpretation. Suppose that the mirative import associated with an asserted proposition \(p\) is interpreted with respect to the modal base characterized by the speaker’s discourse commitments \textit{minus the asserted proposition itself}, i.e., the speaker’s commitments at the stage immediately preceding the assertion. At that time, \(p\) is not (yet) true in every world of the modal base (nor is any other focus alternative: for an assertion of \(p\) to be felicitous, \(p\) must answer a still unsolved question, cf. Roberts 1998): hence, with respect to this modal base, some focus alternative may well be a better possibility than \(p\).

But even this solution turns out to be insufficient. To see this, consider the following scenario: Mary’s parents are talking about an exam

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\textsuperscript{22} Cf. e.g. Chierchia (2006, §3.1).
\textsuperscript{23} I.e., every participant behaves as if she accepted the truth of such propositions, and expects the others to do the same. On acceptance, see Stalnaker (1984, 79 ff.).
\textsuperscript{24} This is the set \(CS_{w1}\) in Farkas & Bruce (2010); see §5.2 for details.
that Mary has just taken, where the maximum score is thirty *cum laude* (with distinction). Mary's mother, after talking to Mary over the phone, asserts that Mary got the top score, but her husband does not accept this claim. They check the score published on the university website and Mary's mother, pointing at the screen, utters:

(33)  
Te l'avevo detto: *trenta e lode* le hanno dato!  
you.CL it.CL had.1SG said thirty cum laude her.CL have.3PL given  
‘What did I tell you? She got *thirty with distinction*!’

This is a felicitous instance of MF:25 but note that the speaker had previously committed herself to the truth of the proposition that Mary got the top score. In this case, the hypothetical two-stage interpretation will not help.

Note that, on the other hand, the use of MF is infelicitous when the propositional content of the assertion is already presupposed by all the participants. Suppose that Mary has just come home and informed her parents that she got the top score on the test. As soon as Mary leaves the room, one of them utters:

(34)  
Pensa te: *trenta e lode* le hanno dato!  
think you thirty cum laude her.CL have.3PL given  
‘Guess what! She got *thirty with distinction*!’

This is not a felicitous utterance, even though it may convey something new – namely, an attitude of surprise about the score that Mary has just reported. The crucial difference between (33) and (34) is that in (33) the asserted proposition is an individual commitment of one participant, whereas in (34) it is already accepted as true by both participants. Given our previous argument, the infelicity of (34) follows immediately if the modal base that is used to interpret the mirative import is the set of worlds characterized by the *joint commitments* of the conversational community at the moment of utterance.26

5.2. *The informative components*

The above argument has led us to identify the relevant modal base with the context set, namely the set of possible worlds in which all the propositions presupposed by the conversational community are true. In

25 Note that (33) cannot be an instance of corrective focus fronting, because Mary’s father has not asserted any alternative proposition of the form ‘Mary got score x.’ As a matter of fact, the assertion in (33), contrary to real corrections, cannot be introduced by the negative particle *no* or an adversative adverb like *actually*.

26 This conclusion concurs with Zimmermann’s (2007) proposal that unexpectedness is defined by the mutually recognized expectations of the speaker and the hearer(s).
order to make this idea explicit, let us reconsider in more detail the structure of the discourse context, starting from the stalinakerian picture informally introduced in §5.1.

At any given point of a conversation – conventionally indicated by an index $i$ – let the common ground $\text{CG}_i$ of a context be the set of propositions that are mutually taken to be accepted by all the conversational participants. Let the context set $\text{CS}_i$ be the set of possible worlds that are compatible with all the information in $\text{CG}_i$; technically, $\text{CS}_i$ is obtained by the intersection of all the propositions of $\text{CG}_i$ ($\cap \text{CG}_i$). If a speaker $s$ asserts a sentence at $i$, she proposes that the expressed proposition $p$ be added to $\text{CG}_i$. If her assertion is accepted by the other participants, the proposition is added to $\text{CG}_i$ ($\text{CG}_{i+1} = \text{CG}_i \cup \{p\}$) and consequently, it discards from $\text{CS}_i$ all the possible worlds in which $p$ is not true: this yields a ‘shrunk’ context set ($\text{CS}_{i+1} = \text{CS}_i \setminus \{p\}$).

Various authors have stressed that this picture is too radically communitarian, in that it does not provide a way to model situations of disagreement, and moreover, it cannot represent any asymmetry between the participants with respect to informational needs or aims. To this effect, the context must also separately represent the discourse commitments of each individual participant.

The structured context proposed by Farkas & Bruce (2010) incorporates both the individual and the communitarian perspectives. This system contains, in addition to the CG, two more components which are under the cooperative control of the conversational community: the Table and the Projected Set.

The Table is a stack structure which records, at any given point, what constitutes the immediate goal of the conversation. Whenever an assertion is made or a question is asked, it is pushed on top of the stack: in the case of an assertion, the immediate goal is to decide whether all the participants accept it; in the case of a question, the immediate goal is to answer it. The Projected Set instead records the default update of the CG following a discourse move; in particular, after an act of assertion the default evolution is the incorporation of the asserted proposition in the CG.

In addition to these ‘shared’ components, the context also contains, for every participant $x$, an individual discourse commitment set ($\text{DC}_{x,i}$), consisting of those propositions that $x$ has publicly committed herself to, but which have not been accepted by the other participants. The total discourse commitments of $x$ at index $i$ consists of the set of individual commitments of $x$ plus the propositions of the Common Ground ($\text{DC}_{x,i} \cup \text{CG}_i$); the intersection of all these propositions yields a context set relative to participant $x$ ($\text{CS}_{x,i}$).

When a speaker $s$ asserts a proposition $p$ at index $i$, several distinct components are updated:

(i) $p$ is added to the speaker’s discourse commitments ($\text{DC}_{s,i} \cup \{p\}$);

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27 Cf. e.g. Gunlsogson (2003) and Ginzburg (2012, ch. 1).

28 The Table is a generalization of Roberts’s (1998) QUD stack.

29 The Projected Set may record more than one potential evolution of the CG; we are simplifying somewhat Farkas & Bruce’s analysis.
(ii) \{p\} (together with the declarative sentence that conveys it) is pushed on the Table, and thus becomes the current conversational goal;

(iii) in the Projected Set, we project a CG to which \( p \) is added. However, \( CG_i \) is updated by \( p \) only after all the participants have confirmed the assertion.\(^{30}\)

More explicitly, the assertion move and its effects on the context are defined as follows. Let \( K_i \) be the input context, \( K_o \) the output context following the relevant assertion; let \( a \) be the author of the assertion, \( b \) another discourse participant; let the denotation of the asserted declarative sentence \( S[D] \) be the singleton set containing the proposition denoted by its sentence radical, \( \{p\} \); let \( push(e, T) \) be the stack obtained by adding item \( e \) on top of stack \( T \); let \( ps_i \) be the projected set containing the future projections of the CG:

\[
\text{Assertion operator: } A(S[D], a, K_i) = K_o \\
\text{such that:}
\]

(i) \( DC_{a,o} = DC_{a,i} \cup \{p\} \);

(ii) \( T_o = push(\langle S[D], \{p\} \rangle, T_i) \);

(iii) \( ps_o = ps_i \cup \{p\} \) (\( p \) is added by union to all the elements contained in the projected set \( ps_i \), yielding a set of projected CGs).

(Farkas & Bruce 2010, (9))

\[
\text{Assertion Confirmation:}
\]

a. Input context conditions:

(i) \( \text{top}(T_i) = \langle S[D]; \{p\} \rangle \)

(ii) \( p \) in \( DC_{a,i} \)

b. Change: \( AC(b, K_o) = K_o \) where \( DC_{b,o} = DC_{b,i} \cup \{p\} \)

(Farkas & Bruce 2010, (16))

\[
\text{Common Ground increasing operation}
\]

If an operator \( M \) contains a change of the form \( DC_{X,o} = DC_{X,i} \cup \{p\} \), and, as a result, \( p \) is now present on the commitment list of each participant in the conversation in \( K_o \), add the following changes to \( M \):

(i) \( CG_o = CG_i \cup \{p\} \);

(ii) \( DC_{X,o} = DC_{X,i} \setminus \{p\} \), for all participants \( X \);

(iii) Pop off of the top of the Table all items that have as an element of their denotation an item \( q \) that is entailed by \( CG_o \).

(Farkas & Bruce 2010, (17))

Crucially, for an assertion of \( p \) to be felicitous, \( p \) cannot be already positively decided in the current context set \( CS_i \) – namely, it cannot be true in all the worlds of \( CS_i \) – because if this were the case, the update effect of the assertion would be vacuous. The proposition cannot be negatively decided in \( CS_i \) either, because in that case the speaker would be making an assertion that is inconsistent with \( CG_o \), and the update effect of her move would lead to an empty \( CS_i \).\(^{31}\)

Therefore, the asserted

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\(^{30}\) Assertion confirmation is a default move, and it may remain tacit.

\(^{31}\) This is just Stalnaker’s (1978) Condition I on assertion.
propagation must be *undecided* with respect the current $C_{Si}$.

In this way, Farkas & Bruce’s componential system allows us to model an intermediate stage of the conversation in which an asserted proposition is on the Table, but is still undecided in $C_{Si}$. This provides us with a suitable modal base to properly interpret the mirative import (18):

(38) For a sentence hosting MF which is asserted at $i$, the modal base w.r.t. which likelihood is calculated is the context set $C_{Si}$, as defined by the conversational common ground $CG_i$ at the moment of utterance $i$, prior to acceptance of the assertion.

Since the expressed proposition $p$ is undecided in $C_{Si}$, it is possible that some distinct focus alternative is more likely than $p$ (with respect to a stereotypical ordering source, to be discussed below). Recall also that MF can appear in yes-no questions (cf. examples (7)/(23) and (28)). In Farkas & Bruce’s analysis, yes-no questions introduce on the Table the polar set consisting of the proposition $p$ denoted by the sentence radical and its complement \{$p, \neg p$\}; crucially, at the point where the question is asked, neither $p$ nor $\neg p$ are in the current $CG_i$: since $p$ is undecided in $C_{Si}$, $CS_i$ constitutes a suitable modal base in this case as well.

(38) provides a natural and conceptually economical solution to the problem of the modal base, but note that it implies a radical shift of perspective: it defines the mirative import not with respect to the speaker’s individual beliefs (or commitments), but rather, with respect to the shared commitments of the conversational community.

5.3. The evaluative components

Let us now consider the second modal parameter that is required to interpret the mirative import, namely the stereotypical ordering source. Here too, there are empirical reasons to question a purely speaker-centred view.

Consider a slight modification of our earlier scenario (§5.1): Mary has to pass an exam where the maximum score is thirty with distinction. The speaker’s expectations diverge from those of her interlocutor: the speaker expects that Mary will get the top score, whereas her interlocutor believes that Mary will get a lower score, around 27-28. Later on, the speaker triumphantly reports to her interlocutor the fact that Mary obtained the top score in the following way:

(39)  
Lo dico io: trenta e lode le hanno dato!
   it.cl.said.1SG thirty cum laude her.cl have.3PL given
   ‘What did I say? She got thirty with distinction!’

Here, MF is felicitous even though it is the hearer’s expectations that are violated, rather than the speaker’s. This shows that the ordering source is not necessarily anchored to the speaker. On the other hand, (40) below would be a felicitous assertion in a context where all the participants
expected Mary with some certainty to get 29, e.g. because she failed exactly one question out of thirty:

\[(40)\quad \text{Che strano: trenta e lode le hanno dato!} \]
\[
\quad \text{how strange: thirty cum laude her have.3pl given}
\quad \text{‘How strange: she got thirty with distinction!’}
\]

Thus, the mirative import can also be interpreted with respect to the shared expectations of the whole conversational community.

These observations suggest that the discourse context makes available a variety of ordering sources. In the unmarked case, the discourse participants will share the same ordering source; however, they may also happen to have in mind partially different ordering sources, as in (39). Consider also example (25), repeated here as (41):

\[(41)\quad \text{A: Pensà tu: un anello di diamanti le ha regalato!} \]
\[
\quad \text{think you A diamond ring to-her.CL has given}
\quad \text{‘Just think about it! He gave her a diamond ring!’}
\]

\[
\text{B: Non c’è niente di strano.}
\quad \text{Not there’s nothing of strange}
\quad \text{‘There’s nothing strange about that.’}
\]

Here, speaker B rejects the mirative import of A’s assertion (while accepting its propositional content). Such a rejection may be due to the fact that the stereotypical ordering source adopted by the interlocutors is defective in Stalnaker’s sense, i.e., some proposition in the stereotypical ordering source is not shared by speaker A. (For instance, A may asymmetrically lack the information that Mary’s new boyfriend is a millionaire who routinely buys very expensive gifts for his girlfriends.) The conversational dynamics revealed in (41) shows that a communitarian aim also holds with respect to evaluative meaning: an evaluative commitment can be accepted or rejected and, if accepted by all participants, it gives rise to a shared evaluation. Therefore, the discourse context must make available a set of ordering sources, and it must record the evaluative commitments based on these ordering sources.

Recall now that we have argued that in interpreting MF, the modal base ordered by the relevant ordering source is the context set characterized by the common ground at the moment of utterance (38). The ordering source propositions are not true in all the worlds of the context set,\(^{32}\) hence by definition they are not included in the common ground. On the other hand, we cannot let the ordering source take in input each world of the context set and return for it a potentially different set of propositions, for we want one set of propositions to directly impose an ordering on the context set itself. We therefore conclude that the relevant ordering source must be drawn from an evaluative component of the context which is distinct from the common ground.

\(^{32}\) If they were, the context set would only contain maximally ideal worlds, which is clearly too strong a requirement.
Note also that a discourse situation may involve a plurality of incompatible ordering sources, each one championed by one participant but not shared by the others. One prominent example is public political debates, where each participant adopts her own ordering source and does not expect her opponents to share it, but only to acknowledge it and use it to correctly interpret her evaluations. Thus, the discourse context must also allow indexing an ordering source to a single participant.

Accordingly, we propose an extension of Farkas & Bruce’s structured context which includes, in addition to their informative components, the following evaluative components:

(i) \( O_i \), a set of ordering sources (stereotypical, deontic, bouletic...) shared by the conversational community, which are used to evaluate how close a given proposition is to a publicly shared ideal.\(^3\)

(ii) For each participant \( x \), \( O_{x,i} \) is the set of ordering sources adopted by \( x \) and not shared by the other participants.

These ordering sources allow each participant to express her evaluative commitments and interpret the others’ evaluations. The next question is where the evaluative commitments are stored. It is certainly possible to store them in the common ground (or in the Discourse Commitment sets of an individual participant); however, we believe that this would obscure a fundamental distinction. While the main purpose of an informative commitment is to rule out certain possible worlds (Stalnaker 1978), the purpose of an evaluative commitment is rather to signal the (in)congruence between a described state of affairs and a given ideal. For this reason, we opt for an implementation in which evaluative commitments too are recorded in distinct evaluative components:

(iii) For each participant \( x \), \( EDC_{x,i} \) records any evaluative commitment that has been publicly expressed by \( x \);

(iv) The ETable, records any evaluative commitment that a speaker proposes as a potential joint commitment;

(v) \( ES_i \) (the Evaluative State) records the evaluations that have been accepted by all participants, and have thus become joint evaluative commitments of the conversational community.

When the relevant ordering source is shared (in \( O_i \)), a proposed evaluation may be accepted by the other participants; if it is, it is recorded as a shared evaluation in \( ES_i \), and from that point on, all the participants are committed to it. Alternatively, if the other participants do not adopt the same ordering source, the evaluation cannot become a joint commitment, but it is nevertheless publicly recognized by everyone, and it is recorded in \( EDC_{x,i} \) as a publicly expressed evaluative commitment of participant \( x \).\(^4\)

On these grounds, we can now give a more precise characterization of the mirative import:

\(^3\) The ordering sources themselves may be subject to a certain degree of negotiation: this is rather common, for instance, for teleological sources, which define a shared aim or objective. We leave aside this issue here.

\(^4\) This is similar to “agreeing to disagree” in the informative dimension; cf. again Farkas & Bruce (2010), who build on Gunlogson (2003).
There is at least one distinct alternative proposition which is more likely than the expressed proposition w.r.t. CS\_j and SO(j), with j the moment of utterance, CS\_j the context set at j, SO(j) a stereotypical ordering source drawn from O\_j or O\_x,j, for some participant x.

Update effect: the mirative evaluation (40) is pushed on the ETable\_i, and is recorded in the speaker’s EDC\_i; if accepted by the other participants, it also updates the ES\_i.

Recall that the update effect is independent from the informative update of the CG: the rejection of an assertion, as shown above, does not automatically imply the rejection of the associated mirative import, and vice versa. Our enriched discourse context can model these complex updates, while making explicit the separation of informative and evaluative content.

5.4. Incorporating the illocutionary layer

At this point, we can extend our analysis of MF to incorporate the illocutionary layer. Recall that we argued above that the mirative implicature is introduced by an operator F-IMP\_c below the illocutionary layer: this operator takes in input the proposition denoted by the sentence radical and returns a pair consisting of the same proposition and an evaluative CI-proposition (§4.1).

The illocutive operators of Assertion and Polar Question, then, will take in input such a two-dimensional meaning and produce the parallel update of the informative component and of the evaluative components (this second update will only apply when the CI-content is non-vacuous).

Updating the analysis presented in §4.1., the sentence radical of the yes-no question (28), repeated here as (44), receives the interpretation in (45):

(42) There is at least one distinct alternative proposition which is more likely than the expressed proposition w.r.t. CS\_j and SO(j), with j the moment of utterance, CS\_j the context set at j, SO(j) a stereotypical ordering source drawn from O\_j or O\_x,j, for some participant x.

(43) Update effect: the mirative evaluation (40) is pushed on the ETable\_i, and is recorded in the speaker’s EDC\_i; if accepted by the other participants, it also updates the ES\_i.

Recall that the update effect is independent from the informative update of the CG: the rejection of an assertion, as shown above, does not automatically imply the rejection of the associated mirative import, and vice versa. Our enriched discourse context can model these complex updates, while making explicit the separation of informative and evaluative content.

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Updating the analysis presented in §4.1., the sentence radical of the yes-no question (28), repeated here as (44), receives the interpretation in (45):

(44) Marina hanno invitato?
Marina have.3pt. invited?
‘Did they invite Marina?’

(45) \[
\begin{align*}
&\lambda i. (\text{invite}(a@b, m)) \bullet (\exists p \in \{\mathcal{C}\} (p \text{ is a better possibility than } \\
&\lambda i. (\text{invite}(a@b, m)) \text{ w.r.t. } CS_i \text{ and } SO(j), \text{ with } j \text{ the moment of } \\
&\text{utterance, } CS_i \text{ the context set at } j, SO(j) \text{ a salient stereotypical } \\
&\text{ordering source drawn from } O_i \text{ or } O_{x,j} \text{ (for some participant } x)).
\end{align*}
\]

The Polar Question operator takes in input the complex p\_u \bullet q\_v and produces the separate updates of the informative components (the Table and the Projected Set) and of the evaluative components (the Evaluative Table and the Evaluative Discourse Commitments set relative to the
speaker). We stick here to Farkas & Bruce’s notation, without making explicit the semantic types of the updated context components³⁵

(46) \( \text{PQ}[[x]]^K, K_j = K_{j+1} \) such that

(i) \( T_{j+1} = \text{push}([\chi; \{ \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m)) \}], \neg \{ \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m)) \}, T_j) \)

(ii) \( \text{ps}_{j+1} = \text{ps}_j \cup \{ \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m)) \}, \neg \{ \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m)) \} \)

(iii) \( \text{EDC}_{j+1} = \text{EDC}_j \cup (\exists p \in [C])(p \text{ is a better possibility than } \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m) \text{ w.r.t. CS}_i \text{ and SO})) \)

(iv) \( \text{ET}_{j+1} = \text{push}([\exists p' \in [C]])(p' \text{ is a better possibility than } \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m) \text{ w.r.t. CS}_i \text{ and SO}(j))), \text{ET}) \)

In (46), (i)-(ii) correspond to the informative update (as defined by Farkas & Bruce 2010), and (iii)-(iv) to the update triggered by the evaluative implicature.

A similar analysis can be given for a declarative clause hosting mirative fronting (47):

(47) (Pensa te...) Marina hanno invitato!

(think you) Marina have.3.pl. invited

*(Guess what!)* They invited Marina!

The only difference concerns the update of the truth-conditional components: following again Farkas & Bruce (cf. (35)), in the case of assertion the at-issue proposition becomes a discourse commitment of speaker s (48b,i), and the projected set will only record a default evolution in which this proposition is added to the common ground (48b,iii):

(48) \( a. \{ [[\chi \text{ F-IMP}_1 [\text{Marina}] \text{ [Marina] }}] \text{ [Marina]} \text{ hanno invitato } t ]] \text{ ~C]} \}^0 = \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m)) \bullet (\exists p' \in [C])(p' \text{ is a better possibility than } \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m) \text{ w.r.t. CS}, \text{ and SO}(j))) \)

b. \( \text{Assert} ([\chi])^K = K_{j+1} \) such that

(i) \( \text{DC}_{j+1} = \text{DC}_j \cup \{ \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m)) \}; \)

(ii) \( T_{j+1} = \text{push}([\chi; \{ \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m)) \}], T_j) \)

(iii) \( \text{ps}_{j+1} = \text{ps}_j \cup \{ \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m)) \} \)

(iv) \( \text{EDC}_{j+1} = \text{EDC}_j \cup (\exists p \in [C])p \text{ is a better possibility than } \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m) \text{ w.r.t. CS}, \text{ and SO}(j)) \)

(v) \( \text{ET}_{j+1} = \text{push}([\exists p' \in [C]])(p \text{ is a better possibility than } \lambda i.(\text{invite}(a@b, m) \text{ w.r.t. CS}, \text{ and SO}(j))), \text{ET}) \)

As already stressed, the truth-conditional update (i)-(iii) and the evaluative update (iv)-(v) can be independently accepted or rejected by the interlocutor.

³⁵ Indices j and j+1 indicate two subsequent stages of the conversation, and they identify the ‘input’ and ‘output’ context respectively.
6. Evaluations, expressives, emotions, and personal tastes

In this section we make a slight digression from the analysis of MF in order to explore in more details some issues related to the proposed evaluative dimension.

6.1. Evaluative vs. expressive meaning

A question that we left open in §4 concerns the relationship between our evaluative commitments and the expressive meaning carried by an epithet like *fucking* in (26) above.

We believe that there are some significant differences, which suggest that these two types of CI-meaning cannot be identified. First, the hearer can correctly interpret an emotive expressive even if she does not have any other information about the emotional state expressed by the speaker: the interpretation here involves neither a modal base nor an ordering source. On the contrary, the interpretation of MF requires the hearer to share a modal base and an ordering source with the speaker. Second, emotive expressives are not intended to propose a common evaluation: if the hearer does not share the speaker’s emotional state towards a given entity, the speaker will not try to get her to share it simply by using an epithet like *fucking*. In view of these differences, it seems safer to conceive of Potts’s (2007a,b) expressive meaning as separate from our evaluative meaning.\(^{36}\)

This is not to say that the two types of meaning cannot be intertwined in a single utterance: as a matter of fact, MF structures are quite hospitable towards emotive expressives, as shown in (49):

(49) Pensa tu: *con quell'oca di Mariangela si è messo!*

   think you with that goose of Mariangela self.Cl is put
   ‘Guess what! He's dating that silly goose of Mariangela’

We believe that this is because instances of MF like (49) actually involve a bouletic ordering source, rather than a stereotypical one, and indicate the speaker’s approval or disappointment at the state of affairs described (cf. above the discussion around (21)). A bouletic evaluation (either positive or negative) is very naturally associated to the expression of a heightened emotional state (correspondingly positive or negative); we suspect that this is the main reason why there is a prevailing tendency to conceive of MF as expressing a speaker attitude. In our view, the evaluation proper can coexist with the immediacy of a heightened emotional state, but should not be identified with it.

6.2. Other instances of evaluative meaning

\(^{36}\) In turn, both are separate from the truth-conditional layer.
A wider issue, which we can only begin to explore, is which other linguistic expressions or structures, besides MF, trigger an update of the evaluative components of the context.

One plausible candidate is the sentence adverb *normally*. According to Portner (2009, 99 ff.), a proposition introduced by this adverb modifies an expectation pattern, i.e. an ordering of possible worlds according to relative normalcy; in our terms, an assertion of *normally p* (at i) would update the stereotypical ordering source shared by the conversational community (in O); if this update is accepted, the modified ordering source will yield a different ordering of the possible worlds of the context set.

Another likely candidate is modal statements. Quite independently of our proposal, it has been argued that at least certain modals convey some kind of non-truth conditional meaning.\(^{37}\) Consider for instance an assertion of (50), containing a root modal:

(50) You must be back by midnight.

According to the standard view, (50) will update the CS by throwing out the possible worlds in which the addressee does not have an obligation to be back by midnight; this is the relevant interpretation in cases where (48) is uttered to remind the addressee of the obligation.

However, (50) can also be uttered *performatively* with the effect of establishing the obligation (cf. Portner 2009, § 4.3.3). This performative use can be captured directly if the modal base is identified with the context set CS: the assertion of (50) will then convey that within the context set, all the worlds that are closest to a relevant deontic ideal are worlds in which the addressee comes back home by midnight.\(^{38}\) If the addressee accepts such a performative assertion, she accepts not only that there exists an obligation, but also that her coming back by midnight holds in all the maximally ideal worlds of the context set. In fact, a typical reaction to a performative assertion of (50) is a reply like *That’s ridiculous!*: what is considered ridiculous by the speaker is not the fact that there is an obligation, but rather, the evaluation that her coming back by midnight is a maximally ideal states of affairs. This reaction looks like a refusal in the evaluative dimension, not in the informative dimension: as a matter of fact, it would be an infelicitous reply to a ‘reminder’ assertion of (50) issued by a speaker who had not previously imposed the obligation. Thus, the performative use of modals may be seen as updating the evaluative components.

One problem that we have to leave open is the relationship between our evaluative implicatures and the so called ‘predicates of personal taste’

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37 In particular, epistemic modals would convey an evidential import: see Portner (2009, 167 ff.) and Hacquard (2011, §6.2) for general discussion and references; and also §7 below.

38 On Portner’s (2009, 194 ff.) view (based on Ninan 2005), the performative component consists in adding the expressed proposition (or property) to the addressee’s To-do List, which then imposes an ordering on the worlds of the context set (much like the stereotypical ordering source in our analysis of MF).
(see Lasersohn 2005, Stephenson 2007, Moltmann 2010, Pearson 2012): a lexical predicate like surprising, which conveys a surprise import, seems to be a predicate of personal taste. The approaches by Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2007) emphasize the perspective-dependence of such predicates, and the fact that they give rise to ‘faultless disagreement’, whereas Moltmann’s and Pearson’s approaches emphasize their inherent genericity, and relate it to a first person-oriented interpretation. None of these proposals invokes a public ordering source, which is the hallmark of evaluative meaning in our sense. We leave this problem for future research.

7. Mirativity in a wider perspective

Our account of mirative fronting relies on two basic claims: firstly, its mirative import is encoded in a layer which is the immediately lower than the illocutionary layer; secondly, it is intrinsically dependent on a focus structure. These two claims are not shared by other recent analyses of mirative phenomena, hence they seem to be at odds with an attempt at giving a unified analysis of mirativity.

As for the first point, the (co-)existence of different semantic analyses which encode the mirative import either at the illocutionary level or below it is not as problematic as it may seem at first sight, in light of the fact that a similar distinction characterizes the literature on evidentials. Indeed, depending on the relationship with epistemic modality, two types of evidential have been identified, which have in turn inspired two different kinds of analysis (cf. Murray 2010: Ch.3): (i) illocutionary evidentials, as in Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2002, 2006), and (ii) epistemic evidentials, as in German (Faller 2006) and St’át’ímcts (Matthewson et al. 2008), which have been interpreted as epistemic modals with an evidential presupposition restricting the modal base. The first analysis generally acknowledges that evidentiality is a category distinct from epistemicity, even though a certain degree of overlapping is admitted in the subfield of inferential evidentiality, which might be interpreted as a type of epistemic modality (Faller 2002; cf. also Dendale & Tasmowski 2001; Plungian 2001). On the contrary, the second type of analysis tends to assume that the two categories of evidentiality and epistemicity cannot be entirely distinct (cf. in particular Matthewson et al. 2008).

In light of this, it is perhaps less surprising that in different cases, the mirative import can be introduced directly by an illocutionary operator (Grosz 2011; Rett 2011; Rett & Murray 2013) or as a conventional implicature at a lower level, as proposed here (and in Frey 2010).

Pursuing further the parallelism with controversies concerning evidentiality, it is also worth emphasizing that languages differ with respect

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39 “To say that the cake is tasty is to say that the cake is tasty to every (contextually restricted) individual with whom I identify. The identify with relation is intended to model a notion of empathy and is therefore reflexive: I always empathize with myself. In normal conversation, we empathize with our interlocutors [...]” (Pearson 2012, §3.3).
to the use of evidentials proper or evidential strategies (Aikhenvald 2004); in a similar way, they may also differ as for the encoding of mirativity, resorting to a range of grammatical devices, strategies and structures, which are yet to be fully explored and described. We have proposed that Italian mirative fronting is one such a structure where the interpretation of mirativity requires a set of focus alternatives: this is meant to explain why in many different languages a mirative flavour arises in connection with the marking of a constituent as narrowly focussed. However, we are not claiming that focus is necessarily involved in all mirative structures and strategies across languages: in other cases, the interpretation could rely on a set of expectations (in the sense of Rett & Murray 2013) which is not related to focus structure in any direct way (see §7.2 for more discussion of Rett & Murray’s proposal).

Despite these parallelisms between the two domains, we ultimately remain agnostic as to the relationship between mirativity and evidentiality. Several studies have highlighted that indirect evidentials may have a mirative function or overtone (DeLancey 1997, Lazard 1999, 2001, Aikhenvald 2004, Peterson 2010, Rett & Murray 2013); however, according to DeLancey (1997, 2001) and Aikhenvald (2004), the two grammatical categories must be viewed as distinct: while evidentials signal the source of information, mirativity marks surprise as a result of unexpected information irrespective of the source. Once again, it is quite conceivable – at least at the present stage of understanding – that mirativity overlaps with evidentiality in some languages or structures, but not in others: in the same way as there are evidential systems that do not express mirativity, there are also mirative systems that do not express evidentiality (Aikhenvald 2004: 195).

As for our case study, Italian mirative fronting does not present evidential readings and it is unrelated to evidential strategies marking the source of information or the way knowledge has been acquired. Note that Italian does not possess a grammatical system of evidential markers, but only evidential extensions of non-evidential categories: the future and imperfect indicative and the conditional, as well as the modal ‘dovere + infinitive’ construction, have developed semantic extensions or overtones that may be related to the evaluation or indication of the information source, similar to inferential evidentials (see e.g. Squartini 2008, 2010). Crucially, however, none of these strategies expresses mirativity, and none of them is necessarily associated with mirative fronting.

In the following subsections, we compare our proposal with two recent analyses of mirative phenomena; this comparison will allow us to further clarify the reason for our analytical choices.
7.1. Torres Bustamante (2012)

Torres Bustamante (2012) analyses the mirative use of the Imperfect in Spanish generic or stative sentences (cf. also Torres Bustamante 2013):

\[(51) \quad \text{¡Juan fumaba!} \quad \text{(Torres Bustamante 2012, 347, (1))}
\]

\[\text{Juan smoke.PAST.IMP.3SG}
\]

\[\text{¡Juan smokes!}\]

Crucially, with this structure the speaker expresses her surprise at a present state of affairs. The author argues that the past tense conveyed by the Imperfect does not temporally locate the state described in the clause, but rather, it shifts backward the temporal parameter of the doxastic modal base representing the speaker’s beliefs: in this way, surprise is defined with respect to the speaker’s past beliefs up to the discovery time in which she realizes that the actual state of affairs (John’s being a smoker) contradicts her previous beliefs.

Similarly to Grosz (2011), the mirative import of the Spanish Imperfect is defined in terms of the relative likelihood of the asserted proposition \(q\) and one relevant focus alternative (which is constrained to having the same aspectual value as \(q\)). Specifiﬁcally, it is characterized as non-at-issue content conveyed by a CP-level operator \(M\), conveying that the worlds in which the asserted proposition is true are ranked below the worlds in which a distinct focus alternative is true. This operator takes in input a doxastic modal base \(p\) – representing the speaker’s beliefs at a past time, as discussed above – and conveys (a) that the proposition \(q\) expressed by the sentence radical is true in the evaluation world \(w_\oplus\), and (b) that the worlds \(w\) of the modal base in which \(q\) is true are ranked below the worlds \(w'\) in which one salient alternative \(q'\) is true, where \(q'\) is supported by the modal base \(p\):

\[(52) \quad M = \lambda p \lambda q. \exists q': q' \neq q \land C(q') \land p \subseteq q'. [ \forall w' [p \cap q'(w') \land p \cap q(w)] \rightarrow w \leq q(w_\oplus)] \land q(w_\oplus) \quad \text{(Torres Bustamante 2012, 356, (21))}\]

This analysis concurs with our proposal in deﬁning surprise in terms of the relative ranking of the asserted proposition and one focus alternative, but it differs crucially with respect to the treatment of the modal base. Note that the propositional content of (51) is asserted, hence it is part of the speaker’s beliefs at the moment of utterance; thus, the backward shifting of the speaker-anchored doxastic modal base allowed by past tense plays a crucial role in avoiding the kind of ‘mirative paradox’ that we discussed in §5.1 above. Since in mirative fronting there is no obligatory past tense morphology, and any past tense is interpreted as part of the

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40 The author also discusses a mirative use of the Pluperfect in Andean Spanish, which we will not consider here for reasons of space.

41 Note however that, contrary to mirative fronting, here no single constituent bears narrow focus, but the whole clause is in focus (Torres Bustamante 2012, (20)).
propositional content, this account cannot be extended to cover mirative fronting.

7.2. Rett & Murray (2013)

Rett & Murray (2013) analyse the mirative use of the indirect evidential in Cheyenne. Their proposal is couched in Murray’s (2014) framework, which distinguishes three kinds of context update that a sentence conveys: the at-issue proposition, which is introduced in the context as a discourse referent; possibly a non-at-issue restriction, which is directly added to the common ground; and an illocutionary relation, like the proposal to add the at-issue proposition to the common ground. The authors characterize the ambiguity of the Cheyenne mirative evidential in terms of these distinctions: the evidential import proper is part of non-at-issue content, whereas the mirative import is part of the illocutionary relation.

Justification for this difference comes from the observation that, while the indirect evidential undergoes the ‘interrogative flip’ in questions – i.e., it becomes hearer-oriented, rather than speaker-oriented – the mirative evidential does not undergo the interrogative flip, and is in fact unavailable in questions (Rett & Murray 2013, 461, (21)). Notice that in this respect our mirative fronting differs from the Cheyenne evidential, since it is available both in assertions and in yes-no questions, as illustrated in (7)/(23) and in (28); hence, by Rett & Murray’s criterion, mirative fronting should not be characterized as conveying an illocutionary relation. As discussed above, this mismatch is not necessarily problematic, but it may well correspond to a genuine cross-linguistic difference parallel to that observed in the domain of evidentiality.

The authors characterize the import of the Cheyenne mirative evidential as a composite illocutionary relation, simultaneously conveying (a) the proposal to add the at-issue proposition to the common ground and (b) the expression that the at-issue proposition \( p \) was not part of the speaker’s expectations (where the set of expectations consists of propositions that are assigned a prior probability above some standard of credence). Differently from our proposal and Torres Bustamante’s, focus plays no role in defining the contextually salient set of propositions to which the at-issue proposition \( p \) is related.

On the other hand, here too the speaker’s expectations are not defined at the moment of utterance, but they are shifted backwards. The authors identify a recency restriction on mirativity, whereby the event of uttering a mirative sentence with at-issue content \( p \) must belong in the target state of the learning event in which the speaker has learned that \( p \):

“It seems as though a speaker can utter an exclamation like *Bill*
has a new car! at different times to different interlocutors, as long
as \( p \) is relevant and as long as the time of utterance is the first
opportunity the speaker has to express surprise to that interlocutor that \( p \).”
(Rett & Murray 2013, 464; emphasis ours)

In the proposed analysis, the recency restriction is captured by a constraint
to the effect that the at-issue proposition \( p \) was not in the speaker’s set of
expectations \( E \) at the time of the learning event at which the speaker
learned that \( p \). Thus, here too the speaker’s expectations are shifted
backwards to the time of the learning event.\(^3\)

Interestingly, the recency restriction as characterized in the above
quote seems to imply that for a mirative construction to be felicitous in a
context, the at-issue proposition cannot be part of the common ground
presuppositions of the participants: this corresponds to the constraint that
we identified in §5.1 above. In this respect, we believe that our solution to
the ‘mirative paradox’ is a possible alternative to the backward shifting of
a speaker-anchored doxastic modal base. As argued above, the relevant
the modal base for the interpretation of MF is the context set as defined
by the conversational common ground prior to, and independently of, the
acceptance of the clause’s propositional content and its incorporation in
the common ground (both in case of an assertion and of a yes-no
question). At the present stage, we remain agnostic as to what extent our
‘communitarian’ approach could be extended to other mirative
constructions or strategies across languages.

At this point, however, it is time to conclude this digression and
return to the main thread of our discussion.

8. Partial focus fronting?

In §2.1 we have argued, on the basis of the prosodic evidence, that the
fronted constituent in MF qualifies as a narrow focus. But previous
discussions have pointed out a problem concerning the extension of focus
in MF. Consider the exchange in (53):

(53) A: Eccoti qui! Cos’è successo?
  here you are  what is happened
B: Una multa da 500 euro mi sono beccato!
  a fine of 500 euros  me.Cl  am got
‘A: Here you are at last! What happened?
B: I got a fine of 500 euros!’

The focus constituent of a sentence is standardly identified by means of
the question-answer congruence criterion, whereby the focus structure of
an answer is determined by the semantics of the question that it answers:
in Alternative Semantics terms, this criterion requires that the set of focus
alternatives of the answer be a superset of the question denotation (Rooth

\(^3\) See also Rett (2012, §3.1) on exclamatives.
On the pragmatic side, focus in an assertion presupposes that the asserted sentence be congruent to the current Question Under Discussion, namely the question that sets the immediate goal of the discourse (Roberts 1998, (26)); this congruence qualifies the assertion as a relevant discourse move.

In (53), then, the general question ‘What happened?’ requires a broad focus answer, in which the whole clause is in focus. However, fronting targets the direct object only: thus, if the fronted constituent qualifies as the maximal focus of the sentence, question-answer congruence is not satisfied. It is for this reason that structures like (53B) have been dubbed ‘partial focus movement’ (Zimmermann 2007; cf. also Fanselow & Lenertova 2011). To put it differently, the answer (53B) apparently shows the coexistence of two overlapping foci: the broad focus required by question-answer congruence, and the narrow focus on the direct object which supports the mirative implicature.

Notice that the two foci cannot be completely dissociated: a narrow focus constituent fronted by MF cannot cooccur with another constituent narrowly focussed by question-answer congruence:

(54) A: Chi ha aspettato i ragazzi a casa? who has waited-for the boys at home?
B: # Per due ore li ha aspettati Franca! for two hours them.Cl has waited-for Franca
(Intended: A: Who waited for the boys at home?
B: Franca waited for them for two hours!)

This is plausibly due to the fact that the fronted adverbial in B’s reply is part of the background of the answer with respect to question-answer congruence: since it is not included in the background of A’s question, the congruence requirement is not satisfied.

The crucial difference between (53B) and (54B) is that the former involves broad focus for question-answer congruence, and the latter narrow focus on two distinct constituents. We will assume, following Selkirk (2008) and Katz & Selkirk (2011), that ‘broad focus’ is actually not

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44 In Structured Meanings terms, instead, the background of the answer must be parallel to the background of the question, and the alternatives of the focus phrase in the answer must include (or be identical to) the restriction of the wh-phrase in the question (e.g. Krifka 2006, §4.3). For a detailed comparison of the two approaches, see Beaver & Clark (2008, ch. 4) and Krifka (2011b).

45 Beaver & Clark (2008, esp. §2.7) modify Roberts’s congruence requirement in their Focus Principle, according to which some part of a declarative utterance must evoke a set of alternatives containing all the Rooth–Hamblin alternatives of the Current Question. Even under this principle, narrow focus on the fronted direct object in (53B) is not sufficient to evoke alternatives corresponding to the Current Question ‘What happened?’.

46 The judgment is clear-cut if the fronted adverb per due ore is realized with the intonation characterizing MF (i.e. H*L-, cf. §2.1), and the clause-final subject Franca with the nuclear pitch accent associated with narrow (information) focus, i.e. H+L* (see Bocci 2013).
marked by an F-feature. Note in fact that, in alternative semantics terms, when the whole proposition is in focus there is no way to constrain the shape of the proposition-level alternatives. (In structured meaning terms, the background will be empty, and we would have to stipulate a contextually relevant set of alternative propositions including – or identical to – a congruent question: but this is a very counter-intuitive characterization of all-new statements.) In our view, this justifies the hypothesis that so called ‘broad focus’ is actually not a focus at all. This in turn implies that no conflicting focus structures are involved in an all-new sentence featuring mirative fronting, like (53B) above.

9. Concluding remarks and future prospects

To sum up, in this paper we have proposed an analysis of the mirative import which can be associated with the fronting of a focal constituent in Italian: this conveys that the asserted proposition is less likely than at least one distinct focus alternative (cf. Grosz 2011). Following an insight of Zimmermann (2007), we have characterized the mirative import not as a subjective speaker attitude, but rather as an evaluation that is based on a shared modal base (the context set) and an ordering source also shared by (or accessible to) the conversational participants. This has led us to propose that the discourse context comprises, in addition to the usual informative components, dedicated evaluative components which are likewise under the cooperative control of the conversational community, and which allow them to negotiate a shared evaluation.

A yet open question concerns the status of the compositional layers sketched in (30), repeated here as (55):

\[
(55) \text{[ψ illocutionary operator [Δ F-IMP}_C \text{[ψ [XP}_C \ldots t] ~ C]]]
\]

Not everyone would accept the idea that the topmost ‘illocutionary layer’ ψ is included in the syntactic structure (but see Rizzi 1997, Tomioka 2010 and Krifka 2011a for proposals in this direction). Equally controversial would be the hypothesis that the implicature trigger in the immediately lower layer corresponds to a covert element in the syntactic tree. Note however that, if the mirative import had no syntactic incarnation, the only possible trigger for the implicature would be the prosodic marking (cf. §2.1). This would require the interpretation process to apply to a syntactic structure augmented with prosodic information – a not unreasonable assumption, but one that clearly departs from the usual T-model of the generative framework. In this respect, a syntactic implementation would seem to be the most conservative solution.

One straightforward syntactic rendition of (55) is possible in the cartographic framework of Rizzi (1997), in which the compositional layers would be identified with dedicated functional projections: the topmost illocutionary layer would correspond to Rizzi’s Force Phrase; the landing site of the fronted constituent would be the Focus Phrase, and the implicature trigger would correspond to a functional projection
sandwiched in between (see Bianchi, Bocci and Bianchi 2013). However, we are well aware that the choice of implementation is strongly conditioned by one’s general theoretical preferences, e.g. a preference for maximally transparent mapping from the syntactic structure to the compositional interpretation, versus a preference for avoiding covert elements in the syntax. Therefore, we will not commit ourselves to one specific implementation.

Independently of this choice, we believe that we have identified the necessary ingredients of a satisfactory analysis of MF; we also hope that the foregoing discussion has made a clear case for the existence of evaluative implicatures, and for the possibility of incorporating them in a highly structured view of the discourse context.

Appendix: Experimental stimuli

(1a) *Mirative*

[Claudia descrive a Bruno i regali che ha ricevuto per la laurea] ‘Claudia gives Bruno a description of the presents she got for her graduation.’

C.: *Una collana di corniole mi hanno regalato!* a necklace of carnelian me have given

“They gave me *a carnelian necklace!*”

Chi se l’aspettava un regalo così costoso? who REFL it expected a present so expensive

‘Who would have expected such an expensive present?’

(1b) *Corrective*

[Claudia e Bruno parlano dei regali che Maria ha ricevuto per la sua laurea] ‘Claudia and Bruno talk about the presents Maria got for her graduation.’

C.: I suoi genitori le hanno regalato un anello. the her parents her have given a ring

“They presents gave her a ring.’

B: Guarda che ti sbagli! *Una collana di corniole* le hanno regalato! look that you are-wrong a necklace of carnelian her have given

Non un anello! not a ring

‘You are wrong! They gave her a carnelian necklace! Not a ring!

(2a) *Mirative*

[Carla racconta a Beatrice di Paolo e delle conseguenze di una sua nuotata al mare in pieno inverno] ‘Carla tells Beatrice about Paolo and about the consequences of his swimming in the sea in midwinter.’

C.: Pensa un po’… *Una polmonite* si è preso! Però se l’è cercata! think a little a pneumonia REFL is taken but REFL it is sought

‘Guess what! He caught pneumonia! But he asked for it!’
(2b) Corrective
[Lea e Marta parlano di Paolo e della sua assenza dal lavoro per malattia]
‘Lea and Marta talk about Paolo and about his absence at work due to illness.’

L: Pensa un po’… Paolo si è preso una polmonite.
think a little a pneumonia refl is taken but refl it is sought
‘Guess what… He caught pneumonia.’

M: Guarda che ti sbagli! Mi ha chiamato ieri….
look that you are-wrong me has called yesterday
‘You are wrong! He called me yesterday…
Una tonsillite si è preso! Non una polmonite!
a tonsillitis refl is taken not a pneumonia
‘He caught tonsillitis! Not pneumonia!’

(3a) Mirative
[Anna e Beatrice parlano di Lea e Gianni che si sono appena sposati.]
‘Anna and Beatrice talk about Leo and Gianni, who just got married.’

A: E io che pensavo che non avessero nemmeno un soldo!
and I that thought that not have even a cent
‘I thought that they were completely penniless!
Indovina un po’?! Alle Maldive sono andati in viaggio di nozze!
guess a little to-the Maldives are gone in journey of wedding
‘Guess what?! They went to the Maldives on honeymoon.’

(3b) Corrective
[Anna e Beatrice parlano di Lea e Gianni che si sono appena sposati.]
Anna and Beatrice talk about Lea and Gianni, who just got married.

A: Se ho capito bene, sono andati alle isole Vergini.
if have understood well, are gone to-the islands Virgin
‘If I understood correctly, they went to the Virgin Islands.’

B: Ti sbagli! Alle Maldive sono andati in viaggio di nozze!
you are-wrong to-the Maldives are gone in journey of wedding
Non alle isole Vergini. Me l’ha detto il fratello di Gianni.
not to-the islands Virgin me it has said the brother of Gianni
‘You are wrong! They went to the Maldives on honeymoon! Not to
the Virgin Islands. Gianni’s brother told me.’

(4a) Mirative
[Anna racconta a Lisa del nuovo fidanzamento del loro amico Gianni]
‘Anna tells Lisa about their friend Gianni’s new engagement.’

A: Pensa te… anche questa poi….
think you also this then
‘You wouldn’t believe this one too…
Con quell’oca di Mariangela si è messo! Deve aver perso la testa...
with that goose of Mariangela refl is put must have lost the head
‘He’s dating that silly goose of Mariangela! He must have lost his mind!’
(4b) Corrective
[Anna racconta a Lisa del nuovo fidanzamento del loro amico Gianni]
‘Anna tells Lisa about their friend Gianni’s new engagement.’

A: Credo che Gianni si sia messo con Giulia
‘I believe that Gianni is dating Giulia.’

L: No ti sbagli! Con Mariangela si è messo! Non con Giulia.
‘You are wrong! He’s dating Mariangela! Not Giulia!’

(5a) Mirative
[Pietro non è contento di una decisione dei genitori e si lamenta con la sorella.] ‘Pietro is not happy with his parents’ decision and complains about it to his sister.’

P: Ma porca miseria! Marina hanno invitato stasera a cena!
‘Damn it! They invited Marina tonight for dinner!’

Lo sanno benissimo che io non la sopporto!!
‘They do know it I can’t stand her!’

(5b) Corrective
[I genitori di Pietro hanno invitato degli amici a cena. Pietro ne parla con la sorella.] ‘Pietro’s parents invited some friends for dinner. Pietro talks about it with his sister.’

P: Se ho capito bene ci sarà anche Giovanna.
‘If I understood correctly, Giovanna will also be there.’

No ti sbagli! Marina hanno invitato! Non Giovanna!
‘No, you are wrong! They invited Marina! Not Giovanna!’

(6a) Mirative
[Durante un quiz televisivo, un concorrente non riesce a rispondere alla domanda. Commento di un telespettatore a casa] ‘During a quiz show, a contestant is not able to answer a question. A television watcher comments at home:’

A: Ma dai, lo sanno tutti!! Michelangelo l’ha scolpita, la Pietà!!
‘Come on, everybody knows it! Michelangelo sculptured the Pietà!!’

(6b) Corrective
[Dopo un compito in classe di educazione artistica, Andrea discute con il professore] ‘After an Art class test, Andrea talks with the teacher.’
A: A proposito della domanda sul discobolo, io ho risposto Lisippo.

to respect of-the question on-the Discobulus, I have answered Lysippos

‘To the question on the Discobulus, I gave Lysippos as an answer.’

B: No, è sbagliato! Mirone l’ha scolpito! Non Lisippo.

no is wrong Myron it.cl has sculptured not Lysippos

‘No, that’s wrong! Myron sculptured it!’

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